United Nations (UN) Secretary-General António Guterres launched the UN80 Initiative in March 2025. Faced with the US government’s increasingly hostile approach to the UN, UN80 was presented as a reform geared towards making the UN system “fit for purpose”. However, this policy brief argues that both the UN bureaucracy and member states have missed key opportunities to turn UN80 into a tool for reconfiguring UN multilateralism and providing space for multilateral cooperation that – despite rising geopolitical tensions – effectively addresses transnational challenges. The UN Secretariat, on the one hand, has pushed for a rushed reform agenda through an avalanche of bureaucratic reshuffling and technocratic ideas that are driven primarily by the logic of efficiency gains. Despite investing considerable efforts, it has failed to develop a coherent organisational and governance vision for the future of the UN that would help the organisation adapt to shifts in global power and policy preferences. Although welcoming reform efforts in principle, member states – on the other hand – have neither provided proactive guidance on desired reform outcomes, nor offered strategic input on the reform proposals put forward by the UN bureaucracy. They have failed to take up their role as political reform governors of a UN system in need of adapting to new geopolitical realities. Although the trajectory of UN80 to date has been far from ideal, the Initiative could still serve as a first step towards more fundamental reform efforts that address member states’ diverging preferences and attempt to tackle multilateral governance deficits. Inorder to highlight what is at stake, the policy brief outlines three scenarios of how post-UN80 dynamics might unfold, helping stakeholders identify what kind of UN system they would like to see and which steps might be necessary to get there.
Scenario 1. Faltering momentum: the phase-out of UN80 contributes to UN fragmentation and decline. Member states and the UN bureaucracy continue working through the UN80 Initiative’s to-do list until everything is either proclaimed done, watered down or silently abandoned. This leaves major challenges unaddressed, contributing to increasing levels of fragmentation and dysfunction across the UN system.
Scenario 2. Bold moves: strategic UN reform ambitions supersede technocratic logics. Member states leave decisions about efficiency gains to UN chief executives while prioritising and spearheading more ambitious reforms. They task the new Secretary-General with designing a high-level debate on the purpose(s) and the future governance of the UN system that reaffirms the UN as the multilateral centre of world politics.
Scenario 3. Muddling through: a combination of technocratic and governance reforms keeps the UN afloat. Cost-cutting reforms continue while a coalition of reform-oriented small and medium-sized member states pushes for a selective reform of multilateral governance. The result is a somewhat smaller UN system that, while not fundamentally transformed, is better equipped to navigate geopolitical tensions.
Tisza Party Leader Péter Magyar speaks to a crowd of supporters in Siófok, a town in Somogy County, southwestern Hungary, after leading a landslide election victory in April. Credit: SNRTZ
By Catherine Wilson
SYDNEY, Australia, May 13 2026 (IPS)
Péter Magyar, leader of the pro-democratic centre-right Tisza Party, which recently swept into power on an unstoppable wave of hope for change, has now been sworn into office as Hungary’s new Prime Minister.
After a decade and a half of increasing authoritarian governance by the former Fidesz regime, led by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, the pro-democracy movement in the central European nation delivered a democratic rebound at the general election held on 12 April.
“I will not rule over Hungary; I will serve my homeland,” the 45 year old Magyar pledged during the taking of the oath of office ceremony in the Hungarian parliament on 9 May. The formal beginning of a new era in the country was followed by a massive public festival dedicated to freedom and democracy in the streets of Budapest, Hungary’s capital. The celebration took place nearly a month after the Tisza Party leader stood in front of jubilant crowds as the election result became clear to declare, “Today the Hungarian people said yes to Europe. They said yes to a free Hungary.”
The new Tisza government, which secured a supermajority of 141 of 199 parliamentary seats, has promised a roll back of the democratic decline that occurred during the Orbán era. After being elected into power in 2010, the Fidesz regime steadily stifled opposition and dissent by manipulating the electoral system, eroding the independence of the judiciary and media, threatening government critics and undermining the work of civil society organisations.
Péter Magyar (L), Leader of the Hungarian Tisza Party, and Viktor Orbán (R), Leader of the Fidesz Party, at a European Parliament Plenary Session in Brussels, 9 October 2024. Credit: European Union/Alain Rolland
“The election results have opened the door to exercising public power within appropriate constraints. Checks and balances may be revived, social participation can have a greater role, and the constant attacks against NGOS and the independent press may cease,” Gábor Medvegy at the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union in Budapest told IPS.
These were the expectations of many Hungarians 37 years ago, when the nation severed ties with its Communist past. Located west of Romania and south of Slovakia and Ukraine, Hungary lived under Soviet-aligned rule from 1947 to 1989 when it began the transition to a multi-party democracy. It then became a member of NATO in 1999 and the European Union (EU) in 2004.
But the next generation after this moment of immense political and social change witnessed the gradual loss, rather than gain, in democratic rights, as Orbán implemented policies in line with his vision of “illiberal democracy”. Four years ago, the European Parliament declared that Hungary had become an ‘electoral autocracy’ which undermined the rule of law, freedom of expression, religion and association while failing to address corruption. According to Transparency International, the nation has a poor corruption perception score of 40/100. And soon it was penalised for its autocratic tendencies when the EU withheld billions of euros in funding.
The possibility of a political alternative emerged two years ago when Magyar, who held positions in the Fidesz Government, resigned to join the opposition. He remains a deeply patriotic leader speaking to Hungarian interests, but he has also articulated a clear commitment to change. The Tisza Party’s manifesto, ‘A Functioning and Humane Hungary,’ outlines a vision of accountable governance, return to the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary and media and a renewed fight against corruption, while also improving public services and addressing the cost of living and rural disadvantage. At present the nation’s public spending on health is about half the EU average and its preventable mortality rate of 333 per 100,000 people is well above the EU average of 168, reports the European Commission.
The party’s focus on core voter concerns and strong policies is likely to have been a factor in the high voter turnout of 77 percent and strong youth participation in the April poll. An estimated 30 percent of the country’s population of 9.7 million people are aged under 30 years, and media reports claim that 65 percent of voters in this age group were Tisza supporters.
And the new government has made a rapid start on its policy promises. Negotiations with the EU have begun to re-establish democratic norms in Hungary and secure the release of the withheld funding. “What is important is the economic development in Hungary,” Dr Anton Shekhovtsov, Visiting Professor at the Central European University in Vienna, told IPS. “If Magyar is able to de-block the EU funding that was withheld for a few years now, the economic situation will hopefully improve.” It will also be important to enable Hungarian industries to thrive in order to boost the domestic economy, he added.
But, to achieve this, the new government will have to address nepotism in state institutions and key public office posts. “Essentially Hungary, under Orbán, is a captured state. The power of Fidesz has penetrated state institutions very deeply. So the task for Tisza is now to drain the swamp, get rid of the deep state,” Shekhovtsov emphasised.
Democracy more widely in Europe could also benefit from the influence of Hungary’s new leadership. The EU’s support of Ukraine, following the Russian invasion in 2022, was impeded by the Fidesz government’s repeated alignment with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Orbán opposed the bloc’s Russian sanctions and, in February, vetoed a critical 90 billion euro loan to Ukraine after a damaged pipeline halted the supply of oil from Russia. However, Hungary lifted its veto by 23 April, with oil flows resuming, and approved the EU’s next round of sanctions on Russia.
“Unlike Orbán, Magyar has no ties to Russia and, therefore, his government will not be subordinated to Moscow and its interests,” Bálint Madlovics, research fellow at the Central European University in Budapest, told IPS. He has also “clearly framed Ukraine as a victim of aggression, strongly opposing any external pressure on Kyiv to cede territory”.
However, on migration, another regional issue, Hungary’s new prime minister made it clear in the months before the election that he opposes illegal migration and intends to maintain the southern border fence which was constructed in 2015 to prevent unauthorised migrants from entering the country. Although Hungary may need to alter its stance when the EU’s new migration and asylum agreement, which requires member states to contribute to the regional responsibility for managing refugees, is implemented in June.
Yet, arguably, the new government has, in a short time, begun to build confidence with its own people and with other European nations that are committed to a democratic region. In the long term, strengthening civic rights and liberties and improving equality are crucial for the new Hungary, Medvegy said. And “we must help ensure that people are not merely spectators of politics but active participants,” he emphasised.
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A residential building in Beirut, Lebanon, lies in ruins. Credit: UNICEF/Fouad Choufany
By Alon Ben-Meir
NEW YORK, May 13 2026 (IPS)
Violence has metastasized into humanity’s baseline condition. Yet international institutions remain paralyzed by vetoes and rivalry, offering hollow declarations while dehumanization becomes normalized. Coordinated action, not gestures, is desperately needed.
Global violence today is metastasizing, not contained; over 180,000 violent events reported globally by the International Institute for Strategic Studies signal a world in which conflict has become a baseline condition rather than an exception. More than 130 armed conflicts now rage—over twice the number of 15 years ago—shattering infrastructure, tearing apart social fabric, and normalizing dehumanization as a political weapon.
Women and children bear the brunt: hundreds of millions live within range of armed clashes, with millions of preventable deaths and lifelong trauma caused not only by bullets and bombs but by hunger, disease, and gender-based violence unleashed by war’s chaos.
Yet the UN system and the world’s democracies appear increasingly paralyzed—trapped in vetoes, geopolitical rivalries, and hollow declarations—offering gestures of concern rather than the coordinated, enforced accountability this modern plague of violence so desperately demands.
The global escalation of violence is a structural crisis rather than an aberration—one that reveals the failure of international institutions, exposing the normalization of suffering across political, economic, and societal dimensions.
The proliferation of violence signals not just an increase in armed confrontations but a breakdown in the very mechanisms meant to constrain conflict, rendering dehumanization a routine tool of power, as demonstrated in the following.
The Philosophical Angle
Violence represents the collapse of legitimate political authority and the rise of impotence masquerading as force. Hannah Arendt’s foundational insight remains essential: “Power and violence are opposites; where the one rules absolutely, the other is absent. Violence appears where power is in jeopardy, but left to its own course, it ends in power’s disappearance” (On Violence, 1970).
This speaks directly to today’s proliferation of conflicts, which indicate not state strength but institutional failure, where violence substitutes for the consent and legitimacy governments can no longer command. The resort to violence signals the exhaustion of political dialogue and the absence of legitimate power structures capable of resolving disputes.
Economic Disenfranchisement
Economic drivers are critical accelerants of contemporary violence through resource competition, commodity exploitation, and systemic inequality. Slavoj Žižek’s concept of systemic violence captures the pervasive economic roots: “Therein resides the fundamental systemic violence of capitalism, much more uncanny than the direct pre-capitalist socio-ideological violence: this violence is no longer attributable to concrete individuals and their ‘evil’ intentions, but is purely ‘objective,’ systemic, anonymous.”
The greed-driven exploitation of natural resources—from diamonds in Sierra Leone to oil in Venezuela and cobalt and other conflict minerals in the Democratic Republic of Congo—finances rebellions and turns conflict into a profitable enterprise. Economic deprivation, geoeconomic confrontation through weaponized tariffs and sanctions, and commodity price shocks directly shape military capacity and conflict outcomes.
The Political Compulsion of Violence
Political violence emerges not merely from divergent interests but from the deliberate choice to pursue objectives through coercion rather than negotiation. The paralysis of the UNSC and democratic institutions reflects what Arendt identified as bureaucratic tyranny: “In a fully developed bureaucracy, there is nobody left with whom one can argue, to whom one can present grievances, on whom the pressures of power can be exerted. … everybody is deprived of political freedom, of the power to act… where we are all equally powerless, we have a tyranny without a tyrant.”
This captures the international community’s inability to enforce accountability—vetoes and geopolitical rivalries create a structural void where violence thrives unchecked. Political fragility and weakening institutions, seen in Syria and Myanmar, make societies vulnerable to breakdown, radicalization, and violent dissent.
Societal Fragmentation
Societal conditions create climates where violence becomes normalized through inequality and the erosion of social cohesion. Thomas Hobbes’s bleak assessment of unconstrained human nature remains relevant: in the state of nature, “the life of man [is] solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.” While Hobbes described a pre-political condition, his insight applies to societies where governance collapses and fear dominates, conditions now afflicting millions living within range of armed clashes.
Social norms that accept violence as conflict resolution, combined with economic inequalities and a lack of community participation, create environments where aggression flourishes. This normalizes dehumanization, where, as in Nigeria, Israel and South Africa, gendered violence, ethnic tensions, and historical grievances fuel recurring cycles of brutality.
Nationalism, Repression and State Complicity
State-level factors amplifying violence include the failure to address ethnic marginalization, resource competition, and the absence of functional governance. Walter Benjamin warned of violence’s relationship to law and state power: “There is no document of civilization which is not at the same time a document of barbarism” (On the Concept of History, 1940).
This observation underscores how national institutions perpetuate violence through their foundational structures and exclusionary practices. Nations repeatedly falling victim to civil and international wars demonstrate governments’ inability to recognize and address destabilizing issues like political, religious, or ethnic marginalization. The weaponization of state apparatus through totalitarian mobilization of violence destroys the very space where political thinking and resistance might occur, as demonstrated in China and Eritrea.
Religious Instrumentalization
Religion, when co-opted by political actors or stripped of its ethical core, becomes a potent catalyst for violence, sanctifying exclusion and legitimizing brutality. Sectarian divides—whether in the Middle East, South Asia, or parts of Africa—transform identity into a battlefield where compromise is heresy and annihilation becomes duty. René Girard’s insight is instructive: “Religion shelters us from violence just as violence seeks shelter in religion.” When faith is manipulated to justify power or grievance, such as in India, Israel or Iraq, it ceases to restrain violence and instead consecrates it, deepening cycles of retribution and rendering conflicts existential rather than negotiable.
The convergence of these dimensions explains why violence has become a baseline condition rather than an exception. Several measures must be considered to de-escalate global violence. Although effecting change is extremely difficult, every effort must still be made, provided the public leads the charge through sustained protest, continuous advocacy, and relentless pressure on policymakers to enact change.
Reform UN Security Council Veto Power
Governments must constrain veto authority by restricting its use in cases involving genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Permanent members should abstain when directly involved, transforming the veto from obstruction into accountability and addressing institutional paralysis that enables unchecked violence.
Establish Functional Early Warning Systems
International bodies should implement systems linking detection to preventive action, closing the warning-response gap. These must integrate predictive analytics, local expertise, and cross-border coordination to anticipate violence months before eruption, enabling timely diplomatic and humanitarian intervention.
Address Economic Inequality and Insecurity
Governments should implement policies that reduce income inequality—including wage increases, tax reform, and financial assistance—aimed at addressing violence triggers. Targeted lending, job creation, and redistributive policies alleviate financial strain that fuels conflict and crime, making structural prevention more effective than reactive measures.
Dr. Alon Ben-Meir is President of the Institute for Humanitarian Conflict Resolution.
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By Anis Chowdhury
SYDNEY, May 12 2026 (IPS)
The Republic of Korea (Korea), Vietnam and Bangladesh are on three different rungs of the development ladder. While Korea is a member of the rich nations’ club, i.e., the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Bangladesh is still a least developed country (LDC); and Vietnam is in the middle.
Anis Chowdhury
However, their initial conditions had significant similarities – they all emerged from devastating wars, and were at the bottom of the development ladder until the late 1960s. They were among the world’s poorest countries struggling to feed a large population, rapidly growing, exceeding 2.5% per annum with per capita GDP less than US$300 in the early 1970s while facing the challenges of reconstruction and rebuilding. Thus, they had to depend heavily on foreign aid.But relative policy independence vis-à-vis donors, among other factors, played a crucial role in separating their development trajectory. Development succeeded in countries that maintained policy independence despite their heavy aid dependence.
Aid dependence and policy independence
Being among the world’s poorest countries, all three had to depend heavily on foreign aid. For example, foreign aid financed around 74% of Korea’s imports on average during 1953-1960, and proceeds from the sales of aid goods (e.g., food aid under the PL480 programme of the US, packaged as “Food for Peace”) constituted on average 38.4% of government revenue.
US aid to Korea was “huge”, contributing about 80% of foreign aid during 1945-1975. Korea received nearly as much economic aid from the US as ALL of Africa during 1946-1978. Excluding military aid, the US economic at its peak was 21% of Korea’s GDP, and financed about 50% of government expenditure.
Source: The World Bank
Yet, the Korean government maintained considerable policy independence regarding the use of aid funds. While the US aid agency insisted on providing non-project assistance for macroeconomic stabilisation rather than growth, the Korean government used non-project aid to rebuild the manufacturing sector for accelerating growth, and demanded more project assistance. The policy conflict was negotiated and coordinated by the Combined Economic Board (CEB, established in 1952). Although CEB was jointly chaired by the representatives of the US aid mission in Korea and the Korean government, Korea prevailed.
The Korean government also maintained its policy independence from the World Bank (WB). For example, when in 1967 the WB rejected Korea’s funding request for the Seoul-Busan expressway, connecting the nation’s capital to its main sea-port, Korea completed the 428km expressway with domestic finance and resources in 1970 as other multilateral and bilateral donors also refused to finance it following the WB’s rejection.
The WB and donors believed the expressway was an excessively grandiose project for a country so poor. Proving them wrong, the expressway not only spurred economic activities along the corridor of two major population centres, its construction was a critical learning opportunity for the Koreans. With the gained capacity, Korean construction companies were able to win major infrastructure projects in the Middle-East, which was a critical source of foreign exchange. Korea is now regarded as a leader in infrastructure construction.
The WB also was very critical of Korea’s Heavy and Chemical Industry (HCI) drive (1973-1979). Ignoring the WB, Korea pushed ahead, and proved the WB and other critics wrong. By the early 1980s, HCI became the nation’s leading export industries. The HCI drive was greatly successful in boosting investment, leading to the rapid growth of the manufacturing sector and its structure change. The manufacturing sector grew 16.2% per annum from 1971 to 1980, much higher than the GDP growth of 9.1% during the same period, while the share of HCIs in manufacturing value added rose to 58.3% in 1980.
No wonder, Korea broke away from the poverty trap in the early 1970s, leaving its “poor cousins” – Bangladesh and Vietnam – behind to become a full member of the OECD in little over two decades in 1996.
Vietnam’s story is not so different from that of Korea. Since initiating reforms in 1986, Vietnam quickly became WB’s one of the top loan recipient countries. But the WB’s influence over Vietnam’s development path has been limited, as the government has always refused to adopt policies imposed by foreign organisations. With strong enough institutions Vietnam achieved “ownership” of public policies.
Here is an interesting story of Vietnam’s determination to pursue its own development strategies. When in 1997, the WB approached Vietnam with an offer of US$300 million in credit in exchange for structural adjustment, à la the Washington Consensus model, including faster privatisation and financial liberalisation, the Vietnamese government declined. The WB returned with a higher offer in 1998, and Vietnam declined again. When the WB came again in 1999 with an even higher offer, the government issued a stern rebuke. The minister of planning and investment, Tran Xua Gia, told WB representatives, “You cannot buy reforms with money . . . no one is going to bombard Vietnam into acting.”
By then the Vietnamese government knew from the experience of Indonesia the risks of yielding too much sovereignty to international markets and institutions. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) had to wind up its last programme in 2004 as Vietnam refused the IMF’s demand for an independent audit of its central bank and disagreed over privatisations of state-owned enterprises.
Vietnam charted its own path of reforms – Đổi Mới, learning from successes and failures of neighbouring East Asian countries, including China as well as its former patron and role model, former Soviet Union.
Vietnam posted remarkable macroeconomic performances following the launch of Đổi Mới, with GDP growing at close to 8% per annum. Since the beginning of the 2000s, it also recorded Asia’s highest rate of growth in exports, half of which were made up of manufactured products, prompting The Economist to hail Vietnam as “Asia’s other miracle”.
Starting in 1975 with a per capita GDP of about US$85 after successfully defeating the US that waged a devastating war on Vietnam for more than two decades, Vietnam became a lower middle-income country in 2009. “Desperately seeking model countries”, unsurprisingly the first country Robert Zoellick visited after becoming President of the WB in 2009 was Vietnam, a country governed by its Communist Party, constructing a ‘socialist-oriented market economy’. One could almost say, “Vietnam is more important for the WB than the WB is for Vietnam”!
Poor Bangladesh lacks self confidence
Bangladesh, in search of development, joined the club of LDCs in 1975 when its GDP per capita was US$230, and still remains a LDC after more than five decades maximising LDC related facilities. Bangladesh is scheduled to graduate out of the LDC category in November this year; but it is asking for a deferment, lacking self-confidence.
On the other hand, self-confident Vietnam with its per capita GDP of only US$82 in 1975 decided not to join the LDC club, despite having to face the challenges of reconstruction and reunification in the most difficult global economic situation – stagflation. It received aid (mostly from the former Soviet Union); but did not blindly follow either its former patron USSR’s reform package or that of the WB/IMF. Its former enemy, the US, which pressured the WB to halt all funding, made a U-turn in the early 1990s, and signed the US-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement in 2000.
Korea could have also joined the LDC club in 1971 when the UN created the LDC category for the world’s poorest countries; but it did not. Heavily dependent on US foreign aid for food, fuel and other raw materials, Korea was not seen as a promising place for major investments until the late 1960s. So, the State took the lead to break the vicious circle of low income and low investment.
Of course, Bangladesh is no longer a “basket case”; it is now a lower middle-income country. It also showed some courage to stand on its own feet when the WB declined to finance the Padma Bridge project, citing corruption.
However, Bangladesh could have done better had it not surrendered its policy independence to the donors, as the experiences of RoK and Vietnam demonstrate. Like successful marriages, there are many factors for successful development. Failure in any one of those essential elements can be damning according to Leo Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina principle, even if it has all the other ingredients of success.
Anis Chowdhury, Emeritus Professor, Western Sydney University (Australia). He held senior UN positions in Bangkok and New York and served as Special Assistant to the Chief Advisor for Finance (with the status and rank of State Minister) in the Professor Yunus-led Interim Government. Anis has written extensively on East and Southeast Asian economies, including The Newly Industrialising Economies of East Asia (Routledge) and The Political Economy of East Asia (Oxford University Press). E-mail: anis.z.chowdhury@gmail.com
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Jabiru Muhammed stands beside a tree planted as part of the Great Green Wall project in his village in Jigawa State. Credit: Promise Eze/IPS
By Promise Eze
GARABADU VILLAGE, Nigeria, May 12 2026 (IPS)
In 2021, Gadeja Shehu and about a hundred farmers in Garbadu village, Zamfara State in northwestern Nigeria, were invited by officials of the National Agency for the Great Green Wall to plant trees across a large stretch of land in their community.
Shehu remembers how fierce, dust-laden winds from the Sahara Desert often tore off the roof of his home and damaged his farmland. For him, taking part in the tree-planting exercise was a way to confront this challenge, especially after seeing the impact of similar interventions in other northern states such as Kaduna, Bauchi, and Jigawa, where desertification has degraded once fertile land.
The Sahara is advancing relentlessly across the Sahel, expanding by nearly 10 per cent since the 1920s. In Nigeria, around 35,000 hectares of land are lost each year as the desert continues to encroach southwards.
Trees planted in Garbadu village, Zamfura State. Credit: Promise Eze/IPS
Desertification is causing land degradation in the Sahel. Credit: Promise Eze/IPS
In Garbadu, a community of roughly 6,000 people who rely on farming, many had abandoned their fields, resulting in falling incomes and growing food shortages. However, the tree-planting initiative is beginning to reverse this trend. It is part of the Great Green Wall Initiative, an ambitious plan to create an 8,000-kilometre-long and 15-kilometre-wide belt of vegetation across Africa.
Launched by the African Union in 2007, the initiative spans 11 countries in the Sahel, including Mauritania, Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria, Chad, Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Djibouti. It aims to restore 100 million hectares of degraded land, generate 10 million jobs, and capture 250 million tonnes of carbon dioxide by 2030.
Nigeria’s section stretches roughly 1,500 kilometres, focusing on a 15-kilometre-wide belt of drought-resistant trees across vulnerable northern states.
Initially conceived as a plant barrier, the initiative has since expanded its goals. It now focuses on restoring degraded lands, halting desert expansion, improving soil and water conservation, supporting agriculture and livestock, creating green jobs, and helping communities adapt to climate change.
“The project has been really impactful here. Previously strong winds would rip off our roofs, but now it is no longer frequent. Before the plantation, the soil of the areas where the trees are now barely held water, but now it does have moisture and I’m happy the area is slowly turning green again,” said Shehu, who added that he continues to care for the trees.
Senegalese villagers working in a tree nursery forming part of the Great Green Wall. Photo: FAO/Benedicte Kurzen/NOOR
Family of Funds
The Great Green Wall has attracted significant funding over the years. The Global Environment Facility (GEF), a key partner, has provided more than $1 billion in grants. These funds have helped leverage an additional $6 billion from governments, development partners, and multilateral institutions. The investments have strengthened landscapes, improved livelihoods, reduced poverty, and enhanced food and water security.
Jonky Tenou, Africa Regional Coordinator at the GEF, said the GEF has supported the Great Green Wall Initiative through strategic, programmatic investments over successive replenishment cycles, leveraging its family of funds to build momentum and coherence.
These efforts include the GEF 4 Strategic Investment Program for Sustainable Land Management in Sub-Saharan Africa (SIP), the GEF 5 Sahel and West Africa Program (SAWAP), the GEF 6 Integrated Approach Pilot on Food Security (IAP Food Security), the GEF 7 Food, Land-Use and Restoration Impact Program (FOLUR), and, under GEF 8, the Transformational Approach to Large-Scale Investment in Support of the Implementation of the Great Green Wall Initiative (TALSISI GGWI).
Tela Jubrin, a farmer, planted trees for the Great Green Wall in Jigawa State, Nigeria. Credit: Promise Eze/IPS
Shafi’u Ladan, one of the farmers who participated in the tree planting project in Garbadu, Zamfara state. Credit: Promise Eze/IPS
Sustainable Impact
The TALSISI GGWI, Tenou explained, is designed as a truly programmatic, multi-country platform that builds on lessons learned over the past decade.
“Compared to earlier approaches, TALSISI places stronger emphasis on regional coordination, deeper integration across GEF focal areas, and a clear focus on scalability, learning, and adaptive management. Crucially, the programme also gives greater attention to the institutional, financial, and security constraints that have previously limited effectiveness, helping to create the conditions needed for sustained and transformative impact at scale,” he said.
Observers have noted that the Great Green Wall Initiative has often been criticised for being highly ambitious but slow in delivery — a concern acknowledged by the GEF and its partners. They stress, however, that the programme is not designed as a quick fix, but rather as a long-term intervention aimed at delivering sustained impact over time.
“Progress on the Great Green Wall is assessed through a transformational, system-level lens rather than through isolated output metrics. In Nigeria and across the Sahel, GEF investments have contributed to advancing land degradation neutrality objectives by strengthening sustainable land management practices, restoring ecosystem functionality, and improving livelihoods in highly vulnerable areas,” said Tenou.
Emmanuel Diagbouga, a natural resources planning and management expert based in Burkina Faso, said the effectiveness of the Great Green Wall Initiative depends on a clear and operational multi-level governance framework that connects regional coordination, national planning, and community-level implementation.
Community Ownership Drives Tree Protection
Murtala Bado, the village head of Garbadu, said one sign of the Great Green Wall Initiative’s progress is the behavioural change among community members in a region where deforestation is a serious problem.
He told IPS that people are now aware of the benefits of trees and no longer cut them in the Great Green Wall Initiative project sites. Defaulters who are caught are reported to village leaders and security agencies for disciplinary measures.
“The project has even provided employment opportunities for people here. Farmers who are part of it receive allowances from the government. This project cannot work if there are no people to take care of it. And for people to actually show up and take interest means that it is going to be sustainable in the long term,” he said.
Rising Above the Challenges
The Great Green Wall Initiative has achieved only 30 per cent of its planned execution in participating countries. In Nigeria, progress is higher, at about 50 per cent, but insecurity has slowed the project and remains one of its greatest challenges.
Insurgency in northern states such as Zamfara, Katsina, and Borno, where the project is implemented, has been a major obstacle. For decades, insurgents have imposed taxes, killed villagers, and kidnapped for ransom, targeting anything linked to the state, including environmental projects.
“Insecurity has emerged as one of the most critical risks to the long-term sustainability of the Great Green Wall, particularly in countries such as Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. Direct operational constraints include armed conflict and the presence of non-state armed groups, which restrict access to restoration sites, force the suspension of field activities, and expose environmental staff and local partners to security threats. Several restored areas have been abandoned due to population displacement and the lack of institutional presence,” said Diagbouga, and the impact is that the budget is diverted toward defence spending.
Tenou said that despite the challenges, the GEF and its partners have responded by adopting flexible and adaptive implementation approaches, including working through local institutions, adjusting geographic focus when necessary, and integrating conflict-sensitive design.
“These approaches help sustain progress while safeguarding communities and ensure that investments remain aligned with GEF’s broader objectives on durability, inclusion, and risk-informed programming,” he said.
Addressing the Funding Gap
Another major challenge facing the initiative is financing. In 2021, $19 billion was pledged at the One Planet Summit to support the Great Green Wall. However, the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification estimates that at least $33 billion is needed to meet its targets, leaving a significant funding gap. Experts say that even where funds exist, their impact has yet to be fully felt.
“The Great Green Wall project has been observed to be hindered by a massive gap between pledged and disbursed funds, with only a fraction of promised international funding, often less than 10% in some areas, reaching local implementers. It has also been observed that severe bureaucratic delays, lack of local capacity to manage funds, and high regional insecurity are some of the reasons stalling progress,” said Yusuf Maina-Bukar, a former Director-General/Chief Executive Officer of the National Agency for the Great Green Wall, which has been implementing the initiative in Nigeria since 2015.
The GEF acknowledged that coordination across diverse national contexts remains a central challenge of the Great Green Wall initiative but noted that this is addressed through regional frameworks, shared results architectures, and close collaboration with regional institutions such as the Pan-African Agency of the Great Green Wall, while maintaining flexibility to accommodate country-specific priorities.
Maina-Bukar told IPS that collaborating effectively to ensure that funding for the initiative translates into lasting impact requires shifting from a top-down, tree-planting approach to a community-driven, integrated landscape management model. This, he said, should be supported by harmonised, multi-level funding, such as that promoted by the UNCCD, which allows partners to measure, report, and verify implementation using a common framework.
He added that other measures include empowering local ownership, establishing transparent monitoring systems, fostering public-private partnerships, and using tools such as the Regreening Africa App to track and evaluate restoration efforts on the ground.
Despite the challenges, Diagbouga believes that “the Great Green Wall has the potential to become one of the most impactful climate resilience and land restoration initiatives globally.”
Great Green Wall: Achievements
Graphic: Wilson Mgobhozi/IPS
Burkina Faso
Graphic: Wilson Mgobhozi/IPS
Ethiopia
Graphic: Wilson Mgobhozi/IPS
Nigeria
Graphic: Wilson Mgobhozi/IPS
Niger
Graphic: Wilson Mgobhozi/IPS
Senegal
Graphic: Wilson Mgobhozi/IPS
Mali
Graphic: Wilson Mgobhozi/IPS
Chad
Graphic: Wilson Mgobhozi/IPS
Sudan
Credit: Wilson Mgobhozi/IPS
Mauritania
Graphic: Wilson Mgobhozi/IPS
Eritrea
Graphic: Wilson Mgobhozi/IPS
Djibouti
Graphic: Wilson Mgobhozi/IPS
Note: The Eighth Global Environment Facility Assembly will be held from May 30 to June 6, 2026, in Samarkand, Uzbekistan.
This feature is published with the support of the GEF. IPS is solely responsible for the editorial content, and it does not necessarily reflect the views of the GEF.
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