Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

How do e-government tools that enable direct online communication with the executive affect citizens’ support for autocracy? On the one hand, such centralised digital government tools may sway public opinion in favour of strongman rule at the expense of autocratic institutions; on the other hand, such participation and responsiveness may unintentionally unveil a wide range of issues in the country, undermining trust in the regime. We examine an electronic platform in Turkey, CIMER, that allows citizens to submit petitions and complaints, send messages to the president, and propose policies and programmes. We conducted a well-powered online survey experiment with a nationally representative sample (N≈4,600) that estimates the effects of different types of regime propaganda around this e-portal on attitudinal and quasi-behavioural outcomes. The results suggest that propaganda through CIMER improves diffuse support for the regime and generates behavioural compliance, even among opposition voters. However, these positive effects accrue to regime institutions rather than to Erdoğan personally as the executive’s personalistic leader. On certain dimensions, the propaganda backfires among the regime’s core support groups, eroding their perceptions of Erdoğan’s popularity as a leader. These results have major implications for the expected downstream effects of these types of digital tools on regime stability and legitimacy, and they add to the growing warnings about holding overly optimistic views concerning the effects of digitalisation on democracy.

How do e-government tools that enable direct online communication with the executive affect citizens’ support for autocracy? On the one hand, such centralised digital government tools may sway public opinion in favour of strongman rule at the expense of autocratic institutions; on the other hand, such participation and responsiveness may unintentionally unveil a wide range of issues in the country, undermining trust in the regime. We examine an electronic platform in Turkey, CIMER, that allows citizens to submit petitions and complaints, send messages to the president, and propose policies and programmes. We conducted a well-powered online survey experiment with a nationally representative sample (N≈4,600) that estimates the effects of different types of regime propaganda around this e-portal on attitudinal and quasi-behavioural outcomes. The results suggest that propaganda through CIMER improves diffuse support for the regime and generates behavioural compliance, even among opposition voters. However, these positive effects accrue to regime institutions rather than to Erdoğan personally as the executive’s personalistic leader. On certain dimensions, the propaganda backfires among the regime’s core support groups, eroding their perceptions of Erdoğan’s popularity as a leader. These results have major implications for the expected downstream effects of these types of digital tools on regime stability and legitimacy, and they add to the growing warnings about holding overly optimistic views concerning the effects of digitalisation on democracy.

Sanitation and proper disposal of human waste are key to a dignified life. The importance of maintaining reasonable standards of sanitation is acknowledged in the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals (SDG target 6.2) as well as in the Art. 43, I b from the Constitution of Kenya (Government of Kenya, 2010). However, the integration of sanitation policies, their associated legislations and lived practices, and their implications for the environment and human health remain opaque. Understanding is particularly limited regarding sanitation governance in Kenya’s fast-growing secondary cities, where responsibility for sanitation has only recently been devolved from the national to the county level. Our study examines these complex interactions, shedding light on how power relations constitute a determining factor in shaping the access to sanitation and its unequal socio-environmental hybridities. Empirically, we focus on three sub-locations in Nakuru City. Nakuru City has been described as a role model in the Kenyan context. Our research design combines both a quantitative, georeferenced household survey and qualitative, semi-structured interviews with actors at various levels. Our descriptive, regression and qualitative content analyses of the collected data reveal that levels of political interest vary considerably. Collaboration along the on-site sanitation service chain and with other sectors, such as solid waste management, presents numerous challenges, and a significant discrepancy exists in degrees of access to safe sanitation between and within sub-locations. As value-driven leadership at a time of heightened political attention has made Nakuru’s role as a “sanitation champion” possible, we believe that many of these challenges can be overcome with increased collective awareness and a more substantial political commitment to realise the constitutionally guaranteed right to sanitation.

Marius Bug, Maria Gerlspeck, Aline-Victoria Grassl, Saskia Metz, Johannes S. Vogel and Carolin Wicke were junior researchers and participants in the 58th Postgraduate Training Programme 2022/2023 of the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS).

Sanitation and proper disposal of human waste are key to a dignified life. The importance of maintaining reasonable standards of sanitation is acknowledged in the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals (SDG target 6.2) as well as in the Art. 43, I b from the Constitution of Kenya (Government of Kenya, 2010). However, the integration of sanitation policies, their associated legislations and lived practices, and their implications for the environment and human health remain opaque. Understanding is particularly limited regarding sanitation governance in Kenya’s fast-growing secondary cities, where responsibility for sanitation has only recently been devolved from the national to the county level. Our study examines these complex interactions, shedding light on how power relations constitute a determining factor in shaping the access to sanitation and its unequal socio-environmental hybridities. Empirically, we focus on three sub-locations in Nakuru City. Nakuru City has been described as a role model in the Kenyan context. Our research design combines both a quantitative, georeferenced household survey and qualitative, semi-structured interviews with actors at various levels. Our descriptive, regression and qualitative content analyses of the collected data reveal that levels of political interest vary considerably. Collaboration along the on-site sanitation service chain and with other sectors, such as solid waste management, presents numerous challenges, and a significant discrepancy exists in degrees of access to safe sanitation between and within sub-locations. As value-driven leadership at a time of heightened political attention has made Nakuru’s role as a “sanitation champion” possible, we believe that many of these challenges can be overcome with increased collective awareness and a more substantial political commitment to realise the constitutionally guaranteed right to sanitation.

Marius Bug, Maria Gerlspeck, Aline-Victoria Grassl, Saskia Metz, Johannes S. Vogel and Carolin Wicke were junior researchers and participants in the 58th Postgraduate Training Programme 2022/2023 of the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS).

Sanitation and proper disposal of human waste are key to a dignified life. The importance of maintaining reasonable standards of sanitation is acknowledged in the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals (SDG target 6.2) as well as in the Art. 43, I b from the Constitution of Kenya (Government of Kenya, 2010). However, the integration of sanitation policies, their associated legislations and lived practices, and their implications for the environment and human health remain opaque. Understanding is particularly limited regarding sanitation governance in Kenya’s fast-growing secondary cities, where responsibility for sanitation has only recently been devolved from the national to the county level. Our study examines these complex interactions, shedding light on how power relations constitute a determining factor in shaping the access to sanitation and its unequal socio-environmental hybridities. Empirically, we focus on three sub-locations in Nakuru City. Nakuru City has been described as a role model in the Kenyan context. Our research design combines both a quantitative, georeferenced household survey and qualitative, semi-structured interviews with actors at various levels. Our descriptive, regression and qualitative content analyses of the collected data reveal that levels of political interest vary considerably. Collaboration along the on-site sanitation service chain and with other sectors, such as solid waste management, presents numerous challenges, and a significant discrepancy exists in degrees of access to safe sanitation between and within sub-locations. As value-driven leadership at a time of heightened political attention has made Nakuru’s role as a “sanitation champion” possible, we believe that many of these challenges can be overcome with increased collective awareness and a more substantial political commitment to realise the constitutionally guaranteed right to sanitation.

Marius Bug, Maria Gerlspeck, Aline-Victoria Grassl, Saskia Metz, Johannes S. Vogel and Carolin Wicke were junior researchers and participants in the 58th Postgraduate Training Programme 2022/2023 of the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS).

Politikberatung gehört zu den Kernaufgaben des DIW Berlin. Um seine Forschungsergebnisse und Empfehlungen in die wirtschafts- und sozialpolitische Debatte einzubringen, betreibt das Institut eine intensive Öffentlichkeitsarbeit. Die Abteilung Kommunikation bereitet Themen und Inhalte für unterschiedliche Zielgruppen in verschiedenen Formaten auf. Dazu gehören insbesondere Pressearbeit, Print- und Onlinepublikationen, Website- und Social-Media-Kommunikation sowie Veranstaltungen.

Zum nächstmöglichen Zeitpunkt suchen wir eine*n

PR-Volontär*in mit dem Schwerpunkt Presse

und Digitale Kommunikation (w/m/d) 

In dem Volontariat erhalten Sie Einblick in alle Aufgabenbereiche der externen und internen Kommunikation eines Forschungsinstituts. Es dauert 18 Monate und besteht aus drei Modulen:

• Ausbildung und Tätigkeit in allen Arbeitsbereichen der Abteilung Kommunikation mit Schwerpunkt in den Bereichen Pressearbeit und Redaktion des DIW-Wochenberichts sowie der Digitalen Kommunikation mit dem Teilbereich Soziale Medien
• Außerbetriebliche Ausbildung in Form eines Volontärseminars
• Externe Hospitation zum Beispiel in einer Medienredaktion

Die von der zweiten Administration unter US-Präsident Donald Trump getroffenen Entscheidungen zur weitgehenden Auflösung der US-amerikanischen Entwicklungspolitik sind tiefgreifend. Die Tragweite der Kursänderung lässt sich allerdings erst abschätzen, wenn man das Fundament des Politikfeldes betrachtet, das wesentlich mit den USA verknüpft ist.

Die von der zweiten Administration unter US-Präsident Donald Trump getroffenen Entscheidungen zur weitgehenden Auflösung der US-amerikanischen Entwicklungspolitik sind tiefgreifend. Die Tragweite der Kursänderung lässt sich allerdings erst abschätzen, wenn man das Fundament des Politikfeldes betrachtet, das wesentlich mit den USA verknüpft ist.

Die von der zweiten Administration unter US-Präsident Donald Trump getroffenen Entscheidungen zur weitgehenden Auflösung der US-amerikanischen Entwicklungspolitik sind tiefgreifend. Die Tragweite der Kursänderung lässt sich allerdings erst abschätzen, wenn man das Fundament des Politikfeldes betrachtet, das wesentlich mit den USA verknüpft ist.

Transparency portals in development cooperation serve two main functions: accountability to a specialist audience and communication with the wider public. In this policy brief, we conduct an international comparison to demonstrate how transparency portals could better fulfil these requirements.
As part of a broader effectiveness agenda, donors are pursuing the goal of greater transparency. In line with this international agenda, transparency is intended to promote learning and improve predictability for partner countries, as well as combatting corruption and fulfilling accountability requirements. Taken together, these factors can contribute to greater development effectiveness.
Donors also hope that their work will receive greater public support. By providing detailed information, experts will be better able to assess the quality of development projects. The aim is to initiate a process of learning and improvement, and to convince the general public that taxpayers’ money is being used effectively. Citizens can use the portals to understand project content and develop their own views.
However, current debates suggest a more complex dynamic. The “Bike Lanes in Peru” project caused a scandal in Germany. Against the backdrop of the closure of the US Agency for International Development (USAID), individual projects became politicised. Accordingly, transparency portals can also have unintended consequences. For example, information can be taken out of context, leading to misunderstandings and legitimate criticism of individual projects going unanswered.
Donors can mitigate these negative effects by redesigning transparency portals. In times of declining approval ratings and cuts to development budgets, they should use the portals to communicate in a targeted manner and demonstrate a greater willingness to engage in honest debate. The following recommendations could help with this:
• Even greater transparency of impact data: Although progress is being made in transparent reporting on project content and financial data, detailed project data on impact measurement and results, as set out in logical frameworks (logframes), is lacking. Increasing transparency in this area could improve development effectiveness.
• Additional investment in communication: Information that is provided in accordance with internationally comparable standards must be translated for a lay audience. In many donor countries, a large proportion of the population has no fixed positive or negative attitude towards development cooperation. Targeted, group-oriented communication should appeal to these people more directly.
• Openness to criticism and discourse: Development policy actors often resist critical examination of their work in public debate. They tend to respond defensively to criticism, whether general or specific. However, informed discussions based on project data from the portals offer an opportunity to openly discuss ineffective projects and, if necessary, replace them with effective ones.

Transparency portals in development cooperation serve two main functions: accountability to a specialist audience and communication with the wider public. In this policy brief, we conduct an international comparison to demonstrate how transparency portals could better fulfil these requirements.
As part of a broader effectiveness agenda, donors are pursuing the goal of greater transparency. In line with this international agenda, transparency is intended to promote learning and improve predictability for partner countries, as well as combatting corruption and fulfilling accountability requirements. Taken together, these factors can contribute to greater development effectiveness.
Donors also hope that their work will receive greater public support. By providing detailed information, experts will be better able to assess the quality of development projects. The aim is to initiate a process of learning and improvement, and to convince the general public that taxpayers’ money is being used effectively. Citizens can use the portals to understand project content and develop their own views.
However, current debates suggest a more complex dynamic. The “Bike Lanes in Peru” project caused a scandal in Germany. Against the backdrop of the closure of the US Agency for International Development (USAID), individual projects became politicised. Accordingly, transparency portals can also have unintended consequences. For example, information can be taken out of context, leading to misunderstandings and legitimate criticism of individual projects going unanswered.
Donors can mitigate these negative effects by redesigning transparency portals. In times of declining approval ratings and cuts to development budgets, they should use the portals to communicate in a targeted manner and demonstrate a greater willingness to engage in honest debate. The following recommendations could help with this:
• Even greater transparency of impact data: Although progress is being made in transparent reporting on project content and financial data, detailed project data on impact measurement and results, as set out in logical frameworks (logframes), is lacking. Increasing transparency in this area could improve development effectiveness.
• Additional investment in communication: Information that is provided in accordance with internationally comparable standards must be translated for a lay audience. In many donor countries, a large proportion of the population has no fixed positive or negative attitude towards development cooperation. Targeted, group-oriented communication should appeal to these people more directly.
• Openness to criticism and discourse: Development policy actors often resist critical examination of their work in public debate. They tend to respond defensively to criticism, whether general or specific. However, informed discussions based on project data from the portals offer an opportunity to openly discuss ineffective projects and, if necessary, replace them with effective ones.

Transparency portals in development cooperation serve two main functions: accountability to a specialist audience and communication with the wider public. In this policy brief, we conduct an international comparison to demonstrate how transparency portals could better fulfil these requirements.
As part of a broader effectiveness agenda, donors are pursuing the goal of greater transparency. In line with this international agenda, transparency is intended to promote learning and improve predictability for partner countries, as well as combatting corruption and fulfilling accountability requirements. Taken together, these factors can contribute to greater development effectiveness.
Donors also hope that their work will receive greater public support. By providing detailed information, experts will be better able to assess the quality of development projects. The aim is to initiate a process of learning and improvement, and to convince the general public that taxpayers’ money is being used effectively. Citizens can use the portals to understand project content and develop their own views.
However, current debates suggest a more complex dynamic. The “Bike Lanes in Peru” project caused a scandal in Germany. Against the backdrop of the closure of the US Agency for International Development (USAID), individual projects became politicised. Accordingly, transparency portals can also have unintended consequences. For example, information can be taken out of context, leading to misunderstandings and legitimate criticism of individual projects going unanswered.
Donors can mitigate these negative effects by redesigning transparency portals. In times of declining approval ratings and cuts to development budgets, they should use the portals to communicate in a targeted manner and demonstrate a greater willingness to engage in honest debate. The following recommendations could help with this:
• Even greater transparency of impact data: Although progress is being made in transparent reporting on project content and financial data, detailed project data on impact measurement and results, as set out in logical frameworks (logframes), is lacking. Increasing transparency in this area could improve development effectiveness.
• Additional investment in communication: Information that is provided in accordance with internationally comparable standards must be translated for a lay audience. In many donor countries, a large proportion of the population has no fixed positive or negative attitude towards development cooperation. Targeted, group-oriented communication should appeal to these people more directly.
• Openness to criticism and discourse: Development policy actors often resist critical examination of their work in public debate. They tend to respond defensively to criticism, whether general or specific. However, informed discussions based on project data from the portals offer an opportunity to openly discuss ineffective projects and, if necessary, replace them with effective ones.

The global development landscape entering 2026 is shaped by deep geopolitical disruptions, significantly intensified by the return of President Trump and the acceleration of systemic rivalry, conflict and multipolar competition. Development policy now unfolds in an environment where multilateral norms are weakening, Western cohesion is fracturing and Global South actors increasingly exercise greater agency through strategies of multi-alignment. Cuts to ODA budgets across traditional donor countries, paralysis in the UN development system and US hostility towards Agenda 2030 have collectively unsettled the development architecture, prompting a proliferation of commissions and processes seeking to rethink future cooperation. We identify four issues that we think will be of high importance for global development policy in 2026 and beyond and situate these within the context outlined above.
Issue I. China’s transition towards high-income status and the implications for its evolving role in global development debates Economically, China is approaching graduation from the list of ODA-eligible countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC), yet politically it continues to claim “developing country” status as part of a deliberate strategy to anchor itself within Global South coalitions. This duality provides significant diplomatic and narrative leverage. China’s expanding suite of global initiatives – from the Belt and Road Initiative to the new Global Governance Initiative – gives it increasing influence over international agenda-setting, especially as some Western actors retreat from traditional development roles. OECD countries must, therefore, craft engagement strategies that can accommodate China’s hybrid positioning while defending coherent standards for global responsibility-sharing.
Issue II. Russia’s influence in the Global South Although Russia lacks a credible development model, it wields significant spoiler power through arms provision, disinformation operations and especially nuclear energy cooperation. Rosatom’s integrated nuclear packages are appealing to many African countries, creating long-term dependencies and expanding Moscow’s geopolitical reach – an area largely overlooked in Western development strategies.
Issue III. The rise of non-democratic governance across much of the Global South and its consequences for global governance With the majority of the population now living in electoral autocracies or closed autocracies, democratic backsliding undermines the foundations of global governance. Normative contestation, institutional fragmentation, legitimacy deficits, geopolitical bargaining and uneven provision of global public goods increasingly shape multilateral cooperation.
Issue IV. How both Southern middle powers and smaller countries are adjusting to the changing environment Countries such as Brazil, Indonesia, Turkey, South Africa and the Gulf states are capitalising on systemic volatility to expand influence through multi-alignment, new coalitions and diversified cooperation instruments. For external actors, accepting multi-alignment as a stable feature will be essential for building effective, issue-based partnerships in areas such as climate, health, food systems and digital public infrastructure.

Professor Andy Sumner is a professor of International Development at King’s College London and President of the European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes.

The global development landscape entering 2026 is shaped by deep geopolitical disruptions, significantly intensified by the return of President Trump and the acceleration of systemic rivalry, conflict and multipolar competition. Development policy now unfolds in an environment where multilateral norms are weakening, Western cohesion is fracturing and Global South actors increasingly exercise greater agency through strategies of multi-alignment. Cuts to ODA budgets across traditional donor countries, paralysis in the UN development system and US hostility towards Agenda 2030 have collectively unsettled the development architecture, prompting a proliferation of commissions and processes seeking to rethink future cooperation. We identify four issues that we think will be of high importance for global development policy in 2026 and beyond and situate these within the context outlined above.
Issue I. China’s transition towards high-income status and the implications for its evolving role in global development debates Economically, China is approaching graduation from the list of ODA-eligible countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC), yet politically it continues to claim “developing country” status as part of a deliberate strategy to anchor itself within Global South coalitions. This duality provides significant diplomatic and narrative leverage. China’s expanding suite of global initiatives – from the Belt and Road Initiative to the new Global Governance Initiative – gives it increasing influence over international agenda-setting, especially as some Western actors retreat from traditional development roles. OECD countries must, therefore, craft engagement strategies that can accommodate China’s hybrid positioning while defending coherent standards for global responsibility-sharing.
Issue II. Russia’s influence in the Global South Although Russia lacks a credible development model, it wields significant spoiler power through arms provision, disinformation operations and especially nuclear energy cooperation. Rosatom’s integrated nuclear packages are appealing to many African countries, creating long-term dependencies and expanding Moscow’s geopolitical reach – an area largely overlooked in Western development strategies.
Issue III. The rise of non-democratic governance across much of the Global South and its consequences for global governance With the majority of the population now living in electoral autocracies or closed autocracies, democratic backsliding undermines the foundations of global governance. Normative contestation, institutional fragmentation, legitimacy deficits, geopolitical bargaining and uneven provision of global public goods increasingly shape multilateral cooperation.
Issue IV. How both Southern middle powers and smaller countries are adjusting to the changing environment Countries such as Brazil, Indonesia, Turkey, South Africa and the Gulf states are capitalising on systemic volatility to expand influence through multi-alignment, new coalitions and diversified cooperation instruments. For external actors, accepting multi-alignment as a stable feature will be essential for building effective, issue-based partnerships in areas such as climate, health, food systems and digital public infrastructure.

Professor Andy Sumner is a professor of International Development at King’s College London and President of the European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes.

The global development landscape entering 2026 is shaped by deep geopolitical disruptions, significantly intensified by the return of President Trump and the acceleration of systemic rivalry, conflict and multipolar competition. Development policy now unfolds in an environment where multilateral norms are weakening, Western cohesion is fracturing and Global South actors increasingly exercise greater agency through strategies of multi-alignment. Cuts to ODA budgets across traditional donor countries, paralysis in the UN development system and US hostility towards Agenda 2030 have collectively unsettled the development architecture, prompting a proliferation of commissions and processes seeking to rethink future cooperation. We identify four issues that we think will be of high importance for global development policy in 2026 and beyond and situate these within the context outlined above.
Issue I. China’s transition towards high-income status and the implications for its evolving role in global development debates Economically, China is approaching graduation from the list of ODA-eligible countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC), yet politically it continues to claim “developing country” status as part of a deliberate strategy to anchor itself within Global South coalitions. This duality provides significant diplomatic and narrative leverage. China’s expanding suite of global initiatives – from the Belt and Road Initiative to the new Global Governance Initiative – gives it increasing influence over international agenda-setting, especially as some Western actors retreat from traditional development roles. OECD countries must, therefore, craft engagement strategies that can accommodate China’s hybrid positioning while defending coherent standards for global responsibility-sharing.
Issue II. Russia’s influence in the Global South Although Russia lacks a credible development model, it wields significant spoiler power through arms provision, disinformation operations and especially nuclear energy cooperation. Rosatom’s integrated nuclear packages are appealing to many African countries, creating long-term dependencies and expanding Moscow’s geopolitical reach – an area largely overlooked in Western development strategies.
Issue III. The rise of non-democratic governance across much of the Global South and its consequences for global governance With the majority of the population now living in electoral autocracies or closed autocracies, democratic backsliding undermines the foundations of global governance. Normative contestation, institutional fragmentation, legitimacy deficits, geopolitical bargaining and uneven provision of global public goods increasingly shape multilateral cooperation.
Issue IV. How both Southern middle powers and smaller countries are adjusting to the changing environment Countries such as Brazil, Indonesia, Turkey, South Africa and the Gulf states are capitalising on systemic volatility to expand influence through multi-alignment, new coalitions and diversified cooperation instruments. For external actors, accepting multi-alignment as a stable feature will be essential for building effective, issue-based partnerships in areas such as climate, health, food systems and digital public infrastructure.

Professor Andy Sumner is a professor of International Development at King’s College London and President of the European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes.

Das DIW Berlin und das OECD Centre Berlin haben am 8. Dezember 2025 die neue Veranstaltungsreihe „DIW-OECD Industrial Strategy Dialogue” gestartet. Sie bietet eine Plattform für den Dialog zwischen wichtigen Akteur*innen aus Politik, Wirtschaft, Gesellschaft und Wissenschaft, um über aktuelle ...

Au lendemain de la tentative de coup d'État déjouée dimanche 7 décembre à l'aube, Cotonou a retrouvé son calme.
‎
C'est sous une fine pluie que les habitants de Cotonou se déplacent ce lundi 8 décembre 2025. Dans les rues, les écoliers ont repris le chemin de leurs classes. Les parents les ont déposés comme un lundi ordinaire. Les travailleurs ont rejoint leurs bureaux. Les commerces ont ouvert. ‎La circulation est fluide. Motos et voitures roulent sans agitation particulière.

‎L'activité a repris après la tentative de coup d'État déjouée dimanche. Les services publics fonctionnent normalement.

Cadjèhoun, quartier proche de la présidence, est calme. Fermée la veille aux premières heures de la mutinerie, la rue qui longe le palais est désormais rouverte. Le seul signe du chaos évité reste un blindé stationné près du siège de la SRTB, la télévision nationale brièvement investie dimanche par les mutins.

Au marché Dantokpa, c'est l'ambiance habituelle. Le marché est animé. Les étals sont ouverts. Entre les allées, des clients circulent. Il est même difficile de se frayer un chemin sur la rue longeant la pharmacie 4 thérapies et le pont.

A quelques encablures de là, les marchés Gbogbanou et Missèbo sont également animés dans l'après-midi de ce lundi 8 décembre.

''Non'' au renversement constitutionnel

‎Dans la matinée, plusieurs rassemblements se sont formés pour dire “non” à la prise de pouvoir par la force. À la mairie de Cotonou, de nombreuses femmes se sont mobilisées.

En soirée, militants et sympathisants du parti Union Progressiste le Renouveau (UP-R) se sont retrouvés à la Place Bulgarie. Vêtus de blanc et casquettes jaunes sur la tête, ils sont rassemblés pour dénoncer le coup de force. Des responsables du parti étaient présents.

Le maire d'Abomey-Calavi, Angelo Ahouandjinou a salué la réaction des forces armées qui, selon lui, ont « anticipé » et dit “non” aux mutins. « Le pire a été reculé », a-t-il ajouté, rendant hommage à la « bravoure » et à la « détermination » du chef de l'État et des forces de l'ordre. Il a appelé les populations « à la tranquillité, au calme et au respect des principes réglementaires ».
M. M.
‎

Les militantes et militants des partis Union progressiste le renouveau (UP-R), le Bloc républicain (BR), le Mouvement des élites engagés pour l'émancipation du Bénin (MOELE-BENIN), la Force cauris pour un Bénin émergent (FCBE), les populations de Cotonou, acteurs politiques, députés et plusieurs autres personnalités sont mobilisés à la Place Bulgarie dans l'après-midi de ce lundi 08 décembre 2025. Seul objectif, dire NON à toute tentative de prise de pouvoir par la force.
Les panneaux réalisés pour la circonstance véhiculent les messages ci-après : « Non à la prise de pouvoir par la force au Bénin », « non aux ennemis du développement du Bénin », etc.
Quelques images

Le Conseil des Ministres s'est tenu en séance extraordinaire ce lundi 8 décembre 2025, sous la présidence de Monsieur Patrice TALON, Président de la République. La séance a été élargie aux ministres conseillers et au haut commandement des Forces de Défense et de Sécurité.
L'ordre du jour a porté exclusivement sur les événements survenus dans la journée du dimanche 7 décembre 2025.

Il ressort du point détaillé fait par le Chef de l'Etat, que le groupuscule de soldats ayant organisé la mutinerie, avait planifié de démettre de ses Fonctions le Président de la République lui-même, de soumettre les Institutions de la République, et de remettre en cause l'ordre constitutionnel établi.
Pour ce faire, ils ont entrepris, dans un premier temps, de neutraliser ou de kidnapper certains officiers généraux et supérieurs de l'Armée à raison des responsabilités qu'ils occupent au sein des Forces Armées béninoises ou de
l'appareil d'Etat.
C'est ainsi qu'ils se sont rendus d'abord vers 2h du matin au domicile du Directeur du cabinet militaire du Président de la République, le général Bertin BADA, qui a réussi à leur échapper et dont ils ont mortellement blessé l'épouse.
Informé, le commandement militaire avait requis l'appui de la base militaire de Togbin pour apporter du soutien au général BADA. Le peu de diligence de cette base a conduit à demander au commandant de celle-ci, le colonel Faïzou GOMINA dont elle relève, de s'y rendre instamment. Une fois
sur les lieux, celui-ci sera violenté et fait otage. C'est alors qu'il a été su que la mutinerie y a pris corps.
Entre temps, cap a été mis sur le domicile du général Abou ISSA, chef d'état- major de l'Armée de Terre, qui a opposé une farouche résistance aux mutins avant qu'il n'ait été kidnappé un peu plus tard par une équipe supposément venue en renfort.

C'est à partir de ce moment que la confirmation est faite que la mutinerie venait bien de la base de Togbin.
Très vite, les renseignements militaires ont permis de savoir que les mutins sont partis de ladite base avec des armes et des engins blindés.
Dans leur progression, autour de 5h du matin, ils se sont portés vers la résidence du Chef de l'Etat où la Garde républicaine alertée et sous les ordres de sa hiérarchie, les attendait fermement. Un rude combat s'en est suivi tant les mutins tenaient à contrôler la situation afin d e se saisir d e la
personne du Président de la République. Celui-ci, aux côtés des éléments
de la Garde Républicaine, a vécu les violents affrontements en direct avec des victimes des deux côtés, jusqu'à ce que les assaillants, débordés par la farouche résistance des soldats loyaux, battent en retraite.
Mais, tenant à exécuter la suite de leur plan, les mutins se sont dirigés vers la Télévision nationale qu'ils ont contrôlée pendant un bout de temps, y faisant une déclaration, avant d'en être délogés par l'Armée loyale. Pris de panique, ils ont donc décampé, abandonnant sur place certains de leurs éléments qui ont été aussitôt arrêtés.
Pour autant, les soldats mutins n'avaient pas résolu de jeter les armes. Loin s'en faut puisque quelques instants après, ils ont essayé d'ouvrir d'autres fronts, notamment à la base militaire de Togbin où ils disposaient encore de blindés. Rapidement, l'Armée républicaine renforcée par les casernez voisines a encerclé la base, rendant tout mouvement des mutins impossible, et se tenait prête à donner l'assaut final
Mais celle-ci étant au cœur d'une zone d'habitation, le Chef suprême des Armées et le commandement militaire ne voulaient pas que s'y déroulent des affrontements à l'arme lourde au risque de faire de nombreuses victimes collatérales dans le rang des populations. Il a été alors décidé des. frappes aériennes ciblées, chirurgicales, sans exposer les quartiers
environnants de Togbin et Fidjrossè, de même que des victimes innocentes du côté des militaires.
A partir de cet instant, la coopération sous-régionale s'est mise en branle, sous l'égide de la CEDEAO et à la demande de notre pays. Le Nigeria nous est des lors venu en assistance en menant des frappes en fin de journée, par son aviation militaire qui a immobilisé certains des engins blindés.

Cette opération s'est déroulée avec succès, sans pertes en vies humaines. Les derniers assaillants, ayant vu les manœuvres préparatoires, ont pris la clé des champs.
Le contrôle de la base a alors été repris et, y est actuellement logée, une force en attente de la CEDEAO composée de soldats nigérians arrivés dans la nuit de dimanche à lundi pour soutenir les efforts de l'Armée républicaine.
De même, toujours dans le cadre de cette coopération sous-régionale, une force spéciale est venue de Côte d'Ivoire en cette même fin de journée du dimanche pour se positionner à Cotonou en vue d'autres actions si besoin en était.

Enfin, il est à signaler que le général Abou ISSA et le colonel Faïzou GOMINA retenus en otage, ont pu être libérés au petit matin de ce lundi 8 décembre, grâce à la diligence des renseignements et au dispositif mis en place dans la ville de Tchaourou où ils avaient déjà été conduits par les mutins en fuite, lesquels menaçaient d'attenter à leurs vies.
Au regard de la gravité des faits, le Gouvernement a observé une minute de silence en mémoire de ceux qui ont perdu la vie, exprimé son soutien aux blessés, puis ordonné que les enquêtes déjà ouvertes permettent d'identifier tous les auteurs et leurs commanditaires quels qu'ils soient, de situer les responsabilités afin qu'ils en répondent, d'évaluer les dégâts
matériels y compris ceux collatéraux subis par des civils et d'envisager une réparation par l'Etat.

Saisissant cette occasion, le Président de la République a tenu à remercier l'ensemble du Peuple béninois pour son soutien indéfectible et son attachement à la bonne marche de notre pays. Il a félicité notre Armée et ses responsables qui ont su montrer leur loyauté et leur sens du devoir républicain ; puis instruit afin que les familles de ceux qui se sont sacrifiés
en défendant la patrie soient assistées convenablement. De même, il s'est félicité de la solidarité des pays de la CEDEAO, en particulier le Nigeria et la Côte d'Ivoire.
Il n'a pas manqué d'inviter le Gouvernement et le Peuple tout entier à voir dans cette épreuve, un motif de continuer à bâtir un Bénin fort et résilient, qui protège l'ensemble de ses enfants mais où chacun devra aussi apprendre à répondre de ses actes surtout lorsqu'ils se révèlent attentatoires aux intérêts du pays.

Enfin, il a affirmé sa conviction que notre pays va poursuivre sa marche vers le progrès et que nous devons tirer tous les enseignements de ces événements pour qu'ils ne se reproduisent plus jamais.