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This paper investigates the impact of aid for trade (AfT) targeted at trade policies on the participation of recipient countries in global value chains (GVCs), and how this impact varies with their prevailing political regimes. In democratic countries, the need for the authorities to account for the interests of various stakeholders (e.g., lobbies, trade unions) can compromise the allocation, use, and effectiveness of AfT. In contrast, less democratic regimes are typically more insulated from political pressures, which may lead to more effective outcomes of aid. At the same time, integration into some complex GVCs requires efficient and democratic institutions, to which these products are sensitive. Employing a sample of 110 countries and data covering 2002-2018, we control for standard determinants of GVC participation, while examining the effect of AfT and the moderating role of the political regime in place. Our estimation addresses the endogeneity of aid through an appropriate instrumentation strategy. Our results suggest that the effect of AfT is mostly positive in autocratic regimes, indicating more effective trade policy reforms. When we account for regional disparities, we find evidence that AfT for trade policy is also impactful in some democratic regimes. This might suggest that the efficacy of AfT is not strictly regime-dependent, but hinges on the government’s commitment to carry out significant reforms leading to greater participation in the global economy.

This paper investigates the impact of aid for trade (AfT) targeted at trade policies on the participation of recipient countries in global value chains (GVCs), and how this impact varies with their prevailing political regimes. In democratic countries, the need for the authorities to account for the interests of various stakeholders (e.g., lobbies, trade unions) can compromise the allocation, use, and effectiveness of AfT. In contrast, less democratic regimes are typically more insulated from political pressures, which may lead to more effective outcomes of aid. At the same time, integration into some complex GVCs requires efficient and democratic institutions, to which these products are sensitive. Employing a sample of 110 countries and data covering 2002-2018, we control for standard determinants of GVC participation, while examining the effect of AfT and the moderating role of the political regime in place. Our estimation addresses the endogeneity of aid through an appropriate instrumentation strategy. Our results suggest that the effect of AfT is mostly positive in autocratic regimes, indicating more effective trade policy reforms. When we account for regional disparities, we find evidence that AfT for trade policy is also impactful in some democratic regimes. This might suggest that the efficacy of AfT is not strictly regime-dependent, but hinges on the government’s commitment to carry out significant reforms leading to greater participation in the global economy.

This paper investigates the impact of aid for trade (AfT) targeted at trade policies on the participation of recipient countries in global value chains (GVCs), and how this impact varies with their prevailing political regimes. In democratic countries, the need for the authorities to account for the interests of various stakeholders (e.g., lobbies, trade unions) can compromise the allocation, use, and effectiveness of AfT. In contrast, less democratic regimes are typically more insulated from political pressures, which may lead to more effective outcomes of aid. At the same time, integration into some complex GVCs requires efficient and democratic institutions, to which these products are sensitive. Employing a sample of 110 countries and data covering 2002-2018, we control for standard determinants of GVC participation, while examining the effect of AfT and the moderating role of the political regime in place. Our estimation addresses the endogeneity of aid through an appropriate instrumentation strategy. Our results suggest that the effect of AfT is mostly positive in autocratic regimes, indicating more effective trade policy reforms. When we account for regional disparities, we find evidence that AfT for trade policy is also impactful in some democratic regimes. This might suggest that the efficacy of AfT is not strictly regime-dependent, but hinges on the government’s commitment to carry out significant reforms leading to greater participation in the global economy.

Many colonies in Africa attained independence through negotiated settlements. However, several others engaged in armed liberation struggles, for example, Kenya, Namibia, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Newly independent states provided liberation movements with bases on their territories and political, military, intellectual, ideological, material, and moral support. In West Africa, Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, a notable pan-Africanist, declared in his Independence Day speech in 1957, “Our independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent.” In East Africa, Julius Nyerere and Jomo Kenyatta, the first presidents of independent Tanzania and Kenya respectively, showed similar commitment to Pan-Africanism and anticolonialism by hosting refugees fleeing armed struggles in Southern Africa. Tanzania hosted the Organization of African Unity Liberation Committee supported anticolonial resistance and liberation movements. President Nyerere supported them for “challenging injustices of empire and apartheid” and declared, “I train freedom fighters”. He encouraged Tanzanians living around liberation movement camps to welcome these movements and their freedom fighters and also protect them from agents of colonial governments. Support also came from many other countries on the continent including Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Algeria. The latter provided sanctuary to representatives of liberation movements such as Nelson Mandela of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa.

Many colonies in Africa attained independence through negotiated settlements. However, several others engaged in armed liberation struggles, for example, Kenya, Namibia, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Newly independent states provided liberation movements with bases on their territories and political, military, intellectual, ideological, material, and moral support. In West Africa, Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, a notable pan-Africanist, declared in his Independence Day speech in 1957, “Our independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent.” In East Africa, Julius Nyerere and Jomo Kenyatta, the first presidents of independent Tanzania and Kenya respectively, showed similar commitment to Pan-Africanism and anticolonialism by hosting refugees fleeing armed struggles in Southern Africa. Tanzania hosted the Organization of African Unity Liberation Committee supported anticolonial resistance and liberation movements. President Nyerere supported them for “challenging injustices of empire and apartheid” and declared, “I train freedom fighters”. He encouraged Tanzanians living around liberation movement camps to welcome these movements and their freedom fighters and also protect them from agents of colonial governments. Support also came from many other countries on the continent including Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Algeria. The latter provided sanctuary to representatives of liberation movements such as Nelson Mandela of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa.

Many colonies in Africa attained independence through negotiated settlements. However, several others engaged in armed liberation struggles, for example, Kenya, Namibia, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Newly independent states provided liberation movements with bases on their territories and political, military, intellectual, ideological, material, and moral support. In West Africa, Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, a notable pan-Africanist, declared in his Independence Day speech in 1957, “Our independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent.” In East Africa, Julius Nyerere and Jomo Kenyatta, the first presidents of independent Tanzania and Kenya respectively, showed similar commitment to Pan-Africanism and anticolonialism by hosting refugees fleeing armed struggles in Southern Africa. Tanzania hosted the Organization of African Unity Liberation Committee supported anticolonial resistance and liberation movements. President Nyerere supported them for “challenging injustices of empire and apartheid” and declared, “I train freedom fighters”. He encouraged Tanzanians living around liberation movement camps to welcome these movements and their freedom fighters and also protect them from agents of colonial governments. Support also came from many other countries on the continent including Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Algeria. The latter provided sanctuary to representatives of liberation movements such as Nelson Mandela of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa.

- Agenda / Roumanie, Région parisienne

This paper examines the renegotiation of social contracts, using the example of Colombia’s phase-out process for fossil fuel subsidies that provides empirical evidence for broad reforms of state–society agreements. While calls for new social contracts increasingly highlight the need to integrate ecological sustainability and address systemic inequalities, few studies explore how such transitions unfold in practice. Drawing on interviews with 43 experts from government, academia, civil society, and the private sector, the paper analyses Colombia’s efforts to remove gasoline and diesel subsidies under President Petro’s reform agenda. The findings reveal four central obstacles: the political cost of reform, structural dependencies in the transport sector, limited state capacity, and the absence of long-term policy continuity. We find that creating a new social contract requires broad support by a range of stakeholders and a clear vision for the new agreement, which is supported across ideological camps. The Colombian government offered an incoherentversion of a green growth social contract, which relied on reforming the existing structures with novel technologies. In contrast to government participants, the interviewees from society, academia and the private sector in Colombia seem to dismiss the plans of the government as unrealistic, as they do not address the deep-rooted challenges within the transport sector and lacks a clear pathway. The Colombian reform process highlights the contested nature of renegotiating social contracts, illustrating the challenges of aligning societal expectations with government visions.

This paper examines the renegotiation of social contracts, using the example of Colombia’s phase-out process for fossil fuel subsidies that provides empirical evidence for broad reforms of state–society agreements. While calls for new social contracts increasingly highlight the need to integrate ecological sustainability and address systemic inequalities, few studies explore how such transitions unfold in practice. Drawing on interviews with 43 experts from government, academia, civil society, and the private sector, the paper analyses Colombia’s efforts to remove gasoline and diesel subsidies under President Petro’s reform agenda. The findings reveal four central obstacles: the political cost of reform, structural dependencies in the transport sector, limited state capacity, and the absence of long-term policy continuity. We find that creating a new social contract requires broad support by a range of stakeholders and a clear vision for the new agreement, which is supported across ideological camps. The Colombian government offered an incoherentversion of a green growth social contract, which relied on reforming the existing structures with novel technologies. In contrast to government participants, the interviewees from society, academia and the private sector in Colombia seem to dismiss the plans of the government as unrealistic, as they do not address the deep-rooted challenges within the transport sector and lacks a clear pathway. The Colombian reform process highlights the contested nature of renegotiating social contracts, illustrating the challenges of aligning societal expectations with government visions.

This paper examines the renegotiation of social contracts, using the example of Colombia’s phase-out process for fossil fuel subsidies that provides empirical evidence for broad reforms of state–society agreements. While calls for new social contracts increasingly highlight the need to integrate ecological sustainability and address systemic inequalities, few studies explore how such transitions unfold in practice. Drawing on interviews with 43 experts from government, academia, civil society, and the private sector, the paper analyses Colombia’s efforts to remove gasoline and diesel subsidies under President Petro’s reform agenda. The findings reveal four central obstacles: the political cost of reform, structural dependencies in the transport sector, limited state capacity, and the absence of long-term policy continuity. We find that creating a new social contract requires broad support by a range of stakeholders and a clear vision for the new agreement, which is supported across ideological camps. The Colombian government offered an incoherentversion of a green growth social contract, which relied on reforming the existing structures with novel technologies. In contrast to government participants, the interviewees from society, academia and the private sector in Colombia seem to dismiss the plans of the government as unrealistic, as they do not address the deep-rooted challenges within the transport sector and lacks a clear pathway. The Colombian reform process highlights the contested nature of renegotiating social contracts, illustrating the challenges of aligning societal expectations with government visions.

- Agenda / Albanie, France - Régions

- Agenda / Albanie, France - Régions

Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the alignment of certain third countries with Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/2286 of 12 October 2026 amending Decision (CFSP) 2018/1544 concerning restrictive measures against the proliferation and use of chemical weapons.

Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the alignment of certain third countries with Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/2283 of 12 October 2026 amending Decision (CFSP) 2016/849 concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the alignment of certain third countries with Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/2397 of 26 October 2026 amending Decision 2010/573/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against the leadership of the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova.

Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the alignment of certain third countries with Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/2378 of 26 October 2026 amending Decision (CFSP) 2016/1693 concerning restrictive measures against ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaeda and persons, groups, undertakings and entities associated with them.

Statement on today's meeting in Abu Dhabi between the EU, France, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom, Ukraine, United States and NATO

Main agenda items, approximate timing and press opportunities.

The Council extended the mandate of the EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine until 15 November 2028.

The Council approved conclusions reaffirming the EU’s commitment to principled humanitarian action, stronger protection of civilians and more effective action amid growing global humanitarian needs.