24. Juli 2026 – Im September 2026 wählt Sachsen-Anhalt einen neuen Landtag. Die AfD hat gute Chancen, stärkste Kraft zu werden. Doch was würden weniger Europa, weniger Zuwanderung und geringere öffentliche Investitionen für die Menschen bedeuten? Diese Kurzstudie belegt ein AfD-Paradox: Regionen, die überproportional stark für die AfD stimmen, leiden deutlich stärker unter einer AfD-Politik als andere. Obwohl vieles an der Unzufriedenheit der Menschen in starken AfD-Regionen verständlich ist, würden sie sich mit der Wahl der AfD selbst am meisten schaden. Das gilt nirgendwo mehr als in Sachsen-Anhalt. Durch die von der AfD geforderte Politik – den Austritt aus Euro und EU, Abschottung und einen Stopp der Zuwanderung sowie massive staatliche Kürzungen – würden Menschen dort im Durchschnitt jährlich rund 1.600 Euro pro Kopf an Einkommen verlieren; zudem könnten rund 10.000 Arbeitsplätze verloren gehen. Die Einkommensverluste durch eine AfD-Politik könnten in Sachsen-Anhalt bis zu doppelt so hoch ausfallen wie im Bundesdurchschnitt. Die Gefahr einer Abwärtsspirale ist groß. Unzufriedenheit treibt die Unterstützung für die AfD, was wiederum die Lebenssituation weiter verschlechtert. Eine hoffnungsvolle Perspektive: Gelingt es, neue Zukunftschancen zu schaffen, kann aus der Abwärts- eine Aufwärtsspirale werden. Denn diese Kurzstudie zeigt auch, dass AfD-Wähler*innen, gerade im Osten, auf Veränderungen reagieren. Die deutsche Geschichte belegt es: Die 1990er und 2000er Jahre waren gerade in den ostdeutschen Ländern Jahrzehnte der Stärkung der Demokratie, des wachsenden Wohlstands und sozialer Teilhabe.
The majority of the people displaced by the armed conflict in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado Province live in host communities. Our research shows that many Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) live with family/friends. Less than half live in displacement camps. As in many other internal displacement contexts, the government of Mozambique, development partners and humanitarian organisations use the terms IDPs and host communities to distinguish between the people who fled the conflict and those who welcomed them, respectively. This is a necessary distinction because IDPs are in a particularly precarious situation, having lost homes, family members and means of livelihoods, which renders material and psychosocial support to them indispensable. However, this policy brief identifies two issues that are pertinent to this distinction and the provision of material support to IDPs. First, while the categories of IDPs and host communities may provide clarity for interventions, they do not always reflect the broader history of local communities and how people identify and relate to each other. Second, in contexts where economically vulnerable host communities share their meagre resources with IDPs prior to the arrival of external humanitarian support, humanitarian organisations need to be sensitive to the material circumstances of host communities so that these do not see such support as discriminatory, leading to conflict. When the material support that humanitarian organisations provide to IDPs is beyond the means of their hosts, the latter can become resentful and withdraw their own support from the IDPs. This is a common problem, and the policy brief shows some ways to address it. Governments, development partners, and humanitarian organisations that adopt simplistic distinctions between IDPs and host communities without locating them in the specific socio-economic context risk missing local acts of solidarity and mutual identification as channels of inclusion that are central to maintaining social cohesion.
Key policy messages:
The majority of the people displaced by the armed conflict in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado Province live in host communities. Our research shows that many Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) live with family/friends. Less than half live in displacement camps. As in many other internal displacement contexts, the government of Mozambique, development partners and humanitarian organisations use the terms IDPs and host communities to distinguish between the people who fled the conflict and those who welcomed them, respectively. This is a necessary distinction because IDPs are in a particularly precarious situation, having lost homes, family members and means of livelihoods, which renders material and psychosocial support to them indispensable. However, this policy brief identifies two issues that are pertinent to this distinction and the provision of material support to IDPs. First, while the categories of IDPs and host communities may provide clarity for interventions, they do not always reflect the broader history of local communities and how people identify and relate to each other. Second, in contexts where economically vulnerable host communities share their meagre resources with IDPs prior to the arrival of external humanitarian support, humanitarian organisations need to be sensitive to the material circumstances of host communities so that these do not see such support as discriminatory, leading to conflict. When the material support that humanitarian organisations provide to IDPs is beyond the means of their hosts, the latter can become resentful and withdraw their own support from the IDPs. This is a common problem, and the policy brief shows some ways to address it. Governments, development partners, and humanitarian organisations that adopt simplistic distinctions between IDPs and host communities without locating them in the specific socio-economic context risk missing local acts of solidarity and mutual identification as channels of inclusion that are central to maintaining social cohesion.
Key policy messages:
The majority of the people displaced by the armed conflict in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado Province live in host communities. Our research shows that many Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) live with family/friends. Less than half live in displacement camps. As in many other internal displacement contexts, the government of Mozambique, development partners and humanitarian organisations use the terms IDPs and host communities to distinguish between the people who fled the conflict and those who welcomed them, respectively. This is a necessary distinction because IDPs are in a particularly precarious situation, having lost homes, family members and means of livelihoods, which renders material and psychosocial support to them indispensable. However, this policy brief identifies two issues that are pertinent to this distinction and the provision of material support to IDPs. First, while the categories of IDPs and host communities may provide clarity for interventions, they do not always reflect the broader history of local communities and how people identify and relate to each other. Second, in contexts where economically vulnerable host communities share their meagre resources with IDPs prior to the arrival of external humanitarian support, humanitarian organisations need to be sensitive to the material circumstances of host communities so that these do not see such support as discriminatory, leading to conflict. When the material support that humanitarian organisations provide to IDPs is beyond the means of their hosts, the latter can become resentful and withdraw their own support from the IDPs. This is a common problem, and the policy brief shows some ways to address it. Governments, development partners, and humanitarian organisations that adopt simplistic distinctions between IDPs and host communities without locating them in the specific socio-economic context risk missing local acts of solidarity and mutual identification as channels of inclusion that are central to maintaining social cohesion.
Key policy messages:
Climate mitigation and adaptation require substantial investment to advance sustainable development. In low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), mobilising such finance is particularly challenging for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) due to persistent market failures, including limited financial disclosure and weak credit-risk information. High upfront costs, uncertain returns and weak regulatory frameworks further constrain adoption of low-carbon technologies. While fiscal constraints and the capital-intensive transition underscore the need for private capital, traditional bank financing is restricted by long project horizons, high risk and macroeconomic instability. Blended finance and guarantees are key instruments for mobilising private investment in LMICs. Blended finance combines concessional public resources with private or additional public capital to mitigate profitability risks, while guarantees reduce perceived risk by covering partial losses, particularly for non-commercial risks. This policy brief assesses their role in scaling SME climate finance, alongside their limitations and context-specific applicability. Evidence suggests that leverage effects, especially for blended finance, are more modest than often assumed and are context dependent; nonetheless, these instruments remain relevant for de-risking SME finance, contingent on improved design and implementation. The policy brief advances the following recommendations:
- Financial intermediaries should prioritise SMEs facing binding financing constraints that prevent projects with clear socio-economic and environmental benefits. Project selection should integrate financial and climate vulnerability, though assessment remains difficult in low-income countries (LICs). De-risking instruments should target specific constraints, with guarantees mitigating risks and blended finance supporting projects with insufficient risk-adjusted returns to attract private capital. Multilateral development banks (MDBs) and development finance institutions (DFIs) should ensure additionality, minimise concessionality and strengthen monitoring and transparency.
- MDBs and DFIs should better align donor incentives with effective risk-sharing and flexible financing structures. Concessional senior loans dominate blended finance but have limited loss absorption, reducing effectiveness in high-risk environments. A more balanced mix, including subordinated debt, equity and guarantees, can improve risk allocation and crowd in private investors. Greater use of special purpose vehicles and off-balance-sheet structures can further expand financing capacity in fragile contexts.
- MDBs and DFIs should strengthen coordination, standardisation and local engagement. Fragmentation in blended finance and guarantees increases complexity and transaction costs and deters institutional investors. Greater harmonisation across MDBs, DFIs and private investors would improve capital allocation and complementarity, while standardised procedures and contracts would streamline project preparation and scaling in LMICs.
Governments in LMICs should address structural constraints, with MDBs and DFIs providing complementary de-risking and capacity-building support. Weak investment climates, shallow financial markets, poor project pipelines and weak credit information systems reduce the effectiveness of blended finance and guarantees, particularly in LICs. Governments should strengthen investment climates, deepen financial markets and improve SME capabilities, while MDBs and DFIs support local intermediaries and broader reforms.
Climate mitigation and adaptation require substantial investment to advance sustainable development. In low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), mobilising such finance is particularly challenging for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) due to persistent market failures, including limited financial disclosure and weak credit-risk information. High upfront costs, uncertain returns and weak regulatory frameworks further constrain adoption of low-carbon technologies. While fiscal constraints and the capital-intensive transition underscore the need for private capital, traditional bank financing is restricted by long project horizons, high risk and macroeconomic instability. Blended finance and guarantees are key instruments for mobilising private investment in LMICs. Blended finance combines concessional public resources with private or additional public capital to mitigate profitability risks, while guarantees reduce perceived risk by covering partial losses, particularly for non-commercial risks. This policy brief assesses their role in scaling SME climate finance, alongside their limitations and context-specific applicability. Evidence suggests that leverage effects, especially for blended finance, are more modest than often assumed and are context dependent; nonetheless, these instruments remain relevant for de-risking SME finance, contingent on improved design and implementation. The policy brief advances the following recommendations:
- Financial intermediaries should prioritise SMEs facing binding financing constraints that prevent projects with clear socio-economic and environmental benefits. Project selection should integrate financial and climate vulnerability, though assessment remains difficult in low-income countries (LICs). De-risking instruments should target specific constraints, with guarantees mitigating risks and blended finance supporting projects with insufficient risk-adjusted returns to attract private capital. Multilateral development banks (MDBs) and development finance institutions (DFIs) should ensure additionality, minimise concessionality and strengthen monitoring and transparency.
- MDBs and DFIs should better align donor incentives with effective risk-sharing and flexible financing structures. Concessional senior loans dominate blended finance but have limited loss absorption, reducing effectiveness in high-risk environments. A more balanced mix, including subordinated debt, equity and guarantees, can improve risk allocation and crowd in private investors. Greater use of special purpose vehicles and off-balance-sheet structures can further expand financing capacity in fragile contexts.
- MDBs and DFIs should strengthen coordination, standardisation and local engagement. Fragmentation in blended finance and guarantees increases complexity and transaction costs and deters institutional investors. Greater harmonisation across MDBs, DFIs and private investors would improve capital allocation and complementarity, while standardised procedures and contracts would streamline project preparation and scaling in LMICs.
Governments in LMICs should address structural constraints, with MDBs and DFIs providing complementary de-risking and capacity-building support. Weak investment climates, shallow financial markets, poor project pipelines and weak credit information systems reduce the effectiveness of blended finance and guarantees, particularly in LICs. Governments should strengthen investment climates, deepen financial markets and improve SME capabilities, while MDBs and DFIs support local intermediaries and broader reforms.
Climate mitigation and adaptation require substantial investment to advance sustainable development. In low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), mobilising such finance is particularly challenging for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) due to persistent market failures, including limited financial disclosure and weak credit-risk information. High upfront costs, uncertain returns and weak regulatory frameworks further constrain adoption of low-carbon technologies. While fiscal constraints and the capital-intensive transition underscore the need for private capital, traditional bank financing is restricted by long project horizons, high risk and macroeconomic instability. Blended finance and guarantees are key instruments for mobilising private investment in LMICs. Blended finance combines concessional public resources with private or additional public capital to mitigate profitability risks, while guarantees reduce perceived risk by covering partial losses, particularly for non-commercial risks. This policy brief assesses their role in scaling SME climate finance, alongside their limitations and context-specific applicability. Evidence suggests that leverage effects, especially for blended finance, are more modest than often assumed and are context dependent; nonetheless, these instruments remain relevant for de-risking SME finance, contingent on improved design and implementation. The policy brief advances the following recommendations:
- Financial intermediaries should prioritise SMEs facing binding financing constraints that prevent projects with clear socio-economic and environmental benefits. Project selection should integrate financial and climate vulnerability, though assessment remains difficult in low-income countries (LICs). De-risking instruments should target specific constraints, with guarantees mitigating risks and blended finance supporting projects with insufficient risk-adjusted returns to attract private capital. Multilateral development banks (MDBs) and development finance institutions (DFIs) should ensure additionality, minimise concessionality and strengthen monitoring and transparency.
- MDBs and DFIs should better align donor incentives with effective risk-sharing and flexible financing structures. Concessional senior loans dominate blended finance but have limited loss absorption, reducing effectiveness in high-risk environments. A more balanced mix, including subordinated debt, equity and guarantees, can improve risk allocation and crowd in private investors. Greater use of special purpose vehicles and off-balance-sheet structures can further expand financing capacity in fragile contexts.
- MDBs and DFIs should strengthen coordination, standardisation and local engagement. Fragmentation in blended finance and guarantees increases complexity and transaction costs and deters institutional investors. Greater harmonisation across MDBs, DFIs and private investors would improve capital allocation and complementarity, while standardised procedures and contracts would streamline project preparation and scaling in LMICs.
Governments in LMICs should address structural constraints, with MDBs and DFIs providing complementary de-risking and capacity-building support. Weak investment climates, shallow financial markets, poor project pipelines and weak credit information systems reduce the effectiveness of blended finance and guarantees, particularly in LICs. Governments should strengthen investment climates, deepen financial markets and improve SME capabilities, while MDBs and DFIs support local intermediaries and broader reforms.
L'avant-centre des Amazones du Bénin, Aude Gbedjissi s'engage désormais avec le club turc de Galatasaray, marquant ainsi un nouveau chapitre de sa carrière footballistique. Ce tournant décisif de l'Amazone intervient après trois belles saisons sous les couleurs du Rc Lens Féminin en France.
L'Amazone Aude Gbedjissi quitte la France et la D2 Féminine pour rejoindre la Turkcell women's football super league en Turquie. Elle vient de signer un contrat avec le club d'Istanbul, Galatasaray SK.
Ce transfert de la footballeuse fait suite à une saison remarquée sous les couleurs du Rc Lens Féminin où elle s'est imposée comme l'une des pièces maitresses de l'attaque artésienne, avec un total de 43 réalisations inscrites, toutes compétitions confondues, sous le maillot lensois. Sur les réseaux, Aude Gbedjissi n'a pas caché sa joie. « Heureuse et fière de rejoindre officiellement le Galatasaray Spor Kulübü », a-t-elle écrit, sûre de pouvoir travailler et de donner le meilleur d'elle-même pour de meilleurs résultats.
Mesurant le chemin parcouru jusque-là, la footballeuse a exprimé sa reconnaissance aux personnes ayant contribué à faire d'elle, « la joueuse et la femme » qu'elle est devenue. « Aujourd'hui, une nouvelle page s'ouvre. Prête à écrire la suite de l'histoire », a-t-elle conclu.
F. A. A.
Les registres d'inscription à la formation professionnelle à titre payant dans les Lycées techniques professionnels (LTP), les Lycées techniques agricoles (LTA) ainsi qu'à l'École de formation médico-sociale (EFMS) de Parakou et son annexe de Djougou sont ouverts depuis le 20 juillet et le resteront jusqu'au 4 septembre 2026.
Le ministère de l'Enseignement supérieur et de la Recherche scientifique invite les candidats remplissant les conditions requises à déposer leurs dossiers pour les rentrées scolaires 2026-2027, avec un large éventail de filières techniques, agricoles, numériques et médico-sociales. Lire le communiqué...