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The European Union’s Pact for the Mediterranean: Opportunity for a reset in the region?

The European Union’s new Pact for the Mediterranean arrives on the 30th anniversary of the Barcelona Process, representing a renewed impetus to forge a working relationship with the ten countries of its Southern Neighbourhood. To achieve this and allow the EU to full unlock the region’s many opportunities, the Pact is called upon to address a complex set of circumstances, which will require it to confront several key structural challenges.

Challenges

• Internal EU Disunity: The competing interests of member-states in the Mediterranean (e.g., France and Italy in Libya) undermine the EU’s ability to act as a unified bloc.
• Geopolitical Considerations: The EU must either confront or accommodate Turkey’s regional aspirations, including its Mavi Vatan maritime doctrine. Turkey’s demeanour directly obstructs key EU energy and connectivity projects, while challenging the rights of Greece and Cyprus in the Eastern Mediterranean.
• Trust Deficit: The EU faces the conundrum of both overcoming reservations over its values-oriented approach, often perceived as veiled neocolonialism, that hinder cooperation while not appearing as overtly transactional, and thus alienating its partners. It must offer an attractive solution to its leading Southern partners and pre-empt them from seeking new alliances (e.g., Egypt joining BRICS).

However, there are several opportunities that the European Union can pursue in the region across several fields including energy, migration, and increased geopolitical influence in an area that directly impacts its interests.

Opportunities

• Energy Hub: The Mediterranean is critical for the goal of EU energy independence from Russian fossil fuels, both by harnessing the region’s energy reserves and as a point of entry for energy from North Africa, Asia, and the United States. This includes a strategic role for Greece as a key port of entry for American LNG via the Revithoussa LNG Terminal and the Alexandroupolis FSRU.
• Migration Management: The Pact must reform the EU’s externalization model to address migration flows, a process complicated by internal divisions and ethical concerns following incidents like the Pylos shipwreck.
• Agency: The Pact is the EU’s chance to assert its own strategic autonomy in a critical region, in which power has been traditionally wielded by those far from the Mediterranean shore. With the prevalence of competing corridors (e.g., China’s BRI and the proposed IMEC) in a critical waterway, the European Union must (to) ensure it is not a spectator in its own neighbourhood.

Read here in pdf the Policy paper by Constantine Capsaskis, Research Fellow, ELIAMEP and Athina Fatsea, Junior Research Fellow, ELIAMEP.

Introduction

The upcoming Pact for the Mediterranean is a manifestation of renewed impetus by the European Union to once again forge a modus vivendi with the ten countries of the so-called Southern Neighbourhood.

The Pact will arrive on the 30th anniversary of the launch of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, commonly known as Barcelona Process, in 1995, which set the goal of transforming the region into an “area of dialogue, exchange and cooperation, guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity”. This was to be achieved by focusing on enhanced political dialogue, increased economic interdependence, and social and cultural exchanges that would strengthen relations between Europe and its Mediterranean neighbours.[1]

The Barcelona Process can be seen as a product of its time, launched in the post-Cold War certainty of Francis Fukuyama’s “end of history” and the assured “universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government”.[2] There was little scope or resilience for the developments witnessed in the region, from the spread of terrorism in the early 2000s to the pivotal Arab Spring in 2011 and its aftershocks, including increased political violence and an explosion of refugee and migrant movement via cross-Mediterranean routes. Exacerbated by the spectre of a multipolar world order and a renewed global emphasis on hard power and ‘realist’ diplomatic approaches, evidenced by the deepening division of regional rivalries in the Mediterranean, it is safe to say that little of the optimism enshrined in the Barcelona Process survived the 21st century.

“The Southern Mediterranean region is facing governance, socio-economic, climate, environmental and security challenges, many of which result from global trends and call for joint action by the EU and Southern Neighbourhood partners”, noted the European Union in its 2021 “Renewed Partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood” which sought to address the many difficulties of the region.[3] Yet, almost five years later, little has been achieved in resolving these issues. In fact, the return of large-scale warfare both in Europe and the Middle East, the increase of competition between the global superpowers, and the selective engagement of the United States, have created an even more dangerous set of circumstances for the region. This is the situation that the Union’s new Pact for the Mediterranean is called upon to address.

Despite the many challenges in the region, however, it also offers several opportunities. The Mediterranean in the long run can enable the European Union’s ambitious “Green Deal”, with renewable energy from the African continent helping drive the transition, and in the short run can offer viable alternative non-renewable energy resources to reduce European dependency on Russian fossil fuels. The region will also be pivotal in addressing the issue of migration which continues to be a pressing political issue for many member-states.

It is clear that the Mediterranean is a critical area for both the European Union’s strategic autonomy and its economic independence. A stable, prosperous, and secure, Southern Neighbourhood will greatly benefit the EU at a time of geopolitical flux. However, to this end the Pact for the Mediterranean must also confront several key challenges.

Challenge #1 – Division within the European Union

Despite the goal of a common foreign policy for the European Union, it is commonly accepted that each member state often prioritises its own national interests ahead of the pursuit of any shared goal.[4] And while disagreements over priorities have hamstrung several EU initiatives in the Mediterranean in the past, including the two European Union Naval Force Mediterranean operations,[5] in extreme cases there have even been instances of open competition between member states in the region.

Nowhere have the divergences between member states been felt more acutely than in Libya, both during the final years of the civil war that ended in 2020 and the subsequent continued division of the country between the Tripoli-based Government of National Unity (GNU) and the Tobruk-led Government of National Stability (GNS).

On the one hand, Italy has worked closely with the GNU, both in the fields of migration and energy co-operation, while France and Greece have mostly focused on forging ties with the de facto ruler of Eastern Libya, Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar. Following the end of the civil war in 2020, this stark divide became less obvious, as there were attempts from most parties involved to bridge existing differences and grievances. Greece, for example, has undertaken significant diplomatic efforts to initiate a rapprochement with the GNU, focused on the issue of maritime delimitation, with the two sides even starting talks on the matter in September 2025.[6] However, telltale signs remain of this divergence.

On the one hand, Italy has worked closely with the GNU, both in the fields of migration and energy co-operation, while France and Greece have mostly focused on forging ties with the de facto ruler of Eastern Libya, Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar. Following the end of the civil war in 2020, this stark divide became less obvious, as there were attempts from most parties involved to bridge existing differences and grievances. Greece, for example, has undertaken significant diplomatic efforts to initiate a rapprochement with the GNU, focused on the issue of maritime delimitation, with the two sides even starting talks on the matter in September 2025.[6] However, telltale signs remain of this divergence. While Italian Prime Minister Georgia Meloni has held several meetings with GNU Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh, including a trilateral summit with Turkey in August 2025, both Greece and France continue meeting with representatives of Haftar, as recently as September 2025 in the case of the former.

It is worth noting that, despite the much improved situation today, the divergence at the time. […] Over this period, which, during the Libyan Civil War, geographically mirrored the political support provided by their respective nations to Libya’s domestic players. 

It is worth noting that, despite the much improved situation today, the divergence between Paris and Rome during the conflict led to a very public souring of bilateral relations at the time.[7] Over this period, Italy’s ENI and France’s TotalEnergies have also been involved in fierce competition over Libya’s energy resources, which, during the Libyan Civil War, geographically mirrored the political support provided by their respective nations to Libya’s domestic players. This competitive dynamic complicates the EU’s ability to act as a unified geopolitical or economic bloc in the region.

Tangentially related to Libya, the troubled activity of both Operation Sophia and Operation Irini also emphasize the effect of divergences between member-states in action. Tension between Italy’s government at the time, and in particular the conduct of then Italian Deputy Prime Minister Matteo Salvini, and other members of the mission, primarily Germany, continued to escalate and reached a climax when Germany withdrew from the mission. Ursula Von Der Leyen, then German Federal Minister of Defense, even went so far as to accuse the Italian commanders of Operation Sophia of sabotaging the mission.[8]

Operation Irini, which succeeded Sophia with a mandate to enforce a United Nations arms embargo on Libya until 2027, has also faced its own share of problems. Most notably, in 2020 Malta withdrew from the operation and threatened to veto any European decisions on the operation.[9] The operation also resulted in a series of tense stand-offs with the Turkish Navy, something which will be explored in more depth later.

Libya is just one country out of the ten highlighted by the European Union as its Southern Neighbourhood. Admittedly, its central role in both Europe’s energy endeavours in the Mediterranean and as a major transit point for migrant corridors make it stand out.[10] However, the failure of the European Union to devise a common policy in its approach to the war-torn country is telling.

Divergences also exist on a wide range of other issues, from the recognition of Palestinian statehood to the stance of member states on external actors such as Russia and China. The North-South divide within the EU on the issue of migration also persists, with the Mediterranean EU member states increasingly moving towards more controversial practices to tackle the influx of migrants and refugees (including Italy’s controversial deal with Albania and Greece’s suspension of asylum applications for three months).

The Pact for the Mediterranean must provide a credible path to an accord between European member states in the region, otherwise the Union risks once again being unable to react to developments in the region. This would lead EU countries in the region to revert to the status quo of focusing on regional bilateral and multilateral cooperation schemes and will allow external actors like Russia and Turkey to continue to maintain the initiative.

Challenge #2 – Trust Deficit

Several of the governments of the South Neighbourhood have long harboured a wariness over European Union values-oriented policies for attempting to violate their sovereignty and erode their control, often decrying these measures as veiled neocolonialism in which the European countries seek to secure their own interests (usually in their former colonies) and promote Eurocentric values.[11]

After all, the Barcelona Declaration of 1995 stated that all participants seek to “respect human rights and fundamental freedoms and guarantee the effective legitimate exercise of such rights and freedoms, including freedom of expression, freedom of association for peaceful purposes and freedom of thought, conscience and religion, both individually and together with other members of the same group, without any discrimination on grounds of race, nationality, language, religion or sex”.[12] Thirty years later, not only has this not been achieved, but arguably the environment is less conducive to the safeguarding of these rights. In fact, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights notes that: “The Middle East and North Africa faces significant challenges, including situations of armed conflict, the rise of violent extremism and the counter-terrorism narrative affecting civil and political rights as well as deeply rooted discrimination against groups”.[13]

It is clear that today the EU has already adopted a more transactional approach with many of the key actors in the region and has retreated from many of its past stances on the issue. While, for example, the 2024 Joint Declaration on the Strategic and Comprehensive Partnership between the European Union and Egypt reiterates the commitment to “work […] to further promote democracy, fundamental freedoms, and human rights, gender equality and equal opportunities”,[14] there are many (including Humans Right Watch[15]) who argue that there has been little progress on this front. This is not something that has stopped the European Union from acknowledging “Egypt as a reliable partner, as well as Egypt’s unique and vital geo-strategic role as a pillar of security, moderation, and peace in the region of the Mediterranean, the Near East and Africa”.[16]

But there is little evidence that this has achieved much in shifting the widespread perception of EU intentions in the region. There are even those that argue that the European Union’s more pragmatic approach is, in fact, more neocolonial in nature.[17]

In the Sahel, not far from the Mediterranean coast, there are already developments that should be of concern to European policymakers. The French military withdrawal from Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Chad,[18] while undoubtedly rooted in different and complex circumstances, emphatically illustrates the continued dynamism of anti-colonial sentiment, particularly when it is fuelled by hostile actors like Russia.[19]

At the same time, European ambivalence over Israeli actions in Gaza did little to earn the EU any goodwill with the Arab populations of the Mediterranean. While it remains to be seen if the current ceasefire will last, the EU’s unwillingness to act on the matter in the same decisive manner it had displayed following the Russian invasion of Ukraine certainly rankled with several actors in the region.[20] After all, it was not too long ago that the European Union and the United States were calling on these countries to freeze out Russia. “The EU actively urges all countries not to provide material or other support for Russia’s war of aggression” was the Commission’s recommendation when documents leaked that Egypt was secretly planning to produce 40,000 missiles for Russia.[21]

It is clear that the Pact for the Mediterranean must move beyond pious generalities about strengthening the relations of the EU with its Southern Neighbours. Fuelled by the possibility of a new multipolar world order, and the selective engagement of the United States, it is clear that several governments in the region see little reason to engage with the European Union’s exacting list of governance reforms. Egypt has already been admitted as a full member of the BRICS.[22]

The fanning of decolonial sentiment, coupled with the proliferation of rhetoric emphasizing competition between the Global North and Global South, have undeniably exacerbated the situation. It will require a delicate balancing act by the European Union to move beyond these difficulties and to work to materially improve relations in the Mediterranean, while at the same time not compromising on the very values that make the European Union what it is.

Challenge #3 – Turkey

Turkey’s regional aspirations in the Eastern Mediterranean must be considered when developing the European Union’s Pact for the region. The maximalist claims of the Mavi Vatan (Blue Homeland) maritime doctrine not only directly impinge on the rights of two EU member states (Greece and Cyprus) but directly involve countries which are part of the Southern Neighbourhood (namely, Syria, Libya, and Egypt). The EU’s ambivalent stance on Turkey cannot be considered in a vacuum and directly affects its relations with the region.

While the EU has unequivocally condemned the Turkish – Libyan Memorandum of Understanding on the delimitation of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of 2019,[23] several European Union projects are directly affected by it. Most notably, the Great Sea Interconnector that proposes to link the power grids of Greece, Cyprus, and Israel, faces significant geopolitical hurdles from Ankara’s objection to the project on the grounds that it violates its claimed maritime rights. It is worth noting here that the interconnector is a Project of Common Interest for the European Commission.

In the summer of 2025, Turkish naval vessels stopped research vessel Fugro Gauss from conducting surveys for the East to Med Corridor (EMC), the proposed fiber-optic cable that would link Israel to France via Greece and Cyprus. “We always conduct the necessary monitoring, preventing any unauthorized activity on our continental shelf, and we do not allow activities or projects [such as the Great Sea Interconnector project] that disregard our country”, noted Turkish sources.[24]

This risk can be assumed to hold for other proposed trans-Mediterranean projects, including the GREGY (Greece – Egypt) electrical interconnector, while it certainly acted as a detrimental factor in the feasibility considerations of the EastMed pipeline project. In fact, the EastMed pipeline was effectively shelved in January 2022, following the decision of the United States to publicly withdrew its support, primarily attributed to American concerns that the project would act as a spoiler for rapprochement efforts with Ankara.[25]

While Turkey’s involvement in Libya has solidified over the last five years, it is also becoming an increasingly influential player in the Middle East following the fall of the Assad regime in Syria. The extent of Turkey’s influence with new President Ahmed al-Sharaa remains to be seen, but its military presence in northern Syria and northern Iraq has undeniably shifted the regional balance of power.  This is further compounded by its developing regional security ties, most notably though the diffusion of Turkish-produced military equipment like the Bayraktar TB2 drones, which has transformed the country’s power projection and cemented it as a major regional arms exporter.[26]

The relationship between Turkey and the European Union has been the subject of many research papers and debates and lies quite beyond the scope of this paper. However, it is increasingly clear that some accommodation will have to be reached with a Turkey that seeks to establish itself as the regional power of the Eastern Mediterranean.

With member-states having significantly different views on how to accommodate Turkey in the region’s security architecture, emphasized by the current debate on its membership in the EU’s SAFE joint procurement project on rearmament, the Pact for the Mediterranean will also be called upon to navigate between the existential threat from Turkey felt by two European Union member states, Turkey’s rivalry with France for primacy in the Eastern Mediterranean, as well as Italy’s, Malta’s, and Spain’s more accommodating stance.

Opportunity #1 – Energy

The European Union has staked its independence from Russian fossil fuels on the energy reserves of the Mediterranean and the Southern Neighbourhood. This includes several “tried and tested” options. Libya’s proven oil reserves are the largest on the African continent, even as political factors on the ground continue to complicate its exploitation.[27] Its neighbour, Algeria’s share of natural gas imports to the EU is at 17.8%, making it the second-largest supplier after Norway (50.8%) for the second quarter of 2025.[28] However, there is concern that the country will be unable to ramp up production to meet European demand.[29]

Recent energy developments in the Eastern Mediterranean have also generated strong interest as a potential solution in ensuring the EU’s energy autonomy. The discovery of substantial gas fields in the region, including the Israeli Leviathan, the Cypriot Aphrodite, and the Egyptian Zohr, in the 2010s marked a paradigm shift for the region. The discoveries in the maritime areas of Cyprus and Israel in particular, due to these countries’ smaller population and lower levels of consumption, could make the two countries net global exporters of natural gas.[30] Overall, the region is estimated to have as much as 8 trillion cubic metres in natural gas.

There are important geopolitical and infrastructure challenges that need to be overcome for this to become a reality, however. Firstly, Cyprus’ continued territorial disputes with Turkey, which refuses to recognize its EEZ, means that development in the extraction and exploitation of these resources has yet to materialise. In Egypt, among other issues, onshore liquefaction plants do not have the capacity to meet European demand, with Egypt only currently able to export the equivalent of 5% of the demand.[31] Additionally, the Egyptian government has so far failed to fully liberalise its gas market, which has also stunted investment in the country’s energy sector.

There are the kind of issues that must be addressed by the Pact. If the European Union is serious about its commitment to diversify its energy sources and become independent of Russian fossil fuels by 2027, it must prioritise its efforts in the Mediterranean. As a result, it must take concrete steps to facilitate Cyprus’ ability to capitalise on its gas discoveries while assisting Egypt in further developing its liquefied natural gas (LNG) export facilities.

But it is important to stress that massive infrastructure projects are required to further develop energy connectivity in the region. These include the aforementioned Great Sea and GREGY electricity interconnectors, but shelved projects like the EastMed pipeline should also be considered once more. Indicatively, Cyprus is currently set to export its gas through Egypt with Julien Pouget, Senior Vice President of Middle East & North Africa, Exploration & Production at TotalEnergies, noting that “TotalEnergies is very pleased to be part of the opening of an export route through Egypt for Cyprus gas. This Host Government Agreement represents a major step in valorizing the Cyprus gas through available LNG capacities in Egypt, contributing to Europe energy security by bringing additional LNG volumes”.[32] Clearly, a link to transport gas from the Eastern Mediterranean directly to Europe would be a welcome development.

Aside from its own reserves, the Mediterranean is also a critical point of entry for energy resources from other parts of the world. The Suez Canal has seen an increase in northbound oil and gas flows following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, with Europe increasingly relying on imports from the Middle East.[33] At the same time, the United States is looking to expand the export of American LNG to the continent. Countries like Greece, which has been developing its regasification capacity, have been singled out in this endeavour, as emphasized in the recent visit of United States Secretary of the Interior Doug Burgum in Athens.[34] This is because the country is strategically positioned to serve as an entry point, notably via the Revithoussa LNG terminal and the new Alexandroupolis Floating Storage and Regasification Unit (FSRU).

The Mediterranean will also likely be important for the European Union’s ‘green transition’, with the region possessing bountiful renewable energy sources in its solar and wind power generation potential.[35] If all solar, wind, and hydropower, projects in the region are completed, combined with current generation capacity, it is estimated that the region could produce a total of 779,2 GW, almost three times the current capacity and 73% of the regional goal of 1 TW.[36] Once again, the Pact must ensure that it creates a proactive and efficient framework in promoting this transition across the Mediterranean, but also ensuring the necessary infrastructure links to import this energy.

Opportunity #2 – Migration

Migration has been one of the primary challenges of the European Union over the last decade, both at the domestic political level and institutionally. At the country level, it has fuelled the rise of far-right parties across the continent, which often accompany their anti-migrant rhetoric with Euroscepticism. There have also been divisions between the member-states on how to best manage the influx of migrants and refugees. These are comprehensive differences, ranging from the very basics of practices when rescuing migrants at sea to questions of refugee and migrant quotas. The practical solution to this issue was the externalisation of the EU’s border control, with primary responsibility for managing migrants flow being delegated to the countries of the Southern Neighbourhood, with assistance packages being agreed with countries like Turkey (a total of €9 billion), Egypt (€7.4 billion), Lebanon, and Tunisia to stem the flow of migrants and refugees.[37]

But it is important to note the scale of the problem. More than a million people have crossed the Mediterranean over the last decade, with Greece registering almost a quarter of a million asylum applications just between 2019 and 2023.[38] Specifically, in 2023, the EU recorded over 380,000 irregular border crossings, the highest number since 2016, with the Central Mediterranean route, from North Africa, mainly Tunisia and Libya, to Italy and Malta, being the most active.[39]

With the failure of the European Union to adopt a comprehensive and shared approach to the issue, the states most affected by migration have established their own policies and methods to tackle the issue. The principle of non-refoulement and the definition of ‘safe countries’ has been at the heart of this debate, both in Italy and Greece. The two countries have also faced legal challenges to their policies with the European Court of Justice ruling against Italy’s controversial deal with Albania, and the European Court of Human Rights challenging Greece’s three-month suspension of the right to asylum.

Allegations of human rights violations have also been levelled against the border enforcement agencies tackling migration on both sides of the Mediterranean, with Libya being once more at the heart of the issue. European Union border agency Frontex has been accused of being complicit in severe violations of human rights by the Libyan coastguard as it provides it with aerial surveillance assistance. This often results in the return of migrants and refugees attempting to cross the Mediterranean to ‘systematic and widespread abuse’ in Libya.[40] Additionally, non-governmental organizations (NGO) operating in the region to rescue migrants and refugees have claimed that the Libyan Coast Guard has begun to shoot at the vessels in an effort to deter their activity. “It’s unacceptable that the Italian government and the EU allows criminal militia to fire on civilians,” said a spokesperson for one of these NGOs.[41] Yet, both Greece and Italy are set to continue their close co-operation with their Libyan partners to tackle the issue of migration.

But it is not only these partners that have been accused of violating the rights of migrants and asylum seekers. The Hellenic Coast Guard has long been accused of conducting pushbacks, and in the aftermath of the Pylos shipwreck and the more than 500 presumed dead, there were even institutional calls for the Frontex agency to leave the country in protest of its handling of migrant vessels.[42] The incident tragically highlighted the lack of effective search-and-rescue (SAR) capabilities and coordination in the Mediterranean, a crucial gap the Pact is set to address.

The issue of migration is a minefield for the European Union, filled with difficult choices and undesirable outcomes. As anti-migration rhetoric continues to proliferate at home, it is unlikely that the European Union will seek to radically change its enforcement model in the region. However, the Pact for the Mediterranean will have to be very careful in how it approaches the issue.

It is important that tackling the issue of migration does not continue to be perceived as being in the self-serving interest of the European Union, solved by offloading the ‘dirty work’ to its partners in the Southern Neighbourhood.[43] This would not only substantially undermine the EU’s credibility, particularly when it comes to issues of promoting good governance and the rule of law, but also leave it indebted to third parties and provide leverage to these actors.

Instead, the Pact for the Mediterranean must act as a starting point for a comprehensive reform of the European Union’s overall approach to migration. If the concerns of the European south are not addressed, then these states will likely once more pursue their own policy on the matter irrespective of whether it breaks from EU strategy or even legal and ethical norms.

Opportunity #3 – Connections and Corridors

The Mediterranean has been one of the most important meeting points of humanity for millennia, with cultural and commercial exchanges flourishing along its coastline since the Bronze Age. The Barcelona Process focused heavily on the importance of civil society for the further development of the ties between the states of the Mediterranean. However, today, the rise of far-right parties in Europe and the resurgence and entrenchment of authoritarian regimes in North Africa and the Middle East following the Arab Spring have left little room for manoeuvre in this regard.[44]

At the same time, the Mediterranean is set to become more interconnected than ever before. Economic corridors and infrastructure connectivity is expected to become a dominant feature of the region, something which must be capitalized upon to increase the cultural and social cohesion between the Mediterranean states. Cooperation on key issues and shared threats, including climate change, water resilience, and global pandemics, should be a key priority for the Pact. Even cooperation on tourism, which is a significant source of income for countries in the region, must be further developed, despite more than two billion euros having been already allocated to a total of 17 Interreg programmes in the region.[45]

Countries around the Mediterranean will face significant water shortages in the future, with millions of people already facing water scarcity.[46] With many of the world’s most water-stressed areas being located in the region, close co-operation will be required to counter the issue as there exist both a serious investment gap and a lack of technical expertise in confronting this problem.[47] Yet, it will be important for the European Union to actively assist its partners in mitigating the impact of climate change and to avoid the further desertification of the region, something that would only exacerbate cross-Mediterranean migratory flows.

Technological innovation and digital connectivity can also have an important role in bridging the divide between the states in the region and further unlock the area’s potential. Undersea fibre optic cables already account for the vast majority of internet traffic, and the EU Global Gateway investment project has already been seen as a valuable instrument in further developing a sustainable digital infrastructure and regulatory framework for the Mediterranean in the future despite difficulties in securing adequate funding.[48] Developing a communications network in line with European values and standards could allow the EU to engage in specific digital economy partnerships, aligning the region to its own economic and development priorities and further underlining its global role as an important digital partner.[49]

Several initiatives have been successful in forging links within the region, and instead of retreat, the Pact for the Mediterranean must double down on these efforts to promote a shared space of peace and prosperity. Soft power has always been one of the most important ways in which the European Union has pursued its goals on the global stage. “The role of culture as a vector for peace, democracy and economic development will continue to be supported to help build a more inclusive Mediterranean. Culture is a field where there is a real added value in working at regional level to reduce social isolation and build connections across the Mediterranean region”, noted the EU’s Regional Multiannual Indicative Programme.[50]

Opportunity #4 – Agency

Since the Napoleonic Era, political control of the Mediterranean has been determined by actors who were far from its shores, from the British Empire in the long nineteenth century to the Cold War struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union in the latter half of the twentieth. However, in the post-Cold War era these traditional rivalries have been steadily retreating, with the termination of Russia’s lease on the military base of Tartus acting as an emphatic capstone. But there is also the high likelihood that the Mediterranean will continue to feature prominently in a renewed era of Great Power competition. Indicatively, the Mediterranean saw one of the most significant concentration of warships in the world during the opening days of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

China is increasingly becoming a major factor in the region, developing its bilateral relations with the countries of North Africa and West Asia through a focus on soft power and development (best exemplified by the country’s Belt and Road Initiative or BRI) and buoyed by Beijing’s official policy of non-interference in domestic politics.[51] But it has also began developing deeper security and diplomatic relations with actors in the region, including establishing Comprehensive Strategic Partnerships with Algeria and Egypt. In fact, aside from the fact that China has become the leading trade partner for both countries, it also is providing them with military equipment and support (even conducting joint naval exercises with Egypt).[52] Chinese military supplies to northern Africa accounted for almost half (49%) of its total military exports to the continent. China also opened its first overseas military base in Djibouti, not far from the southern entrance to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. Additionally, China has been attempting to establish itself in the Balkans and Eastern Europe through the 14+1 cooperation scheme, with the COSCO-owned Greek port of Piraeus seen as a key entryway for the BRI into Europe.

While the United States will likely continue its pivot to the Indo-Pacific in an effort to contain Chinese aspirations, a more comprehensive and hawkish US policy could likely see the country re-engaging with the Mediterranean to this effect. With the current administration’s efforts to reinforce American shipbuilding capabilities, both military and commercial, it may also seek to re-establish its presence in one of the world’s most critical waterways. While the United States Sixth Fleet has dwindled in size since the end of the Cold War, usually down to one carrier battle group, it is strongly reinforced in times of crises. In the aftermath of the October 7, 2023, attack by Hamas, the USS Gerald Ford carrier and the amphibious assault ships USS Bataan and USS Wasp were all deployed to join the Sixth Fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean.

There are elements within the US military chain of command who directly view the BRI as a threat to US interests, as it strengthens China’s control over the global logistics system. The establishment of Alexandroupolis as the main port of entry for NATO materiel, a port free of connection to either China or Russia, was not a coincidence, nor was the Greek’s state decision to cancel the tender for the port due to its increased geopolitical and strategic importance spontaneous.[53] “[S]ome OBOR [One Belt One Road] investments could create potential military advantages for China, should China require access to selected foreign ports to pre-position the necessary logistics support to sustain naval deployments in waters as distant as the Indian Ocean, Mediterranean Sea, and Atlantic Ocean to protect its growing interests”, tellingly noted a Pentagon report in 2018.[54]

If the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC), supported by elements of the United States administration as a counterweight to the BRI,[55] materialises it would add yet another dimension to a possible renewed global struggle over the Mediterranean, with India and China likely to compete for influence in the region, and likely, the same actors. The IMEC, announced in September 2023, is intended to serve as a strategic and economic bridge between Asia, the Middle East, and Europe, positioning the Mediterranean as a central node in future global trade architecture. This convergence of competing great power-led corridors highlights the region’s increasing strategic value, necessitating a proactive and unified EU response through the new Pact.[56]

Additionally, states from the Gulf region, primarily Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, have also gradually increased their footprint in the Mediterranean, even if their focus is limited in scope. Initially enmeshing themselves in the region in the aftermath of the Arab Spring to counter the spread of the Turkey- and Qatar-backed Muslim Brotherhood,[57] the two Gulf states have since developed strategic and economic ties with both sides of the Mediterranean coast, particularly Greece and Egypt. These investments often focus on strategic sectors like ports, logistics, and renewable energy, creating an alternative source of capital and influence outside traditional EU and Chinese channels.

This could be a defining moment for the European Union to prove that it can be a serious geopolitical player.

This could be a defining moment for the European Union to prove that it can be a serious geopolitical player. While the threat of a US withdrawal from NATO has subsided, it is clear that the EU must move beyond its dependence on American policy to secure its own security and prosperity. The Mediterranean continues to be a region in flux, with several global and regional powers seeking to assert themselves in this strategically and economically critical area. The Pact for the Mediterranean must facilitate the European Union in its efforts to seize the initiative and muster the agency to chart its own path in a region that directly impacts it, rather than to once more be relegated to the role of a reactive spectator.

Conclusion

The Pact for the Mediterranean will arrive at a challenging time for the region. The divergence between the European Union and its Southern Neighbourhood seems more likely to grow deeper instead of being bridged. There are serious challenges on all fronts, political, economic, and social, that risk its viability entirely. A more holistic approach by the European Union to the region can only benefit its influence and credibility, but it must be careful in acknowledging and addressing the concerns of its member states in the region and be cognisant of the adverse global conditions.

Ultimately, the Pact will be judged by its implementation. Whether it will offer measurable and concrete actions to confront the challenges and grasp the opportunities of the region, or whether it will remain a document defined by good intentions, remains to be seen. To succeed, the Pact must prioritize internal EU cohesion, credibly address the trust deficit with Southern partners by balancing values and transactional interests, and demonstrate a unified strategic stance toward external actors, particularly Turkey. Only through such a consistent action can the EU fully capitalize on the energy, connectivity, and geopolitical agency opportunities the Mediterranean offers.

 

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https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20251003-italy-libya-migration-pact-under-scrutiny-as-bullets-fly

Melly, Paul, ‘Chad exploits Russian-Western rivalry to its advantage’, BBC News, 5/10/2024
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cx2kr40nlkpo

Nedos, Vassilis, ‘Ankara blocks research on cable route’, Kathimerini English Edition, 8/8/2025.
https://www.ekathimerini.com/politics/foreign-policy/1277492/ankara-blocks-research-on-cable-route/

“PM Mitsotakis announces EEZ delimitation talks with Libya”, Kathimerini English Edition, 21/09/2025.
https://www.ekathimerini.com/politics/foreign-policy/1281553/mitsotakis-announces-eez-delimitation-talks-with-libya/

Scicluna, Chris and Emmott, Robin, ‘Malta pulls out of new EU Libya sea patrols in migration row’, Reuters, 8/5/2020.
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-libya-idUSKBN22K1UT/

Stamouli, Nektaria and Röhn, Tim, ‘Greece must face punishment over abuses against migrants, Frontex official says’, Politico, 24/4/2025.
https://www.politico.eu/article/frontex-greece-punishment-migration-abuse-jonas-grimheden/

 

[1]https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/joint_communication_renewed_partnership_southern_neighbourhood.pdf

[2] Francis Fukuyama, ‘The End of History?’, The National Interest, Vol. 16 (Summer, 1989), p. 4.

[3]https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/joint_communication_renewed_partnership_southern_neighbourhood.pdf

[4] https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/when-member-states-are-divided-how-do-we-ensure-europe-able-act-0_en

[5] E., Hokayem, & R., Momtaz, Turbulence in the Eastern Mediterranean: Geopolitical, Security, and

Energy Dynamics (London, Routledge, 2024), pp. 265-266.

[6] https://www.ekathimerini.com/politics/foreign-policy/1281553/mitsotakis-announces-eez-delimitation-talks-with-libya/

[7] https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/italy-france/

[8] Hokayem, & Momtaz, Turbulence in the Eastern Mediterranean, pp. 265-266.

[9] https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-libya-idUSKBN22K1UT/

[10] https://www.politico.eu/article/italy-greece-sound-alarm-over-libya-allies-arent-rushing-to-help/

[11] https://www.euromesco.net/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Policy-Brief-N%C2%BA140.pdf

[12] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/doc_95_7

[13] https://romena.ohchr.org/en/human-rights-situation-mena-region

[14] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/STATEMENT_24_1513

[15] https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/01/16/egypt-repression-rising-poverty-sisis-second-decade

[16] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/ga/statement_24_1513

[17] https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/09/the-eus-dead-on-arrival-pact-for-the-mediterranean?lang=en

[18] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cx2kr40nlkpo

[19] https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/frances-strategic-failure-mali-postcolonial-disutility-force

[20] https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/09/the-eus-dead-on-arrival-pact-for-the-mediterranean?lang=en

[21] https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-9-2023-001267-ASW_EN.html

[22]https://idsc.gov.eg/upload/DocumentLibraryIssues/AttachmentA/10166/Egypt%27s%20Relations%20with%20BRICS%20%20One%20year%20after%20joining%20the%20group%20-%20future%20perspectives%20%20.pdf

[23] https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/libyat%C3%BCrkiye-statement-spokesperson-reported-agreement-hydrocarbons_en

[24] https://www.ekathimerini.com/politics/foreign-policy/1277492/ankara-blocks-research-on-cable-route/

[25] Hokayem, & Momtaz, Turbulence in the Eastern Mediterranean, pp. 265-266.

[26] https://www.prio.org/publications/13435

[27] https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/freeing-libyas-locked-oil-reserves

[28] https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=EU_imports_of_energy_products_-_latest_developments#:~:text=Norway%20was%20the%20largest%20supplier,Norway%20increased%20by%207.2%20pp

[29] https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/en/analyses/another-round-of-algerian-gas-for-europe/

[30] Hokayem, & Momtaz, Turbulence in the Eastern Mediterranean, p. 63.

[31] Ibid., p. 66.

[32] https://www.offshore-energy.biz/totalenergies-and-eni-sign-on-dotted-line-for-cyprus-gas-exports-through-egypt/

[33] https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=61025

[34] https://www.ekathimerini.com/economy/energy/1281386/diplomatic-engagement-is-key-for-chevrons-energy-project/

[35] https://iogpeurope.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/The-Mediterranean-an-energy-and-decarbonization-opportunity-for-Europe-UPDATED.pdf

[36] https://www.climatechampions.net/news/mediterranean-in-the-global-clean-energy-revolution/

[37]Hokayem, & Momtaz, Turbulence in the Eastern Mediterranean, p. 263.

[38] https://www.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Policy-brief_Greece.pdf

[39]https://www.frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news/news-release/significant-rise-in-irregular-border-crossings-in-2023-highest-since-2016-C0gGpm#:~:text=Significant%20rise%20in%20irregular%20border%20crossings%20in%202023%2C%20highest%20since%202016,-2024%2D01%2D26&text=The%20number%20of%20irregular%20border,to%20preliminary%20calculations%20by%20Frontex

[40] https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/12/12/eu-frontex-complicit-abuse-libya

[41] https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20251003-italy-libya-migration-pact-under-scrutiny-as-bullets-fly

[42] https://www.politico.eu/article/frontex-greece-punishment-migration-abuse-jonas-grimheden/

[43] https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/eu-north-africa-migration-first-181145

[44] https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/09/the-eus-dead-on-arrival-pact-for-the-mediterranean?lang=en

[45] https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/whats-new/newsroom/14-08-2025-cohesion-policy-towards-a-more-sustainable-tourism-in-the-mediterranean_en

[46] https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/21361dc9-26dc-11ef-a195-01aa75ed71a1

[47] Ibid.

[48] https://ecdpm.org/application/files/6617/1982/5473/Financing-Inclusive-Digital-Transformation-EU-Global-Gateway-ECDPM-Discussion-Paper-370-2024.pdf

[49] Ibid.

[50] https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/19e6c4a6-7d6a-4831-8a8c-f4bea98cf5a0_en

[51] https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/FP_20200720_china_mediterranean_ghafar_jacobs.pdf

[52] https://chinapower.csis.org/china-global-arms-trade/

[53] https://www.ekathimerini.com/economy/1197356/greece-to-cancel-alexandroupolis-port-tender-as-its-importance-increases/

[54] https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/who-controls-rimland-competition-and-rivalry-mediterranean-26983

[55] https://www.cfr.org/blog/will-us-plan-counter-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-work

[56] https://www.orfonline.org/research/integrating-the-eu-s-hinterland-through-imec

[57] https://ecfr.eu/special/eastern_med/gcc

Nikos Bakirtzis (Junior Research Fellow, South-East Europe Programme – ELIAMEP & Project Manager, think nea – New Narratives of EU Integration) authored the policy brief titled “Enlargement on the edge: Strategic investment, credibility and resilience” in the framework of ELIAMEP’s initiative think nea – New Narratives of EU Integration.

The memo was part of the first set of Ignita Memos — seven concise, strategic briefs developed within the Ignita Initiative. Each Memo outlines key insights and policy recommendations that define the preconditions for meaningful EU integration in the Western Balkans. Designed to strengthen civil society advocacy and guide institutional dialogue, the Memos distill lessons from the Ignita Forum’s first year and propose actionable priorities for both regional and EU-level stakeholders.

“Ignita 2025: On the Edge” was the inaugural edition of a new regional platform that brought together civil society, researchers, policymakers, the business community, and youth in sustained, strategic dialogue on the Western Balkans’ European future. Held in the repurposed creativity hub of ITP Prizren on October 8–10, 2025, the Forum’s theme, “On the Edge”, invited civil society to reclaim its role in shaping the region’s European trajectory through adaptive advocacy and grounded expertise in advancing EU accession efforts.

ELIAMEP is part of Ignita, a collaboration of regional civil society organizations led by the Open Society Foundations – Western Balkans (OSF-WB). Ignita serves as a cohesive hub for stakeholders engaged in regional cooperation and EU integration, providing a dynamic and flexible platform that adapts to the evolving landscape of enlargement policy. By employing innovative strategies and empowering key regional actors, Ignita enables a more active and informed role in shaping policymaking at both regional and EU levels. As a flagship initiative of OSF-WB, it is dedicated to forging meaningful connections and advancing a shared vision for a region fully integrated into the European Union.

You can read the policy brief here.

You can read the other policy briefs here.

Trotz der Budgetkürzungen für 2025 und 2026 bleibt Deutschland der größte Geber öffentlicher Entwicklungsleistungen (Official Development Assistance, ODA) unter den 27 EU-Mitgliedstaaten und trägt aufgrund seiner Wirtschaftskraft den größten Anteil am ODA-Budget der EU. Die laufenden Diskussionen zur Neuausrichtung der deutschen Entwicklungspolitik fokussieren sich bisher primär auf die bilaterale Zusammenarbeit, ohne die europäische Entwicklungspolitik genügend zu berücksichtigen. Letztere leistet jedoch zentrale Beiträge, um die entwicklungs- und außenpolitischen Ziele der Bundesregierung umzusetzen. Sie sollte daher stärker in die Reformdebatten miteinbezogen werden. Die gegenwärtige weltpolitische Lage erfordert es, europäische entwicklungspolitische Expertise und Prioritäten gezielt zu bündeln und insbesondere auch in die gemeinsame Strategiefindung einzubinden.
In den kommenden Jahren stehen die EU und Deutschland vor der dreifachen Herausforderung, gleichzeitig die sicherheitspolitische Handlungsfähigkeit auszubauen, die wirtschaftliche Wettbewerbsfähigkeit zu sichern und die Nachhaltigkeitsprioritäten des European Green Deals zu verwirklichen. Um diese Ziele zu erreichen, muss Entwicklungspolitik von einem Randthema zu einem strategischen und sichtbaren Pfeiler einer wertebasierten Außenpolitik werden, die geopolitische wie geoökonomische Realitäten reflektiert. Damit dies gelingt, schlagen wir fünf Schlüsselbereiche vor, welche Deutschland gemeinsam mit Brüssel ausgestalten und priorisieren sollte:
1. Wohlstandssicherung und Wirtschaftsförderung: Vier Jahre nach dem Start von Global Gateway sollte sich Deutschland für eine stärkere Partnerorientierung und für eine Konkretisierung der Initiative hinsichtlich ihrer formalen Ziele und Prioritäten stark machen – auch in den bevorstehenden EU-Haushaltsverhandlungen.
2. Sicherheitspolitische Beiträge von Entwicklungspolitik: Die EU und Deutschland sollten gezielt entwicklungspolitische Bereiche und Initiativen fördern, die einen sicherheitspolitischen Mehrwert entfalten. Dies ist insbesondere im Fall der zivilen Unterstützung der Ukraine und im Bereich der Krisenprävention in fragilen Kontexten möglich.
3. Migration: Die EU sollte ihre externe Migrationspolitik im Hinblick auf Wirksamkeit und unbeabsichtigte Folgen kritisch überprüfen. Sie sollte mehr Transparenz und klare Standards bei Migrationspartnerschaften schaffen und Konditionalität als begrenztes, kontextabhängiges Instrument einsetzen. Um gegenseitigen Nutzen für die EU und ihre Partner zu sichern, ist ein ausgewogenes Zusammenspiel von kurzfristiger Krisenbewältigung und langfristiger Ursachenbekämpfung entscheidend, das von Investitionen in legale Mobilitätsoptionen flankiert wird.
4. Team Europe im multilateralen Kontext: Die derzeit laufenden Reformdiskussionen in den Vereinten Nationen (VN) erfordern das Engagement der EU und ihrer Mitgliedstaaten und eine starke gemeinsame Position – auch angesichts der Verpflichtung des EU-Vertrags, multilaterale Lösungen für globale Herausforderungen zu suchen.
5. Demokratieförderung, transnationale Netzwerke und politische Bildung: Deutschland und Europa sollten ihre Demokratieförderung gemeinsam überdenken und priorisieren. Insbesondere zivilgesellschaftliche Organisationen, die sich für die Förderung von Demokratie und Menschenrechten einset-zen, sollten stärker unterstützt werden.

Trotz der Budgetkürzungen für 2025 und 2026 bleibt Deutschland der größte Geber öffentlicher Entwicklungsleistungen (Official Development Assistance, ODA) unter den 27 EU-Mitgliedstaaten und trägt aufgrund seiner Wirtschaftskraft den größten Anteil am ODA-Budget der EU. Die laufenden Diskussionen zur Neuausrichtung der deutschen Entwicklungspolitik fokussieren sich bisher primär auf die bilaterale Zusammenarbeit, ohne die europäische Entwicklungspolitik genügend zu berücksichtigen. Letztere leistet jedoch zentrale Beiträge, um die entwicklungs- und außenpolitischen Ziele der Bundesregierung umzusetzen. Sie sollte daher stärker in die Reformdebatten miteinbezogen werden. Die gegenwärtige weltpolitische Lage erfordert es, europäische entwicklungspolitische Expertise und Prioritäten gezielt zu bündeln und insbesondere auch in die gemeinsame Strategiefindung einzubinden.
In den kommenden Jahren stehen die EU und Deutschland vor der dreifachen Herausforderung, gleichzeitig die sicherheitspolitische Handlungsfähigkeit auszubauen, die wirtschaftliche Wettbewerbsfähigkeit zu sichern und die Nachhaltigkeitsprioritäten des European Green Deals zu verwirklichen. Um diese Ziele zu erreichen, muss Entwicklungspolitik von einem Randthema zu einem strategischen und sichtbaren Pfeiler einer wertebasierten Außenpolitik werden, die geopolitische wie geoökonomische Realitäten reflektiert. Damit dies gelingt, schlagen wir fünf Schlüsselbereiche vor, welche Deutschland gemeinsam mit Brüssel ausgestalten und priorisieren sollte:
1. Wohlstandssicherung und Wirtschaftsförderung: Vier Jahre nach dem Start von Global Gateway sollte sich Deutschland für eine stärkere Partnerorientierung und für eine Konkretisierung der Initiative hinsichtlich ihrer formalen Ziele und Prioritäten stark machen – auch in den bevorstehenden EU-Haushaltsverhandlungen.
2. Sicherheitspolitische Beiträge von Entwicklungspolitik: Die EU und Deutschland sollten gezielt entwicklungspolitische Bereiche und Initiativen fördern, die einen sicherheitspolitischen Mehrwert entfalten. Dies ist insbesondere im Fall der zivilen Unterstützung der Ukraine und im Bereich der Krisenprävention in fragilen Kontexten möglich.
3. Migration: Die EU sollte ihre externe Migrationspolitik im Hinblick auf Wirksamkeit und unbeabsichtigte Folgen kritisch überprüfen. Sie sollte mehr Transparenz und klare Standards bei Migrationspartnerschaften schaffen und Konditionalität als begrenztes, kontextabhängiges Instrument einsetzen. Um gegenseitigen Nutzen für die EU und ihre Partner zu sichern, ist ein ausgewogenes Zusammenspiel von kurzfristiger Krisenbewältigung und langfristiger Ursachenbekämpfung entscheidend, das von Investitionen in legale Mobilitätsoptionen flankiert wird.
4. Team Europe im multilateralen Kontext: Die derzeit laufenden Reformdiskussionen in den Vereinten Nationen (VN) erfordern das Engagement der EU und ihrer Mitgliedstaaten und eine starke gemeinsame Position – auch angesichts der Verpflichtung des EU-Vertrags, multilaterale Lösungen für globale Herausforderungen zu suchen.
5. Demokratieförderung, transnationale Netzwerke und politische Bildung: Deutschland und Europa sollten ihre Demokratieförderung gemeinsam überdenken und priorisieren. Insbesondere zivilgesellschaftliche Organisationen, die sich für die Förderung von Demokratie und Menschenrechten einset-zen, sollten stärker unterstützt werden.

Trotz der Budgetkürzungen für 2025 und 2026 bleibt Deutschland der größte Geber öffentlicher Entwicklungsleistungen (Official Development Assistance, ODA) unter den 27 EU-Mitgliedstaaten und trägt aufgrund seiner Wirtschaftskraft den größten Anteil am ODA-Budget der EU. Die laufenden Diskussionen zur Neuausrichtung der deutschen Entwicklungspolitik fokussieren sich bisher primär auf die bilaterale Zusammenarbeit, ohne die europäische Entwicklungspolitik genügend zu berücksichtigen. Letztere leistet jedoch zentrale Beiträge, um die entwicklungs- und außenpolitischen Ziele der Bundesregierung umzusetzen. Sie sollte daher stärker in die Reformdebatten miteinbezogen werden. Die gegenwärtige weltpolitische Lage erfordert es, europäische entwicklungspolitische Expertise und Prioritäten gezielt zu bündeln und insbesondere auch in die gemeinsame Strategiefindung einzubinden.
In den kommenden Jahren stehen die EU und Deutschland vor der dreifachen Herausforderung, gleichzeitig die sicherheitspolitische Handlungsfähigkeit auszubauen, die wirtschaftliche Wettbewerbsfähigkeit zu sichern und die Nachhaltigkeitsprioritäten des European Green Deals zu verwirklichen. Um diese Ziele zu erreichen, muss Entwicklungspolitik von einem Randthema zu einem strategischen und sichtbaren Pfeiler einer wertebasierten Außenpolitik werden, die geopolitische wie geoökonomische Realitäten reflektiert. Damit dies gelingt, schlagen wir fünf Schlüsselbereiche vor, welche Deutschland gemeinsam mit Brüssel ausgestalten und priorisieren sollte:
1. Wohlstandssicherung und Wirtschaftsförderung: Vier Jahre nach dem Start von Global Gateway sollte sich Deutschland für eine stärkere Partnerorientierung und für eine Konkretisierung der Initiative hinsichtlich ihrer formalen Ziele und Prioritäten stark machen – auch in den bevorstehenden EU-Haushaltsverhandlungen.
2. Sicherheitspolitische Beiträge von Entwicklungspolitik: Die EU und Deutschland sollten gezielt entwicklungspolitische Bereiche und Initiativen fördern, die einen sicherheitspolitischen Mehrwert entfalten. Dies ist insbesondere im Fall der zivilen Unterstützung der Ukraine und im Bereich der Krisenprävention in fragilen Kontexten möglich.
3. Migration: Die EU sollte ihre externe Migrationspolitik im Hinblick auf Wirksamkeit und unbeabsichtigte Folgen kritisch überprüfen. Sie sollte mehr Transparenz und klare Standards bei Migrationspartnerschaften schaffen und Konditionalität als begrenztes, kontextabhängiges Instrument einsetzen. Um gegenseitigen Nutzen für die EU und ihre Partner zu sichern, ist ein ausgewogenes Zusammenspiel von kurzfristiger Krisenbewältigung und langfristiger Ursachenbekämpfung entscheidend, das von Investitionen in legale Mobilitätsoptionen flankiert wird.
4. Team Europe im multilateralen Kontext: Die derzeit laufenden Reformdiskussionen in den Vereinten Nationen (VN) erfordern das Engagement der EU und ihrer Mitgliedstaaten und eine starke gemeinsame Position – auch angesichts der Verpflichtung des EU-Vertrags, multilaterale Lösungen für globale Herausforderungen zu suchen.
5. Demokratieförderung, transnationale Netzwerke und politische Bildung: Deutschland und Europa sollten ihre Demokratieförderung gemeinsam überdenken und priorisieren. Insbesondere zivilgesellschaftliche Organisationen, die sich für die Förderung von Demokratie und Menschenrechten einset-zen, sollten stärker unterstützt werden.

Das Bundeskabinett will heute die Aktivrente beschließen. Menschen, die über das reguläre Rentenalter hinaus in abhängiger Beschäftigung arbeiten, dürfen dann ab 2026 bis zu 2000 Euro im Monat steuerfrei hinzuverdienen. Dazu eine Einschätzung von Peter Haan, Leiter der Abteilung Staat am DIW Berlin:

Es ist richtig, die Beschäftigung älterer Menschen zu fördern. Aktuell sind in Deutschland circa 20 Prozent der 65- bis 69-Jährigen erwerbstätig - in der Regel in Minijobs. Hier liegt also ein wichtiges Potenzial, um den Fachkräftemangel zu reduzieren und das Rentensystem zu stabilisieren.

Der Effekt der Aktivrente dürfte aber überschaubar sein. Dazu kommt, dass negative fiskalische Effekte zu erwarten sind und dass verteilungspolitische sowie verfassungsrechtliche Fragen bleiben. Insbesondere die Nichtberücksichtigung von Selbständigen könnte zu Problemen führen. Finanzielle Anreize sind nur ein Faktor, warum ältere Menschen arbeiten. Wichtiger sind Arbeitsbedingungen, Sinn und Befriedigung durch Arbeit, aber auch Weiterbildung und Gesundheit. Hier muss die Politik investieren.

Gleichzeitig sollte das Rentensystem so reformiert werden, dass es keine Anreize gibt, früher aus der Beschäftigung zu gehen. Reformen bei der Rente für besonders langjährig Versicherte („Rente mit 63“) oder bei der steuerlich geförderte Altersteilzeit sollten an erster Stelle stehen.

Hohe Inflation hat den Anstieg der Bruttostundenlöhne und Haushaltsnettoeinkommen gebremst – Einkommensungleichheit und Armutsrisikoquote stagnieren seit 2020 – Unter Geflüchteten und Erwerbslosen ist Armutsrisiko weit überdurchschnittlich hoch und deutlich gestiegen Die hohe Inflation der Jahre 20 ...

The World Bank and IMF Annual Meetings for 2025 are taking place in Washington, D.C., October 13–18, at the World Bank Group and IMF headquarters. The meetings bring together the international community to discuss global economic challenges and opportunities, with a focus on creating jobs and driving sustainable growth, according to the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and World Bank.
 
Meanwhile, with prices at record highs, the IMF should use its gold reserves to fund much-needed support for developing countries.

By Michael Galant and Ivana Vasic-Lalovic
WASHINGTON DC, Oct 15 2025 (IPS)

Countries across the Global South face an accelerating climate crisis, tepid growth, and unsustainable levels of debt. Yet hopes of finding support at the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Annual Meetings in Washington are dim. The IMF is tightening its purse strings — even as it leaves untouched a vast treasure of more than 3,000 tons of gold that offers a prime opportunity to stabilize the global economy.

While IMF lending yielded record income in FY2024, fears that Trump will cut off funding — combined with the organization’s exposure on an ill-advised,
US-directed mega-loan to Argentina — have prompted the Fund to reassess its assistance to those most in need.

At last year’s meetings, the IMF implemented a system of tiered interest rates on loans made through the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT) — a formerly interest-free lending facility for low-income countries.

The Fund also elected to maintain (if slightly modify) its controversial “surcharge” policy, which generates revenue for the IMF by charging onerous fees to highly indebted middle-income countries. Income from surcharges is now effectively being used to fund the PRGT, forcing these distressed countries to
subsidize the Fund’s concessional lending.

Yet while the IMF squeezes financing from the very countries it is meant to support, it is, in fact, sitting on hundreds of billions of dollars worth of idle firepower.

When the Fund was founded in 1944, members were required to pay at least a quarter of their initial contribution in gold, which at the time was the foundation of the global monetary order. The gold standard is long gone, but the IMF still holds 90.5 million ounces — or over 3,000 tons — of the precious metal, historically held at the central banks of major shareholders.

Critically, this gold is still on the IMF’s books at a price determined in 1944: roughly $48 per ounce. This year, amid geopolitical uncertainty and increased demand from central banks, prices soared to all-time highs; for the first time ever, gold prices now exceed $4,000 per ounce.

In other words, the IMF’s gold reserves are worth over 85 times more than its accounting would suggest.

Selling just 1.5 percent of these holdings would cover the income generated from all surcharge payments through 2030. Selling 10 percent would cover the PRGT’s entire current lending envelope for a decade.

There’s precedent for such a move. In 1999, when gold was $282 per ounce, the IMF sold about 444 tons of gold directly to IMF members, who immediately returned it at the same price in fulfillment of outstanding debts.

The IMF was thus left with the same quantity of gold holdings, but with about $3 billion in profit to provide debt relief for low-income countries as a part of the celebrated Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative.

In 2009, with gold prices still less than a third of today’s, the IMF board agreed to sell an eighth of its holdings outright, generating $15 billion in proceeds, a portion of which was transferred to the PRGT.

So, what’s stopping the IMF from doing the same today?

An agreement to sell gold reserves requires an 85 percent vote of the IMF board. As the proceeds from gold sales are, by default, distributed to IMF members in proportion to their quotas, a sale to bolster IMF lending power would require prior commitment from members to return their share of the windfall. But these political hurdles have been cleared before, in both 1999 and 2009.

While the US, which alone holds an effective veto over major IMF decisions, would have to agree to any arrangement, it’s difficult to see a cause for objection. Strengthening global economic stability — and therefore demand for US exports — at no new cost to the United States should hardly run afoul of an “America First” agenda.

Moreover, common concerns about the impacts of a sale on the gold market mean little in today’s context. With prices at record highs, the market can easily weather any price drops from an IMF sell-off, which can in any case be mitigated through the use of phased sales and off-market transactions.

And while some have historically fretted over the prudence of selling off a portion of the institution’s “rainy day” fund, selling while prices are sky-high makes good financial sense, and would easily leave plenty for future need.

Even if the political challenges to a gold sale prove insurmountable, there may still be a way to unlock its benefits; the IMF can simply revalue its gold holdings to match the market price, thus increasing the assets on its books without conducting even a single transaction.

Germany, Italy, and South Africa have all recently taken similar actions with their national gold holdings, and there is some speculation that the United States might follow suit. In fact, the IMF’s own accounting guidelines recommend countries value gold holdings at the market rate.

Awareness of the need to tap the IMF’s undervalued gold reserves is growing. In the past year, leading experts, top officials from Brazil and South Africa, and the G-24, which represents developing country interests at the Fund, all called on the organization to consider a gold sale.

Seeing that call through would take additional political will. But if the alternative is letting developing countries founder in the current crisis — or worse, bleeding them dry in order to protect the IMF’s balance sheets — then the choice couldn’t be clearer.

Michael Galant is a Senior Research and Outreach Associate, and Ivana Vasic-Lalovic is a Senior Research Associate, at the Center for Economic and Policy Research (cepr.net) in Washington, DC

IPS UN Bureau

 

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Am 17. und 18. November organisieren wir einen zweitägigen Präsenz-Workshop zum Sozio-oekonomischen Panel (SOEP) am DIW Berlin. Neben Vorträgen zu Aufbau, Datenstruktur, Ziehungsdesign und Gewichtungsstrategie bieten hands-on Sessions eine praxisorientierte Annäherung an die Daten und ihre ...

Bonn, 14. Oktober 2025.  Während Frauen in ländlichen Gebieten eine entscheidende Rolle in der Landwirtschaft und in Ernährungssystemen spielen, werden sie in Datenerhebungen und Entscheidungsprozessen allzu oft vergessen.

Am 15. Oktober begehen wir den Internationalen Tag der Frauen in ländlichen Gebieten und würdigen damit „die zentrale Rolle von Frauen [...] und ihren Beitrag zur Förderung der landwirtschaftlichen und ländlichen Entwicklung, zur Verbesserung der Ernährungssicherheit und zur Beseitigung der ländlichen Armut“. Das Thema für 2025, „Der Aufstieg der Frauen auf dem Land: Mit Beijing+30 eine resiliente Zukunft aufbauen“, unterstreicht die Ungleichheit, mit der ländliche Frauen nach wie vor konfrontiert sind, und ihre entscheidende Rolle für eine nachhaltige Entwicklung.

Zahlreiche Fakten belegen die entscheidende Rolle von Frauen in der landwirtschaftlichen Produktion. Zum Beispiel das Anpflanzen, Ernten und Verarbeiten von Feldfrüchten, das Sichern der Ernährung ihrer Haushalte und das Hüten der natürlichen Ressourcen für künftige Generationen. Allerdings gehören Frauen in ländlichen Gebieten oft zu den Ärmsten und stellen den Großteil der Analphabet*innen weltweit. Schätzungen zufolge wäre das Potenzial von Frauen enorm, wenn sie nur denselben Zugang und die gleichen Chancen wie Männer hätten. Millionen von Menschen würden so aus der Armut herauskommen.

Eines ist klar: Frauen in ländlichen Gebieten sind Multiplikatorinnen in ihren Gemeinschaften. Damit dieses Potenzial ausgeschöpft werden kann, müssen politische Maßnahmen jedoch auf einem differenzierten Verständnis der vielfältigen Lebensrealitäten von Frauen in ländlichen Gebieten beruhen. Hinter der öffentlichen Anerkennung von „ländlichen Frauen“ steht eine vereinfachende Zuschreibung. Wer verbirgt sich tatsächlich hinter dieser Bezeichnung? Datenlücken zeigen, dass ihre Lebensrealitäten bislang nur unzureichend abgebildet werden.

Das Wissen um die bestehenden Lücken hat verschiedene Datensysteme mit geschlechtsspezifischer Differenzierung hervorgebracht. Die Gender Disaggregated Labor Database der Weltbank liefert detaillierte Einblicke in die Erwerbsbeteiligung in unterschiedlichen Berufsfeldern. Der UN Women Data Hub erhebt Daten, um die Überwachung der Nachhaltigkeitsziele (SDG-Monitoring) aus einer Geschlechterperspektive zu unterstützen. Ebenso misst der Women’s Empowerment in Agriculture Index (WEAI), die Handlungsfähigkeit und Mitbestimmung von Frauen in landwirtschaftlichen Entscheidungsprozessen. Doch auch wenn die Verfügbarkeit solcher Daten zunimmt, zeigen die bisherigen Erkenntnisse klar: Geschlechtsspezifische Ungleichheiten bestehen fort und unser Wissen bleibt begrenzt.

Trotz erzielter Fortschritte bilden unsere Datensysteme die Vielfalt der Lebensrealitäten von Frauen noch immer nicht umfassend ab. Wir sind uns der strukturellen Benachteiligung und Mehrfachdiskriminierung von Frauen bewusst. Sie manifestiert sich in ungleichen Voraussetzungen für den Zugang zu, die Kontrolle über und den Besitz von grundlegenden Ressourcen, in asymmetrischen Machtverhältnissen, dem Ausschluss von Frauen aus Entscheidungsprozessen sowie der geschlechtsspezifischen Arbeitsteilung. Hinzu kommen Gewalt und soziale Normen, die dem Empowerment von Frauen entgegenstehen. Während die Diskriminierung von Frauen gut dokumentiert ist, bleiben intersektionale Diskriminierungen weitgehend unsichtbar. Denn die Überschneidung von Geschlecht mit Alter, ethnischer Zugehörigkeit, Familienstand, Klasse oder geografischem Kontext schafft jeweils eigene Muster von Privileg und Ausgrenzung. Hier beginnen die Datenlücken sichtbar zu werden.

In vielen Fällen verschleiern unsere Annahmen über „die Frauen“ jene Vorurteile, die schon bei der Datenerhebung und -interpretation zum Tragen kommen. Viele Erhebungen erfolgen auf Haushaltsebene oder aus öffentlichen Quellen, meist aus einer männlich geprägten Perspektive. So mag ein Haushalt Land besitzen, ohne dass Frauen Einfluss auf dessen Nutzung haben. Der Kauf moderner Landmaschinen bedeutet nicht automatisch, dass Frauen sie auch bedienen können, da ihnen die entsprechende Ausbildung fehlt.

Darüber hinaus existieren Dimensionen der Lebenswirklichkeit von Frauen, die gänzlich außerhalb unseres derzeitigen Wissens liegen. Wer fundierte politische Empfehlungen für Frauen in ländlichen Gebieten entwickeln und ihre zentrale Rolle sichtbar machen will, muss sich bewusst mit diesen blinden Flecken auseinandersetzen. Die bloße Aufnahme einer Geschlechtsvariable in eine Umfrage genügt nicht mehr. Echte Inklusivität erfordert einen tiefgreifenden Wandel in Forschungsdesign und Methodik. Partizipative Ansätze – etwa gemeinschaftliche Lernplattformen, Fokusgruppendiskussionen oder kooperative Forschungsprozesse – können helfen, die verborgenen Dynamiken innerhalb von Haushalten und Gemeinschaften offenzulegen.

Am Internationalen Tag der Frauen in ländlichen Gebieten sollten sich Entwicklungsorganisationen, Regierungen, Forschende und Gemeinschaften gleichermaßen dazu verpflichten, Frauen in all ihrer Vielfalt als zentrale Akteurinnen ländlicher Entwicklung anzuerkennen und das Bewusstsein für das zu schärfen, was wir noch nicht wissen. Frauen in ländlichen Gebieten sichtbar zu machen, bestehende Lücken bei Ressourcen, Rechten und Daten zu schließen und ihre vielfältigen Perspektiven einzubeziehen, sind konkrete Schritte auf dem Weg zu Geschlechtergerechtigkeit, ökologischer Nachhaltigkeit und einer inklusiveren ländlichen Wirtschaft.

Bonn, 14. Oktober 2025.  Während Frauen in ländlichen Gebieten eine entscheidende Rolle in der Landwirtschaft und in Ernährungssystemen spielen, werden sie in Datenerhebungen und Entscheidungsprozessen allzu oft vergessen.

Am 15. Oktober begehen wir den Internationalen Tag der Frauen in ländlichen Gebieten und würdigen damit „die zentrale Rolle von Frauen [...] und ihren Beitrag zur Förderung der landwirtschaftlichen und ländlichen Entwicklung, zur Verbesserung der Ernährungssicherheit und zur Beseitigung der ländlichen Armut“. Das Thema für 2025, „Der Aufstieg der Frauen auf dem Land: Mit Beijing+30 eine resiliente Zukunft aufbauen“, unterstreicht die Ungleichheit, mit der ländliche Frauen nach wie vor konfrontiert sind, und ihre entscheidende Rolle für eine nachhaltige Entwicklung.

Zahlreiche Fakten belegen die entscheidende Rolle von Frauen in der landwirtschaftlichen Produktion. Zum Beispiel das Anpflanzen, Ernten und Verarbeiten von Feldfrüchten, das Sichern der Ernährung ihrer Haushalte und das Hüten der natürlichen Ressourcen für künftige Generationen. Allerdings gehören Frauen in ländlichen Gebieten oft zu den Ärmsten und stellen den Großteil der Analphabet*innen weltweit. Schätzungen zufolge wäre das Potenzial von Frauen enorm, wenn sie nur denselben Zugang und die gleichen Chancen wie Männer hätten. Millionen von Menschen würden so aus der Armut herauskommen.

Eines ist klar: Frauen in ländlichen Gebieten sind Multiplikatorinnen in ihren Gemeinschaften. Damit dieses Potenzial ausgeschöpft werden kann, müssen politische Maßnahmen jedoch auf einem differenzierten Verständnis der vielfältigen Lebensrealitäten von Frauen in ländlichen Gebieten beruhen. Hinter der öffentlichen Anerkennung von „ländlichen Frauen“ steht eine vereinfachende Zuschreibung. Wer verbirgt sich tatsächlich hinter dieser Bezeichnung? Datenlücken zeigen, dass ihre Lebensrealitäten bislang nur unzureichend abgebildet werden.

Das Wissen um die bestehenden Lücken hat verschiedene Datensysteme mit geschlechtsspezifischer Differenzierung hervorgebracht. Die Gender Disaggregated Labor Database der Weltbank liefert detaillierte Einblicke in die Erwerbsbeteiligung in unterschiedlichen Berufsfeldern. Der UN Women Data Hub erhebt Daten, um die Überwachung der Nachhaltigkeitsziele (SDG-Monitoring) aus einer Geschlechterperspektive zu unterstützen. Ebenso misst der Women’s Empowerment in Agriculture Index (WEAI), die Handlungsfähigkeit und Mitbestimmung von Frauen in landwirtschaftlichen Entscheidungsprozessen. Doch auch wenn die Verfügbarkeit solcher Daten zunimmt, zeigen die bisherigen Erkenntnisse klar: Geschlechtsspezifische Ungleichheiten bestehen fort und unser Wissen bleibt begrenzt.

Trotz erzielter Fortschritte bilden unsere Datensysteme die Vielfalt der Lebensrealitäten von Frauen noch immer nicht umfassend ab. Wir sind uns der strukturellen Benachteiligung und Mehrfachdiskriminierung von Frauen bewusst. Sie manifestiert sich in ungleichen Voraussetzungen für den Zugang zu, die Kontrolle über und den Besitz von grundlegenden Ressourcen, in asymmetrischen Machtverhältnissen, dem Ausschluss von Frauen aus Entscheidungsprozessen sowie der geschlechtsspezifischen Arbeitsteilung. Hinzu kommen Gewalt und soziale Normen, die dem Empowerment von Frauen entgegenstehen. Während die Diskriminierung von Frauen gut dokumentiert ist, bleiben intersektionale Diskriminierungen weitgehend unsichtbar. Denn die Überschneidung von Geschlecht mit Alter, ethnischer Zugehörigkeit, Familienstand, Klasse oder geografischem Kontext schafft jeweils eigene Muster von Privileg und Ausgrenzung. Hier beginnen die Datenlücken sichtbar zu werden.

In vielen Fällen verschleiern unsere Annahmen über „die Frauen“ jene Vorurteile, die schon bei der Datenerhebung und -interpretation zum Tragen kommen. Viele Erhebungen erfolgen auf Haushaltsebene oder aus öffentlichen Quellen, meist aus einer männlich geprägten Perspektive. So mag ein Haushalt Land besitzen, ohne dass Frauen Einfluss auf dessen Nutzung haben. Der Kauf moderner Landmaschinen bedeutet nicht automatisch, dass Frauen sie auch bedienen können, da ihnen die entsprechende Ausbildung fehlt.

Darüber hinaus existieren Dimensionen der Lebenswirklichkeit von Frauen, die gänzlich außerhalb unseres derzeitigen Wissens liegen. Wer fundierte politische Empfehlungen für Frauen in ländlichen Gebieten entwickeln und ihre zentrale Rolle sichtbar machen will, muss sich bewusst mit diesen blinden Flecken auseinandersetzen. Die bloße Aufnahme einer Geschlechtsvariable in eine Umfrage genügt nicht mehr. Echte Inklusivität erfordert einen tiefgreifenden Wandel in Forschungsdesign und Methodik. Partizipative Ansätze – etwa gemeinschaftliche Lernplattformen, Fokusgruppendiskussionen oder kooperative Forschungsprozesse – können helfen, die verborgenen Dynamiken innerhalb von Haushalten und Gemeinschaften offenzulegen.

Am Internationalen Tag der Frauen in ländlichen Gebieten sollten sich Entwicklungsorganisationen, Regierungen, Forschende und Gemeinschaften gleichermaßen dazu verpflichten, Frauen in all ihrer Vielfalt als zentrale Akteurinnen ländlicher Entwicklung anzuerkennen und das Bewusstsein für das zu schärfen, was wir noch nicht wissen. Frauen in ländlichen Gebieten sichtbar zu machen, bestehende Lücken bei Ressourcen, Rechten und Daten zu schließen und ihre vielfältigen Perspektiven einzubeziehen, sind konkrete Schritte auf dem Weg zu Geschlechtergerechtigkeit, ökologischer Nachhaltigkeit und einer inklusiveren ländlichen Wirtschaft.

Bonn, 14. Oktober 2025.  Während Frauen in ländlichen Gebieten eine entscheidende Rolle in der Landwirtschaft und in Ernährungssystemen spielen, werden sie in Datenerhebungen und Entscheidungsprozessen allzu oft vergessen.

Am 15. Oktober begehen wir den Internationalen Tag der Frauen in ländlichen Gebieten und würdigen damit „die zentrale Rolle von Frauen [...] und ihren Beitrag zur Förderung der landwirtschaftlichen und ländlichen Entwicklung, zur Verbesserung der Ernährungssicherheit und zur Beseitigung der ländlichen Armut“. Das Thema für 2025, „Der Aufstieg der Frauen auf dem Land: Mit Beijing+30 eine resiliente Zukunft aufbauen“, unterstreicht die Ungleichheit, mit der ländliche Frauen nach wie vor konfrontiert sind, und ihre entscheidende Rolle für eine nachhaltige Entwicklung.

Zahlreiche Fakten belegen die entscheidende Rolle von Frauen in der landwirtschaftlichen Produktion. Zum Beispiel das Anpflanzen, Ernten und Verarbeiten von Feldfrüchten, das Sichern der Ernährung ihrer Haushalte und das Hüten der natürlichen Ressourcen für künftige Generationen. Allerdings gehören Frauen in ländlichen Gebieten oft zu den Ärmsten und stellen den Großteil der Analphabet*innen weltweit. Schätzungen zufolge wäre das Potenzial von Frauen enorm, wenn sie nur denselben Zugang und die gleichen Chancen wie Männer hätten. Millionen von Menschen würden so aus der Armut herauskommen.

Eines ist klar: Frauen in ländlichen Gebieten sind Multiplikatorinnen in ihren Gemeinschaften. Damit dieses Potenzial ausgeschöpft werden kann, müssen politische Maßnahmen jedoch auf einem differenzierten Verständnis der vielfältigen Lebensrealitäten von Frauen in ländlichen Gebieten beruhen. Hinter der öffentlichen Anerkennung von „ländlichen Frauen“ steht eine vereinfachende Zuschreibung. Wer verbirgt sich tatsächlich hinter dieser Bezeichnung? Datenlücken zeigen, dass ihre Lebensrealitäten bislang nur unzureichend abgebildet werden.

Das Wissen um die bestehenden Lücken hat verschiedene Datensysteme mit geschlechtsspezifischer Differenzierung hervorgebracht. Die Gender Disaggregated Labor Database der Weltbank liefert detaillierte Einblicke in die Erwerbsbeteiligung in unterschiedlichen Berufsfeldern. Der UN Women Data Hub erhebt Daten, um die Überwachung der Nachhaltigkeitsziele (SDG-Monitoring) aus einer Geschlechterperspektive zu unterstützen. Ebenso misst der Women’s Empowerment in Agriculture Index (WEAI), die Handlungsfähigkeit und Mitbestimmung von Frauen in landwirtschaftlichen Entscheidungsprozessen. Doch auch wenn die Verfügbarkeit solcher Daten zunimmt, zeigen die bisherigen Erkenntnisse klar: Geschlechtsspezifische Ungleichheiten bestehen fort und unser Wissen bleibt begrenzt.

Trotz erzielter Fortschritte bilden unsere Datensysteme die Vielfalt der Lebensrealitäten von Frauen noch immer nicht umfassend ab. Wir sind uns der strukturellen Benachteiligung und Mehrfachdiskriminierung von Frauen bewusst. Sie manifestiert sich in ungleichen Voraussetzungen für den Zugang zu, die Kontrolle über und den Besitz von grundlegenden Ressourcen, in asymmetrischen Machtverhältnissen, dem Ausschluss von Frauen aus Entscheidungsprozessen sowie der geschlechtsspezifischen Arbeitsteilung. Hinzu kommen Gewalt und soziale Normen, die dem Empowerment von Frauen entgegenstehen. Während die Diskriminierung von Frauen gut dokumentiert ist, bleiben intersektionale Diskriminierungen weitgehend unsichtbar. Denn die Überschneidung von Geschlecht mit Alter, ethnischer Zugehörigkeit, Familienstand, Klasse oder geografischem Kontext schafft jeweils eigene Muster von Privileg und Ausgrenzung. Hier beginnen die Datenlücken sichtbar zu werden.

In vielen Fällen verschleiern unsere Annahmen über „die Frauen“ jene Vorurteile, die schon bei der Datenerhebung und -interpretation zum Tragen kommen. Viele Erhebungen erfolgen auf Haushaltsebene oder aus öffentlichen Quellen, meist aus einer männlich geprägten Perspektive. So mag ein Haushalt Land besitzen, ohne dass Frauen Einfluss auf dessen Nutzung haben. Der Kauf moderner Landmaschinen bedeutet nicht automatisch, dass Frauen sie auch bedienen können, da ihnen die entsprechende Ausbildung fehlt.

Darüber hinaus existieren Dimensionen der Lebenswirklichkeit von Frauen, die gänzlich außerhalb unseres derzeitigen Wissens liegen. Wer fundierte politische Empfehlungen für Frauen in ländlichen Gebieten entwickeln und ihre zentrale Rolle sichtbar machen will, muss sich bewusst mit diesen blinden Flecken auseinandersetzen. Die bloße Aufnahme einer Geschlechtsvariable in eine Umfrage genügt nicht mehr. Echte Inklusivität erfordert einen tiefgreifenden Wandel in Forschungsdesign und Methodik. Partizipative Ansätze – etwa gemeinschaftliche Lernplattformen, Fokusgruppendiskussionen oder kooperative Forschungsprozesse – können helfen, die verborgenen Dynamiken innerhalb von Haushalten und Gemeinschaften offenzulegen.

Am Internationalen Tag der Frauen in ländlichen Gebieten sollten sich Entwicklungsorganisationen, Regierungen, Forschende und Gemeinschaften gleichermaßen dazu verpflichten, Frauen in all ihrer Vielfalt als zentrale Akteurinnen ländlicher Entwicklung anzuerkennen und das Bewusstsein für das zu schärfen, was wir noch nicht wissen. Frauen in ländlichen Gebieten sichtbar zu machen, bestehende Lücken bei Ressourcen, Rechten und Daten zu schließen und ihre vielfältigen Perspektiven einzubeziehen, sind konkrete Schritte auf dem Weg zu Geschlechtergerechtigkeit, ökologischer Nachhaltigkeit und einer inklusiveren ländlichen Wirtschaft.

Written by Tim Peters and Jakub Przetacznik with Ana Luisa Melo Almeida.

Updated on 07.10.2025

In response to Russia’s full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine, which started in February 2022, the European Union (EU) and its Member States have provided unprecedented financial, military and humanitarian support to Ukraine. According to European Commission figures, Team Europe, consisting of the EU and its Member States, has made available around €173.5 billion in support to Ukraine. This support encompasses macro-financial assistance, financial support through the Ukraine Facility, humanitarian aid and military assistance from Member States and the European Peace Facility, as well as support to Ukrainian refugees in the EU.

The overall support for Ukraine provided by Team Europe is now larger than the support provided by the United States, except in terms of military support allocation, even though Team Europe has provided 83 % of the tanks and 61 % of the air defence systems given to Ukraine since the start of the full-scale war.

The disbursement of EU payments is conditional on Ukraine implementing the Ukraine Plan – an ambitious reform and investment plan drafted by Ukraine’s government and endorsed by the EU. The G7 have agreed upon a further €45 billion loan, with €18.1 billion of the whole amount to be financed by the EU. For that purpose, a Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism has been established, which uses extraordinary revenues originating from Russian sovereign assets immobilised in the G7 member states to repay loans and associated interest costs. The European Parliament has repeatedly called for a full confiscation of immobilised Russian sovereign assets with the objective of making Russia pay for the destruction it has brought on Ukraine. The European Commission has proposed to use those assets for a ‘reparation loan’ to Ukraine.

Read the complete briefing on ‘State of Play: EU support to Ukraine‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Team Europe financial, humanitarian and military support for Ukraine, February 2022 to September 2025, in € billion Bilateral and EU budget contributions to Ukraine by EU and non-EU Member States, 2022-2025, in € billion and as a % of GNI

Populisten inszenieren Klimaschutz als Klassenkampf und schüren so Ängste. Fakt ist: Das Aus für den Verbrennungsmotor ist sozial, wenn die Kosten fair verteilt werden., Die Bundesregierung streitet über das geplante Verbrenner-Aus ab 2035. Dabei geht es nicht nur um Klimapolitik, sondern auch um soziale Gerechtigkeit: Wer trägt die Kosten – und wer profitiert? In Deutschland instrumentalisieren populistische Kräfte diese Debatte zunehmend, indem sie Klimaschutz als ...

Written by Vasilis Margaras.

Towns and cities are home to nearly three quarters of the EU’s population. Many EU cities and urban areas constitute vibrant spaces of economic growth and innovation. However, they also face multiple challenges, such as building inclusive societies, tackling inequalities, addressing climate change and environmental degradation, and dealing with housing issues and demographic challenges. Cities are at the forefront of implementing EU legislation in several policy areas, including cohesion, and have been demanding a stronger role in shaping these policies and greater access to EU financial resources.

Cohesion policy has a strong urban dimension. Its support for sustainable urban development was reinforced in the current 2021-2027 programming period to help cities take an active role in designing and implementing policy responses to their own challenges. Cohesion funds invest more than €100 billion in towns and cities. For their part, cities are directly responsible for designing and implementing investments worth over €24 billion under the cohesion policy programmes.

The emergence of the Urban Agenda for the EU in 2016 and the beginning of participatory partnerships raised new expectations about the role of urban authorities in the EU decision-making process. The Pact of Amsterdam provided for urban partnerships focusing on key urban themes such as air quality, urban poverty and housing. However, progress in empowering cities within cohesion policy has been limited. Stakeholders evaluating the progress of the Urban Agenda for the EU highlight issues such as limited EU resources channelled to tackling urban issues, obstacles in achieving direct EU funding, a lack of effective long-term urban governance mechanisms in EU policymaking, and limited input of urban areas into EU policies.

Read the complete briefing on ‘A new urban policy agenda for the EU: Addressing cities’ current challenges‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Event Video 
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In October 2025, the UN community will mark the 25th anniversary of UN Security Council Resolution 1325, which launched the women, peace, and security (WPS) agenda. Since 2019, IPI has analyzed challenges and successes in increasing uniformed women’s meaningful participation in peace operations as part of its partnership with the Elsie Initiative for Peace Operations, contributing to a global community of practice that provides evidence-based research on gender and peacekeeping. Over the past six years, this research has explored a range of topics related to women in peace operations, highlighting gaps and offering actionable recommendations for the implementation of the WPS agenda.

IPI in partnership with the Elsie Initiative for Women in Peace Operations (led by Global Affairs Canada), the Stimson Center, the Latin American Security and Defence Network (RESDAL), and the Gender and Security Sector (GSS) Lab, cohosted a hybrid policy forum on October 9th on “Reflecting on 25 Years of the WPS Agenda: Lessons Learned from Gender Research and UN Peace Operations.

The conversation was an opportunity to share research findings, reflect on lessons and challenges for women in peacekeeping, consider the role of research in advancing the WPS agenda, and strengthen communities of practice to ensure the sustainable implementation of recommendations on gender equality in peacekeeping in the years to come. With discussions around UN reforms underway, severe funding crises, shrinking space for women’s civil society, and rising anti-gender backlash, partnerships between researchers, practitioners, and member states committed to defending and advancing the WPS agenda are more important than ever.

Opening Remarks:
Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, President and CEO, International Peace Institute
Lieutenant General Mohan Subramanian, Force Commander, United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) (virtual)

Speakers:
Jacqueline O’Neill, former Women, Peace and Security Ambassador for Canada; Director, Global Affairs Canada
Lisa Sharland, Senior Fellow and Director, Protecting Civilians & Human Security, Stimson Center
Elisa Rial, Program Coordinator, Latin American Security and Defence Network (RESDAL) (virtual)
Roya Izadi, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Rhode Island
Joana Osei-Tutu, Deputy Director, Women Youth Peace and Security Institute, Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) (virtual)
Colonel Roger Nilsson, Counsellor, Military Advisor, Permanent Mission of Sweden to the United Nations

Closing Remarks:
Christian Saunders, Under-Secretary-General and Special Coordinator on Improving the UN Response to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse

Moderator:
Phoebe Donnelly, Senior Fellow and Head of Women, Peace, and Security, International Peace Institute

The post Reflecting on 25 Years of the WPS Agenda: Lessons Learned from Gender Research and UN Peace Operations appeared first on International Peace Institute.

Während Europa über China als „systemischen Rivalen“ diskutiert, agiert ein einflussreicher Akteur fast unbemerkt im Hintergrund: die Internationale Abteilung der Kommunistischen Partei (CCP-ID). Hinter diesem bürokratisch klingenden Namen verbirgt sich ein zentraler Akteur chinesischer Außenbeziehungen mit klarem Auftrag: internationale Netzwerke aufbauen, Fürsprecher für China mobilisieren und politische Diskurse in anderen Ländern gezielt beeinflussen. Eine systematische Analyse zeigt, wie sich die Aktivitäten des CCP-ID in Europa seit Anfang der 2000er Jahre verändert haben.

Während Europa über China als „systemischen Rivalen“ diskutiert, agiert ein einflussreicher Akteur fast unbemerkt im Hintergrund: die Internationale Abteilung der Kommunistischen Partei (CCP-ID). Hinter diesem bürokratisch klingenden Namen verbirgt sich ein zentraler Akteur chinesischer Außenbeziehungen mit klarem Auftrag: internationale Netzwerke aufbauen, Fürsprecher für China mobilisieren und politische Diskurse in anderen Ländern gezielt beeinflussen. Eine systematische Analyse zeigt, wie sich die Aktivitäten des CCP-ID in Europa seit Anfang der 2000er Jahre verändert haben.

Während Europa über China als „systemischen Rivalen“ diskutiert, agiert ein einflussreicher Akteur fast unbemerkt im Hintergrund: die Internationale Abteilung der Kommunistischen Partei (CCP-ID). Hinter diesem bürokratisch klingenden Namen verbirgt sich ein zentraler Akteur chinesischer Außenbeziehungen mit klarem Auftrag: internationale Netzwerke aufbauen, Fürsprecher für China mobilisieren und politische Diskurse in anderen Ländern gezielt beeinflussen. Eine systematische Analyse zeigt, wie sich die Aktivitäten des CCP-ID in Europa seit Anfang der 2000er Jahre verändert haben.

• Since landing ships, made in Turkish shipyards in order to enable the invasion of Cyprus, reached their designated beachheads on the 20th of July of 1974, the Turkish defence technological industrial base (TDTIB) has been locked in a see saw pattern.
• From the late 1960’s to today the TDTIB has advanced in order to enable Turkey to exercise strategic autonomy. The very exercise of this strategic autonomy has recurrently caused ruptures with Turkey’s western allies. These ruptures have, in turn, disrupted the industrial partnerships on which the TDTIB depends.
• This pattern is experiencing a historic high currently with the TDTIB’s product range, which includes sophisticated UAVs and naval ships being employed by Turkey in support of an aggressive challenge of European interests, and most prominently in a comprehensive challenge of Greek rights, solidly established under UNCLOS, to an exclusive economic zone and to the laying of a subsea electricity cable linking Greece with Cyprus.
• At the same time, due to the European Union’ s (EU) rearmament effort, and the possibility of third countries participating in it, already provided from in the SAFE funding facility, the TDTIB has the opportunity to further grow in volume and sophistication.
• This policy paper will argue that this opportunity should be denied to the TDTIB both on the basis of past behavior of Turkey but also on solid evidence of the current and future priorities of the Erdogan regime.
• As in the past nearly sixty years, it is clear that the current Turkish leadership prioritises the exercise of its strategic autonomy, facilitated by the TDTIB, and not the TDTIB’s participation in the EU’s rearmament. Such a prioritization makes structurally unstable the relationship, and in particular highly prone to disruption, between the TDTIB and the EU’s rearmament effort.
• Additionally, the participation of the TDTIB in the EU’s rearmament effort by boosting the capacity of Turkey to challenge Greece’s and Cyprus’ sovereign rights, corrodes the principles of collective security, and thus undermines the ability of the EU to mobilise the collective resources necessary for its own strategic autonomy.
• Thus the TDTIB neither can nor should participate in the EU’s rearmament effort.

Read here in pdf the Policy Paper by Antonis Kamaras, ELIAMEP Research Associate.

Introduction

This policy paper will posit that the Turkish defence technological industrial base (TDTIB) neither can nor should benefit from the EU’s collective rearmament effort and for the same set of reasons.  Turkey’s internal repression and external aggression make participation of the TDTIB in the EU’s rearmament both highly vulnerable to disruption and corrosive to the intra-EU consensus that collective rearmament requires for its realization.

The first section will chart the evolution of the TDTIB, from the effort to prepare for military intervention in Cyprus, culminating in the invasion of the island in 1974, to today’s integration of Turkish-made UAVs either in the cross border operations of the Turkish Armed Forces or in the military operations of Turkey’s proxies and allies.  The pattern will emerge of a see saw movement whereby strategic autonomy enabled by the TDIB creates bilateral or multilateral ruptures which in turn derail the TDTIB’s partnerships with key western partners.

The second section will argue that the interaction of the TDTIB with Turkey’s striving for a strategic autonomy that is mostly antithetical to the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), as well as increasing domestic repression, will continue to be a mainstay of the Erdogan regime. Consequently, even if the TDTIB is allowed to benefit from the EU’s collective defence funding, the participation of the TDTIB in the EU’s rearmament effort is bound to be a structurally unstable, and thus an inherently unreliable proposition.

The third section will explore the way in which the EU’s collective rearmament effort is both constitutive and reliant upon the construction of a new EU polity, as it involves greater collective mobilisation of resources in the service of the defence needs of all EU members. These defence needs are already more diverse than the Russo-Ukrainian war suggests and bound to get more so in the future, due to the size and diversity of the Union. By extension, this polity, the ‘geopolitical Europe’ as it has been called, cannot privilege one threat over another, nor one or more member-states’ threat perception over the threat perceptions of other member-states, if it is to achieve the cohesion and mobilisational capacity that are indispensable to its viability.  Yet the participation of the TDTIB in the EU’s rearmament, by undermining the Greek and Cypriot deterrence over Turkish aggression, discriminates in terms of which threat is considered to be important, and for which member-states, at the EU-collective level and which is less so.

The fourth section will review arguments made in favour of the participation of the TDTIB in Europe’s rearmament, and policies recommended to that effect, and evaluate whether they can indeed supersede the considerable disadvantages of such participation indentified by the author.

The concluding section will, on the basis of the above, argue that the TDTIB should be excluded from participating in the EU’s collective rearmament effort.

The evolution of the relationship between the TDTIB and Turkey’s strategic autonomy

On the 20th of July 1974 Turkish landing ships reached the designated beachheads in Cyprus out of which poured Turkish infantry, tanks and armoured personnel carriers.  As the authors of the definitive study of the Turkish invasion to Cyprus point out this was the commencement of “the only successfully completed amphibious and airborne landing against a determined defender since 1945”[1]. The invasion of Cyprus was also one of the largest, in terms of the proportion of territory lost by a sovereign state via military means, partial conquests in the post WW II era, partial as opposed to total conquests being the dominant form of territorial conquest in this period[2].     It is worthwhile mentioning that as a result of this military operation 36 % of the territory of the Republic of Cyprus is still occupied by Turkey whereas Russia, today and after more than three years of war, occupies approximately 20 % of Ukrainian territory.

Preparation for the invasion also included the founding act of the creation of the TDTIB, in the post WW II era, in the service of Turkey’s strategic autonomy.   Although discussions among Turkish civilian and military policy makers on a possible invasion of Cyprus started as early as 1955 it was after the Cyprus crisis of 1964 and the humiliating Johnson letter, in which the US President explicitly forbade Turkey from employing US equipment to invade Cyprus, that Turkey set itself on a path to acquire its own technical means necessary for such a successful invasion. Specifically, a US embargo on the sale of landing ships, tank (LSTs), led Turkey to convert ships to this configuration, acquired by other countries, and more importantly for Turkish shipyards to acquire the capability to construct 600-ton LSTs in the 1970S, twelve of which had joined the Turkish navy by 1974[3].

Importantly, the invasion of Cyprus set in motion a see saw pattern which has exercised, still today, a bit more than half a century, determinative influence over the interaction between the TDTIB and Turkey’s strategic autonomy. In essence, the TDTIB by enabling Turkey’s strategic autonomy would contribute to the implementation of weapons embargoes by Turkey’s main Western weapon systems suppliers, subsequent to the exercise of such an autonomy. In return these embargoes would both disrupt the evolution of the TDTIB while also pushing Turkish policy makers to double down in developing the TDTIB, with Turkey’s own resources, albeit subject to the structural and fiscal constraints of the country[4].

The invasion of Cyprus catalysed the mobilization of the politically influential Greek-American community which, in the aftermath of Watergate, managed to convince the US Congress to impose a weapons embargo to Turkey on all US weapons sales, which lasted for three years. This ‘rule of law’ lobby successfully argued that the invasion of Cyprus was not simply a Greek and Greek-Cypriot matter but constituted a gross violation of the universal norm of sovereignty, and as such warranted Congressional restrictions placed on the US Administration, regarding the management of the US-Turkey relationship[5].  Analysts of the TDTIB are in agreement, that the US embargo catalyzed the determination of Turkey’s policy makers to invest in a long term effort to develop comprehensively their defence industrial capacity such that a future embargo would not threaten to cripple the Turkish Armed Forces, considering for example that Turkey’s Air Force in 1974 was completely depended on US spare parts[6].

A brief review[7] of the key incidents that negatively affected Turkey’s access to Western weapon systems, including the provision of such access via bilateral or multilateral DTIB partnerships, demonstrate continuity with the pivotal Cyprus invasion and its aftermath.

The repression of the Kurds in the 1990’s, at a time when Turkey was under military tutelage, resulted in suspension of weapon sales from Western European suppliers, particularly land systems. The 1996 Imia crisis with Greece had a similar effect. Both the repression of the Kurds, which entailed massive violations of human rights, and the Imia incident which was accompanied and justified by a baseless challenge of Greek sovereignty of the Imia as well as other Aegean islets constituted norm breaking behavior to Western perceptions[8].

The Mavi Marmara crisis in 2010 which led to a complete breakdown of the defence relationship between Israel and Turkey, including the cessation of a productive for the TDTIB relationship with leading Israeli defence firms, also constituted an exception, in terms of a European and North American canon. This canon mandates that Europeans at the country and EU level, due to the status of the Holocaust as a genocide implemented in European soil, by Nazi Germany and the active collaboration of important societal forces in Nazi-occupied countries, from Lithuania to Greece,  will make allowances to the Jewish state (with suspension of weapons sales imposed on Israel in the 1960’s  by France and the UK driven solely by commercial and geopolitical considerations and in particular the need to sustain relationships with the Arab world).  Turkey, as a predominantly Muslim country which did not fall under Nazi occupation and was not a combatant in WW II, is clearly outside this canon.   The point here is not whether the EU and its constituent member-countries are in the right in not taking a more robust attitude towards the death and destruction visited upon Gaza at the time of writing by Israel’s armed forces – but rather to underline that EU member states, their diversity notwithstanding, share in a historical past and normative preferences to a greater degree among themselves than they do with Turkey.

The acquisition of the Russian S400 ground to air system, and the resulting expulsion of the TDTIB from the dominant, globally, 5th generation aircraft’s supply chain also reflects Turkish exceptionalism. In effect, Turkey struck such a close defence relationship with a country, Russia, presenting a clear threat to European security already two years prior, as the conquest of Crimea which reanimated fears of Russian intent in the Western camp had already taken place in 2014. Indicatively, France had to revisit its 2011 decision, under the Sarkozy Presidency, to sell two Mistral helicopter carriers to Russia, cancelling the sale by 2014, under the Hollande Presidency. The decision to sell the Mistrals to Russia was misaligned, to say the least, with the strategic interests of the western alliance France was a member of, which furthermore threatened its overall defence relationship with front line states of the EU and NATO[9]. To the extent that the S400 decision was motivated by Erdogan’s suspicion that the US instigated the 2016 coup attempt against him and he had to, in effect, acquire a ground to air defence system that could guard him against his own US-equipped and trained Air Force[10], this procurement decision also points to an exceptional distrust of the US by a fellow NATO-member country, exceptional even by the standards set by the second Trump Presidency.

In 2018 Turkey’s deliberated-upon partnership with Italy and France for the co-production of SMT missiles was suspended due to Turkey’s divergent interests in Syria and the Mediterranean[11].  Turkey’s aggressive challenging in the field of Greek and Greek-Cypriot sovereign rights led to Turkey’s exclusion from the PESCO and EDF R&D defence funds in the early 2020’s to today. Turkey’s military operations in Syria, against Kurdish forces, its human rights record, and other such issues, also generated opposition to weapon sales in Holland which has a strong lobby arguing for a normative-informed weapons export policy[12].    Last but not least, the sale of Eurofighter aircraft to Turkey was suspended, in early 2025, due to the opposition of the previous German government, engendered by the imprisonment of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglou and Erdogan’s most formidable challenger for the office of the Presidency. This decision was reversed by the succeeding CDU-led government while there is ongoing speculation on whether Greece will manage to impose commitments by the government of Turkey that the Typhoons will not be used against her.

Importantly, Turkey’s policy in Libya which has alienated France was also induced by the former’s need to challenge Greek sovereign rights in the Mediterranean, by advancing through an agreement with Libya, the notion that Greece’s islands, even such large ones as Crete do not produce sovereign rights in terms of the delineation of exclusive economic zones, a notion widely accepted as contravening the international law of the seas[13]. We also mention that Greece exerted pressure, albeit unsuccessfully, to freeze the partnership between Spain and Germany and Turkey, involving respectively, the manufacturing under license of an aircraft carrier and advanced T214 submarines.

Overshadowing Turkey’s relationships with Western counterparts, is the contributing role itself of TDTIB in Turkey’s geopolitical exceptionalism. Turkish-made UAVs, and more largely their integration in combined arms operations initially in Southern Turkey and subsequently in Syria, Libya and Nagorno Karabach, have been a contributing factor in counter mobilization against Turkey by influential ethnic communities in Germany (Turkish Kurds) and the US (Greek-Americans, Armenian-Americans, Jewish-Americans).  In an action-reaction dynamic techno-nationalism, namely the vested interest of the Erdogan regime to demonstrate to domestic audiences the superiority of Turkish arms, the martial virtues of the Turkish soldier being leveraged by the indigenous technical means at his disposal, has been adding fuel to the fire[14].  Additionally, the ambitious naval shipbuilding programme of the Turkish Navy has fueled Turkish aggression in the Mediterranean, encapsulated in the Mavi Vatan doctrine, with parochial but influential economic and Service (Turkish Navy) interests being vested in Turkey’s geopolitical aggrandizement.      This package gets wrapped up in Turkey’s emergence as a classic middle power, its geopolitical ambitions informed by reimaginings of its imperial past and propelled forward by the US’s profound ambivalence of its role as a global policeman[15]. To top it all, the return of ‘Big War, as evidenced in Ukraine, has reinforced the link between a country’s ability to achieve escalation dominance and the size and capability of its DTIB, with even war gaming now including defence industrial capacity in the context of a sustained war effort[16].  As such the TDTIB, depending on its evolution, can very well contribute to the ‘war optimism’ of Turkeys’ leadership under an ever expanding range of military conflict scenarios.

All in all, what is observed in Turkey is a recurrent pattern over a period of approximately sixty years of divergent geopolitical interests, informed by geography, history and identity, as well as of impossible to dislodge for long domestic authoritarianism, derailing bilateral or multilateral defence relationships. Domestic and international Western norm breaking, or even lack of sharing of historically-informed western preferences, as in the case of Israel, are also an important factor. Geopolitical divergence and norm breaking also create fertile ground for the seeding and growth of coalitions in Europe and North America which prioritise the breaking up of such bilateral and multilateral defence relationships between Turkey and the West.  Such a counter-reaction is assisted by the fact that Erdogan has now been entrenched in a gallery of rogues, right next to Putin, of leaders willing to employ force to impose their will both to their own citizens and to neighbouring states[17].

Furthermore, the more capable the TDTIB has become and the greater a share of a sophisticated supply chain of a weapon system it can claim, the more disruptive the subsequent rupture becomes for its western partner(s).  This highly volatile relationship of weapons manufacturing and sales by the West to Turkey, of sixty years standing, started with the denial and then suspension of sales of weapon systems for which the nascent TDTIB would provide limited  maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) support services, such as the technologically simple, WW II-vintage LSTs, and culminated in the need by Lockheed Martin, the US manufacturer of F35s, the world’s leading fifth-generation fighter jet,  to replace in short order a total of 12 billion USD’s worth of supply chain production  by those Turkish firms which were expelled from the F35 manufacturing programme, after Erdogan’s  decision to procure the S400s[18]. Indeed, if the F35 imbroglio demonstrates anything is that the participation of the TDTIB to valuable for the Turkish economy supply chains, as much as to the its Western partners, will and can be sacrificed if domestic imperatives and or strategic autonomy rationales mandate so.

Can the Erdogan regime strike a viable partnership between the TDTIB and the EDTIB?

There is no doubt that the TDTIB stands to gain a lot in turns of both volume of sales and innovation capabilities were it to be incorporated in the European Defence Technological Industrial Base (EDTIB), in terms similar to those accessible to the UK and Norway. As with the case of South Korea, industrialised nations which doubled down in the development of their DTIBs due to geopolitical circumstances different from those enjoyed by most EU-members, are now in a position to meet rapidly increasing demand for everything military[19]. More largely, Turkey’s robust manufacturing base together with the geographic proximity to the EU, make the country one of the potential greatest beneficiaries of the EU’s need to build up resilient supply chains via near-shoring partnerships. Naturally such a geopolitically driven partnership between the EU and Turkey can also be translated in political leverage in terms of the enhanced ability of Turkish policy makers to make what EU interlocutors, including Greek ones, would consider as legitimate Turkish interests and policy priorities appreciated and respected both in Brussels and the chancelleries of Europe.

Equally, such an alignment of industrial and geopolitical interests is simply not realistic if Turkey, under Erdogan and his potential regime successors, stays on the same course, of a) geopolitical heterodoxy, a heterodoxy which includes the attempt to challenge the sovereignty of EU member-countries, namely Greece and Cyprus, as well as b) to effectively suspend democracy in Turkey, and go, as international commentators have noted, for ‘full autocracy’[20].  As with the previous instances of the disruption in TDTIB bilateral and multilateral partnerships which we briefly reviewed above, sooner or later this domestic and foreign policy mix, catalyzed by any one or more future incidents that it is bound to generate, will derail Turkey’s DTIB relationship with the EU.  Simply put, this Turkish comportment will, as it has so often done in the past, create the coalitions between pressure groups and states, the mutually reinforcing loop between norms and interests that will compel the EU to show the door to TDTIB, notwithstanding any defence industrial partnerships that may have been struck in the meantime. Indeed, several EU reports recurrently produced long lists of policy items where there is massive divergence between Turkey and the EU, a veritable minefield of unbridgeable gaps in interests and norms that can explode at any moment[21].

In the estimation of this policy paper, in the timeframe of any possible decision by the EU and its member-states, say the next 2-3 years, the second possibility of continuous divergence from CFSP is the most realistic one and not the first.

The fact that Erdogan is determined to hold on to power, despite the near certainty that any under conceivable scenario of free and competitive elections he will lose by any one of his  most formidable opponents, among CHP’s leadership roster, mandates repression at home and aggression abroad. The economic benefits of a geopolitically-based industrial partnership between the EU and Turkey are not enough, and cannot come fast enough, to make him prevail over any of his more charismatic opponents in the 2027 Presidential elections.   So he has to throw his opponents into prison, causing further trouble to the Turkish economy which has already eroded his popularity irrevocably.  Indeed, the more times passes, the more inexorable the process of eliminating the regime’s main political foe, CHP, as a viable political competitor becomes, with accretive imprisonments and suspensions from public life, directed against an ever widening circle of key CHP personalities[22].

Increased domestic repression, in turn, is legitimized by aggressive assertion abroad.  The militarization of Turkish foreign policy as a pillar of Erdogan’s effort to checkmate his domestic opponents has been well-documented, particularly through Turkish military operations in Syria[23].  Turkey’s currently ongoing challenge in the field, of Greece’s effort to lay an electric energy interconnecting cable between Crete and Cyprus, the Great Sea Interconnector (GSI), a project of Common European Interest, partly funded by the EU, and executed by a leading French manufacturer with an expertise in subsea electricity cable laying, has reanimated Greece’s objections to the TDTIB benefiting from the EU rearmament. These objections were most prominently demonstrated in Greek efforts to eliminate the possibility that Turkish defence firms will benefit, as subcontractors, from EU defence procurement orders funded by the concessionary rates of the 150-billio euro SAFE programme[24]

The bigger picture is one of a Turkish leader who, from the 2010’s onwards, has grounded his hegemonic enterprise on extracting geopolitical rents and prestige from unilateral force projection as opposed through economic and geopolitical integration with the EU.

This strategic choice of Erdogan has nullified politically most if not all of the advantages that accrued to the New Democracy (ND) Greek Government by the ‘calm waters’ Greco-Turkish agreement  of 2023, namely the containment of illegal migration flows from the Turkish coast to the east Aegean islands, the visa facilitation of tourist flows from the Turkish  coast  to the East Aegean islands (essentially the agreement exchanged politically destabilizing migratory flows to Greece with politically beneficial tourist flows), the cessation of violations of the Greek air space by the Turkish Air Force and the containment of the geopolitical risk, as a factor which could derail  Greece’s still painfully gradual recovery from the ten year fiscal crisis and in particular threaten the lucrative for the Greek economy tourist season.

It is illuminating that at the present juncture, when Turkey has every interest to ‘play nice’ with Greece on the basis of this ‘calms water’ agreement, in view of the potential benefits that may accrue to her from a partnership with the EU, it is challenging as we mentioned above in the field the right of Greece, according to the international law of the seas, to explore the seabed and proceed to lay the GSI cable between Crete and Cyprus.  Turkish activism in Libya and Syria also aim at maintaining the idiosyncratic challenge, according to the international law of the seas, to Greece’s right for an exclusive economic zone, based on the position and size of its island territories, most prominently, but not exclusively, the largest such island territory, Crete.

This course of action pursued by Erdogan has created a dynamic in Greece in favour of a creation of yet another nationalistic party, threatening to eat into ND support, enabled the major opposition party, PASOK, to put the government on the spot on the issue of if and when the GSI will actually be implemented and has engendered critique, both within and outside ND, that primarily SAFE betrays the promise of collective European defence, by potentially benefiting the TDTIB.

Considering the above, and the fact that elections are to be held in Greece in 2027 at the latest, we may as well take for granted that Greece and Cyprus will energetically lobby against any type of participation by the TDITB in the rearmament of Europe.   While disagreements between Greece and the Republic of Cyprus on the financial viability of GSI have cast a shadow over the project’s viability, Greek policy makers have also provided assurances that Greece is determined to proceed with the laying of the cable, even if that means a testing of wills, militarily, in the field.

Indeed the fact that the Erdogan is being so reckless in pressing his claims against Greece, through diplomacy and force deployment, itself underlines the fragility of any future partnership between the EU’s rearmament effort and the TDTIB – it is proof positive that for the Erdogan regime such a partnership is a ‘nice to have’ whereas aggression against two EU member countries, Greece and Cyprus, are politically speaking ‘must haves’.      As it is, it is only because the Greek government has refrained, thus far, from forcing this issue via military means, in the field, as she is perfectly entitled and capable of doing so, that its fellow EU member-countries have not been compelled to admit the incongruity of Turkey’s participation in the EU’s rearmament effort.

Should the Erdogan regime be given the opportunity to strike a partnership between the TDTIB and Europe’s rearmament?

National commitments reached in NATO’s Hague summit, of a rise to 3.5 % of GDP to defence spending, and an additional 1.5 % of GDP spending to domains supporting NATO’s collective defence, should not be discounted as implausible. They reflect, on the one hand, the structural trend of the US to prioritise deterring a possible Chinese invasion of Taiwan, which could be tantamount to nothing short of terminating US hegemony in Asia and the Pacific.  And, on the other hand, they illuminate Europe’s need to secure continued US fealty to NATO’s Article 5, premised on European countries picking up an ever greater share of the bill for conventional deterrence in Europe and, in exchange, retaining the US nuclear guarantee, as the ultimate deterrent against Russian aggression.

That being said, it is also commonly acknowledged that European states are determined to develop and deploy their own strategic enablers so that they do not become hostages to diverging US priorities, relating to collective European defence, or to US determination to leverage its military indispensability to extract rents from Europe via its trade and/or monetary policy[25].

Such enablers refer, first, to achieving economies of scale in the production of weapon platforms that are already within the technological reach of EU member-states, via EDTIB consolidation. Economies of scale in already available technologies would underpin strategic autonomy by producing enough quantities of limited in number platforms, by a consolidated EDTIB, so that the EU can deter against Russia, with the massive quantities of war materiel that the return of peer to peer conflict necessitates.

Second, strategic enablers are for the EU those technologies and weapon platforms which are currently provided by the US, as EU countries have not developed comparable capabilities. They refer, mainly, to strategic lift, ISR based on an extensive satellite network, sixth generation aircraft and long range ground to air and ground to ground missile systems.

Obtaining such enablers is a profoundly political exercise, the success of which would be constitutive of an essentially evolved European polity, which has already received the relevant coined terms, such as ‘a geopolitical Europe’ of a European ‘defence community’ and so on[26].  While EU member countries have indeed sacrificed the important for the sake of the urgent, as in the case of covering capability gaps which have accumulated over two decades by procuring US and Israeli weapon systems, setting back the cause of the EUs strategic autonomy, the direction of travel towards a European defence polity is still clear.

Such a polity, to come into being, requires achieving consensus, as per the Draghi Report recommendations[27], on a massive, recurrent programme of debt issuance by the European Commission. Such issuance would fund, among other priority domains, the research, development and production of the EU’s strategic enablers as well as provide the fiscal incentivisation of joint procurement necessary for the EDTIB’s drive for economies of scale through industrial consolidation.  The alternative, and more modest policy suggestion, is based on shifting resources from cohesion funding and the Common Agricultural Policy to collective European defence spending.

Both courses of action are highly contestable politically[28]. The former course of action needs to overcome the reluctance of net contributors among EU member states to underwrite fiscal issuance by the EU while the latter course of action means overcoming the reluctance of the net recipients, among EU member countries, to see a substantial decline in fiscal resources directed to those socioeconomic groups and regions most depended on EU transfers.

That being said, either exercise can also command a unique common ground among EU member states which were only recently, during the euro’s fiscal crisis, in opposing camps.  Strengthening the EU’s collective defence is a shared priority from the very end of both the North and the South, in the EU’s eastern periphery, from Lithuania to Cyprus.    Defence has shortened if not collapsed the policy distance separating the ‘frugals’ from the ‘spendthrifts’ with leading members of both cohorts facing existential threats due to the partial disengagement and growing unreliability of the US security guarantee.   To illustrate, when the US Department of Defence starts considering withdrawing military aid from the Baltics[29], Denmark, Sweden and Finland have every reason to boost the EU’s common defence and entertain financial arrangements, such as common bond issuance, that a fiscally constrained Greece would most welcome.

Significantly, the blatant assertion by the Trump Administration that Greenland will, one way or another, fall under US sovereignty, has universalized the perception of threat, cutting its unbiblical cord from Russia, and impressing on all member-states that the capacity for collective defence needs to be developed against all threat contingencies.  Simply put, it makes it that much easier for Greek policy makers to relate to their EU colleagues how serious as much as unacceptable is Turkey’s comportment on the basis of ‘might is right’ and, as such, deserving of a common European response. And once threat loses its specificity, threat representation becomes important, as each and every threat is entitled to be addressed and no threat posed to a member-states’ national security can be airily dismissed as an unrealistic obsession, as a mere domestic perception as opposed to a geopolitical fact.  Arguably, as the recommendations of the Niinisto report are implemented, particularly with regard to a common EU intelligence function, that will have the effect of Europeanising each member country’s valid threat perceptions[30], rendering ever more untenable defence industrial and other policies that are incompatible with such Europeanised threat perceptions. Suffice it to say here that Turkey’s gray zone playbook vis a vis Greece and Cyprus is starkly similar to that of Russia in CEE and in the Baltics and China in the South China Sea.

Denmark is emblematic in that regard, a small Scandinavian country, one of the ‘frugals’ during the Eurozone crisis, now in favour of rising defence expenditures, in order to deter Russia, as in the case of all Scandinavian countries which are with the exception of Finland in the second line of defence against Russia, while also being the first EU member country to have its sovereignty challenged by the US[31].

Τhe drive of the EU for strategic autonomy, tantamount to the construction of a new European polity, both puts the importance of the TDTIB, but also of the Turkish Armed Forces, in its appropriate scale, as important but by no stretch of imagination indispensable, in terms of providing scarce material and human resources to Europe’s collective defence. It is the intra-European consensus necessary for collective mobilization that is indispensable, not the contribution to such a vast mobilization of any one third party, Turkey included.

This is even more the case when such a third party participation is corrosive of the consensus that needs to be achieved. For that level of consensus to be generated, all member states need to be convinced that collective defence is one and indivisible, just as within any nation-state one region bordering to a third country has an absolutely equal claim to its integrity and rights, conferred by its inclusion in the sovereign entity, to all other regions of that country bordering with other third countries.  It is that foundational assumption that is indispensable to the project of the EU’s strategic autonomy.

It is also important to note that it is inevitable that the more the EU develops its strategic autonomy the less this autonomy will come to be limited to countering the Russian threat.  Military capabilities, as much as the modalities of their acquisition, will expand the domains of their application, commensurately with their growth.  These capabilities may be deployed in a massive operation to stabilize sub-Saharan Africa. On another occasion, they could embolden the EU to risk rupture with the US, by imposing punitive regulations to US IT titans operating in the EU, in case of a forceful acquisition of Greenland by the US.  In yet another possibility, the EU’s military capabilities could provide leverage to the EU to exert moderating influence over Israel’s behaviour in the West Bank due to the growing reliance of Israel’s DTIB on the rapidly growing EDTIB.

Greece together with Cyprus are not stowaways in this exciting European voyage but rather key members of the crew. Greece is the only country in the EU to be so physically distant to Moscow that in 2024 spent above 3 % of its GDP in defence – as much or nearly as much as those EU member countries close to Moscow.  Through the port of Alexandroupolis it has proven its significance, in terms of military logistics, for the integrity of the Southern part of the EU’s collective defence against the Russian Federation as well as for the support of the energy needs of Bulgaria and Romania through the Alexandroupolis FSRU.  Greece has also taken the lead in the setting up of EUNAVFPOR ASPIDES which seeks to mitigate Houthi attacks against the merchant marine in the Red Sea – where the Turkish navy has been conspicuously absent[32].  Needless to say in the years ahead, as the Hellenic Navy renews its fleet and as other EU Mediterranean Fleets similarly get strengthened, Greece will be a pillar of freedom of navigation in the critical seaways linking Asia with Europe.

Both Greece and Cyprus reaffirmed their strategic importance due to the wars of the Middle East with the heavy use respectively of the US Suda Bay base in Crete and the UK Akrotiri base in Cyprus.  Greece, as already suggested enjoys important leverage in the US, considering that US engagement will continue to be important for the EU’s collective defence.  The Suba Bay base is critical to the operations of the US Navy and Air Force in the Mediterranean. Alexandroupolis is a point of entry for US natural gas servicing Southern European energy needs, the defence relationship with Israel is growing as it involves strategic Israeli investments in the GDTIB and the Greek-American lobby, in alignment with the Jewish-American lobby enjoys considerable influence in the US Congress[33].

All in all, Greece, both on its own and together with Cyprus, as a typically medium-sized EU member country, with its contribution to the ongoing defence effort against Russian aggression, its participation in mitigating the negative consequences of the Middle East wars, its exceptionally high defence spending and its military and geopolitical contributions that it will be able to make in the future strategically autonomous Europe –  a Europe that will have to confront a threat diversity  commensurate with its growing strategic autonomy – represents  precisely the type of EU member country that needs to have its own threat environment acknowledged and addressed if there is to be a successful construction of a European polity that guarantees the safety of all its member-states. And in such a European polity there is no place for defence firms of a non-EU member that persists in threatening an EU member country, such as Turkey.

The TDTIB and the EU’s Rearmament: Simply not worth the trouble

A flurry of policy papers and press coverage have presented the TDITB as indispensable to the EU’s rearmament and/or, more largely, argued for the vital role that Turkey needs to play in Europe’s collective defence[34].

This advocacy is grounded in three claims.  First, that the TDITB is critical both in terms of filling the need of the EU for manufacturing of mass, reliable quality, NATO-standard defence articles as well as in addressing important niche capabilities as in the UAV domain. Second, such an TDTIB participation will enable the EU to avail itself of the Turkey’s Armed Forces manpower in case it decides to sent a peacekeeping force to Ukraine, considering that it is the second largest Army in NATO and that the Turkish government has a high tolerance, at least compared to European governments, for casualties in the field of battle. Third that such a package – TDTIB and the contribution of troops – will anchor Turkey in the Western alliance.

None of these arguments are to be easily dismissed but rather carefully weighted in the cost benefit calculations and robust risk assessments that are attendant to any difficult policy choice.

On the TDTIB aspect what is essential to point out is that its relative contribution to the EU’s rearmament effort is a declining rather than a rising asset, precisely because of the mobilisation of resources in EU member countries catalyzed by country-member, EU funding and strategic and portfolio investments in the EDTIB as well as in parallel developments taking place in key EU-allied countries, European and non-European, such as the UK, Ukraine, Norway and Canada.  On mass what we see in the EU is a combination of investment in new plants and machinery, investments in older plants including reactivation, with a special focus on the Central Eastern European defence industry which had not attracted FDI in the transition period, due to peace dividend dynamics. We can expect that German and CEE experience in activating industrial supply chains in the post – 1989 period in the civilian sector where it has excelled, will now prove its worth in the military domain.  In niche capabilities such as UAVs, innovation’s baton has been decisively transferred from Turkey to Ukraine with a variety of European defence firms operating in Ukraine and / or partnering with Ukrainian firms in order to be able to be innovative.   What is striking in the latest assessment of defence manufacturing in Europe[35] is the common playbook, on top of increases in defence spending, adopted by all significant, in defence manufacturing terms, European countries, all geared to increasing the supply of defence platforms, systems and materiel: relaxation of regulatory environment relating to defence manufacturing, the speeding up of procurement through reform, increased funding for innovation in defence, investing in the defence sector’s skills base, and so on.   Relatedly, the TDTIB is identified as a meaningful contributor only in one capability gap of collective European defence, in medium altitude long endurance (MALE) UAVs and, potentially, in land attack systems up to 1,000 kms[36].  This rather marginal role of the TDTIB in Europe’s capability building is also reflected in its export record of defence systems to European countries which mostly involves low or middle range technologies such as MALE UAVs, corvettes and armoured personnel carriers[37]. Inevitably Turkey’s mid size economy, with its mediocre innovation record, cannot rise to the challenge of contributing, let alone replacing, such US-originating capabilities as space-based ISR, integrated air and missile defence, battle management systems and long range attack systems[38].

Relatedly, the increasingly well-funded defence industrial strategies of those EU member state’s that have them, also focus on the UAVs and other niches so as to spur innovation in their own defence sectors.   Their twin motive is both to provide a qualitative edger to their own armed forces via homegrown innovation and to be able to leverage this edge to commercial success throughout Europe.  Indeed, the TDTIB itself partakes in this process with the industrial  presence in Ukraine of its most prominent UAV manufacturer, Bayraktar.    In the end nobody intimated this decline in relative terms of the TDTIB than one of its most fervent advocates, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte. Pointing out that Europe in seeking to prevail militarily over Russia, needs  to prevail, by mobilising its economic prowess, over an “economy [that] is not bigger than Texas. So can you imagine that Texas, the State of Texas, producing more ammunition than the whole of NATO?”[39]. By the same token, how credible is to argue that the whole of the EDTIB cannot, when effectively mobilized, cannot produce the defence materiel necessary to deter against Russian aggression, without the participation of an economy, namely Turkey’s, which is just a bit larger  than that of the state of Illinois, which is to say 1/17th of the EU’s GDP?

Similar dynamics are operative in terms of the availability of sufficiently manned units to be fielded by EU and non-EU countries, most prominently the UK, in the much discussed prospect of a European peace keeping force in Ukraine.  The advisability of such a mission has been contested but that is not the issue. As with the EDTIB there is an ongoing effort across Europe to both hire more professional soldiers and reintroduce conscription[40].    We do not believe that higher tolerance of casualties, on the part of the Turkish government, and more largely polity and society is a valid argument for two reasons.  First, European states have demonstrated in Afghanistan, through participation in ISAF, that they are willing to suffer casualties in the service of vital allied goals (in this case supporting US operations in Afghanistan not least so as to help preserve US commitment to the collective defence of Europe).  It is worth pointing out that eight EU member countries, from Denmark (population 5.5. million) to Germany (population 82 million), suffered more casualties, both relative to their population and in absolute terms, through their ISAF participation, than Turkey did[41].  More generally the west’s democracies have demonstrated their ability to generate parliamentary consensus when invoking allied commitments in order to put troops in harm’s way[42].  Indeed, the rise of the EU as a collective provider has added a case example in this canon by enabling the Greek government to participate in the high risk EUNAVFOR ASPIDES freedom of navigation mission where the Hellenic Navy employed its guns for the first time since WW II, in an allied operation. Nor is it credible to suggest that in any such operation in Ukraine Turkey would play the role of the mercenary, putting at risk of death of injury a disproportionate number of its soldiers than other European states, in a mission that is definitive for the collective will of Europe and more specifically for the EU and its member states to defend themselves.  So, as in the case of the TDTIB, we are talking about a useful but not indispensable contribution in risk-taking troops.   As with the Rutte evocation of the disparity between collective European versus Russian economic-industrial mobilization, so with force generation we recall Poland’s PM rhetorical evocation of the EU’s collective population preponderance: ‘500 million Europeans are asking 300 million Americans help fight 140 million Russians’[43]. To suggest that such a Europe, of 500 million Europeans, cannot muster a peacekeeping force in the tens of thousands, for the defence of Ukraine, without Turkey’s troop contribution is simply risible.

The third argument of the TDTIB’s participation in the EU’s rearmament is about Turkey’s geopolitical and economic importance, and the importance of TDTIB participation in Europe’s rearmament as a means of engaging with Turkey, of in effect ‘not losing’ Turkey. It is important to note that within Turkish opinion, there is a diversity of opinion. We do have Imamoglou’s own advocacy in favour of lifting the embargo to the sale of Typhoons to Turkey[44]  as well as arguments of critics of the Erdogan regime to the effect that an EDTIB-TDTIB relationship will affirm Turkey’s European vocation and is bound to outlive Erdogan’s authoritarian turn[45]. Equally, we have voices arguing that the EU should not reward Turkey’s authoritarian backsliding, due to its potential contribution to the EU’s rearmament, as this backsliding no more entrenched it becomes there more bound it is to make Turkey even more of an unreliable security partner to the EU[46].

The position of this paper is that the imperative of Erdogan’s maintaining himself in power privileges further internal repression and external aggression and that the opportunity of the TDTIB to participate in the EU’s rearmament is not a sufficient incentive for him to abandon this twin track approach.   At the point of writing developments on both tracks prove our point, with further politically-engineered court actions seeking to neutralize CHP as an effective political force and the threat of military brinkmanship hanging over Greece’s and Cyprus’ perfectly legitimate plans to connect themselves energy-wise by laying the GSI undersea cable.  It is indeed hard to see how Turkey, even if its TDTIB is definitively excluded from the EU’s rearmament, can be lost to Europe more than it already has. It is, however, much more plausible to envisage a situation whereby a growing reliance ofEurope on the TDTIB could lead Erdogan to miscalculate his personal importance, and that of his country, and make him even more reckless vis a vis Greece and Cyprus.

Concluding Remarks

Turkey neither can nor should participate, through the TDTIB, in Europe’s rearmament effort and for the same set of reasons.

Under Erdogan’s leadership and in the current geopolitical juncture Turkey has reaffirmed a pattern in its relations with the West that has rendered partnering with the TDTIB highly unstable as much as undesirable.  Unstable because the combination of internal repression and external aggression, by the Turkish leadership, mobilises an influential counter-reaction by western states and influential lobby groups in these states, which prioritises the cut-off of bilateral or multilateral defence industrial relationships. Undesirable, because allowing for such defence industrial relationships to continue, despite Turkey’s internal and external comportment, is bound to be corrosive to the norms and interests binding collective security arrangements among EU member-states.

Greek-Turkish relations, from this ‘neither can nor should’ prism are both illuminating and definitive, historically and currently.  Historically, the birth of TDITB in the post WWII period was due to the need of Turkey to invade and partly conquer Cyprus, an act that destabilised NATO, led to an unprecedented US embargo of weapons sales to Turkey and which has as its only peer event in the European continent, in the entire post WW II period, the invasion of Ukraine by Russia in 2022.  Currently, Erdogan’s determination to challenge Greek sovereign rights through actions in the field and diplomatically, even more so if they are successful, they are bound to either create insurmountable blocks to the entry or generate risks in the ongoing participation of the TDITB in Europe’s rearmament effort. Appropriately enough such an incongruity is addressed by the SAFE regulation conditionalities, as in the case of article 17[51]. We have argued in these pages that Erdogan has, through his policy choices, to let these roadblocks in place, because doing so is a ‘must have’ whereas participation of the TDITB in Europe’s rearmament is only a ‘nice to have’.

This calculation between the ‘must have’ and ‘nice to have’ is even more pronounced in the case of Erdogan’s uninhibited suppression of democratic contestation, as allowing such contestation would be equal to his loss of power. Inevitably, external aggression and internal repression compound each other, strengthening both the ‘cant’ and ‘shouldn’t’ of the participation of the TDTIB in Europe’s rearmament.

Finally, we have argued that the resource mobilization necessary for the EU to gain strategic autonomy, both in the ambitious scenario (Draghi recommendations) and the modest scenario (reordering of the EU budget), would render the TDIB contribution to Europe’s rearmament if not marginal definitely not critical. At the same time such a participation, under the ‘can’t and shouldn’t’ perspective would be both highly uncertain in its implementation and much more trouble than its worth, due to the resulting corrosion of the intra-EU consensus on which this mobilization needs to rest upon.

As for the icing of the European cake, a strategically autonomous Europe would substantially fill the vacuum left from an Asia-oriented US, put an end to Turkey’s geopolitical heterodoxy and convince its leadership to integrate Turkey with the EU’s CS

[1] Erickson, Edward J., and Mesut Uyar. Phase Line Attila: The Amphibious Campaign for Cyprus, 1974. Marine Corps University Press, 2020, p. 90.

[2] See, Altman, Dan. “The evolution of territorial conquest after 1945 and the limits of the territorial integrity norm.” International Organization 74.3 (2020): 490-522.

[3]Erickson, Edward J., and Mesut Uyar. Phase Line Attila: The Amphibious Campaign for Cyprus, 1974. Marine Corps University Press, 2020, p. 55.

[4]Turkey belongs to the emerging innovator category, the lowest category of the European Innovation Scoreboard, dedicating modest resources to R&D, being ranked 31st among 39 EU member states and neighbouring countries, see European Commission, European Innovation Scoreboard 2024, 2024, p. 104.

[5] Kitroeff, Alexander. “Diaspora-Homeland Relations and Greek-American Lobbying: the Panhellenic Emergency Committee, 1974–78.” Journal of Modern Hellenism 11 (1994): 19-40.

[6] See indicatively, Bağcı, Hüseyin, and Çağlar Kurç. “Turkey’s strategic choice: buy or make weapons?.” Defence Studies 17.1 (2017): 38-62 and Mevlütoğlu, Arda, et al. “Adapting security: The intersection of Turkiye’s foreign policy and defence industrialisation.” Center for foreign policy and peace research and international institute for strategic studies (2024).

[7] This overview draws from Mevlütoğlu, Arda, et al. “Adapting security: The intersection of Turkiye’s foreign policy and defence industrialisation.” Center for foreign policy and peace research and international institute for strategic studies (2024).

[8]Domestic repression and external aggression, singly or jointly, engendered official and unofficial weapons embargoes by Switzerland, Norway, Germany and the US, see, Egeli, Sıtkı, et al. “From client to competitor: The rise of Turkiye’s defence industry.” Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research and International Institute for Strategic Studies (2024). US diplomatic sources have confirmed that the Imia islets were Greek and should have not been contested by Turkey notwithstanding the fact that the US State Department did not communicate this conviction in public so as to not alienate Turkey, see Kostoulas, Vassilis, Fascinating revelations about the 1996 Imia crisis, Kathimerini, English edition, 14 February 2025.

[9] See, for a discussion Kamaras, Antonis. “Greece’s call for an embargo on weapons sales to Turkey.” ELIAMEP, (2020).

[10] See, T. Karako, Coup proofing? Making sense of Turkey’s S-400 Decision, Centre for International and Strategic Studies, 28.4.22

[11] Mevlütoğlu, Arda, et al. “Adapting security: The intersection of Turkiye’s foreign policy and defence industrialisation.” Center for foreign policy and peace research and international institute for strategic studies (2024).

[12] Waldwyn, Tom. “Turkiye’s Defence-industrial Relationships with Other European States.” Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research and International Institute for Strategic Studies  (2024).

[13]  For an analysis of these forces in play shaping Turkey’s naval strategy see, R. Gingeras, The Turkish Navy in an era of great power competition, War on the Rocks, 30.4. 2019

[14] See, Soyaltin-Colella, Digdem, and Tolga Demiryol. “Unusual middle power activism and regime survival: Turkey’s drone warfare and its regime-boosting effects.” Third World Quarterly 44.4 (2023): 724-743.

[15] See J. Mankof, The war in Ukraine and Eurasia’s new imperial moment, The Washington Quarterly, 2022

[16] Ministry of Defence, Defence Indiustrial Strategy 2025: Making Defence an Engine for Growth, UK, 8 September 2025.

[17]See, typically, Rachman, Gideon. The age of the strongman: How the cult of the leader threatens democracy around the world. Other Press, LLC, 2022.

[18] See, https://www.statista.com/chart/17557/details-about–the-turkish-companies-supporting-f-35-development/

[19] For a discussion of South Korea’s DTIB see, Nemeth, Bence. “South Korean Military Power: Lessons Europe Can Learn from Seoul on Spending Defence Budgets Efficiently.” The RUSI Journal 169.1-2 (2024): 92-101.

[20] See, typically of solidifying international consensus on Erdogan’s power grab, Tol, Gonul, Turkey is now a full-blown autocracy. Foreign Affairs, March 21 2025.

[21] See, indicatively Committee on Foreign Affairs, Report on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Turkyie, European Parliament, 15 4 2025.

[22] See, indicatively, the analysis of Erdogan’s attempt to reinstate at CHP’s helm the ineffective Kimal Kilicdaroglou, through a court case that would put of action more capable CHP figures, GZERO Daily Newsletter, Is democracy doomed in Turkey?, 16 September 2025.

[23] See, H. Zengin, Instrumentalising the army before elections in Turkey, Third World Quarterly, 2023 and S. Adar, Understanding Turkey’s Increasingly Militaristic Foreign Policy, APSA MENA Politics Newsletter, Vol. 3, Issue 1, 2020.

[24] See indicatively Nedos, Vasillis, Turkish corvette off Crete signals Turkish intent, Kathimerini, English edition, 4,2.2025 and newsroom, SAFE could be a ‘backdoor’ for Turkish aspirations, warns Greek defence minister, Kathimerini, English edition, 29.05.2025.

[25] The discussion on Europe’s strategic enablers, and the modaliti4es of their acquisition, is based on Wolff, Guntram, Steinbach, Armin and Zettelmeyer, Jeromin, The governance and funding of European Rearmament, Policy Brief 15/25, Bruegel, April 2025 and International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). Building Defence Capacity in Europe: An Assessment. Routledge, 2024.

[26] The debate on the EU’s defence vocation having as its starting point the first Trump Presidency and accelerating with the ongoing war in Ukraine, see indicatively President of the EU Commission acceptance speech reference to a Geopolitical Commission,  European Commission, Speech by President-elect von der Leyen in the European Parliament Plenary on the occasion of the presentation of her College of Commissioners and their programme, 27 November 2019 and the discussion, post Brexit, of the UK being an integral part of Europe’s defence community, Leonard, Mark, Britain and Europe are Changing together, European Council of Foreign Relations,  July 15 2025.

[27] Draghi, Mario. “The Future of European Competitiveness Part A: A competitiveness strategy for Europe.” (2024).

[28] See the op-ed article of the Prime Minister of Sweden arguing, as an alternative to joint issuance of debt, the restructuring of the EU Budget, Kristerson, Ulf, The next EU budget cannot be business as usual, Politico, July 14 2025.

[29] Nicholas Oakes, Baltic allies brace as US prepares to slash security assistance, Modern Diplomacy, 6 September 2025.

[30] The author makes that point in European Defence covers Greece, Ta Nea, 12 4 2025 (Η Ευρωπαϊκή άμυνα καλύπτει την Ελλάδα, Τα Νέα).

[31] Power, Jack, A frugal no more: Russian threat shifts Denmark’s thinking on defence spending,  July 7 2025.

[32] Cafiero, George, NATO member Turkey takes role of ‘active neutrality’ in Red Sea crisis’ Responsible Statecraft, March 24 2025.

[33] Greek lobby succeeds in US efforts, Ekathimerini, https://www.ekathimerini.com/news/1189218/greek-lobby-succeeds-in-us-efforts/, 18 July 2022; Greek and Jewish Diaspora team up for Cyprus security, Knews, https://knews.kathimerini.com.cy/en/news/greek-and-jewish-diaspora-team-up-for-cyprus, 7 May 2018.

[34] See indicatively, John Paul Rathbone and Henry Foy, Military Briefing: How Turkey became vital to European Security, Financial Times, 14.5.2025, Kadri Tastan, et al, EU-Turkiye Defense cooperation: Why now – and how far?, German Marshall Fund, Ilke Toygur, et al.,  Turkey, Europe and the quest for security, CEPS, June 2025, Sinem Adar, et al, Alignment of Necessity, Centre for Applied Turkish Studies, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, August 2025.

[35] Progress and Shortfalls in Europe’s Defence – An Assessment, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, September 2025.

[36] Ibid.

[37] See, Tom Waldwyn, Turkiye’s defence industry charts a growth for European Growth,International Institute for Strategic Studies, 20 January 2025.

[38] Progress and Shortfalls in Europe’s Defence – An Assessment, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, September 2025.

[39] Rutte, Mark, Specch by the NATO Secretary General at the IISS Prague Defence Summit, 4 September 2025

[40] See, Lazarou, Eleni and Politis Lamprou, Panagiotis, Conscription as an element in European Union preparedness, European Parliamentary Research Service, March 2025.

[41] Wikipedia, Coalition casualties in Afghanistan.

[42] Wagner, Wolfgang. “Is there a parliamentary peace? Parliamentary veto power and military interventions from Kosovo to Daesh.” The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 20.1 (2018): 121-134.

[43]See his statement in the following youtube segment,  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yX06zhJf20o

[44] Imamoglu calls on Germany to lift veto on Eurofighter – “Turkey is not only Erdogan”

[45] Gonul Tol, Don’t cut Turkey out of European defence efforts because of Erdogan, Financial Times, 23 June 2024.

[46] Hurjan Asli Aksoy and Salim Cevik, Turkey’s authoritarian turn: Imamoglu’s arrest and Europe’s strategic dilemma, Centre for Applied Turkish Studies, 25 March 2025.

[47] Ruth Michaelson and Nevin Sungar, Turkish opposition leader criticizes Starmer for ingoring arrest of Istanbul Mayor, Guardian, 11 April 2025.

[48] Ekrem Imamoglou, Why Turkey’s democratic future matters for the world, Financial Times, April 16 2025.

[49] Sinem Adar, et al, Alignment of Necessity, Centre for Applied Turkish Studies, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, August 2025.

[50]

[51] Council Regulation (EU) 2-25/1106 of 27 May 2025 establishing the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) through the Reinforcement of the European Defence Industry Instrument, Official Journal of the European Union, 28.5.2025