Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

The European Fund for Sustainable Development Plus (EFSD+) is a core element of EU development cooperation and reflects the EU’s strong commitment to deploying blended finance and guarantees as development financing tools. This discussion paper examines the EU’s intentions concerning how the EFSD+ will be integrated into geographic programmes, focussing on the least developed countries (LDCs) in Africa. Based on a review of the Multiannual Indicative Programmes (MIPs) for 30 African LDCs as well as the regional MIP for Sub-Saharan Africa covering the period 2021-2027, the paper provides an overview of funding reserved for EFSD+ implementation in geographic programmes, identifies the expected EFSD+ sectoral priorities and summarises references to development finance institutions (DFIs) as EFSD+ implementation partners. This descriptive review highlights issues for the future monitoring and assessment of the EFSD+. The paper points to uncertainty about the magnitude of the management challenge that EU institutions face in EFSD+ implementation given the difficulties of predicting the scale of guarantee-backed operations in individual countries, the lack of information on the expected volume of blended finance operations, and the limited analysis of how EFSD+ tools relate to other EU funding approaches. The paper also notes that EU institutions should be more explicit about the criteria shaping EFSD+ resource commitments to clarify relevant prerequisites for the effective deployment of EFSD+ tools. Finally, the broad thematic scope for EFSD+ use implies that knowledge about how blended finance and guarantees function and how the financing approaches interact with other interventions needs to increase throughout the EU system.

The European Fund for Sustainable Development Plus (EFSD+) is a core element of EU development cooperation and reflects the EU’s strong commitment to deploying blended finance and guarantees as development financing tools. This discussion paper examines the EU’s intentions concerning how the EFSD+ will be integrated into geographic programmes, focussing on the least developed countries (LDCs) in Africa. Based on a review of the Multiannual Indicative Programmes (MIPs) for 30 African LDCs as well as the regional MIP for Sub-Saharan Africa covering the period 2021-2027, the paper provides an overview of funding reserved for EFSD+ implementation in geographic programmes, identifies the expected EFSD+ sectoral priorities and summarises references to development finance institutions (DFIs) as EFSD+ implementation partners. This descriptive review highlights issues for the future monitoring and assessment of the EFSD+. The paper points to uncertainty about the magnitude of the management challenge that EU institutions face in EFSD+ implementation given the difficulties of predicting the scale of guarantee-backed operations in individual countries, the lack of information on the expected volume of blended finance operations, and the limited analysis of how EFSD+ tools relate to other EU funding approaches. The paper also notes that EU institutions should be more explicit about the criteria shaping EFSD+ resource commitments to clarify relevant prerequisites for the effective deployment of EFSD+ tools. Finally, the broad thematic scope for EFSD+ use implies that knowledge about how blended finance and guarantees function and how the financing approaches interact with other interventions needs to increase throughout the EU system.

Die Abteilung Energie, Verkehr, Umwelt untersucht energie-, verkehrs- und umweltpolitische Strategien einer nachhaltigen Entwicklung. Im Mittelpunkt stehen dabei die Transformation der Energiewirtschaft und die Frage, wie sich die Energie- und Klimapolitik auf die Ressourcen- und Umweltmärkte auswirkt.

Zur Verstärkung des Teams sucht die Abteilung zum nächstmöglichen Zeitpunkt eine*n Postdoc (m/w/d) (Teilzeit 90%) im Bereich der empirischen Energie- und Umweltforschung.

This study sets out to examine state-society relations in Iraq through the conceptual lens of the social contract and also provides a starting point for deriving potential areas of activity for external actors, such as German development cooperation (DC) and technical cooperation (TC). These players could provide support for the re-negotiation of this fraught mesh of relationships. This analysis is founded on a concept of the social contract in which the relationship between the government and those it governs is viewed primarily as a process of negotiation and can be operationalised, for instance, on the basis of the three Ps (participation, provision and protection). As such, the concept is informed both by contemporary approaches and by traditional reflections of French and Anglo-Saxon thinkers, who focus on the restriction of individual freedoms in return for the provision of legal certainty by the state.
This study is divided into three sections. The first section explores weak statehood and the breakdown of society in the heuristic context of the social contract. The role of external actors in Iraq’s post-2003 development is then examined in the next section, which takes a closer look at the political system of proportional representation and its socio-political implications. Finally, the third section synthesises the first two by considering how external actors from the development cooperation sector might contribute to the peaceful negotiation of Iraq’s dysfunctional social contract. These reflections are made against the systemic backdrop of a rentier state with a hybrid form of governance and take account of the extremely fragile government-society relationship on the one hand, and external interventions, which have largely failed to date, on the other. In this context, the shortcomings of the largely dysfunctional Iraqi social contract become apparent and at the same time provide starting points for its improvement and renegotiation.

This study sets out to examine state-society relations in Iraq through the conceptual lens of the social contract and also provides a starting point for deriving potential areas of activity for external actors, such as German development cooperation (DC) and technical cooperation (TC). These players could provide support for the re-negotiation of this fraught mesh of relationships. This analysis is founded on a concept of the social contract in which the relationship between the government and those it governs is viewed primarily as a process of negotiation and can be operationalised, for instance, on the basis of the three Ps (participation, provision and protection). As such, the concept is informed both by contemporary approaches and by traditional reflections of French and Anglo-Saxon thinkers, who focus on the restriction of individual freedoms in return for the provision of legal certainty by the state.
This study is divided into three sections. The first section explores weak statehood and the breakdown of society in the heuristic context of the social contract. The role of external actors in Iraq’s post-2003 development is then examined in the next section, which takes a closer look at the political system of proportional representation and its socio-political implications. Finally, the third section synthesises the first two by considering how external actors from the development cooperation sector might contribute to the peaceful negotiation of Iraq’s dysfunctional social contract. These reflections are made against the systemic backdrop of a rentier state with a hybrid form of governance and take account of the extremely fragile government-society relationship on the one hand, and external interventions, which have largely failed to date, on the other. In this context, the shortcomings of the largely dysfunctional Iraqi social contract become apparent and at the same time provide starting points for its improvement and renegotiation.

This study sets out to examine state-society relations in Iraq through the conceptual lens of the social contract and also provides a starting point for deriving potential areas of activity for external actors, such as German development cooperation (DC) and technical cooperation (TC). These players could provide support for the re-negotiation of this fraught mesh of relationships. This analysis is founded on a concept of the social contract in which the relationship between the government and those it governs is viewed primarily as a process of negotiation and can be operationalised, for instance, on the basis of the three Ps (participation, provision and protection). As such, the concept is informed both by contemporary approaches and by traditional reflections of French and Anglo-Saxon thinkers, who focus on the restriction of individual freedoms in return for the provision of legal certainty by the state.
This study is divided into three sections. The first section explores weak statehood and the breakdown of society in the heuristic context of the social contract. The role of external actors in Iraq’s post-2003 development is then examined in the next section, which takes a closer look at the political system of proportional representation and its socio-political implications. Finally, the third section synthesises the first two by considering how external actors from the development cooperation sector might contribute to the peaceful negotiation of Iraq’s dysfunctional social contract. These reflections are made against the systemic backdrop of a rentier state with a hybrid form of governance and take account of the extremely fragile government-society relationship on the one hand, and external interventions, which have largely failed to date, on the other. In this context, the shortcomings of the largely dysfunctional Iraqi social contract become apparent and at the same time provide starting points for its improvement and renegotiation.

This study sets out to examine state-society relations in Iraq through the conceptual lens of the social contract and also provides a starting point for deriving potential areas of activity for external actors, such as German development cooperation (DC) and technical cooperation (TC). These players could provide support for the re-negotiation of this fraught mesh of relationships. This analysis is founded on a concept of the social contract in which the relationship between the government and those it governs is viewed primarily as a process of negotiation and can be operationalised, for instance, on the basis of the three Ps (participation, provision and protection). As such, the concept is informed both by contemporary approaches and by traditional reflections of French and Anglo-Saxon thinkers, who focus on the restriction of individual freedoms in return for the provision of legal certainty by the state.
This study is divided into three sections. The first section explores weak statehood and the breakdown of society in the heuristic context of the social contract. The role of external actors in Iraq’s post-2003 development is then examined in the next section, which takes a closer look at the political system of proportional representation and its socio-political implications. Finally, the third section synthesises the first two by considering how external actors from the development cooperation sector might contribute to the peaceful negotiation of Iraq’s dysfunctional social contract. These reflections are made against the systemic backdrop of a rentier state with a hybrid form of governance and take account of the extremely fragile government-society relationship on the one hand, and external interventions, which have largely failed to date, on the other. In this context, the shortcomings of the largely dysfunctional Iraqi social contract become apparent and at the same time provide starting points for its improvement and renegotiation.

This study sets out to examine state-society relations in Iraq through the conceptual lens of the social contract and also provides a starting point for deriving potential areas of activity for external actors, such as German development cooperation (DC) and technical cooperation (TC). These players could provide support for the re-negotiation of this fraught mesh of relationships. This analysis is founded on a concept of the social contract in which the relationship between the government and those it governs is viewed primarily as a process of negotiation and can be operationalised, for instance, on the basis of the three Ps (participation, provision and protection). As such, the concept is informed both by contemporary approaches and by traditional reflections of French and Anglo-Saxon thinkers, who focus on the restriction of individual freedoms in return for the provision of legal certainty by the state.
This study is divided into three sections. The first section explores weak statehood and the breakdown of society in the heuristic context of the social contract. The role of external actors in Iraq’s post-2003 development is then examined in the next section, which takes a closer look at the political system of proportional representation and its socio-political implications. Finally, the third section synthesises the first two by considering how external actors from the development cooperation sector might contribute to the peaceful negotiation of Iraq’s dysfunctional social contract. These reflections are made against the systemic backdrop of a rentier state with a hybrid form of governance and take account of the extremely fragile government-society relationship on the one hand, and external interventions, which have largely failed to date, on the other. In this context, the shortcomings of the largely dysfunctional Iraqi social contract become apparent and at the same time provide starting points for its improvement and renegotiation.

This study sets out to examine state-society relations in Iraq through the conceptual lens of the social contract and also provides a starting point for deriving potential areas of activity for external actors, such as German development cooperation (DC) and technical cooperation (TC). These players could provide support for the re-negotiation of this fraught mesh of relationships. This analysis is founded on a concept of the social contract in which the relationship between the government and those it governs is viewed primarily as a process of negotiation and can be operationalised, for instance, on the basis of the three Ps (participation, provision and protection). As such, the concept is informed both by contemporary approaches and by traditional reflections of French and Anglo-Saxon thinkers, who focus on the restriction of individual freedoms in return for the provision of legal certainty by the state.
This study is divided into three sections. The first section explores weak statehood and the breakdown of society in the heuristic context of the social contract. The role of external actors in Iraq’s post-2003 development is then examined in the next section, which takes a closer look at the political system of proportional representation and its socio-political implications. Finally, the third section synthesises the first two by considering how external actors from the development cooperation sector might contribute to the peaceful negotiation of Iraq’s dysfunctional social contract. These reflections are made against the systemic backdrop of a rentier state with a hybrid form of governance and take account of the extremely fragile government-society relationship on the one hand, and external interventions, which have largely failed to date, on the other. In this context, the shortcomings of the largely dysfunctional Iraqi social contract become apparent and at the same time provide starting points for its improvement and renegotiation.

The COVID-19 outbreak has had severe economic consequences across the globe. The crisis emanating from the pandemic has caused demand and supply side shocks, which are more far reaching than any crisis in living memory. We use a new data set from the 2020/21 Egyptian Industrial Firm Behavior Survey (EIFBS) to examine determinants of firms’ resilience during the COVID-19 pandemic. Crisis present the opportunity for what Schumpeter (1934) called creative destruction. Have manufacturing firms been all hit by the crisis equally, or were less efficient firms more likely to exit or downsize their activities thereby ‘cleansing’ the market? Two sets of factors affect firm dynamics and survival: 1) firms’ innate characteristics, such as formality and export status, sector, ownership, age, size and location and; 2) firm behavior which captures the extent to which good managerial practices, innovation, the adoption of advanced technologies and worker training have provided an opportunity for firms to adapt their business models and show greater resilience in coping with the crisis. Our main findings illustrate the vulnerability of private, smaller, informal firms and those that are not located in industrial zones. Also, as expected, pre-COVID behavioral characteristics matter for firm dynamics. The food sector and sectors identified as ‘COVID sectors’ show more resilience. More nuanced results show that the effect of some behavioral traits vary by sector and are more influential depending on firm size.

The COVID-19 outbreak has had severe economic consequences across the globe. The crisis emanating from the pandemic has caused demand and supply side shocks, which are more far reaching than any crisis in living memory. We use a new data set from the 2020/21 Egyptian Industrial Firm Behavior Survey (EIFBS) to examine determinants of firms’ resilience during the COVID-19 pandemic. Crisis present the opportunity for what Schumpeter (1934) called creative destruction. Have manufacturing firms been all hit by the crisis equally, or were less efficient firms more likely to exit or downsize their activities thereby ‘cleansing’ the market? Two sets of factors affect firm dynamics and survival: 1) firms’ innate characteristics, such as formality and export status, sector, ownership, age, size and location and; 2) firm behavior which captures the extent to which good managerial practices, innovation, the adoption of advanced technologies and worker training have provided an opportunity for firms to adapt their business models and show greater resilience in coping with the crisis. Our main findings illustrate the vulnerability of private, smaller, informal firms and those that are not located in industrial zones. Also, as expected, pre-COVID behavioral characteristics matter for firm dynamics. The food sector and sectors identified as ‘COVID sectors’ show more resilience. More nuanced results show that the effect of some behavioral traits vary by sector and are more influential depending on firm size.

The COVID-19 outbreak has had severe economic consequences across the globe. The crisis emanating from the pandemic has caused demand and supply side shocks, which are more far reaching than any crisis in living memory. We use a new data set from the 2020/21 Egyptian Industrial Firm Behavior Survey (EIFBS) to examine determinants of firms’ resilience during the COVID-19 pandemic. Crisis present the opportunity for what Schumpeter (1934) called creative destruction. Have manufacturing firms been all hit by the crisis equally, or were less efficient firms more likely to exit or downsize their activities thereby ‘cleansing’ the market? Two sets of factors affect firm dynamics and survival: 1) firms’ innate characteristics, such as formality and export status, sector, ownership, age, size and location and; 2) firm behavior which captures the extent to which good managerial practices, innovation, the adoption of advanced technologies and worker training have provided an opportunity for firms to adapt their business models and show greater resilience in coping with the crisis. Our main findings illustrate the vulnerability of private, smaller, informal firms and those that are not located in industrial zones. Also, as expected, pre-COVID behavioral characteristics matter for firm dynamics. The food sector and sectors identified as ‘COVID sectors’ show more resilience. More nuanced results show that the effect of some behavioral traits vary by sector and are more influential depending on firm size.

The COVID-19 outbreak has had severe economic consequences across the globe. The crisis emanating from the pandemic has caused demand and supply side shocks, which are more far reaching than any crisis in living memory. We use a new data set from the 2020/21 Egyptian Industrial Firm Behavior Survey (EIFBS) to examine determinants of firms’ resilience during the COVID-19 pandemic. Crisis present the opportunity for what Schumpeter (1934) called creative destruction. Have manufacturing firms been all hit by the crisis equally, or were less efficient firms more likely to exit or downsize their activities thereby ‘cleansing’ the market? Two sets of factors affect firm dynamics and survival: 1) firms’ innate characteristics, such as formality and export status, sector, ownership, age, size and location and; 2) firm behavior which captures the extent to which good managerial practices, innovation, the adoption of advanced technologies and worker training have provided an opportunity for firms to adapt their business models and show greater resilience in coping with the crisis. Our main findings illustrate the vulnerability of private, smaller, informal firms and those that are not located in industrial zones. Also, as expected, pre-COVID behavioral characteristics matter for firm dynamics. The food sector and sectors identified as ‘COVID sectors’ show more resilience. More nuanced results show that the effect of some behavioral traits vary by sector and are more influential depending on firm size.

The COVID-19 outbreak has had severe economic consequences across the globe. The crisis emanating from the pandemic has caused demand and supply side shocks, which are more far reaching than any crisis in living memory. We use a new data set from the 2020/21 Egyptian Industrial Firm Behavior Survey (EIFBS) to examine determinants of firms’ resilience during the COVID-19 pandemic. Crisis present the opportunity for what Schumpeter (1934) called creative destruction. Have manufacturing firms been all hit by the crisis equally, or were less efficient firms more likely to exit or downsize their activities thereby ‘cleansing’ the market? Two sets of factors affect firm dynamics and survival: 1) firms’ innate characteristics, such as formality and export status, sector, ownership, age, size and location and; 2) firm behavior which captures the extent to which good managerial practices, innovation, the adoption of advanced technologies and worker training have provided an opportunity for firms to adapt their business models and show greater resilience in coping with the crisis. Our main findings illustrate the vulnerability of private, smaller, informal firms and those that are not located in industrial zones. Also, as expected, pre-COVID behavioral characteristics matter for firm dynamics. The food sector and sectors identified as ‘COVID sectors’ show more resilience. More nuanced results show that the effect of some behavioral traits vary by sector and are more influential depending on firm size.

The COVID-19 outbreak has had severe economic consequences across the globe. The crisis emanating from the pandemic has caused demand and supply side shocks, which are more far reaching than any crisis in living memory. We use a new data set from the 2020/21 Egyptian Industrial Firm Behavior Survey (EIFBS) to examine determinants of firms’ resilience during the COVID-19 pandemic. Crisis present the opportunity for what Schumpeter (1934) called creative destruction. Have manufacturing firms been all hit by the crisis equally, or were less efficient firms more likely to exit or downsize their activities thereby ‘cleansing’ the market? Two sets of factors affect firm dynamics and survival: 1) firms’ innate characteristics, such as formality and export status, sector, ownership, age, size and location and; 2) firm behavior which captures the extent to which good managerial practices, innovation, the adoption of advanced technologies and worker training have provided an opportunity for firms to adapt their business models and show greater resilience in coping with the crisis. Our main findings illustrate the vulnerability of private, smaller, informal firms and those that are not located in industrial zones. Also, as expected, pre-COVID behavioral characteristics matter for firm dynamics. The food sector and sectors identified as ‘COVID sectors’ show more resilience. More nuanced results show that the effect of some behavioral traits vary by sector and are more influential depending on firm size.

Der Rat der Europäischen Zentralbank (EZB) hat heute beschlossen, den Leitzins um 0,5 Prozentpunkte zu erhöhen. Dazu ein Statement von Marcel Fratzscher, Präsident des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin):

Die Europäische Zentralbank (EZB) hat die in sie gesetzten Erwartungen erfüllt, den Leitzins um 0,5 Prozentpunkte erhöht und eine weitere solche Zinserhöhung für März angekündigt. Sie hält an ihrem Kurs des moderaten Abbaus ihrer Anleihebestände fest. Ich erwarte, dass der EZB-Rat lediglich noch zwei weitere Zinserhöhungen in den kommenden Monaten vornehmen wird und den Leitzins zum Jahresende bereits wieder senkt. 

Die EZB musste selten Entscheidungen in so unsicheren Zeiten treffen wie heute. Der wirtschaftliche Ausblick ist extrem unsicher, und die wirtschaftlichen Risiken deuten auf eine schwächere Wirtschaftsentwicklung hin, vor allem wenn der Krieg in der Ukraine eskaliert oder sonstige Probleme bei Lieferketten oder Energiepreisen auftreten. Die Schwierigkeit für die EZB besteht in der unklaren Datenlage. Auf der einen Seite ist die Kerninflation mit knapp fünf Prozent viel zu hoch und zudem kürzlich nochmals gestiegen. Auf der anderen Seite weichen die Inflationserwartungen für die kommenden fünf Jahre nicht stark vom Ziel der Preisstabilität in Höhe von zwei Prozent Inflation ab. Auch gibt es zur Zeit keine Sorge um eine Lohn-Preis-Spirale oder eine zu expansive Finanzpolitik. Durch die Unsicherheit muss die EZB nun ihre Kommunikation vorsichtiger gestalten und nicht weiter versuchen, Markterwartungen so stark zu dominieren, wie sie es in den vergangenen Monaten getan hat. Es könnte ihrer Glaubwürdigkeit schaden, wenn sie durch unerwartete Entwicklungen deutlich von ihrem versprochenen Kurs abweichen muss. 

Die EZB befindet sich in einem Dilemma. Sie muss einerseits ihre Glaubwürdigkeit schützen und überzeugend signalisieren, dass sie alles tun wird, um möglichst schnell zu ihrem Mandat der Preisstabilität zurückzukehren. Andererseits ist ihre Geldpolitik bereits jetzt restriktiv und wirkt sich schon jetzt deutlich dämpfend auf die Wirtschaft in Deutschland und des gesamten Euroraums aus. Nicht das Niveau, sondern die Geschwindigkeit der Zinserhöhungen hat zahlreiche Investitionen auf Eis gelegt. So ist die Kreditvergabe der Banken an die Realwirtschaft in den vergangenen Monaten deutlich zurückgegangen. Die Arbeitslosigkeit im Euroraum dürfte in diesem Jahr auch deshalb leicht zunehmen. Vor allem in der Baubranche sehen wir die stark restriktiven Effekte der Geldpolitik durch höhere Finanzierungskosten. Wenn der trübe Wirtschaftsausblick 2024 und 2025 anhält, dann dürfte die EZB zum Ende des Jahres hin gezwungen sein, die Zinsen wieder zu senken.

Organizations working with refugees are increasingly using information communication technologies (ICTs) in their work. While there is a rich literature in the field of media and communications studies exploring how refugees use ICTs to meet their social and economic needs, this article focuses on whether and how refugees’ ICT use maps onto the policy concept of refugee self-reliance, focusing on the economic, educational, administrative, health, and security/protection domains of self-reliance in informal urban settings. Building on the literature on refugees’ ICT use, we use semi-structured interviews with urban refugees in Malaysia to understand how they use technology in their daily lives and whether these refugees’ digital practices support self-reliance. We also interviewed practitioners from the Malaysian United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees office and non-governmental organization (NGO) sectors to better understand such institutions’ strategies for using ICTs to deliver economic, educational, administrative, health, and protection programs in local refugee communities. Our findings are twofold: refugees’ use of ICTs represented idiosyncratic ways of achieving self-reliance, but when institutions tried to implement ICT solutions to support refugee self-reliance at a population level, refugees either did not use these ICT solutions or were critical of the institutional solutions. The findings presented here have import for not only research on refugee self-reliance and ICTs but also the wider migration field, as organizations, such as the International Organization for Migration and national immigration authorities, integrate ICTs into processes that affect migrants’ and displaced peoples’ economic, social, and political inclusion in cities of arrival.

Organizations working with refugees are increasingly using information communication technologies (ICTs) in their work. While there is a rich literature in the field of media and communications studies exploring how refugees use ICTs to meet their social and economic needs, this article focuses on whether and how refugees’ ICT use maps onto the policy concept of refugee self-reliance, focusing on the economic, educational, administrative, health, and security/protection domains of self-reliance in informal urban settings. Building on the literature on refugees’ ICT use, we use semi-structured interviews with urban refugees in Malaysia to understand how they use technology in their daily lives and whether these refugees’ digital practices support self-reliance. We also interviewed practitioners from the Malaysian United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees office and non-governmental organization (NGO) sectors to better understand such institutions’ strategies for using ICTs to deliver economic, educational, administrative, health, and protection programs in local refugee communities. Our findings are twofold: refugees’ use of ICTs represented idiosyncratic ways of achieving self-reliance, but when institutions tried to implement ICT solutions to support refugee self-reliance at a population level, refugees either did not use these ICT solutions or were critical of the institutional solutions. The findings presented here have import for not only research on refugee self-reliance and ICTs but also the wider migration field, as organizations, such as the International Organization for Migration and national immigration authorities, integrate ICTs into processes that affect migrants’ and displaced peoples’ economic, social, and political inclusion in cities of arrival.

Organizations working with refugees are increasingly using information communication technologies (ICTs) in their work. While there is a rich literature in the field of media and communications studies exploring how refugees use ICTs to meet their social and economic needs, this article focuses on whether and how refugees’ ICT use maps onto the policy concept of refugee self-reliance, focusing on the economic, educational, administrative, health, and security/protection domains of self-reliance in informal urban settings. Building on the literature on refugees’ ICT use, we use semi-structured interviews with urban refugees in Malaysia to understand how they use technology in their daily lives and whether these refugees’ digital practices support self-reliance. We also interviewed practitioners from the Malaysian United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees office and non-governmental organization (NGO) sectors to better understand such institutions’ strategies for using ICTs to deliver economic, educational, administrative, health, and protection programs in local refugee communities. Our findings are twofold: refugees’ use of ICTs represented idiosyncratic ways of achieving self-reliance, but when institutions tried to implement ICT solutions to support refugee self-reliance at a population level, refugees either did not use these ICT solutions or were critical of the institutional solutions. The findings presented here have import for not only research on refugee self-reliance and ICTs but also the wider migration field, as organizations, such as the International Organization for Migration and national immigration authorities, integrate ICTs into processes that affect migrants’ and displaced peoples’ economic, social, and political inclusion in cities of arrival.