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This paper investigates the impact of aid for trade (AfT) targeted at trade policies on the participation of recipient countries in global value chains (GVCs), and how this impact varies with their prevailing political regimes. In democratic countries, the need for the authorities to account for the interests of various stakeholders (e.g., lobbies, trade unions) can compromise the allocation, use, and effectiveness of AfT. In contrast, less democratic regimes are typically more insulated from political pressures, which may lead to more effective outcomes of aid. At the same time, integration into some complex GVCs requires efficient and democratic institutions, to which these products are sensitive. Employing a sample of 110 countries and data covering 2002-2018, we control for standard determinants of GVC participation, while examining the effect of AfT and the moderating role of the political regime in place. Our estimation addresses the endogeneity of aid through an appropriate instrumentation strategy. Our results suggest that the effect of AfT is mostly positive in autocratic regimes, indicating more effective trade policy reforms. When we account for regional disparities, we find evidence that AfT for trade policy is also impactful in some democratic regimes. This might suggest that the efficacy of AfT is not strictly regime-dependent, but hinges on the government’s commitment to carry out significant reforms leading to greater participation in the global economy.

This paper investigates the impact of aid for trade (AfT) targeted at trade policies on the participation of recipient countries in global value chains (GVCs), and how this impact varies with their prevailing political regimes. In democratic countries, the need for the authorities to account for the interests of various stakeholders (e.g., lobbies, trade unions) can compromise the allocation, use, and effectiveness of AfT. In contrast, less democratic regimes are typically more insulated from political pressures, which may lead to more effective outcomes of aid. At the same time, integration into some complex GVCs requires efficient and democratic institutions, to which these products are sensitive. Employing a sample of 110 countries and data covering 2002-2018, we control for standard determinants of GVC participation, while examining the effect of AfT and the moderating role of the political regime in place. Our estimation addresses the endogeneity of aid through an appropriate instrumentation strategy. Our results suggest that the effect of AfT is mostly positive in autocratic regimes, indicating more effective trade policy reforms. When we account for regional disparities, we find evidence that AfT for trade policy is also impactful in some democratic regimes. This might suggest that the efficacy of AfT is not strictly regime-dependent, but hinges on the government’s commitment to carry out significant reforms leading to greater participation in the global economy.

This paper investigates the impact of aid for trade (AfT) targeted at trade policies on the participation of recipient countries in global value chains (GVCs), and how this impact varies with their prevailing political regimes. In democratic countries, the need for the authorities to account for the interests of various stakeholders (e.g., lobbies, trade unions) can compromise the allocation, use, and effectiveness of AfT. In contrast, less democratic regimes are typically more insulated from political pressures, which may lead to more effective outcomes of aid. At the same time, integration into some complex GVCs requires efficient and democratic institutions, to which these products are sensitive. Employing a sample of 110 countries and data covering 2002-2018, we control for standard determinants of GVC participation, while examining the effect of AfT and the moderating role of the political regime in place. Our estimation addresses the endogeneity of aid through an appropriate instrumentation strategy. Our results suggest that the effect of AfT is mostly positive in autocratic regimes, indicating more effective trade policy reforms. When we account for regional disparities, we find evidence that AfT for trade policy is also impactful in some democratic regimes. This might suggest that the efficacy of AfT is not strictly regime-dependent, but hinges on the government’s commitment to carry out significant reforms leading to greater participation in the global economy.

Many colonies in Africa attained independence through negotiated settlements. However, several others engaged in armed liberation struggles, for example, Kenya, Namibia, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Newly independent states provided liberation movements with bases on their territories and political, military, intellectual, ideological, material, and moral support. In West Africa, Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, a notable pan-Africanist, declared in his Independence Day speech in 1957, “Our independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent.” In East Africa, Julius Nyerere and Jomo Kenyatta, the first presidents of independent Tanzania and Kenya respectively, showed similar commitment to Pan-Africanism and anticolonialism by hosting refugees fleeing armed struggles in Southern Africa. Tanzania hosted the Organization of African Unity Liberation Committee supported anticolonial resistance and liberation movements. President Nyerere supported them for “challenging injustices of empire and apartheid” and declared, “I train freedom fighters”. He encouraged Tanzanians living around liberation movement camps to welcome these movements and their freedom fighters and also protect them from agents of colonial governments. Support also came from many other countries on the continent including Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Algeria. The latter provided sanctuary to representatives of liberation movements such as Nelson Mandela of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa.

Many colonies in Africa attained independence through negotiated settlements. However, several others engaged in armed liberation struggles, for example, Kenya, Namibia, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Newly independent states provided liberation movements with bases on their territories and political, military, intellectual, ideological, material, and moral support. In West Africa, Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, a notable pan-Africanist, declared in his Independence Day speech in 1957, “Our independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent.” In East Africa, Julius Nyerere and Jomo Kenyatta, the first presidents of independent Tanzania and Kenya respectively, showed similar commitment to Pan-Africanism and anticolonialism by hosting refugees fleeing armed struggles in Southern Africa. Tanzania hosted the Organization of African Unity Liberation Committee supported anticolonial resistance and liberation movements. President Nyerere supported them for “challenging injustices of empire and apartheid” and declared, “I train freedom fighters”. He encouraged Tanzanians living around liberation movement camps to welcome these movements and their freedom fighters and also protect them from agents of colonial governments. Support also came from many other countries on the continent including Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Algeria. The latter provided sanctuary to representatives of liberation movements such as Nelson Mandela of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa.

Many colonies in Africa attained independence through negotiated settlements. However, several others engaged in armed liberation struggles, for example, Kenya, Namibia, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, and São Tomé and Príncipe. Newly independent states provided liberation movements with bases on their territories and political, military, intellectual, ideological, material, and moral support. In West Africa, Ghana’s first president, Kwame Nkrumah, a notable pan-Africanist, declared in his Independence Day speech in 1957, “Our independence is meaningless unless it is linked up with the total liberation of the African continent.” In East Africa, Julius Nyerere and Jomo Kenyatta, the first presidents of independent Tanzania and Kenya respectively, showed similar commitment to Pan-Africanism and anticolonialism by hosting refugees fleeing armed struggles in Southern Africa. Tanzania hosted the Organization of African Unity Liberation Committee supported anticolonial resistance and liberation movements. President Nyerere supported them for “challenging injustices of empire and apartheid” and declared, “I train freedom fighters”. He encouraged Tanzanians living around liberation movement camps to welcome these movements and their freedom fighters and also protect them from agents of colonial governments. Support also came from many other countries on the continent including Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Algeria. The latter provided sanctuary to representatives of liberation movements such as Nelson Mandela of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa.

Countries now act in an international cooperation architecture whose rules are disputed from several directions at once. One of those directions is the hegemon itself, the US. The paper argues that the Trump administration’s disruption matters because it moves the largest actor from affirming to contesting across several arenas at once. That reshuffles the calculus for every country. This paper asks how countries can exercise agency when the international order itself is fragmenting. The paper surveys the bewildering array of concepts on state agency and proposes a schema built on two continua. The first is the medium or type of agency, meaning material/institutional versus ideational/discursive. The second is orientation to the prevailing order in a specific arena (not in general) as affirming versus contesting. Countries are not fixed in one position. Whether the same state contests the rules depends on its interests in a particular arena. Each potential position is available only to a country that can pay the arena’s entry fee. The entry fee is the resources, broadly defined, a position demands before a country can take it up. The paper sets out the strategic positions available in a fragmenting system. It names a further position, norm imperialism, where material instruments are turned against an ideational object. The implications for different types of country are discussed.

Countries now act in an international cooperation architecture whose rules are disputed from several directions at once. One of those directions is the hegemon itself, the US. The paper argues that the Trump administration’s disruption matters because it moves the largest actor from affirming to contesting across several arenas at once. That reshuffles the calculus for every country. This paper asks how countries can exercise agency when the international order itself is fragmenting. The paper surveys the bewildering array of concepts on state agency and proposes a schema built on two continua. The first is the medium or type of agency, meaning material/institutional versus ideational/discursive. The second is orientation to the prevailing order in a specific arena (not in general) as affirming versus contesting. Countries are not fixed in one position. Whether the same state contests the rules depends on its interests in a particular arena. Each potential position is available only to a country that can pay the arena’s entry fee. The entry fee is the resources, broadly defined, a position demands before a country can take it up. The paper sets out the strategic positions available in a fragmenting system. It names a further position, norm imperialism, where material instruments are turned against an ideational object. The implications for different types of country are discussed.

Countries now act in an international cooperation architecture whose rules are disputed from several directions at once. One of those directions is the hegemon itself, the US. The paper argues that the Trump administration’s disruption matters because it moves the largest actor from affirming to contesting across several arenas at once. That reshuffles the calculus for every country. This paper asks how countries can exercise agency when the international order itself is fragmenting. The paper surveys the bewildering array of concepts on state agency and proposes a schema built on two continua. The first is the medium or type of agency, meaning material/institutional versus ideational/discursive. The second is orientation to the prevailing order in a specific arena (not in general) as affirming versus contesting. Countries are not fixed in one position. Whether the same state contests the rules depends on its interests in a particular arena. Each potential position is available only to a country that can pay the arena’s entry fee. The entry fee is the resources, broadly defined, a position demands before a country can take it up. The paper sets out the strategic positions available in a fragmenting system. It names a further position, norm imperialism, where material instruments are turned against an ideational object. The implications for different types of country are discussed.

This chapter seeks to explain why development cooperation norms that looked stable in the mid-2010s became contested after 2016. We link this to crisis politics and the post-2030 agenda. Here, the ‘good old days’ means the mid-2010s cooperation moment. In 2015, four agreements were adopted within months: the 2030 Agenda (SDGs), the Paris Agreement, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda on financing for development. Their adoption set shared expectations about collective action. These agreements did not create a single regime, but they shared a narrative of common problems, shared responsibility, and multilateral problem-solving, backed by monitoring, review, and had a basis in evidence. Only a decade later, that consensus has evaporated. Development cooperation faces intersecting pressures operating through budget contractions, institutional precarity, and public narratives fuelled by the populist right in many DAC donor countries. In this new context, many DAC donors are shifting attention towards direct national interests, including security, migration policing, and geo-politics/geo-economic priorities, amid fiscal squeeze, intensified by the Trump 2.0 administration’s anti-multilateralism. Our chapter argues that the mid-2010s moment was highly contingent on an alignment of interests, institutions, and policy narratives, rather than a settled consensus, and that shifting political ‘mood’ has unravelled that spirit dramatically. We use a policy norm dynamics framework that traces norm contestation through actors and networks, institutions, and context and policy narratives, and introduces ‘epochal moods’ as the over-arching political climate that shape the nature and form of development cooperation. We outline the competing normative regimes of development cooperation and what they imply for positioning on a post-SDG/post-2030 collective framework.

This chapter seeks to explain why development cooperation norms that looked stable in the mid-2010s became contested after 2016. We link this to crisis politics and the post-2030 agenda. Here, the ‘good old days’ means the mid-2010s cooperation moment. In 2015, four agreements were adopted within months: the 2030 Agenda (SDGs), the Paris Agreement, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda on financing for development. Their adoption set shared expectations about collective action. These agreements did not create a single regime, but they shared a narrative of common problems, shared responsibility, and multilateral problem-solving, backed by monitoring, review, and had a basis in evidence. Only a decade later, that consensus has evaporated. Development cooperation faces intersecting pressures operating through budget contractions, institutional precarity, and public narratives fuelled by the populist right in many DAC donor countries. In this new context, many DAC donors are shifting attention towards direct national interests, including security, migration policing, and geo-politics/geo-economic priorities, amid fiscal squeeze, intensified by the Trump 2.0 administration’s anti-multilateralism. Our chapter argues that the mid-2010s moment was highly contingent on an alignment of interests, institutions, and policy narratives, rather than a settled consensus, and that shifting political ‘mood’ has unravelled that spirit dramatically. We use a policy norm dynamics framework that traces norm contestation through actors and networks, institutions, and context and policy narratives, and introduces ‘epochal moods’ as the over-arching political climate that shape the nature and form of development cooperation. We outline the competing normative regimes of development cooperation and what they imply for positioning on a post-SDG/post-2030 collective framework.

This chapter seeks to explain why development cooperation norms that looked stable in the mid-2010s became contested after 2016. We link this to crisis politics and the post-2030 agenda. Here, the ‘good old days’ means the mid-2010s cooperation moment. In 2015, four agreements were adopted within months: the 2030 Agenda (SDGs), the Paris Agreement, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda on financing for development. Their adoption set shared expectations about collective action. These agreements did not create a single regime, but they shared a narrative of common problems, shared responsibility, and multilateral problem-solving, backed by monitoring, review, and had a basis in evidence. Only a decade later, that consensus has evaporated. Development cooperation faces intersecting pressures operating through budget contractions, institutional precarity, and public narratives fuelled by the populist right in many DAC donor countries. In this new context, many DAC donors are shifting attention towards direct national interests, including security, migration policing, and geo-politics/geo-economic priorities, amid fiscal squeeze, intensified by the Trump 2.0 administration’s anti-multilateralism. Our chapter argues that the mid-2010s moment was highly contingent on an alignment of interests, institutions, and policy narratives, rather than a settled consensus, and that shifting political ‘mood’ has unravelled that spirit dramatically. We use a policy norm dynamics framework that traces norm contestation through actors and networks, institutions, and context and policy narratives, and introduces ‘epochal moods’ as the over-arching political climate that shape the nature and form of development cooperation. We outline the competing normative regimes of development cooperation and what they imply for positioning on a post-SDG/post-2030 collective framework.

Die AfD beißt sich in das eigene Parteiprogramm: Sie verspricht etwas, das sie nie wird einhalten können. Ihre Politik würde Probleme sogar verschärfen., Bei den Landtagswahlen am 6. September in Sachsen-Anhalt droht ein politischer Einschnitt. Die AfD könnte erstmals eine Regierung bilden und den Ministerpräsidenten stellen. Für welche politischen Positionen steht die AfD in Sachsen-Anhalt? Mit welchen Parteien hat sie Überschneidungen? Und wo ...

Dr. Thomas Meissner, Associate Professor am Department of Microeconomics and Public Economics der School of Business and Economics der Maastricht University, war vom 11. Juni bis 19. Juli 2026 als Visiting Researcher am SOEP im DIW Berlin zu Gast. Während seines Aufenthalts nahm der ...

Zusammenfassung:

2. September 2026 – Nach den Landtagswahlen am 6. September könnte Sachsen-Anhalt dramatische politische Veränderungen erfahren: Die AfD könnte zum ersten Mal Regierungsverantwortung übernehmen und den Ministerpräsidenten stellen. Für welche politischen Positionen steht die AfD in Sachsen-Anhalt? Wie fällt ein Vergleich zu den demokratischen Parteien aus, wo gibt es Überschneidungen? Und wie extrem ist die AfD in ihren Positionen, wo bestehen Widersprüche? Eine Auswertung des Wahl-O-Mats der Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung sowie ein Vergleich mit den Landtagswahlen 2016 und 2021 und der Bundestagswahl 2025 zeigen ein grundlegend verändertes Parteiensystem. Trotz wachsender Unterschiede in den Positionen der Parteien verliert die AfD vermehrt ihre inhaltliche Alleinstellung. Gerade in der Sozialpolitik zeigt sich in Sachsen-Anhalt das AfD-Paradox: Menschen und Wirtschaft sind auf eine gute öffentliche Daseinsvorsorge, Fachkräfte, kommunale Infrastruktur, Bildung, bezahlbares Wohnen und eine verlässliche Gesundheitsversorgung angewiesen. Die AfD unterstützt zwar einzelne populäre Maßnahmen wie kostenfreie Schüler-Mobilität, geringere Kita-Kosten oder öffentliche Krankenhäuser. Aber sie lehnt zentrale Voraussetzungen einer zukunftsfähigen sozialen Infrastruktur ab, etwa die Anwerbung ausländischer Fachkräfte, Projekte gegen Rechtsextremismus, Demokratiebildung, Klimaneutralität, Vermögensteuer und teils Instrumente des sozialen Wohnungsbaus oder der Ausbildungsfinanzierung.

DIW Berlin setzt Konjunkturprognose nach oben – Deutsche Wirtschaft entwickelt sich besser als im Sommer erwartet, vor allem dank zuletzt starker Exporte – Voraussichtlich mehr als ein Prozent Wirtschaftswachstum in diesem Jahr – Hohe Gaspreise, Niedrigwasser und strukturelle Schwächen bremsen im ...

Wir freuen uns mitzuteilen, dass seit heute die Ausschreibung der W3-Professur für Angewandte Sozialforschung und Surveymethodologie online ist. Die Professur ist mit der Leitung des Bereichs Surveymethodik und -management am Sozio-oekonomischen Panel (SOEP) des Deutschen Instituts für ...

Seit der Teillegalisierung diskutieren wir über Cannabis. Doch dessen Konsum ist gar nicht gestiegen. Ein Blick ins Abwasser zeigt: Die wahren Drogenprobleme sind andere., Die Teillegalisierung von Cannabis vor zwei Jahren hat die Gesellschaft gespalten. Innenminister Alexander Dobrindt etwa spricht von einem richtigen »Scheißgesetz«, auch andere sparen nicht an harscher Kritik. Dabei deutet eine ausgewogene, wenn auch bislang vorläufige Betrachtung der Zahlen darauf ...

Etwa die Hälfte der einkommensschwachen Länder ist derzeit zahlungsunfähig oder hat ein großes Risiko, zahlungsunfähig zu werden. Was die Weltgemeinschaft dagegen tun muss, erläutert eine IDOS-Wissenschaftlerin.

Etwa die Hälfte der einkommensschwachen Länder ist derzeit zahlungsunfähig oder hat ein großes Risiko, zahlungsunfähig zu werden. Was die Weltgemeinschaft dagegen tun muss, erläutert eine IDOS-Wissenschaftlerin.