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By Mawdudur Rahman and Habib Siddiqui
BOSTON / PHILADELPHIA, Oct 28 2024 (IPS)

The students and the common people of Bangladesh dared to do something in 36 days of July-August that was considered simply impossible by most people just days before August 5, 2024. They said ‘enough is enough’ to an old order that outraged their humanity, robbed their dignity and the rulers imagined that their citadel of power was simply impenetrable. The revolutionists refused to bow down to the murderous regime that knew no bounds to its cruelty and plundering. They were ready to sacrifice their lives for the freedom of the besieged nation.

Mawdudur Rahman

This revolution is unique in so many ways. It is a revolution in the digital age that is rooted in meta-modernist philosophy. The old political leadership with its moribund appeal and bankrupt philosophy proved irrelevant in this agenda. As Professor Yunus, the Chief Advisor to the Interim Government, has rightly said, ‘Now is the era of a new generation’.

Meta-modernism is the cultural philosophy of the digital age, coined by Mas’ud Zavarzadeh in 1975. meta-modernism is the Age of the Internet or more balanced worldview. As one analyst puts it, we went from modernism — “Make it new!” Let’s shape History! – to postmodernism — everything sucks! Nothing really matters! — to meta-modernism – maybe things are not this black-and-white, maybe there’s a middle ground.

Meta-modernist thinkers perceive the present world around them as a threat to their very existence. They work with pragmatic idealism and have no grand narrative thinking or any orthodox certainties. In other words, they try to strike a balance between all of this. They recognize that they have to face the problems of the society.

Habib Siddiqui

Arguably, all the activities of Bangladeshi revolutionists including their wall posters, followed a framework of Meta-Modernism. It is understood that the new Bangladesh is defined in a new ideology. Student revolutionaries have said that our ideology is reflected through the language we use. The basis of the new ideology is language. It is a revolution of change from the cultural context of fascist imperialist language to the native (spoken) language of the people. In other words, new ideals will be reflected through the language of the people.

It would be wrong to think that this people’s revolution was all about a change of government. Its victory is unlike 1947 and 1971. In both those cases, there was a change of government without any structural change. As a result, the incoming government followed imperialist practices of exploitation left behind by the British. Subsequent governments turned the country into a failed democracy, in order to control, exploit and subjugate its citizens. The police were used as an enabling force to subjugate the citizens, while the legislature and judiciary worked as the rubber stamps to sustain the total control of the government. This evil social system has corrupted the mindset and behavior of our people. An immoral society was formed with no fear of accountability, whose driving force was unfathomed greed and mantra — the ‘rule and exploitation by repression’. Government employees saw themselves as bosses and not as public servants. They thrived upon corruption at all levels.

There are now two competing ideologies in front of Bangladesh – one of decaying fascism that wants to resurface under old leadership and the other is the young leadership of equality and morality. As the revolution demonstrated, the ‘New Bangladesh’ does not approve fascist-supporting corrupt institutions. It desires a corruption-free new society. It is for paradigm shift – a transformational change.

The Chief Advisor and Student Coordinators have clearly highlighted the ideals of New Bangladesh through their speeches and interviews. Dr. Yunus said, ‘We are all one nation’. This is a clarion call to establish a holistic change in society. Such a radical change in society requires a change in values. A change in values lies in the change in public ideology.

The new Bangladesh is not the old Bangladesh with a new cover. It demands a change in the fundamental values of human behavior, actions, and beliefs. These include structural changes, personal changes, expectations.

To understand the ideology of this change, one has to listen carefully to the speech of Mahfuz Alam, the ‘thinker’ of the movement. Five points can be deduced from his recent talks: (1) unity, (2) ‘language is their inspiration’, (3) group leadership, (4) they are children of time, and that (5) they are not a slave to traditional thinking. His views reflect today’s meta-modernism.

For any transformational change to succeed, the change agents must own it, direct it, and ultimately excel in it. We think that this revolution of holistic change can benefit from the revolutionary approaches adopted in China and Cuba that were also led by youths. They owned the revolution and did not allow it to be hijacked by the reactionaries. We see some of these characteristics in the minds and mission of the Bangladeshi revolutionaries.

The bottom line is, bringing any changes in old culture habits was never an easy task. This revolution has presented an opportunity to change the destiny of Bangladesh as never before.

The meta-modernist youths of Bangladesh have come to lead and move forward; they will not go back to the old ways. Their message is clear: if you do not join us, the country will not wait for you. If older generations do not adopt the new view of change, we fear further instability and chaos to come, whose outcome cannot be pleasant.

Dr. Mawdudur Rahman, Professor Emeritus, Suffolk University, Boston, USA. He can be contacted at: mrahman@suffolk.edu.

Dr. Habib Siddiqui is a peace and human rights activists. His latest book – ‘Bangladesh: a polarized and divided nation?’ is available in the Amazon.com. Both are members of the steering committee of Esho Desh Gori – Let’s Build Bangladesh.

IPS UN Bureau

 

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TASHKENT, 28 October 2024 – Uzbekistan’s 27 October parliamentary elections took place amid ongoing reforms, including amendments to the Constitution, but the political environment remained constrained, not providing voters with a genuine choice, international observers said in a preliminary statement released today. Despite the ongoing reforms, fundamental freedoms remain disproportionally limited both by legislation and in practice, the statement says.

"These elections were held under a new mixed electoral system, reflecting significant constitutional amendments and a revised electoral code as part of Uzbekistan's ongoing reform efforts," said Mr. Azay Guliyev, Special Co-ordinator and leader of the OSCE short-term observers. "While these reforms represent progress in enhancing human rights provisions, significant challenges remain in the realization of fundamental freedoms, particularly the rights to association, peaceful assembly and freedom of expression."

While the election-related laws have gradually evolved and the elections were technically well-prepared, significant challenges in meeting international standards persist in such areas as political party registration, the right to stand, campaign finance transparency, citizen observation, and the publication of polling station results. 

All five registered political parties were able to campaign freely and with legally enforced equal conditions, but their campaigns were low-key and devoid of real challenges to the policies of the ruling party or to each other. Media coverage was limited by restrictions on free expression, resulting in minimal access for voters to diverse viewpoints. Positively, women were well represented among candidates and in election administration.

“In a landscape where the five registered parties share a common support for government policies, voters were not presented with genuine alternatives. This further highlights a need to foster a more dynamic and competitive political environment to truly represent citizens’ voices,” said Sargis Khandanyan, Head of the OSCE PA delegation. “At the same time, the increased gender quota for parliamentary candidates marks a positive development. We are hopeful that this will further boost women's participation in public and political life in line with OSCE commitments.”

The changes to election-related laws include a revised electoral system, new party list registration rules, modified rules on election management bodies, and an increased gender quota, but the relatively short timeframe for implementing these changes raised questions about compliance with international good practices.

The country’s media-related laws contain broad and insufficiently defined provisions, including on religious extremism, disturbances of public order and false information and, as such, do not provide legal clarity and unduly restrict the right to freedom of expression. Defamation and insult remain criminalized, while imprisonment is still foreseen for public slander and insulting the president. In addition, undue external interference on media editorial freedom and a limited advertising market stifle open discussion and independent journalism, and result in reported widespread self-censorship. State-owned broadcast and print media provided free airtime and space for contestants in line with the law. Private television channels organized election debates, but provided only limited news coverage and virtually no analysis of the campaign.

Election preparations at all levels were administered efficiently, and the Central Election Commission held regular live-streamed sessions and swiftly published its decisions, contributing to transparency. Despite previous ODIHR recommendations, the independence of lower-level election commissions remained negatively affected by the prominent role of Mahallas, which are local self-governing bodies  closely aligned with state and local administration in various aspects of the electoral process.

Election day was calm and orderly, but marred by numerous cases of identified violations and malfeasance, as well as procedural and technical problems. Important safeguards were repeatedly disregarded during voting, counting and tabulation, challenging the integrity of the process and undermining transparency.

“Uzbekistan’s authorities have partially addressed some prior ODIHR recommendations through recent legislative changes,” said Douglas Wake, Head of the Election Observation Mission from the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. “Nevertheless, given the problems that our observers identified in yesterday's voting, counting and tabulation, much more must be done to enhance transparency and confidence in the officially announced turnout and results. ODIHR looks forward to further co-operation with Uzbekistan’s authorities, including on the recommendations that will come in our final report.”

A total of 875 candidates were registered from the five registered political parties. The laws retain burdensome requirements for party registration, as well as broad legal grounds for denying registration and the suspension of party activities. The legal framework also does not allow for independent candidates, thus limiting pluralism and political competition.

For these elections, the gender quota for women was increased from 30 to 40 per cent.  Women hold 47 of the 150 seats in the outgoing Legislative Chamber and comprised 45 per cent of candidates. Furthermore, the Speaker of the Senate, one of seven Deputy Speakers of the Legislative Chamber, and one of four Deputy Prime Ministers are women. Despite ongoing efforts to increase women's participation in public and political life, however, women remain underrepresented in decision-making positions. Only two out of 27 ministers and three out of 12 members of the Supreme Judicial Council are women. All regional governors (Hokims) are men.

The regulations for campaign finance lack clarity and do not facilitate transparency, not providing for effective oversight and public scrutiny. Funding for campaign purposes is allocated exclusively from the state budget, and only to registered political parties with an approved list of candidates.

International organizations, political parties, Mahallas and accredited media are entitled to observe elections. The CEC registered 851 international observers. Despite previous ODIHR recommendations, the legislation does not contain provisions for citizen election observers.

For further information, contact:

Thomas Rymer, press adviser, ODIHR election observation mission, thomas.rymer@odihr-uzbekistan.org

Anzhelika Ivanishcheva, media officer, OSCE PA, anzhelika.ivanishcheva@oscepa.dk

ENTWURF EINES BERICHTS über die Umsetzung der Gemeinsamen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik – Jahresbericht 2024
Ausschuss für auswärtige Angelegenheiten
David McAllister

Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2024 - EP

L’opposition de centre gauche lituanienne ressort lundi 28 octobre comme la claire gagnante des élections législatives face aux conservateurs au pouvoir, après une campagne dominée par les préoccupations relatives à l’augmentation du coût de la vie et aux inégalités sociales.

Die EU ringt aktuell um eine Reaktion auf die umstrittenen Wahlen in Georgien. Derweil plant der ungarische Ministerpräsident Viktor Orbán, ein politischer Verbündeter der georgischen Regierungspartei 'Georgischer Traum', das Land am Montag zu besuchen. 

Transit Site in Roriak, Unity State, South Sudan. People receive support after fleeing conflict in Sudan. Credit: UNICEF/South Sudan

By Oritro Karim
UNITED NATIONS, Oct 28 2024 (IPS)

Critical levels of nationwide hunger in Sudan has only increased to critical levels since the start of the Sudanese civil war in April 2023. Escalated hostilities between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have led to limited mobility and repeated blockages of humanitarian aid. This, coupled with the volatile floods and droughts, have decimated crop fields which has only exacerbated famine levels greatly. All of these factors have left nearly 25 million people in Sudan in need of humanitarian assistance in 2024.

“The situation in Sudan can now only be described as a humanitarian disaster of the highest level. All sides are committing atrocities, as recently confirmed by the United Nations fact-finding mission. The war, now in its second year, has pushed parts of North Darfur into famine conditions, with the situation expected to deteriorate,” said the European Union (EU) Commissioner for Crisis Management, H.E. Mr. Janez Lenarčič.

Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) estimates that since the wake of the conflict, there have been over 5,170 violent conflicts in the nation, culminating in the deaths of 14,790 civilians. Early figures from the World Food Programme (WFP) show that there has been little improvement in food security since relief efforts began. Heavy torrential rains and floods have led to the destruction of farmland. Continued fighting between the RSF and the SAF have made it difficult for farmers to cultivate and harvest crops. Approximately 25.6 million people are facing acute food insecurity in Sudan. 13 areas of the country are at risk of experiencing severe famine in the coming months.

The United Nations (UN) reports that sustained violence has led to over 10.7 million people being internally displaced and an additional 2.3 million fleeing to neighbouring countries. Humanitarian organizations are concerned about the scale of Sudanese refugees in neighbouring countries, fearing that this could overwhelm economies in northeast Africa.

“This brutal war has uprooted millions of people, forcing them to leave their homes, schools and jobs behind in search of safety. Countries neighbouring Sudan are generously hosting a rising number of refugees, but cannot shoulder that responsibility alone. The stability of the whole region hangs in the balance,” said UN High Commissioner for Refugees Filippo Grandi.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) issued a report on October 25 predicting that the Central African Republic, Chad, Eritrea, and Ethiopia could be the most negatively impacted from adopting Sudanese refugees. “A number of these countries that are neighbors are also fragile countries with their own challenges. And then to be confronted with the refugees, the security issues, the trade issues, is very challenging for their growth,” said Catherine Pattillo, IMF’s deputy director.

UN Secretary-General António Guterres is expected to address the Security Council next week on initiatives to take to prevent further suffering in Sudan and its neighbouring countries. The African Union has expressed concern that the escalating situation in Sudan could become a genocide. As is the African Union report into the Rwanda Genocide: “Each case of modern genocide has taken the world by surprise. Even when, in retrospect, it is clear that unmistakable warning signs and statements of intent were there in advance for all to see.”

The UN and its affiliated nations are on the frontlines providing humanitarian assistance to affected communities. In August, Sudanese officials approved requests to open the Adre border in Darfur to allow for aid missions to access critical areas. The World Food Programme has delivered food assistance to over 360,000 people in Darfur. WFP is also mobilized to scale up efforts in Zamzam, aiming to assist more than 180,000 people.

The 2024 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan for Sudan has requested 2.7 billion dollars to help over 14 million people until the end of the year. With funding having reached only 49 percent, the UN urges donor contributions as conditions grow more dire every day.

IPS UN Bureau Report

 

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Drei Länder in Osteuropa sind über das Wochenende an die Urnen gegangen – mit sehr unterschiedlichen Ergebnissen. Zwei der Wahlausgänge dürften die EU noch weiter beschäftigen.

Quelle est la probabilité que le Royaume-Uni accorde des réparations pour la traite des esclaves, et à quoi cela pourrait-il ressembler ?

Quelle est la probabilité que le Royaume-Uni accorde des réparations pour la traite des esclaves, et à quoi cela pourrait-il ressembler ?

The Busher nuclear power plant in Iran. IAEA/Paolo Contri
 
Israel’s strikes against Hezbollah and Hamas weaken Iran. The country’s will to cross the nuclear threshold is growing.

By Ruslan Suleymanov
CAIRO, Egypt, Oct 28 2024 (IPS)

Violence in the Middle East has escalated dramatically since the Hamas terrorist attack in October 2023 and the fallout that has since followed. There is tension, if not a state of war, between all the major opponents on the ground.

Israel is directly facing off with mainly non-state actors from other countries, who have more firepower than their country’s national armies. Think of Hezbollah in Lebanon, Ansar Allah (Houthis) in Yemen and Shia militias in Iraq. Together with Hamas, they form the ‘Axis of Resistance’, an armed pro-Iranian alliance in the region.

For years, Tehran’s military doctrine was based on keeping any conflict with a potential enemy far away from its own borders. Now things are different. Iran has launched massive attacks against Israel from its own territory. The country’s shift in foreign policy is primarily a product of events in the Gaza Strip.

Although there is no evidence that Iran was involved in the Hamas attacks on Israel on 7 October 2023, officials in Tehran have openly welcomed the events that killed at least 1 200 people. ‘What they have done signifies pride, glory and strength; God will support them’, said then-Iranian-President Ebrahim Raisi as he congratulated Hamas.

Israel’s subsequent campaign in Gaza has now been going on for a year, claiming the lives of 40 000 civilians. The fate of many Israeli hostages remains unknown.

Israel has now shifted its strategy to intelligence operations. These include the assassination of the head of the Hamas Political Bureau, Ismail Haniyeh, in Tehran in July, the killing of numerous Hezbollah fighters through exploding communications devices, and the assassinations of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah in September and Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar in October.

All of these were huge moral blows to Iran, showing that it cannot protect its puppets’ commanders even in their own countries — hence Tehran’s response to Israel’s attacks.

The only success that the Israelis’ ground invasion has achieved is that it has diverted the world’s attention away from the Gaza Strip.

Hezbollah has lost at least 10 high-ranking leaders, not least Nasrallah, in Israel’s attacks. The militia seems to be on the ground in the long term, but how important it will be in the future is being questioned. Still, it’s too early to write off Hezbollah.

The group has around 100 000 fighters in its ranks, and its arsenal still consists of up to 150 000 missiles. History shows that these groups are quick to replace high-ranking leaders with other militants who can carry on the group’s work seamlessly. In 2004, Israel took out two Hamas leaders. But that only brought the group even greater popularity and influence.

The fact that the militia is still capable of resisting the Israeli government is demonstrated in its drone attack on 13 October this year. To date, more than 80 000 Israeli citizens have had to flee their homes in the north of the country and cannot return home because of coming under constant fire from Lebanon.

The only success that the Israelis’ ground invasion has achieved is that it has diverted the world’s attention away from the Gaza Strip. The situation there is dire: the prospects of freeing the remaining hostages are still slim, and Hamas continues to thrive. After all, Sinwar’s assassination does not mean Hamas has been defeated.

According to ACLED’s US analysts, the group has lost only about 8 500 of its 25 000 to 30 000 fighters in clashes with Israel. These losses are offset by unknown quantities of new Palestinian recruits, who lost friends and relatives in Israel’s attacks.

The attack on Lebanon also triggered the second massive Iranian missile attack on Israel within a year. Both attacks were calculated not in a way to cause maximum damage, but to send a symbolic message. Bold words from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu issued after the attack showed that Israel’s continued response is still unclear.

All-out war is not as likely as it is sometimes made out to be. This is also due to the great distance between Iran and Israel – at their nearest points, it is 1 200 kilometres. But it’s not just that …

Israel knows that attacking Tehran’s oil industry would send global prices in the crude oil market shooting up and upset its own allies, most notably the US.

Iran has mustered around 40 000 Afghan, Iraqi, Pakistani and Syrian militants together in Syria. Iran has not tried to use them against Israel yet, as the Tehran leadership only knows too well that doing so would be suicide. What’s more, the situation in the oil market is preventing escalation on both sides.

While Iran relies on its oil revenues, Israel knows that attacking Tehran’s oil industry would send global prices in the crude oil market shooting up and upset its own allies, most notably the US. Ultimately, a massive attack on Iran with civilian casualties would rally its population around the otherwise unpopular government.

So, despite its military inferiority, the Iranian regime is actually in quite a favourable situation if it comes to direct conflict. Any escalation could only end up strengthening it.

And then there’s the possibility of an Iranian nuclear bomb. Officials in Iran have been clear in recent years that when it comes to nuclear weapons, their aim is to maintain what they call a ‘threshold status’, i.e. to be capable of producing nuclear weapons quickly, but only if needed.

The situation has changed dramatically here too. International observers have raised concerns that Iran could soon start developing a nuclear bomb, with US intelligence agencies reporting in July that active preparations were underway.

Shortly afterwards, the International Atomic Energy Agency stated that it could no longer be confident that Iran’s nuclear programme was for peaceful purposes.

It might sound paradoxical, but despite high inflation, more and more people in Iran support the idea of producing nuclear weapons. In a survey conducted by IranPoll, nearly 70 per cent of Iranians surveyed said that the country should possess its own nuclear weapons.

The more pressure that Israel or the West puts on Iran, the more determined the country will be to cross that nuclear threshold to deter a conventionally superior opponent if it deems it necessary.

Ruslan Suleymanov is a Russian orientalist and journalist. He was the senior Middle East correspondent of the TASS news agency in Cairo until February 2022. He resigned from this post in protest against the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Source: International Politics and Society (IPS)-Journal published by the International Political Analysis Unit of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Hiroshimastrasse 28, D-10785 Berlin

IPS UN Bureau

 

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Dans la matinée de ce samedi 26 Octobre 2024 devraient se tenir les travaux de l'Assemblée Générale Élective de la Fédération Béninoise de Rugby, exercice 2024 - 2028. Cependant, à la grande surprise, l'AG a été annulée. Face aux journalistes, Dominique Amanvi a évoqué les raisons de l'annulation de la séance.

Pas d'AG Élective samedi dernier à la Fédération Béninoise de Rugby. Si pourtant à la veille la Commission Ad'hoc a rendu public la liste des candidatures aux différents postes, au Chant d'oiseau de Cotonou dans la matinée du samedi, les travaux ont été annulés. En effet, malgré un processus électoral entaché d'irrégularités au nombre desquels le déclenchement unilatéral du processus électoral par le Président M. Faustin DAHITO, les acteurs de la balle ovale ont tenu à aller aux élections pour mettre fin réglementairement au mandat actuel du comité exécutif.

Cependant, la grande surprise a été de constater sur place que M. Faustin DAHITO s'est permis, avec son équipe, de choisir lui-même des délégués différents de ceux envoyés par les associations sportives. Tout ça, dans le but de favoriser l'élection frauduleuse de ses candidats choisis. Fort heureusement, la vigilance des acteurs venus nombreux a permis de déjouer ce plan machiavélique et entraîner le report des élections.

Au micro des journalistes, Dominique Amanvi, Secrétaire général de la Fédération Béninoise de Rugby, a notifié que le club des Magouillats Percuteurs a constaté un changement sur sa liste envoyée à la Commission Ad'hoc. La réaction du président du club créant donc une malcompréhension entre les différentes parties. Autre irrégularité, le Secrétaire général de la Fédération Béninoise de Rugby se dit surpris de l'appel à candidature qui a été émis sans sa signature.

Malgré le fait d'avoir saisi les autorités compétentes, les irrégularités n'ont pu être corrigées à temps. Dominique Amanvi profite quand même de l'occasion pour lancer un appel au Ministre des Sports. "Nous interpellons le ministre des sports d'instruire ses organes capables de régler la situation à ce que l'AG soit reconvoquée et que tout s'organise dans la règle de l'art."

J.S

Written by Silvia Kotanidis.

The hearings of the Commissioners-designate before the European Parliament’s committees are scheduled to take place between 4 and 12 November 2024. Depending on the results of the hearings, the plenary vote on the entire Commission is likely to take place during the November plenary session (25-28 November) or the December session in Strasbourg. Before such a vote, President-elect Ursula von der Leyen will present the full college and its programme. Considering that the incumbent Commission was appointed until 31 October 2024, it is already certain that the new Commission will not be able to enter into office by the time the mandate of the current one ends. The outgoing Commission will thus remain in office until the formal appointment of its replacement, although questions arise as to its powers in that period.

Background

Following the election by Parliament of Ursula von der Leyen as President-elect of the Commission, her next step was to announce, after a decision taken in common accord with the Council under Article 17(7) TEU, the names and portfolios of the Commissioners-designate. They have to undergo public hearings before the committees responsible for their portfolios, prior to Parliament’s vote of consent (a majority of the votes cast) on the President-elect and the Commissioners-designate (including the Vice-President appointed by the Council as High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy) as a body. Ultimately, following that consent, the Commission is appointed by the European Council, acting by qualified majority (Article 17(7) TEU).

The confirmation hearings to which Commissioners-designate are subject are not required by the Treaties, but have long existed in a practice which has been codified in Parliament’s Rules of Procedure (Rule 129 and Annex VII). For the tenth legislative term, the Conference of Presidents decided that the hearings would be held between 4 and 12 November 2024, which means that the vote on the Commission as a body could take place during Parliament’s plenary session of 25-29 November.

This scrutiny of the candidates implies that the steps and timetable may need to be adjusted. Before the confirmation hearings start, the Committee on Legal Affairs scrutinised the candidates’ declarations of interests (Article 3 of Annex VII). The confirmation hearings are organised by the Conference of Presidents and aim to establish whether the candidate is suitable to be a member of the Commission and is fit for the assigned portfolio. The confirmation hearings, which are regulated in detail by Article 4 and 5 of Annex VII, conclude with an evaluation of the Commissioner-designate by the Chair and the coordinators of the committee(s) concerned, leading to the approval or rejection of the candidate.

Once the hearing process is completed, the President-elect and the Commissioners-designate appear before Parliament to present the Commission programme and for a vote on the entire College of Commissioners. The new Commission requires approval by Parliament by a majority of the votes cast, by roll-call vote (Article 6 of Annex VII). A decision of the European Council appoints the new Commission and the mandate of the new Commission starts from the date indicated in that decision.

The notion of a ‘caretaker’ Commission

Considering that the mandate of the current Commission ends on 31 October 2024, according to the European Council decision of 27 November 2019, it is now certain that, with the schedule of confirmation hearings starting only on 4 November 2024, the new Commission will not be able to take up its functions by the time the current one ends its mandate. This gives rise to the following questions: What are the consequences if the Commission is delayed in taking office? What limits are there, if any, on the exercise of the Commission President’s functions, and those of the College, and under what rules?

The Treaties do not explicitly take into account a possible delay in the Commission taking office. Neither Article 17 TEU, setting out the term of office and the details of the procedure leading to the Commission’s election, nor any other provisions in the Treaties provide for this situation, although similar events have occurred more than once in the past (see below).

Article 246(6) TFEU, however, deals with a comparable situation, according to which, when all members of the Commission submit their resignation collectively, they are to remain in office and continue to deal with current business until they are replaced, for the remainder of their term of office. This provision embodies the principle, quite widespread in the life of both EU and national institutions, of institutional continuity. The Treaties do not define the powers of the ‘prolonged’ Commission, but some experts argue that the Commission must act as a ‘caretaker administration’ not only when it resigns collectively as a College but also when, as in this case, the new Commission does not take office immediately after the previous College’s term of office expires.

In this context, ‘current business’ would include all daily, routine business as well as all acts that cannot be postponed to the next College. Against this background, the adoption of new legislative proposals would seem to be excluded, except for emergency reasons. Some limited case law has helped to frame the scope of the Commission’s room for manoeuvre when the notion of ‘current business’ comes into play.

In 2003, the question arose in the case of Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Commission (Joined Cases T-228/99 and T-233/99) as to whether a State aid decision issued by a resigning Commission was lawful. On that occasion, the Court affirmed that the adoption of a State aid decision by the Commission after its collective resignation did fall within the scope of a caretaker administration, insofar as it did not constitute a new political initiative and the supervisory function of the Commission constituted part of the fulfilment ofan ‘essential task of the Community’. In this sense, the Court considered that the Commission had not exceeded the powers entrusted to a ‘caretaker administrator’ but had ‘confined itself to applying to that case a legal scheme of long-established rules and principles’.

In another case, from 2012, European Parliament v Council (C‑130/10), the Court argued that the same reasoning could be applicable ‘a fortiori in circumstances in which a pre-existing proposal remained pending’. In fact, in that specific case, the Barroso I Commission formally amended one of its own proposals – which was then adopted as Regulation 1286/2009 – in respect of its legal basis, to take account of the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. This decision was taken at a time when the Barroso I Commission’s term of office had ended, but the new Commission had not yet formally entered into office. The Court also ruled in this case that such a ‘step was essential if the Union legislature was to continue with the pending procedure after the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force’. However, the Court did not provide additional clarifications on what should be considered as ‘essential’.

A look back

The current situation is not an extraordinary one. The first von der Leyen Commission started its mandate on 1 December 2019, according to the specific European Council decision, while the Juncker Commission’s mandate ended on 31 October 2019, one month before the start of the next mandate.

The Prodi Commission was appointed for a term running until 22 January 2005, although, in accordance with Article 45 of the Act concerning the 2004 enlargement, it ended earlier (on 31 October 2004). The Barroso I Commission should, therefore, have started on 1 November 2004. However, due to uncertainties as to whether Parliament would support three of the Commissioners-designate initially put forward by Barroso, Parliament’s vote was postponed from 27 October to 18 November 2004. After its election by Parliament, the Barroso I Commission (with two of those three candidates replaced, and the third taking a different portfolio to that originally proposed) took office on 22 November 2004, three weeks after the statutory date.

Likewise, the Barroso II Commission took office a few months later than the statutory date, starting work on 10 February 2010 instead of 1 November 2009, due to the delayed ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, which was completed only in November 2009; the election of the Barroso II Commission fell under the rules of the new Treaty. On that occasion, the Commission spokesperson, Johannes Laitenberger, declared that the Commission’s mandate was extended ‘based on the principle of institutional continuity’ so that the Commission could work in a ‘caretaker capacity’.

This is an update of an ‘At a glance’ note written in 2019, by Micaela del Monte and Silvia Kotanidis.

Read this ‘At a glance’ note on ‘The Commission as ‘caretaker administration’‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Vasárnap súlyos izraeli légicsapások érték a Gázai övezetet, amelyek során legkevesebb 45 ember vesztette életét, és számos civil megsérült – jelentette be a Hamász ellenőrzése alatt álló helyi egészségügyi hatóság. A legtöbb halálos áldozat az övezet északi részén található palesztin közösségekből került ki, különösen Dzsabalíja településén, ahol húszan haltak meg egy támadás során.

Az izraeli hadsereg közleménye szerint az utóbbi 24 órában több mint 40 olyan személyt öltek meg, akiket terroristaként azonosítottak. Az izraeli védelmi miniszter, Joáv Galant hozzátette: a Hamász gázai katonai képességei lényegében megbénultak, míg a Hezbollah libanoni milícia, amelyet Irán támogat, szintén súlyos veszteségeket szenvedett.

ENSZ-közlemény: Humanitárius válsághelyzet a Gázai övezetben

António Guterres ENSZ-főtitkár aggodalmát fejezte ki a Gázai övezetben súlyosbodó humanitárius helyzet miatt, és felszólította Izraelt, hogy biztosítson szabad hozzáférést a humanitárius segélyek számára. Guterres különösen az északi övezetet sújtó „katasztrofális körülményekre” hívta fel a figyelmet, ahol sok civil, köztük sebesültek és egész családok rekedtek a romok között orvosi ellátás, élelem és hajlék nélkül.

Az ENSZ nyilatkozatában hangsúlyozta, hogy az izraeli hatóságok a legtöbb esetben akadályozzák az alapvető élelmiszerek, gyógyszerek és menedékhez szükséges eszközök bejutását az övezetbe, ami miatt számos emberi élet forog kockán. Az egészségügyi helyzet tovább romolhat, különösen a gyermekbénulás elleni oltások késedelme miatt, amely gyerekek ezreit fenyegeti.

The post Tragédia Gázában: A civil áldozatok száma nő, az ENSZ humanitárius segítséget sürget appeared first on Biztonságpiac.

Die GERB-Partei unter Ex-Ministerpräsident Bojko Borissow hat die Wahlen am 27. Oktober gewonnen. Nun stehen ihr jedoch schwierige Verhandlungen zur Regierungsbildung mit der pro-europäischen Koalition Wir setzen den Wandel fort – Demokratisches Bulgarien und mindestens einer weiteren Partei bevor.

Ebben a bejegyzésben folytatjuk tavasszal megkezdett sétánkat a USS Harry S. Truman repülőgép-hordozó kilenc repülőszázadának gépei között. Márciusban az F-14 Tomcat-tel kezdtem, augusztusban az E-2 Hawkeye és a C-2 Greyhound került sorra, most pedig három típussal, az EA-6B Prowlerrel, az S-3B Vikinggel és az SH-60F / HH-60H Seahawkkal folytatom. Emlékeztetőül: a helyszín a Földközi-tenger, az időpont 2005 márciusa.

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A VAQ-130 Zappers elektronikai hadviselési század 2000 óta volt része a Truman ezredének. 2005-ben már a harmadik bevetést teljesítették ezen a hordozón és végeztek elektronikai harctevékenységet az Iraqi Freedom műveletben. Amíg a vadászbombázó századok egy-egy repülőgép-hordozós bevetés végén többnyire közzéteszik a ledobott bombák, elindított rakéták, kilőtt gépágyúlőszerek és úgy általában a felszállások számát, a Prowler alegységek ebben a kérdésben igen diszkrétek voltak. Jöttek-mentek, zavartak, adatokat gyűjtöttek, esetleg elindítottak egy-egy lokátor elleni HARM rakétát – ha volt mire. A VAQ-130-asok nyilvánosság számára szóló naplójában sem szerepel több, de hát ez már csak így működik, amióta légi elektronikai hadviselés létezik. A század szárazföldi bázisáról, a Washington állambeli Whidbey Island-ről 180 fővel települt a Trumanra. Ebben a létszámban mindössze 24 hajózó volt, ők osztoztak a négy Prowler 16 ülésén.

[...] Bővebben!

Aujourd'hui dans l'Expresso : le rêve européen de la Géorgie menacé, le casse-tête des OQTF au cœur de la visite d’État d’Emmanuel Macron au Maroc, des hackers infiltrent des données sensibles du gouvernement et de la police en Italie.

Une ingérence russe d'une ampleur sans précédent a marqué les élections en Moldavie, avec un système pyramidal qui aurait influencé entre 10 et 20 % de l'électorat. Mais cet « éléphant dans la pièce » ne doit pas en cacher un autre : une bonne part des Moldaves voient l'Union européenne comme un mirage.

- Articles / Moldavie, Politique, Courrier des Balkans, Questions européennes, Moldavie Russie UE

Die georgische Präsidentin Salome Surabischwili erkannte am Sonntag (27. Oktober) den Wahlsieg der Partei Georgischer Traum nicht an. Sie rief zu Massenprotesten am darauffolgenden Tag auf, während Oppositionsvertreter den Westen zum Handeln drängten.

Les électeurs slovènes devaient approuver par référendum la construction d'un second réacteur à la centrale nucléaire de Krško, mais la consultation, prévue le 24 novembre, n'aura pas lieu. En cause : des considérations légales, mais surtout la crainte des partis de voir l'opinion publique décrocher du projet.

- Le fil de l'Info / Courrier des Balkans, Slovénie, Politique

Un scandale de harcèlement sexuel impliquant un ancien député de la plateforme de gauche Sumar, partenaire du gouvernement espagnol, a provoqué une crise majeure dans le camp de la gauche, menaçant sa crédibilité politique.