Biztonságpolitika

Avec un salaire minimum équivalent à 420 euros, la Macédoine du Nord est le pays qui a les plus faibles revenus dans les Balkans après le Kosovo. Malgré la croissance économique, le gouvernement s'oppose à une hausse significative des salaires, tandis que le coût de la vie continue d'augmenter.

- Articles / Courrier des Balkans, Macédoine du Nord, Economie, Société, Une - Diaporama, Une - Diaporama - En premier

La police albanaise a démantelé un vaste réseau de centres d'appel frauduleux, qui aurait extorqué des millions d'euros dans plusieurs pays d'Europe, aux Canada et aux Etats-Unis, confirmant que l'Albanie est bien devenue une plaque tournante de la fraude mondiale.

- Le fil de l'Info / Courrier des Balkans, Albanie, Défense, police et justice, Une - Diaporama

Die Gäste des argentinischen Traditionsklubs Racing Club haben es schwer. Um von der Kabine aufs Spielfeld zu gelangen, müssen sich durch ein Treppen-Labyrinth mit einem Gang von 125 Metern kämpfen. Der Zustand lässt auch zu Wünschen übrig ...

8. Oktober 1936 – † 4. April 2026 , Prof. Dr. Richard Hauser ist Anfang April im Alter von 89 Jahren verstorben. Mit ihm verliert die Längsschnittstudie SOEP einen ihrer Gründungsväter, langjährigen Förderer und stets verlässlichen Unterstützer. Richard Hauser hat das SOEP in den frühen 1980er Jahren gemeinsam mit seinen Kolleginnen ...

Es ist der Moment, auf den alle gewartet haben. Die Crew der Artemis 2-Mission ist von ihrer Reise um den Mond erfolgreich auf die Erde zurückgekehrt. Nach der Landung vor der US-Westküste öffnen US-Taucher die Luke zur Orion-Kapsel.

In Ireland, lorry drivers, farmers and taxi and bus companies have staged major protests in recent days against rising petrol and diesel prices. On Sunday protesters used their vehicles to block streets in and around Dublin and there were skirmishes with the police. The events draw criticism in the Irish press.

US Vice President JD Vance tried to drum up support for Viktor Orbán at a campaign rally – which did the veteran prime minister no favours at all. Commentators are now speculating that it was precisely Vance's intervention that led to Orbán's crushing defeat and cite further examples of failed initiatives by Trump's second-in-command.

Zum dritten Mal in fünf Jahren muss Ajoie nicht um den Ligaerhalt kämpfen. Die Diskussion ist offen und schonungslos: Zu viele Teams, keine echten Konsequenzen und eine fehlende Leistungskultur in der National League. Wird es endlich Konsequenzen geben?

Am Gässeliweg in Au fanden Einsatzkräfte am Donnerstag vier Personen mit teils schweren Verletzungen. Rettungskräfte und Rega brachten die Opfer ins Spital. Ermittlungen laufen.

André Pfister will von Zürich nach Venedig fliegen – doch die Swiss will seinen elektrischen Rollstuhl nicht transportieren. Aus der Reise wird ein Streit mit der Airline.

Wer exzessiv trainiere, bewege sich auf einem schmalen Grat zwischen Ehrgeiz und Zwang, sagt Flora Colledge, Profi-Triathletin und Wissenschaftlerin. Sie kennt typische Anzeichen für Sportsucht und weiss, inwiefern das Verlangen nach Bewegung anderen Süchten gleicht.

Mit dem Raval enthüllt Seat-Tochter Cupra als erste Marke des VW-Konzerns ihren Mini-Stromer auf der MEB+-Plattform und will sich von den Technikbrüdern VW ID. Polo und Skoda Epiq abheben. Gelingt dies?

El kell dönteni, hogy mi a fontos és mi a nem fontos, és persze el kell dönteni, hogy mi mennyire fontos. Ideális esetben a védelmi szféra a szuverén nemzeti létezés - rosszabb esetben az arra irányuló remény - alapvető intézményrendszere. Állapota annak tükre. Következésképp sem szolgalelkűségnek-önfeladásnak, sem öncélnak-kisajátításnak nem a terepe ugye.

Addig is, ha nem vagy képes háborúzni, keresd a békét.

Zord

Abstract

The relationship between attack and defense has long been a central problem in military theory and strategic studies. From Carl von Clausewitz’s claim that defense constitutes the stronger form of war to modern realist analyses of the offense–defense balance, scholars have sought to explain why wars begin, how they evolve, and why they so often persist longer than expected (Clausewitz, 1832/1976; Van Evera, 1998). This article examines the interaction between offensive and defensive forms of warfare through a theoretically grounded and historically informed framework. Drawing on offense–defense theory and the security dilemma, the study analyzes how military technology, doctrine, and political incentives shape strategic behavior (Jervis, 1978; Glaser & Kaufmann, 1998). Using closed historical cases—most notably the First World War and the evolution of military doctrine in the interwar and Cold War periods—the article argues that technological change rarely abolishes the structural advantages of defense (Lieber, 2000). Instead, successive innovations tend to reinforce defensive denial and resilience while preserving political incentives for offensive action. This enduring tension helps explain the prevalence of long wars, miscalculated military strategies, and persistent security dilemmas in international politics (Nilsson, 2012).

1. Introduction
The tension between attack and defense lies at the heart of warfare. Political leaders and military institutions have historically favored offensive action, associating it with initiative, decisiveness, and strategic success (Snyder, 1984; Van Evera, 1998). Defense, by contrast, is often framed as a secondary or reactive posture. Despite this preference, historical experience repeatedly demonstrates that defense is frequently more effective and sustainable than anticipated by those who initiate wars. Conflicts launched with expectations of rapid victory often devolve into prolonged struggles of attrition (Nilsson, 2012).

2. Clausewitz and the Primacy of Defense
Carl von Clausewitz argued that defense is the stronger form of warfare because it benefits from time, terrain, preparation, and moral advantage (Clausewitz, 1832/1976). Defensive forces can exploit interior lines and compel attackers to expend resources under conditions of uncertainty and friction. Clausewitz nevertheless emphasized that defense alone cannot secure political objectives; decision ultimately requires an offensive transition, underscoring the paradox at the heart of war (Posen, 1984).

3. Offense–Defense Theory and the Security Dilemma
Offense–defense theory formalizes the Clausewitzian insight within international relations. It asks whether conquest is easier than defense and how this balance shapes state behavior (Glaser & Kaufmann, 1998). When offense is believed to dominate, states are more likely to adopt aggressive strategies and consider preventive war. When defense is perceived as dominant, restraint and cooperation become more plausible. Misperceptions, however, frequently distort this balance, intensifying the security dilemma (Jervis, 1978; Van Evera, 1998).

4. The First World War: The Failure of the Offensive
The First World War illustrates the catastrophic consequences of misjudging the offense–defense balance. European militaries entered the war with doctrines emphasizing speed and decisive battle, rooted in the ideology of the offensive (Snyder, 1984). Industrial firepower fundamentally shifted advantages toward defense. Trench systems, machine guns, and artillery rendered frontal assaults prohibitively costly, producing prolonged attrition rather than decisive victory (Van Evera, 1998).

5. Doctrine and Technology Between the Wars
The interwar period witnessed divergent responses to defensive dominance. Some militaries sought to restore maneuver through combined arms and concentration, while others invested in deep defensive fortifications. These approaches reflected different interpretations of the same historical lesson: defense had proved dominant, but political and strategic imperatives prevented its full acceptance (Posen, 1984).

6. Nuclear Weapons and Strategic Defense
The nuclear age transformed the offense–defense relationship at the strategic level. Second-strike capability imposed extreme defensive dominance by ensuring that no attack could escape devastating retaliation, producing a condition of deterrent stability (Waltz, 1979). Nuclear weapons thus reinforced defense at the strategic level, even as states preserved offensive capabilities (Lieber, 2000).

7. Why Offensive Beliefs Persist
Offensive doctrines persist because they promise initiative, control, and decisive results. Political incentives reward action over restraint, while military organizations often privilege aggressive concepts. Historical memory highlights rare offensive successes while neglecting numerous failures, reinforcing systematic underestimation of defensive resilience (Fearon, 1995; Snyder, 1984).

8. Conclusion
The relationship between attack and defense is characterized by enduring asymmetry. Across historical periods, defense has demonstrated structural advantages, while offense remains politically compelling. This tension explains the persistence of long wars and repeated strategic miscalculations. Understanding the enduring strength of defense is therefore essential for realistic strategy and sustainable security policy in international politics (Clausewitz, 1832/1976; Jervis, 1978; Nilsson, 2012).

References

Clausewitz, C. von. (1976). On war (M. Howard & P. Paret, Trans.). Princeton University Press.
(Original work published 1832)

Fearon, J. D. (1995). Rationalist explanations for war. International Organization, 49(3), 379–414.
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300033324

Glaser, C. L. (1997). The security dilemma revisited. World Politics, 50(1), 171–201.
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887100014720

Glaser, C. L., & Kaufmann, C. (1998). What is the offense–defense balance and can we measure it? International Security, 22(4), 44–82.
https://doi.org/10.2307/2539240

Jervis, R. (1978). Cooperation under the security dilemma. World Politics, 30(2), 167–214.
https://doi.org/10.2307/2009958

Levy, J. S. (1984). The offensive/defensive balance of military technology: A theoretical and historical analysis. International Studies Quarterly, 28(2), 219–238.
https://doi.org/10.2307/2600696

Lieber, K. A. (2000). Grasping the technological peace: The offense–defense balance and international security. International Security, 25(1), 71–104.
https://doi.org/10.1162/016228800560390

Nilsson, M. (2012). Offense–defense balance, war duration, and the security dilemma. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 56(3), 467–489.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002712438350

Posen, B. R. (1984). The sources of military doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the world wars. Cornell University Press.

Snyder, J. (1984). The ideology of the offensive: Military decision making and the disasters of 1914. Cornell University Press.

Van Evera, S. (1998). Offense, defense, and the causes of war. International Security, 22(4), 5–43.
https://doi.org/10.2307/2539239

Waltz, K. N. (1979). Theory of international politics. McGraw‑Hill.

 

A The Relationship Between Attack and Defense in Warfare Theoretical Foundations and Historical Lessons bejegyzés először Biztonságpolitika-én jelent meg.

Für Thomas Minder erfolgen die Selektionen viel zu früh, er stellt Gymiprüfungen grundsätzlich infrage.