Read here in pdf the Policy brief by Eduardo Massieu Paredes, Executive-in-residence Fellow, Geneva Centre for Security Policy.
VENEZUELA’S CRISIS HAS LONG BEEN NARRATED THROUGH AN OPPOSITION PRISM: crowds in the streets demanding democracy, negotiations or contested ballots. In 2025, the spotlight has shifted. The decisive question is not how hard Venezuelans push but what the United States is prepared to do, and why. The United States deployed a naval buildup that includes more than 10 ships, including amphibious assault ships, a nuclear‑powered submarine, a special operations ship and an aircraft carrier, unprecedented to the Caribbean. For all that, the Venezuelan portfolio does not solely sit in the Pentagon or the State Department: Stephen Miller, the president’s homeland security adviser, has also taken a leading role in deciding which vessels to target. U.S. forces have so far destroyed sixteen suspected drug‑smuggling boats in international waters. This intervention could underscore a new viewpoint: is this campaign choreographed for a U.S. audience? Furthermore, how far are they willing to go?
A Don-Roe Doctrine?Two forces shape the Caribbean stand‑off. First is a policy shift. President Donald Trump returned to office on an agenda that places national security, economic strength and sovereignty ahead of traditional diplomacy. Marco Rubio, the new secretary of state and the first Hispanic to hold the job, has been tasked with turning that creed into policy. The State Department’s first hundred‑day report notes that foreign‑aid programs were cut and visa rules tightened to ensure U.S. dollars serve “America First” priorities. It also touts persuading Panama and other Central American countries to reduce cooperation with China’s Belt and Road infrastructure plans. The message is clear: the Western Hemisphere is once again Washington’s sphere of influence.
The plan envisages shifting forces away from Europe and the Indo‑Pacific and expanding air and naval operations along the southern U.S. border and throughout the Caribbean.
Second, a draft defence review proposes a major redeployment. Led by under‑secretary Elbridge Colby, it calls for concentrating military power on the homeland and the Americas. The plan envisages shifting forces away from Europe and the Indo‑Pacific and expanding air and naval operations along the southern U.S. border and throughout the Caribbean. It revives the logic of the Monroe Doctrine: prevent rival powers from embedding in Latin America. In this view, Venezuela is not simply a faltering dictatorship but a potential beachhead for Iranian or Russian influence; deterrence must be visible and follow in line with this administration’s motto of ‘peace through strength’.
Always Victory at HomeFor the architects of Washington’s new Venezuela campaign, success will be judged less by what happens in Caracas than by how it plays in Washington DC or Florida. The White House homeland‑security adviser, Stephen Miller, chairs a reworked council that picks targets and sometimes sidelines the State Department. He has reportedly described the government in Caracas as a cartel—language calibrated for a domestic audience that wants to see criminals punished. War Secretary Pete Hegseth told marines aboard the USS Iwo Jima that their deployment is not a drill but a real‑world mission to “end the poisoning of Americans,” casting it as a crusade that keeps citizens safe. The presence of these two figures, alongside Secretary of State Marco Rubio, underscores how closely the ‘MAGA’ operation aligns with familiar Republican hawkishness: tough on security, unilateral when necessary, and keenly aware of how it plays in the electoral map.
Mr Rubio’s involvement also reflects personal and political ties. As Florida’s former senator he cultivated deep relationships with Venezuela’s opposition; he once called María Corina Machado, the most recent Nobel Peace Prize Laureate, the “Iron Lady” of her country and published an op‑ed praising her courage. He knows that Venezuelan‑American and Cuban‑American voters are pivotal in his home state, and he is not alone in seeing the Caribbean as fertile ground for political capital. For all three men, pressing a regime they see on the ropes may look like a low‑hanging fruit: a way to showcase toughness, score points with a conservative base and, perhaps, advance their own ambitions.
The question is whether this chase for a domestic victory will actually change anything inside Venezuela. By measuring success in domestic terms, the United States may very well leave Venezuelans no closer to the democracy they seek.
In this view, Caracas is both a proxy and an opportunity: neutralise a hostile regime, demonstrate that Washington will police its neighbourhood and send a message to US’ voters that the administration is protecting the homeland. The question is whether this chase for a domestic victory will actually change anything inside Venezuela. By measuring success in domestic terms, the United States may very well leave Venezuelans no closer to the democracy they seek.
What can Europe learn from the CaribbeanWashington’s handling of the Venezuelan crisis could be a preview of a wider strategic realignment.
Washington’s handling of the Venezuelan crisis could be a preview of a wider strategic realignment. Colby’s “homeland first, hemisphere next” doctrine would pull military assets from the East and surge them into the Americas. In practical terms, that would mean fewer ships and aircraft watching the South China Sea or the Baltic Sea, and more watching the Caribbean and the southern border. For instance, the U.S. Navy’s most powerful aircraft carrier, USS Gerald R. Ford, and its strike group departed from Croatia and are heading to the Caribbean for a new deployment. Latin America becomes the arena where America wants to prove it can still dominate without alliances, while Europe and Asia get pushed down the priority list.
This administration also seems to be resuscitating the Reagan-Bush discourse of the “war on drugs”. Four lethal U.S. strikes against drug boats in the Caribbean are being justified as part of a “non‑international armed conflict” with terrorist cartels. In other words, this administration sees little threats in a geopolitical context of democracy vs. autocracy as well as no need to consult international allies or Congress. Domestic optics—especially playing to voters who want a hard line on drugs and immigration—seem to matter more than European approval or Asian deterrence. The Venezuelan case suggests that, for the foreseeable future, U.S. security decisions may be shaped less by global consensus and more by domestic calculations with a Monroe‑style sphere of influence twist.
Reaction from the NeighbourhoodLatin America’s response reflects both caution and fatigue. Brazil’s President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva described the U.S. naval buildup as a source of tension and warned it could threaten regional peace. He noted that Washington’s drug‑trafficking accusations lacked evidence and that the lethal strike on a boat was likely illegal. The comment signals the delicate position of governments that distrust Mr Maduro but also remember past US interventions contemptuously. In Mexico City, Mr Rubio faced questions about sovereignty even as he promised deeper cooperation with President Claudia Sheinbaum. Mexico and Brazil may oppose an ‘invasion’ but are unlikely to expend political capital defending Caracas. They will hedge: criticise the optics of U.S. gunboat diplomacy while quietly ignoring any weakening of the Maduro regime.
As Venezuela’s largest neighbour and leading diplomatic power in South America, Brazil is deeply concerned that a forced collapse of the Maduro regime would trigger mass migration to its northern frontier, regional militarisation, and paramilitary spillover.
As Venezuela’s largest neighbour and leading diplomatic power in South America, Brazil is deeply concerned that a forced collapse of the Maduro regime would trigger mass migration to its northern frontier, regional militarisation, and paramilitary spillover. This pushes Brazil to continue favoring a negotiated scenario, yet Brazil’s influence has proven limited in the past. The opposition pointed to how it could not secure safe passage for dissidents under its protection in Caracas, and how little diplomatic pressure any international actor can put on Maduro. Brazil will continue to signal to the US against any form of intervention, will quietly promote talks, and essentially seek stability on its border regardless of the fate of Mr. Maduro.
Legitimacy at a NadirAll this is happening while Mr Maduro’s own standing is at its lowest. International observers and independent tallies agree that opposition candidate Edmundo González Urrutia won the 2024 presidential vote, only for the regime to rewrite the results. Even some of Mr Maduro’s traditional allies in the region—like Brazil and Colombia—acknowledged doubts about the election’s legitimacy and declined to recognise his new mandate. The regime’s only remaining legitimacy is the loyalty of its security apparatus and the fear it can instill.
Yet that loyalty is brittle. Years of purges and politicisation have left the armed forces fractured. This fragmentation has done two things at once: it has prevented a coup—no faction is strong enough to depose Mr Maduro—yet it also means that if he falls, no coherent military bloc is likely to topple his successor.
As U.S. warships drew closer in September, he ordered the Bolivarian National Militia—a civilian force attached to the armed forces— instead of the Army to prepare to “defend the homeland.” In other words, the state’s coercive power rests as much on politicised volunteers as on the regular army—a sign of weakness rather than strength.
Years of dictatorship have also depoliticised society. Under the weight of hyperinflation and collapsing services, many Venezuelans have turned away from ideological debate; politics is secondary to hunger and survival. This makes Mr Maduro’s appeals to defend the homeland against imperialism ring hollow for large swathes of the population. A militarised mobilisation might energise loyalists who benefit from the status quo, but it does not convince those who are simply trying to feed their families. The contrast is stark: on one side, an ageing elite clinging to power; on the other, a society more concerned with the price of food than with slogans about sovereignty.
The opposition, meanwhile, still holds the moral mandate. That legitimacy now carries even more weight after María Corina Machado was awarded the 2025 Nobel Peace Prize.
The opposition, meanwhile, still holds the moral mandate. That legitimacy now carries even more weight after María Corina Machado was awarded the 2025 Nobel Peace Prize. It is a powerful endorsement at home and abroad, yet the opposition has not been able to translate its moral authority into decisive action. With prominent leaders jailed, exiled or underground, Machado is the only widely recognised voice, operating from the shadows yet carrying a broad popular mandate. Her ally Edmundo González, widely regarded as the true winner of the 2024 election, speaks from abroad; together they embody a legitimacy that the regime lacks, though they cannot convert it into power while the armed forces remain fragmented and society is exhausted by poverty and persecution. That credibility matters in a post‑Maduro scenario: there is a leader to hand the reins to, even if the day‑to‑day structures of the state are in disarray. But the longer the standoff drags on, the more the opposition risks becoming symbolic rather than operational. The stalemate endures partly because everyone is too weak to break it.
Scenarios Beyond the HeadlinesIn Washington, the priority is a win that plays at home. The administration shows little interest in adjudicating who governs in Caracas; all signals suggest Mr. Trump’s instinct is to avoid classic “regime change” so much so that the President failed to mention Maduro or Machado by name when he talked about his phone call with the Nobel Peace Prize winner. Is this enough to hypothesize that the US administration could land on a middle course, declare victory over “the cartels” for a domestic audience while steering clear of Venezuela’s internal power struggle. Against that backdrop, four trajectories remain on the table for the crisis itself:
If the United States genuinely wants systemic change, it will need more than sinking boats and slogans, it will need a strategy that endures beyond the next news cycle.
Venezuela’s impasse is fast becoming a proving ground for Washington’s “America first” doctrine and a primary focus on the Western Hemisphere in their foreign policy in decades. To some in this administration, reviving Monroe‑era language, sinking a few boats, slap the label of “narco‑terrorism” on an adversary, and declaring a mission accomplished to voters in Florida will be a win. To others, victory is only possible if the US collects Maduro’s bounty, but there we will be entering into unknown territory, territory which could make President Trump uncomfortable. In addition, the backdrop is a country with its people exhausted, and its institutions hollowed out so internally in Venezuela very little should be expected. A purely theatrical strike may consolidate the status quo rather than topple it. If the United States genuinely wants systemic change, it will need more than sinking boats and slogans, it will need a strategy that endures beyond the next news cycle. Whether that is what President Trump actually seeks remains an open question.
En Conseil des ministres ce mercredi 05 novembre 2025, le gouvernement a marqué son accord pour la réalisation d'études dans le cadre de la construction ou de la réhabilitation de quatre-vingts (80) retenues d'eau dans différentes localités du Bénin.
Bonne nouvelle pour les acteurs du monde agricole. 80 retenues d'eau seront bientôt construites ou réhabilitées. Les travaux d'études ont été autorisés ce mercredi 05 novembre 2025 en Conseil des ministres. Ces études selon le communiqué du gouvernement participent « de la mise en valeur du potentiel hydroagricole dont recèle le pays en vue de développer la pratique de l'irrigation par la maîtrise totale de l'eau ». L'objectif visé est de renforcer les capacités de résilience de l'agriculture béninoise et d'accroître sa compétitivité.
A cet effet, il est prévu la construction de soixante (60) retenues d'eau à vocation agropastorale et la réhabilitation de vingt autres réparties dans plusieurs départements et communes.
F. A. A.