Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Since the beginning of US President Donald Trump’s second term in early 2025, not only US development policy but the entire international development cooperation landscape has fundamentally changed. The United States – previously by far the leading actor in global development cooperation – has rapidly withdrawn from key multilateral structures, drastically cut budgets and almost completely shut down the operations of its own development agency, the United States Agency for  International Development (USAID). This move exemplifies a deeper tectonic shift: the end of a phase of Western-dominated global cooperation and broad acceptance of rules-based collaboration, now giving way to a multipolar, power-driven and conflict-laden world order.

Constellations of State Fragility provides an empirical typology of states from a fragility perspective. It uses global data from 2005-2024 to identify typical constellations of state fragility. We conceptualize fragility as constituted of deficiencies in three dimensions: authority, capacity and legitimacy. This update to version 3.0 makes two major changes compared to version 2.0: A data update, consisting of the inclusion of data for the years 2021-2024, extending the overall period covered to 2005-2024; a modification of how the battle deaths indicator is calculated: now only battle deaths occurring in the country’s own territory are considered to increase validity; a modification of the indicator measuring school enrolment rates: we move from net to gross enrolment, due to lack of recent data for net enrolment; the replacement of the indicator measuring human rights: the ‘Human rights protection scores’ by Christopher Fariss is replaced by the ‘Physical violence index’ provided by Varieties of Democracy) due to lack of recent data for the Human rights protection scores, and minor changes for the years 2005-2020 deriving from original data updates provided by data providers. Based on these new data, new estimates of the nature of constellations of fragility. This results in the same eight typical constellations of state fragility that were identified by v2.

Constellations of State Fragility provides an empirical typology of states from a fragility perspective. It uses global data from 2005-2024 to identify typical constellations of state fragility. We conceptualize fragility as constituted of deficiencies in three dimensions: authority, capacity and legitimacy. This update to version 3.0 makes two major changes compared to version 2.0: A data update, consisting of the inclusion of data for the years 2021-2024, extending the overall period covered to 2005-2024; a modification of how the battle deaths indicator is calculated: now only battle deaths occurring in the country’s own territory are considered to increase validity; a modification of the indicator measuring school enrolment rates: we move from net to gross enrolment, due to lack of recent data for net enrolment; the replacement of the indicator measuring human rights: the ‘Human rights protection scores’ by Christopher Fariss is replaced by the ‘Physical violence index’ provided by Varieties of Democracy) due to lack of recent data for the Human rights protection scores, and minor changes for the years 2005-2020 deriving from original data updates provided by data providers. Based on these new data, new estimates of the nature of constellations of fragility. This results in the same eight typical constellations of state fragility that were identified by v2.

Constellations of State Fragility provides an empirical typology of states from a fragility perspective. It uses global data from 2005-2024 to identify typical constellations of state fragility. We conceptualize fragility as constituted of deficiencies in three dimensions: authority, capacity and legitimacy. This update to version 3.0 makes two major changes compared to version 2.0: A data update, consisting of the inclusion of data for the years 2021-2024, extending the overall period covered to 2005-2024; a modification of how the battle deaths indicator is calculated: now only battle deaths occurring in the country’s own territory are considered to increase validity; a modification of the indicator measuring school enrolment rates: we move from net to gross enrolment, due to lack of recent data for net enrolment; the replacement of the indicator measuring human rights: the ‘Human rights protection scores’ by Christopher Fariss is replaced by the ‘Physical violence index’ provided by Varieties of Democracy) due to lack of recent data for the Human rights protection scores, and minor changes for the years 2005-2020 deriving from original data updates provided by data providers. Based on these new data, new estimates of the nature of constellations of fragility. This results in the same eight typical constellations of state fragility that were identified by v2.

Since the beginning of US President Donald Trump’s second term in early 2025, not only US development policy but the entire international development cooperation landscape has fundamentally changed. The United States – previously by far the leading actor in global development cooperation – has rapidly withdrawn from key multilateral structures, drastically cut budgets and almost completely shut down the operations of its own development agency, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). This move exemplifies a deeper tectonic shift: the end of a phase of Western-dominated global cooperation and broad acceptance of rules-based collaboration, now giving way to a multipolar, power-driven and conflict-laden world order.

Andy Sumner is Professor of International Development at King’s College in London and President of the European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes.

Since the beginning of US President Donald Trump’s second term in early 2025, not only US development policy but the entire international development cooperation landscape has fundamentally changed. The United States – previously by far the leading actor in global development cooperation – has rapidly withdrawn from key multilateral structures, drastically cut budgets and almost completely shut down the operations of its own development agency, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). This move exemplifies a deeper tectonic shift: the end of a phase of Western-dominated global cooperation and broad acceptance of rules-based collaboration, now giving way to a multipolar, power-driven and conflict-laden world order.

Andy Sumner is Professor of International Development at King’s College in London and President of the European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes.

Since the beginning of US President Donald Trump’s second term in early 2025, not only US development policy but the entire international development cooperation landscape has fundamentally changed. The United States – previously by far the leading actor in global development cooperation – has rapidly withdrawn from key multilateral structures, drastically cut budgets and almost completely shut down the operations of its own development agency, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). This move exemplifies a deeper tectonic shift: the end of a phase of Western-dominated global cooperation and broad acceptance of rules-based collaboration, now giving way to a multipolar, power-driven and conflict-laden world order.

Andy Sumner is Professor of International Development at King’s College in London and President of the European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes.

The Compromiso de Sevilla, the outcome document of the 4th Financing for Development Conference (FfD4) highlights the importance of digital technologies for financial inclusion. It outlines three central insights – concerning financial inclusion, consumer protection and regulations, and competition rules – that provide general guidance for policy-makers with regard to digital finance. These considerations point in the right direction as they adequately reflect the fine line between maximising benefits from access to digital financial services (DFS) and mitigating negative, unintended consequences. However, they are too abstract to serve as a blueprint for governments and for regulatory and supervisory authorities on how to navigate the complexities of digital finance. This blog post aspires to translate the general commitments of FfD4 into concrete measures and policies that foster the potential of DFS for financial inclusion, address challenges for consumers, and deal with platformisation and monopolies.

The Compromiso de Sevilla, the outcome document of the 4th Financing for Development Conference (FfD4) highlights the importance of digital technologies for financial inclusion. It outlines three central insights – concerning financial inclusion, consumer protection and regulations, and competition rules – that provide general guidance for policy-makers with regard to digital finance. These considerations point in the right direction as they adequately reflect the fine line between maximising benefits from access to digital financial services (DFS) and mitigating negative, unintended consequences. However, they are too abstract to serve as a blueprint for governments and for regulatory and supervisory authorities on how to navigate the complexities of digital finance. This blog post aspires to translate the general commitments of FfD4 into concrete measures and policies that foster the potential of DFS for financial inclusion, address challenges for consumers, and deal with platformisation and monopolies.

The Compromiso de Sevilla, the outcome document of the 4th Financing for Development Conference (FfD4) highlights the importance of digital technologies for financial inclusion. It outlines three central insights – concerning financial inclusion, consumer protection and regulations, and competition rules – that provide general guidance for policy-makers with regard to digital finance. These considerations point in the right direction as they adequately reflect the fine line between maximising benefits from access to digital financial services (DFS) and mitigating negative, unintended consequences. However, they are too abstract to serve as a blueprint for governments and for regulatory and supervisory authorities on how to navigate the complexities of digital finance. This blog post aspires to translate the general commitments of FfD4 into concrete measures and policies that foster the potential of DFS for financial inclusion, address challenges for consumers, and deal with platformisation and monopolies.

We are now back from the UN Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development (FfD4), held in Sevilla. Despite the record high temperatures, over 8,000 participants – representing UN member countries, multilateral organisations, the business sector, civil society organisations, think tanks, academia and other experts – gathered and exchanged ideas and policy proposals in more than 470 side and special events. Members of the ETTG co-organised and were involved in many of these. Attention was in fact drawn to parallel discussions and the SPA (Sevilla Platform for Action) announcements, since the Summit’s conclusions, the Compromiso de Sevilla (Seville Commitment), had already been (pre)approved at UN headquarters a few days before the Summit. This happened after the withdrawal of the US from the FfD4 process – since the country’s proposal of 400 amendments to the draft conclusions was not approved. However, several bolder proposals included in previous versions of the text were substantially watered down throughout the process by both the US and other countries. This was the case, especially, with issues related to the reform of the international financial architecture (IFA), where Bretton Woods institutions play a critical role. The inaugural addresses revealed the more or less prominent role that countries and supra-national bodies have opted to play. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) recalled its mandate, with no references whatsoever to potential reforms. President von der Leyen presented the EU as the main provider of official development assistance (ODA) despite the ODA cuts announced by key member States; underlined the need for developing countries to mobilize domestic resources; and for the private sector to more actively participate in development processes, making reference once again to the EU’s Global Gateway. Iraq and Angola, on behalf of the G77 + China and the African Group respectively, underscored the importance of multilateralism, the 2030 Agenda, the burden of external debt and the risks posed by geopolitical fragmentation to international and global development.

We are now back from the UN Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development (FfD4), held in Sevilla. Despite the record high temperatures, over 8,000 participants – representing UN member countries, multilateral organisations, the business sector, civil society organisations, think tanks, academia and other experts – gathered and exchanged ideas and policy proposals in more than 470 side and special events. Members of the ETTG co-organised and were involved in many of these. Attention was in fact drawn to parallel discussions and the SPA (Sevilla Platform for Action) announcements, since the Summit’s conclusions, the Compromiso de Sevilla (Seville Commitment), had already been (pre)approved at UN headquarters a few days before the Summit. This happened after the withdrawal of the US from the FfD4 process – since the country’s proposal of 400 amendments to the draft conclusions was not approved. However, several bolder proposals included in previous versions of the text were substantially watered down throughout the process by both the US and other countries. This was the case, especially, with issues related to the reform of the international financial architecture (IFA), where Bretton Woods institutions play a critical role. The inaugural addresses revealed the more or less prominent role that countries and supra-national bodies have opted to play. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) recalled its mandate, with no references whatsoever to potential reforms. President von der Leyen presented the EU as the main provider of official development assistance (ODA) despite the ODA cuts announced by key member States; underlined the need for developing countries to mobilize domestic resources; and for the private sector to more actively participate in development processes, making reference once again to the EU’s Global Gateway. Iraq and Angola, on behalf of the G77 + China and the African Group respectively, underscored the importance of multilateralism, the 2030 Agenda, the burden of external debt and the risks posed by geopolitical fragmentation to international and global development.

We are now back from the UN Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development (FfD4), held in Sevilla. Despite the record high temperatures, over 8,000 participants – representing UN member countries, multilateral organisations, the business sector, civil society organisations, think tanks, academia and other experts – gathered and exchanged ideas and policy proposals in more than 470 side and special events. Members of the ETTG co-organised and were involved in many of these. Attention was in fact drawn to parallel discussions and the SPA (Sevilla Platform for Action) announcements, since the Summit’s conclusions, the Compromiso de Sevilla (Seville Commitment), had already been (pre)approved at UN headquarters a few days before the Summit. This happened after the withdrawal of the US from the FfD4 process – since the country’s proposal of 400 amendments to the draft conclusions was not approved. However, several bolder proposals included in previous versions of the text were substantially watered down throughout the process by both the US and other countries. This was the case, especially, with issues related to the reform of the international financial architecture (IFA), where Bretton Woods institutions play a critical role. The inaugural addresses revealed the more or less prominent role that countries and supra-national bodies have opted to play. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) recalled its mandate, with no references whatsoever to potential reforms. President von der Leyen presented the EU as the main provider of official development assistance (ODA) despite the ODA cuts announced by key member States; underlined the need for developing countries to mobilize domestic resources; and for the private sector to more actively participate in development processes, making reference once again to the EU’s Global Gateway. Iraq and Angola, on behalf of the G77 + China and the African Group respectively, underscored the importance of multilateralism, the 2030 Agenda, the burden of external debt and the risks posed by geopolitical fragmentation to international and global development.

The new ALGREE thematic report, titled “Mapping the dominant media frames between Greece and Albania during the year 2022 and exploring alternative frames to override negative stereotypes”, is a key output of the ALGREE – Albania-Greece: Understanding. Connecting. Partnering project. Authored by Panagiotis Paschalidis and Kriton Kuci, and implemented by the South-East Europe Programme of ELIAMEP, the study investigates the ways in which Greek and Albanian media portray one another and proposes constructive counter-narratives to challenge negative stereotypes.

Using a mixed-method approach that combines quantitative content analysis with qualitative frame analysis, the report explores media coverage through six case studies focused on politically and socially sensitive topics, such as Albania’s EU accession process, the Greek minority in Albania, maritime border disputes, regional dynamics, economic cooperation, and the high-profile “Beleri case.” It examines both the tone and framing of news stories and highlights how political alignment often influences media narratives on both sides.

Among its key findings, the study reveals a persistent politicization of media discourse, a strong focus on conflict-laden narratives, and a lack of attention to positive themes such as culture, society, and economic cooperation. While some progress is noted—particularly regarding regional cooperation and perceptions of economic partnership—the presence of stereotypes remains a significant obstacle to balanced representation.

The report offers a series of recommendations aimed at depoliticizing media narratives and encouraging more nuanced and constructive reporting. By fostering alternative frames that promote mutual understanding, the study contributes to the broader goals of ALGREE to support evidence-based dialogue, informed policy-making, and improved bilateral relations between Greece and Albania.

You can read the thematic report here.

 

Kriminalitätsfurcht hängt nicht nur mit realer Kriminalität zusammen – Regional ist ein deutliches Nord-Süd-Gefälle erkennbar – Sozial ungleich verteilt zeigt sich Kriminalitätsfurcht besonders bei vulnerablen Gruppen – Politik und Medien sollten sachlich aufklären, um unnötige Ängste zu vermeiden ...

Vor der polnischen Ostseeküste wurden enorme Öl- und Gasvorkommen gefunden. Das Vorkommen wird aktuell auf 200 Millionen Barrel geschätzt. Über die energiepolitsche Bedeutung einer möglichen Förderung gibt Claudia Kemfert, Leiterin der Abteilung Energie, Verkehr, Umwelt im Deutschen Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin) eine Einschätzung:

Die energiepolitische Bedeutung der Förderung fossiler Energien in Polen für Deutschland dürfte gering sein. Der Ölfund könnte theoretisch zur Versorgungssicherheit beitragen, da die Raffinerie Schwedt seit dem russischen Öl-Embargo nur zu etwa 50-60 Prozent ausgelastet ist und auf Alternativen angewiesen ist. Jedoch dürfte Polen das Öl primär für eigene Zwecke nutzen - die Förderung soll 4-5 Prozent des polnischen Ölbedarfs für mehrere Jahre decken. Die Raffinerie Schwedt ist bereits jetzt auf polnische Kooperation angewiesen, aber Polen blockiert teilweise Öllieferungen über Danzig und macht die Enteignung der Rosneft-Anteile zur Bedingung für eine erweiterte Zusammenarbeit. Der neue Fund könnte Polens Verhandlungsposition gegenüber Deutschland weiter stärken.
Die Förderung fossiler Energien könnte jedoch erhebliche negative Folgen auf andere Bereiche haben wie beispielsweise auf den Tourismus, da rund eine Million Touristen jährlich Usedom besuchen  und die Bohrplattformen vom deutschen Teil der Insel sichtbar wäre. Auch besteht potentiell eine erhebliche Umweltgefährdung durch das Risiko von Havarien. Bei Unfällen könnte es zu grenzüberschreitenden Verschmutzungen kommen, da deutsche Gewässer direkt betroffen wären. Zudem konterkariert die Förderung fossiler Energien die Klimaschutzziele. Daher stehen Kosten und Nutzen in keinem Verhältnis. Von der Förderung ist eher abzuraten.

Felix Schmidt, Research Associate in the Energy, Transportation, Environment Department, successfully defended his dissertation entitled “Modeling variable renewable energy systems. The role of weather uncertainty, heating and long-duration storage” with summa cum laude on July 18, 2025. He was ...

Die Rente muss dringend reformiert werden. Eine Sonderabgabe für Wohlhabende im Ruhestand löst viele Probleme. Ohne die Jüngeren weiter zu belasten., Die Alterung der Gesellschaft und der bevorstehende Ruhestand der Babyboomer-Generation sind kein Zukunftsszenario mehr – sie sind Realität und stellen schon heute eine akute sozialpolitische Herausforderung dar. Der demografische Wandel erschüttert die Fundamente der gesetzlichen Rentenversicherung ...

The Transatlantic Periscope is an interactive, multimedia tool that brings together expert commentary, high-quality media coverage, official policy documents, quantitative data, social media posts, and gray literature. It will provide on a monthly basis a summary of the most important news concerning the Greek-US relations, as reflected in the media. Below you will find an overview for June 2025.

On June 5, 2025, the 15th Bilateral Military Cooperation between the Hellenic Navy and the United States Navy was held in Athens. The Greek delegation was headed by Commodore Stefanos Sarris HN, Director of Branch A, while the U.S. delegation was led by Rear Admiral Patrick S. Hayden, Director Maritime Headquarters (DMHQ), U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Africa. Discussions addressed issues of mutual interest and strengthening cooperation for stability and development in the wider Eastern Mediterranean region. On the sidelines of the talks, the head of the U.S. delegation held a brief meeting with the Deputy Chief of the Hellenic Navy General Staff, Rear Admiral Spyridon Lagaras HN.

On the other side of the Atlantic, the U.S. State Department is formally moving forward with the nomination of Kimberly Guilfoyle as the next American ambassador to Greece, undercutting widespread media speculation that she had declined the post. In a move that clarifies the administration’s intent, the State Department issued on June 18 an official “Certificate of Competency” for the nomination, a standard step preceding a confirmation hearing in the U.S. Senate. Guilfoyle is set to appear before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee on July 9, 2025, as part of her confirmation process to become the next U.S. Ambassador to Greece.

During his visit to Chicago, Detroit, and Cleveland from June 12 to 18, 2025, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Yannis Loverdos conveyed a message of support from the Greek government to the Greek American community and of strengthening ties with Greeks abroad. During the visit, he had a series of meetings with prominent members of the Greek-American in several fields and informed them about the Greek government’s initiatives for the Greeks abroad.

At the NATO Summit, on June 25, 2025, Greek Foreign Minister Giorgos Gerapetritis held a high-level meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, underscoring the growing importance of Greek-American cooperation in a rapidly shifting geopolitical landscape. U.S. Secretary of State Rubio emphasized Greece’s role as a reliable NATO ally and a pillar of stability in the Eastern Mediterranean. He acknowledged the importance of Greece’s contributions to regional security, while Minister Gerapetritis praised U.S. efforts to de-escalate tensions in the broader Middle East. Both officials reaffirmed their intent to further deepen bilateral strategic relations.

According to Vassilis Nedos (Kathimerini), an undisclosed number of Greek Patriot missile systems are being relocated to the Hellenic Navy and NATO base at Souda Bay, Crete, to provide anti-ballistic protection to American assets in the region. The move comes amid increased U.S. military activity in the area following the escalation of the Israel-Iran conflict. Several U.S. F-16 fighter jets have also been temporarily deployed to Crete ahead of their participation in the upcoming “Anatolian Eagle” exercise in Turkey in early July.

More at: https://transatlanticperiscope.org/relationship/GR#

The EU's efforts to integrate sustainability into its trade policy have met with mixed reactions, particularly from developing countries. Previously, the EU has sought to promote relevant autonomous measures and the Trade and Sustainable Development chapters in its trade agreements by offering support for implementation and compliance. However, further alignment of trade and development co-operation, known as external policy coherence, faces growing challenges as the second von der Leyen Commission has made Europe's economic security a top priority. Although this new agenda has yet to translate into tangible (trade) policy actions beyond recently adopted initial measures, the shift in focus is driving increased investment in competitiveness and securing access to critical raw materials – efforts that, at times, appear fragmented rather than co-ordinated. Whilst the EU acknowledges that partnerships, including those with countries from the Global South, are essential to strengthen its position in the growing geopolitical competition with other major economies, the increasingly complex global and regional context, coupled with shifting internal priorities, challenges the Commission's ability to balance the EU's trade and development ambitions. This commentary explores new directions for a coherent EU trade and development policy in the dynamic geopolitical landscape of 2025 and beyond.