Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Gesellschaftlicher Zusammenhalt ist Voraussetzung für die Bewältigung der Umwelt-, Sicherheits- und  transformationsherausforderungen des 21. Jahrhunderts. Der WBGU empfiehlt daher, gesellschaftliche, wirtschaftliche und politische Teilhabe strukturell zu stärken, Bildungsfinanzierung als Zukunftsinvestition auszugestalten, Kommunen handlungsfähiger zu machen und politische Kommunikation auf Zusammenhalt statt Polarisierung auszurichten. So kann demokratische Handlungsfähigkeit gestärkt und Sicherheit umfassender gedacht werden.

Leitautor:innen: Jörg E. Drewes, Anna-Katharina Hornidge, Aletta Bonn, Kai Maaz, Karen Pittel,Hans-Otto Pörtner, Sabine Schlacke, Claudia Traidl-Hoffmann, Joscha Wullweber
Mitautor:innen: Julia Behrens, Mareike Blum, Kerstin Burghaus, Catharina Caspari, Astrid Dähn, Verena Engelhardt, Tallulah Gundelach, Paula Haufe, Magdalena Knabl, Katharina Michael, Alexander Mitranescu, Katharina Molitor, Jürgen Orasche, Marion Schulte zu Berge, Astrid Schulz, Jan Siegmeier, Nikola Tietze

Am morgigen Freitag wird der Bundestag über den von der Koalition beschlossenen Tankrabatt entscheiden. Stefan Bach, Steuerexperte am Deutschen Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin), empfiehlt eine für Geringverdienende und Pendelnde zielgenauere Alternative über den Direktauszahlungsmechanismus.

Der neue Tankrabatt ist kein zielgenaues Instrument zur Entlastung der Bevölkerung, da er nach dem Gießkannenprinzip auch Haushalten mit hohen Einkommen zugutekommt oder Freizeitfahrten fördert. Zugleich wird der notwendige Anreiz zum Energiesparen abgeschwächt. Eine zielgenauere Alternative wäre ein einkommensdifferenziertes Energiegeld. Dieses muss zunächst über den Direktauszahlungsmechanismus an alle ausgezahlt werden. Technisch steht dieser Mechanismus bereit, doch haben bisher nur wenige ihre Kontoverbindung hinterlegt. Aber wenn ein Energiegeld von beispielsweise 200 Euro ausgelobt würde, stiege die Erfassung wohl innerhalb weniger Wochen rasant an. Wer sich nicht registriert, könnte zu Weihnachten einen Gutschein über einen geringeren Betrag per Post erhalten. 

Die weitere Herausforderung liegt in der Differenzierung nach den individuellen Einkommen, damit es zielgenau nur an Geringverdienende geht. Eine Einkommensprüfung bereits bei Auszahlung ist administrativ zu aufwendig, da die Finanzbehörden die aktuellen Einkommen nicht kennen. Stattdessen sollte das pauschal ausgezahlte Energiegeld bei der Einkommensteuererklärung im Folgejahr über einen gesonderten Tarif versteuert werden. Denkbar wäre beispielsweise, dass die unteren 40 Prozent der Einkommensverteilung das Energiegeld vollständig steuerfrei behalten dürfen. Bei mittleren Einkommen würde es mit steigenden Einkommen schrittweise belastet, während es die oberen 40 Prozent vollständig zurückzahlen müssen.

Ein Energiegeld von beispielsweise 200 Euro – als Weihnachtsgeld bis Mitte Dezember an alle ausgezahlt – würde den Staat zunächst mehr als 16 Milliarden Euro kosten. Durch die nachträgliche Einkommensdifferenzierung ließen sich die fiskalischen Kosten jedoch um die Hälfte reduzieren. Das wäre zwar immer noch teurer als der Tankrabatt, aber dafür zielgenau.

Pendelnden könnte man zusätzlich ein Mobilitätsgeld von beispielsweise 3 Cent je Entfernungskilometer zahlen. Das würde zusätzlich 0,8 Milliarden Euro kosten, wenn man es der oberen Einkommenshälfte bei der Einkommensteuer wieder abzieht.

Pressemitteilung der Projektgruppe Gemeinschaftsdiagnose: Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin), ifo Institut – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München e. V. in Kooperation mit dem Österreichischen Institut für Wirt­schaftsforschung (WIFO), Kiel ...

Fossil fuel subsidies are widespread, regressive, and environmentally costly, yet abrupt removal can raise poverty. To identify a practical reform pathway, we evaluate the effectiveness of compensatory policies grounded in existing national social protection systems. We develop a high-resolution global social accounting matrix to quantify how reallocating subsidies through actual social assistance impacts poverty, inequality, and CO2 emissions. Without compensation, reform lowers emissions but increases poverty, especially for low-income households in emerging economies. Redirecting funds via social assistance disproportionately benefits the bottom half and reduces national poverty, particularly under targeted cash transfers or expanded programs where savings are large. However, full revenue recycling is not always desirable: Once vulnerable households are adequately protected, additional recycling can weaken both fiscal and climate gains. We therefore treat full recycling through social assistance as an analytical benchmark rather than a policy prescription and show that partial, targeted recycling, as illustrated by retaining roughly 20% of savings while channeling the remainder through social protection, can still reduce poverty while preserving emissions cuts. Overall, fossil fuel subsidy reform is most effective when social assistance is used to compensate low-income households, not to absorb all fiscal savings, leaving residual revenues available for other public priorities.

 

Fossil fuel subsidies are widespread, regressive, and environmentally costly, yet abrupt removal can raise poverty. To identify a practical reform pathway, we evaluate the effectiveness of compensatory policies grounded in existing national social protection systems. We develop a high-resolution global social accounting matrix to quantify how reallocating subsidies through actual social assistance impacts poverty, inequality, and CO2 emissions. Without compensation, reform lowers emissions but increases poverty, especially for low-income households in emerging economies. Redirecting funds via social assistance disproportionately benefits the bottom half and reduces national poverty, particularly under targeted cash transfers or expanded programs where savings are large. However, full revenue recycling is not always desirable: Once vulnerable households are adequately protected, additional recycling can weaken both fiscal and climate gains. We therefore treat full recycling through social assistance as an analytical benchmark rather than a policy prescription and show that partial, targeted recycling, as illustrated by retaining roughly 20% of savings while channeling the remainder through social protection, can still reduce poverty while preserving emissions cuts. Overall, fossil fuel subsidy reform is most effective when social assistance is used to compensate low-income households, not to absorb all fiscal savings, leaving residual revenues available for other public priorities.

 

Fossil fuel subsidies are widespread, regressive, and environmentally costly, yet abrupt removal can raise poverty. To identify a practical reform pathway, we evaluate the effectiveness of compensatory policies grounded in existing national social protection systems. We develop a high-resolution global social accounting matrix to quantify how reallocating subsidies through actual social assistance impacts poverty, inequality, and CO2 emissions. Without compensation, reform lowers emissions but increases poverty, especially for low-income households in emerging economies. Redirecting funds via social assistance disproportionately benefits the bottom half and reduces national poverty, particularly under targeted cash transfers or expanded programs where savings are large. However, full revenue recycling is not always desirable: Once vulnerable households are adequately protected, additional recycling can weaken both fiscal and climate gains. We therefore treat full recycling through social assistance as an analytical benchmark rather than a policy prescription and show that partial, targeted recycling, as illustrated by retaining roughly 20% of savings while channeling the remainder through social protection, can still reduce poverty while preserving emissions cuts. Overall, fossil fuel subsidy reform is most effective when social assistance is used to compensate low-income households, not to absorb all fiscal savings, leaving residual revenues available for other public priorities.

 

During UN General Assembly High-Level Week, IPI convened the 9th Annual Women, Peace and Leadership Symposium, co-hosted by the Permanent Mission of Spain to the United Nations, the Permanent Mission, of Portugal to the United Nations, the Federal Republic of Somalia, the Republic of Mozambique, the Permanent Mission of Ireland to the United Nations, the Permanent Mission of Denmark to the United Nations, and Global Affairs Canada, and in partnership with Our Secure Future, the Nobel Women’s Initiative, and The Elders. The WPL Symposium brought together policymakers, practitioners, and advocates to examine how the WPS agenda can continue to move forward in an increasingly challenging geopolitical environment.   

H.E. José Manuel Albares, Minister for Foreign Affairs, European Union and Cooperation, Kingdom of Spain and H.E. Lucrecia Peinado, First Lady of the Republic of Guatemala, provided opening remarks. The panel was moderated by IPI’s President and CEO, Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein. Panelists included H.E. Mary Robinson, Former President of Ireland and Representative from The Elders; Ana Isabel Xavier, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of Portugal; Sahana Dharmapuri, Vice President of Our Secure Future and Vice President of the PAX sapiens Foundation; Negina Yari, Founder and Executive Director of Window for Hope (Afghanistan) and Representative from the Nobel Women’s Initiative; and Sarah Hendriks, Director of the Policy, Programme and Intergovernmental Division, UN Women. Following the panel, H.E. Katsuhiko Takahashi, Ambassador for Women, Peace and Security for Japan; Karen Grønlund Rogne, Director for Multilateral Cooperation and Policy, Denmark; Kaavya Asoka, Executive Director of the NGO Working Group on WPS; and Irene Fellin, NATO Secretary General’s Special Representative for WPS, provided interventions from the floor. To conclude the event, H.E. Michael Gort, Deputy Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations and Phoebe Donnelly, Senior Fellow and Head of WPS, IPI provided closing remarks.  

Zeid Al Hussein described the current moment as an “upside-down world” in which conflicts are multiplying, women’s participation in peace processes is shrinking, and funding for women’s organizations is dire. While the data is sobering, speakers highlighted that it is more important than ever to continue pushing forward by increasing coordination and supporting local ownership.  

Key themes which emerged from the discussion:  

• The pushback against women’s rights and gender equality is organized and well financed – The backlash is coordinated and increasingly cross-border, and therefore, the response from WPS advocates should be equally coordinated. 
• Local ownership is non-negotiable – peace cannot only be driven from the top down. It is essential to prioritize, support, and fund grassroots women and civil society actors who are the key drivers of peace.  
• Women’s participation in peace negotiations is falling – Across 55 peace negotiations tracked in the latest UN data, only 5% of participants were women, down from 7% the year before. None of the 13 ceasefires agreed last year named sexual violence as a prohibited act, and none had a substantive reference to women. 
• The international community should stand together with the women and girls of Afghanistan – Negina Yari described the systematic exclusion of Afghan women and girls to be gender apartheid and called for it to be established as a crime under international law. Many speakers emphasized the grave situation in Afghanistan and called for solidarity within the international community to stand with Afghan women and girls so that the Taliban’s actions do not become normalized. 
• The next Secretary General of the UN should be a woman – Many speakers declared that after 80 years, it is past time for the UN to have a woman in the highest position of leadership. Furthermore, it is crucial that the next SG be a champion of human rights and gender equality.  

Sarah Hendriks reminded us that though the most recent data paints a picture which is sobering, it is not one without hope. Similarly, H.E. Robinson described herself as a “prisoner of hope,” reaffirming the central message of the conversation: now is not the time to retreat. Sustaining the WPS agenda will require not only defending past achievements but also building new alliances and approaches capable of responding to today’s political realities. 

The post 9th Annual Women, Peace and Leadership Symposium appeared first on International Peace Institute.

Die Forschungsgruppe Gender Economics ging aus dem Forschungsbereich Gender Studies hervor und untersucht Gender Gaps am Arbeitsmarkt sowie die gleichstellungspolitischen Auswirkungen von Steuer-, Sozial- und Familienpolitik. Die Forschung im Bereich Gender Gaps am Arbeitsmarkt konzentriert sich auf die Unterschiede in den Verdiensten von Frauen und Männern sowie auf die geringe Repräsentation von Frauen in Führungspositionen in der Wirtschaft. Zudem forscht die Gruppe in mehreren Projekten zu den Auswirkungen familienpolitischer Maßnahmen wie z.B. Elterngeld, Kita-Ausbau und Ehegattensplitting in Bezug auf die Erwerbsbeteiligung und Lohnentwicklung von Frauen. Die Forschungsgruppe ist Teil der Abteilung Staat.

Zum nächstmöglichen Zeitpunkt suchen wir für Projektarbeiten einen Wissenschaftlerin (w/m/d) (Für den Zeitraum 1. November 2026 bis 31. Januar 2028, Teilzeit mit 75 % der regulären Arbeitszeit).

Looking back, 2015 was a true “window of opportunity”: Both the 2030 Agenda with its 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) and the Paris Climate Agreement were adopted. The current situation, however, is the opposite of such a moment. The 2026 communiqué from the G7 development ministers makes no mention of the 2030 Agenda, the SDG, or climate change. The U.S. administration under President Trump has succeeded in making even non binding international guiding principles politically taboo.

Looking back, 2015 was a true “window of opportunity”: Both the 2030 Agenda with its 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) and the Paris Climate Agreement were adopted. The current situation, however, is the opposite of such a moment. The 2026 communiqué from the G7 development ministers makes no mention of the 2030 Agenda, the SDG, or climate change. The U.S. administration under President Trump has succeeded in making even non binding international guiding principles politically taboo.

Looking back, 2015 was a true “window of opportunity”: Both the 2030 Agenda with its 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) and the Paris Climate Agreement were adopted. The current situation, however, is the opposite of such a moment. The 2026 communiqué from the G7 development ministers makes no mention of the 2030 Agenda, the SDG, or climate change. The U.S. administration under President Trump has succeeded in making even non binding international guiding principles politically taboo.

DIW-Studie stellt Screening-Verfahren vor, um Wettbewerbsverstöße aufzudecken – Auffällige Aussagen zu Strategie und Wettbewerb in Analystenkonferenzen werden herausgefiltert – Verwenden mehrere Wettbewerber gleichzeitig oder wiederholt dieselben auffälligen Formulierungen, ist das ein Indiz für ...

This paper draws on the 2020/21 Egyptian Industrial Firm Behaviour Survey of 2,383 manufacturing firms to provide the first systematic, firm-level evidence on how Egypt’s industrial policy institutions are experienced by manufacturing firms. Using firms’ own perceptions of institutional obstacles, the analysis distinguishes between ministries (“institutions”) and subordinate ministerial and corporatist bodies (“entities”), and classifies these entities into capability-building bodies, regulatory gatekeepers, and quasi-public corporatist bodies. This framework allows the identification of systematic differences in firms’ perceptions across types of institutions and entities, as well as across firm types. It also enables the mapping of mandate overlaps among the entities most frequently identified as problematic. Three results emerge. First, firms report entities as substantially more problematic than ministries. Second, reported institutional burdens are unevenly distributed. In particular, regulatory gatekeepers that control licensing, standards, inspections and continued market access are associated with disproportionately higher reported burdens on structurally more vulnerable firms. Reported frictions are systematically higher for domestically oriented non-exporters, small and medium enterprises, firms located outside industrial zones, privately owned firms and especially informal firms. Third, these patterns are consistent with coordination failures arising from overlapping mandates and weak accountability within specialised agencies. The findings suggest several reform priorities centred on predictable and published requirements, a single coordinated front end for firms, end-to-end case handling, outcome-based monitoring and disclosure, and scaling only those programmes with rigorously demonstrated impact.

This paper draws on the 2020/21 Egyptian Industrial Firm Behaviour Survey of 2,383 manufacturing firms to provide the first systematic, firm-level evidence on how Egypt’s industrial policy institutions are experienced by manufacturing firms. Using firms’ own perceptions of institutional obstacles, the analysis distinguishes between ministries (“institutions”) and subordinate ministerial and corporatist bodies (“entities”), and classifies these entities into capability-building bodies, regulatory gatekeepers, and quasi-public corporatist bodies. This framework allows the identification of systematic differences in firms’ perceptions across types of institutions and entities, as well as across firm types. It also enables the mapping of mandate overlaps among the entities most frequently identified as problematic. Three results emerge. First, firms report entities as substantially more problematic than ministries. Second, reported institutional burdens are unevenly distributed. In particular, regulatory gatekeepers that control licensing, standards, inspections and continued market access are associated with disproportionately higher reported burdens on structurally more vulnerable firms. Reported frictions are systematically higher for domestically oriented non-exporters, small and medium enterprises, firms located outside industrial zones, privately owned firms and especially informal firms. Third, these patterns are consistent with coordination failures arising from overlapping mandates and weak accountability within specialised agencies. The findings suggest several reform priorities centred on predictable and published requirements, a single coordinated front end for firms, end-to-end case handling, outcome-based monitoring and disclosure, and scaling only those programmes with rigorously demonstrated impact.

This paper draws on the 2020/21 Egyptian Industrial Firm Behaviour Survey of 2,383 manufacturing firms to provide the first systematic, firm-level evidence on how Egypt’s industrial policy institutions are experienced by manufacturing firms. Using firms’ own perceptions of institutional obstacles, the analysis distinguishes between ministries (“institutions”) and subordinate ministerial and corporatist bodies (“entities”), and classifies these entities into capability-building bodies, regulatory gatekeepers, and quasi-public corporatist bodies. This framework allows the identification of systematic differences in firms’ perceptions across types of institutions and entities, as well as across firm types. It also enables the mapping of mandate overlaps among the entities most frequently identified as problematic. Three results emerge. First, firms report entities as substantially more problematic than ministries. Second, reported institutional burdens are unevenly distributed. In particular, regulatory gatekeepers that control licensing, standards, inspections and continued market access are associated with disproportionately higher reported burdens on structurally more vulnerable firms. Reported frictions are systematically higher for domestically oriented non-exporters, small and medium enterprises, firms located outside industrial zones, privately owned firms and especially informal firms. Third, these patterns are consistent with coordination failures arising from overlapping mandates and weak accountability within specialised agencies. The findings suggest several reform priorities centred on predictable and published requirements, a single coordinated front end for firms, end-to-end case handling, outcome-based monitoring and disclosure, and scaling only those programmes with rigorously demonstrated impact.

Nach den Landtagswahlen in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern und Berlin kommentiert Marcel Fratzscher, Präsident des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin), die Wahlergebnisse wie folgt: 

Dieser Wahltag war ein weiterer schlechter Tag für unsere Demokratie. Die AfD hat in beiden Bundesländern stark zugelegt. Da in beiden Ländern nun Dreierkoalitionen zur Regierungsbildung nötig sein werden, dürfte die Umsetzung dringend notwendiger Reformprogramme noch schwieriger werden.

Diese Wahlergebnisse sind ein weiteres Misstrauensvotum für die Bundesregierung. Für die Bundesregierung wird es nun noch schwieriger werden, den Mut und die politische Unterstützung für ein grundlegendes Reformprogramm zu mobilisieren. Wenn CDU, CSU und SPD weiterhin an ihren roten Linien festhalten, wird sich die politische Lähmung verfestigen, die wirtschaftliche Schwäche fortsetzen und die Wahrscheinlichkeit eines Wahlsiegs der AfD 2029 weiter steigen.

Das Versprechen eines Tankrabatts zwei Tage vor der Wahl hat wohl weder der CDU noch der SPD entscheidend geholfen. Die falsche Lehre für die Bundesregierung wäre nun der Versuch, die Bürgerinnen und Bürger mit Wahlgeschenken wie dem Tankrabatt ruhigzustellen. Die Energiekrise wird sich mit hoher Wahrscheinlichkeit verschärfen. Die Bundesregierung braucht jetzt einen überzeugenden Plan, wie sie Menschen und Unternehmen sozial und wirtschaftlich ausgewogen entlastet. Dafür wird sie das Steuersystem reformieren und Subventionen abbauen müssen. Genauso wichtig sind Strukturreformen, die Deutschland wirtschaftlich voranbringen und die Sorgen der Menschen nachhaltig beantworten.

Deutschland hat noch immer alle Karten in der Hand, um seine eigene Zukunft zu bestimmen. Dafür braucht es jetzt jedoch einen Pakt zwischen Politik und Wirtschaft: mutige Reformen umzusetzen und auch seitens der Wirtschaft mehr Verantwortung zu übernehmen. Stetes Klagen über die Politik wird nicht ausreichen, um Deutschland zukunftsfähig zu machen.

In a world undergoing tumultuous transition, sustainable futures are at stake. Disruptive policy-making is on the rise, taking the form of new waves of authoritarian nationalism and the systematic erosion of rules-based politics. Yet, reform initiatives are simultaneously taking shape. Rather than proclaiming the collapse of the multilateral order or focusing on disruptive trends, this volume highlights the institutions, actors and coalitions that are advancing and shaping reform to sustain and rebuild cooperation in a multipolar world. It builds on the premise that,
in this era of concurrent disruption and reform, Germany and Europe need to invest in politics of cooperation and perseverance. Drawing on research and policy engagement by the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS) and its partner networks, the publication identifies practical and political pathways for reform. These include opportunities for middle-power coalitions; new forms of plurilateral cooperation and institutional adaptation; reconfigured partnership and financing architectures; and new cultures of cooperation and political leadership. These pathways are explored across four thematic sections: geopolitics, partnerships and a new global order; multilateralism in a multipolar world; sustainable transformation architectures; and (social) innovation and transformative capabilities. The volume does not seek to resolve the tension between disruption and reform, but to equip its readers to understand where reform is already taking shape and the actors who may need to be persuaded or supported to take the lead. It thereby aims to offer the expertise and inspiration needed to turn disruptive change into reform dynamics that enable the pursuit of sustainable futures.

Table of Contents: 

Introduction: Sustainable Futures at Stake? The Case for Politics of Cooperation and Perseverance (Hornidge, Anna-Katharina / Axel Berger)

1) Geopolitics, Partnerships, and a New Global Order

From Crisis to Change: The Future of Global Peace and Security (Fiedler, Charlotte / Jasmin Lorch / Karina Mross)

Reforming the WTO in an Age of Power-Based Trade (Brandi, Clara)

Europe’s International Cooperation as a Key Component of a Stable World Order (Keijzer, Niels / Mark Furness)

2) Multilateralism in a Multipolar World

A bold post-UN80 reform agenda for the next UN Secretary-General (Novoselova Anna / Ronny Patz)

The Geopolitics of a Global Sustainability Framework Beyond 2030 (Leininger, Julia)

Environmental Multilateralism in 2026: more robust than disruption narratives suggest (Bauer, Steffen / Niklas Wagner / Ines Dombrowsky)

3) Sustainable Transformation Architectures

Development Finance: Proposals to Make Blended Finance (Finally) Deliver (Berensmann, Kathrin / Bao-We-Wal Bambe)

Domestic Revenue Mobilisation, the Financing Gap and why Tax Expenditures Matter (Sen, Kunal / Christian von Haldenwang

Global Health Beyond 2030: Protecting Ambition in a Fragmented World (von Haaren, Paula)

4) (Social) Innovation and Transformative Capabilities

AI’s Potential to Facilitate More Agile Development Cooperation (Sinanoglu, Semuhi / Michael Roll)

Resilience in Knowledge Infrastructures: Science at a Juncture (Effert, Sarah-Lea / Anna-Katharina Hornidge)

Training Competencies to Navigate Tectonic Shifts and Shape Change (Domingues, Joãao Vitor / Sven Grimm / Zahrina Tamimi)

Futuring Politics of Cooperation and Perseverance: A Possible World in 2040 (Effert, Sarah-Lea / Sven Grimm / Christopher Wingens)