Le parti Union Progressiste le Renouveau (UP-R) a remis, samedi 4 juillet 2026 à Cotonou, un manuel de recommandations destiné aux maires et à leurs adjoints élus sous ses couleurs pour la mandature 2026-2032.
Les dix (10) orientations que l'Union Progressiste le Renouveau (UP-R) souhaite voir appliquées dans la gestion des communes afin de promouvoir une gouvernance fondée sur la rigueur, la proximité avec les populations et la bonne gouvernance ont été consignées dans un document.
Le manuel a été remis, samedi 4 juillet 2026, à Cotonou, aux maires et adjoints au maire UP-R.
Selon le secrétaire général de l'UP-R, Gérard Gbénonchi, cette cérémonie fait suite à la rentrée politique organisée le 1er mars 2026 à Abomey-Calavi. Il a été décidé, à cette occasion, de constituer un comité chargé de formuler dix recommandations à l'endroit des élus communaux.
Après validation par la Haute Direction politique, ces recommandations ont été regroupées dans un manuel appelé à servir de référence dans l'exercice des responsabilités locales.
Au nom des participants, la maire de Kétou, Angélique Titilola Adégnika, a lu une déclaration d'engagement par laquelle les maires et adjoints au maire promettent de faire de ce document un repère dans la conduite de leurs actions. Ils y réaffirment leur volonté d'exercer leurs fonctions dans le respect des principes de bonne gouvernance et de service aux citoyens.
En procédant à la remise officielle du manuel, le président de l'UP-R, Joseph Fifamin Djogbénou, a présenté ce qu'il a qualifié de « 10 commandements du Maire UP le Renouveau ».
Il a exhorté les élus à promouvoir une gouvernance rigoureuse, inclusive et davantage tournée vers les préoccupations des populations.
Le président du parti les a également invités à s'approprier la stratégie de régionalisation du développement portée par le chef de l'État, estimant qu'elle constitue un levier pour accélérer le développement des territoires. « Nous pouvons assurer, garantir à nos populations que la barque de la gouvernance ne va pas tanguer », a-t-il déclaré devant les élus.
Pour accompagner la mise en œuvre de ces orientations, un comité de suivi et d'évaluation a été institué. Placé sous la présidence de l'expert Franck Kinninvo, cet organe aura pour mission d'apprécier l'application effective des recommandations formulées dans le manuel auprès des communes dirigées par les élus du parti UP-R.
M. M.
Le trafic est rétabli sur le tronçon Iita-Godomey après quelques jours de blocage du fait du débordement du « Djonou », sorti de son lit suite aux pluies diluviennes qui se sont abattues sur le Littoral et l'Atlantique ces derniers jours.
Joie et satisfaction pour les usagers de la Route inter-Etats Cotonou-Niamey. Le blocus observé sur le tronçon Iita-carrefour-pont de Houédonou du fait du débordement du « Djonou » est désormais levé. Le équipes techniques déployées sur les lieux sont parvenues à évacuer l'eau offrant la possibilité aux motocyclistes et automobilistes de circuler librement.
Ces derniers jours, les pluies diluviennes qui se sont abattues sur les départemets du Littoral et de l'Atlantique ont provoqué une forte inondation du ce tronçon obligeant les usagers à un ralentissement inhabituel et à une déviation par Womey.
F. A. A.
Le maire de Parakou, Zul-Kifly Sani Zakarie, a donné, le 2 juillet 2026, le coup d'envoi de la deuxième phase du Programme d'Assainissement Pluvial des Villes Secondaires (PAPVS), un projet estimé à plus de 14 milliards de FCFA destiné à améliorer durablement la gestion des eaux pluviales et les infrastructures urbaines à Parakou.
9,2 kilomètres de collecteurs d'eaux pluviales, de 5,7 kilomètres de voiries de desserte et de désenclavement, ainsi que des aménagements complémentaires comprenant des espaces verts, un réseau d'éclairage public et des équipements de sécurité seront réalisés à Parakou.
C'est dans le cadre de la phase 2 du Programme d'Assainissement Pluvial des Villes Secondaires (PAPVS)
Le projet, financé par la Banque Ouest-Africaine de Développement (BOAD), a été lancé le jeudi 2 juillet 2026.
Les travaux, confiés à l'entreprise IRRIGA-MED pour une durée prévisionnelle de deux ans, concerneront notamment les quartiers Kpérou-Guèra, Amanwignon, Gbira, Zongo, Nima et Albarika.
L'objectif est de réduire les risques d'inondation tout en améliorant les conditions de circulation et le cadre de vie des habitants de ces secteurs de la ville.
Dans les quartiers concernés, le lancement des travaux a été accueilli avec satisfaction.
Le conseiller municipal Jasmin Adouvo ainsi que plusieurs responsables communautaires et habitants d'Alaga, de Kpérou-Guèra et d'Albarika y voient l'aboutissement d'engagements longtemps attendus, notamment en ce qui concerne les ouvrages d'assainissement et l'aménagement de la voie reliant Albarika à Kpérou-Guèra.
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Credit: Connie France/AFP
By Inés M. Pousadela
MONTEVIDEO, Uruguay, Jul 3 2026 (IPS)
Right-wing candidate Keiko Fujimori has won Peru’s presidential runoff, narrowly defeating leftist Roberto Sánchez to become the country’s ninth president in a decade. She inherits a system so engineered for dysfunction that rather than making compromises, she may decide the concentration of power is her only means of survival. The constitution that created this trap was written by her father.
A system built to fail
Keiko, daughter of authoritarian former president Alberto Fujimori, has finally succeeded in her fourth consecutive runoff, having lost in 2011, 2016 and 2021. She won with a margin of roughly a quarter of a percentage point over a candidate who is a close ally of jailed former president Pedro Castillo. Both sides alleged fraud, filed claims and sent their supporters onto the streets.
Peru is often described as a democracy without parties. The party system disintegrated in the 1990s and was never rebuilt. In its place came a sequence of improvised candidacies and personal electoral vehicles that rise and fall with their founders. For the first-round vote on 12 April, the largest ballot paper in Peru’s history listed 35 candidates. Fujimori came first with just 17.19 per cent. Ultimately, most Peruvians didn’t vote for either candidate who made the runoff. A president elected on that basis has a mandate so weak that rivals can dispute it from day one, and they do.
Congressional seats scatter across dozens of parties, none of which dominates. But parties can combine to reach the two-thirds threshold needed to invoke a constitutional clause to impeach and remove a president on the grounds of ‘permanent moral incapacity’, a mechanism Peru’s constitution leaves deliberately vague. The Congress elected in 2021 removed three presidents in one term.
Authoritarian incentives
The constitutional mechanism that enables political instability is the reason Fujimori’s presidency could be dangerous. As she enters office with a razor-thin margin and no congressional majority, she faces an immediate strategic choice. She can seek compromise with her opponents, but this might signal that the threat of impeachment works, inviting it. Or she can move to concentrate power and weaken the institutions that constrain the executive, denying her opponents the tools they could use to remove her.
Everything points towards the second option. Most presidents recently removed by Congress were, at the time of their removal, attempting to govern within the rules, and the rules were weaponised against them. Pedro Castillo tried a different approach, dissolving Congress pre-emptively to forestall his impeachment. He was immediately arrested and removed. A politician who has watched this dynamic consume eight predecessors might conclude that the only way to survive is to change the game.
Keiko’s father ruled Peru from 1990 to 2000 as an elected president who progressively dismantled the institutions that constrained him. Two years into his first term, citing the simultaneous crises of hyperinflation and insurgency, he dissolved Congress and suspended the constitution. The emergency was real, but it was also an opportunity. Fujimori rewrote the constitution to entrench executive power, won re-election in 1995 and then won a fraud-tainted third term before being forced from office within months. His government became synonymous with grand corruption and human rights atrocities, including the forced sterilisation of over 272,000 mostly Indigenous women. After he was forced out in 2000, he was convicted of homicide and kidnapping, and imprisoned.
The constitution Alberto Fujimori wrote to entrench his power is still in force. The moral incapacity clause that the 1993 constitution retained – useful to Fujimori when he controlled Congress – has become the primary weapon congressional majorities have used to remove president after president. The most significant recent constitutional change, the reinstatement of a two-chamber Congress, may end up increasing congressional power. This is the system Keiko now has to deal with.
The costs of dysfunction
Peru’s dysfunction has long been sustained by a comforting fiction: that while politics is chaotic, the economy runs itself. Macro fundamentals have remained relatively stable. Inflation in 2025 ran at around 1.5 per cent, and the economy grew 3.4 per cent in 2024. But economic growth has roughly halved over a decade of turmoil. Poverty, at 27.6 per cent in 2024, remains above pre-pandemic levels. Homicides stand at 10.7 per 100,000 people, alongside an epidemic of extortion.
Freedoms are deteriorating and those who protest pay the highest price. In 2025, attempts to change the pension system triggered Gen Z-led protests that quickly expressed broader anger at corruption, insecurity and political dysfunction. Security forces responded with violence. In December 2024, the CIVICUS Monitor, which tracks civic space conditions globally, downgraded Peru to repressed status, its second-worst rating, citing years of escalating state violence and the systematic harassment of human rights defenders and journalists, who political figures routinely smear as terrorists and traitors.
In March 2025, Congress passed a law giving the Peruvian Agency for International Cooperation extensive powers to control, censor and persecute civil society organisations that receive foreign funding, threatening fines of up to US$720,000 and criminalising any use of foreign funds to support legal action against the Peruvian state. It is, in effect, a law against accountability.
Danger ahead
Keiko Fujimori ran a law-and-order campaign under the slogan ‘Fujimori returns, order returns’, casting the fight against organised crime as a sequel to her father’s 1990s war against insurgency and promising mass deployments of police and military forces. Her party championed a 2025 amnesty law shielding security forces and civilian armed groups from prosecution for disappearances, killings and torture during that conflict, in direct defiance of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Keiko has been evasive about her father’s atrocities and has recast human rights as a matter of access to basic services rather than accountability for past abuses. Her record offers no grounds for optimism about civic space or democratic norms.
Keiko’s father justified breaking the rules that constrained him by pointing to insurgency and economic collapse. Keiko faces no insurgency and no hyperinflation, so if she moves to concentrate power, she will have to find her own justification, perhaps in a crime wave, a security emergency or a conspiracy of her enemies. The Fujimorist playbook could come back with a vengeance.
Inés M. Pousadela is CIVICUS Head of Research and Analysis, co-director and writer for CIVICUS Lens and co-author of the State of Civil Society Report. She is also a Professor of Comparative Politics at Universidad ORT Uruguay.
For interviews or more information, please contact research@civicus.org
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Whether it is the middle or working classes, or even the well-to-do, life can start to shrink in the face of extreme weather. Credit: Shutterstock
By Philippe Benoit
PARIS, Jul 3 2026 (IPS)
If you pay close attention to the rhetoric regarding climate change (at least in those forums still allowed to use the term), there has been a disturbing emerging trend among some climate-concerned thought leaders, as epitomized by Bill Gates’s letter to COP30 last fall.
In it, Mr. Gates argues that climate change is principally a problem facing poorer countries: “Although climate change will have serious consequences – particularly for the people in the poorest countries – it will not lead to humanity’s demise. People will be able to live and thrive in most places on Earth for the foreseeable future.”
In many ways, Mr. Gates is correct: the people living in the poorest countries are particularly vulnerable to climate change, and the Earth will continue to be able to support humanity for decades and more. But what the recent record heat wave across Europe has served to remind those of us in more affluent countries is that there are different ways of living — and that living under a heat dome of near-40-degrees Celsius (over 100 degrees Fahrenheit) can stop us from thriving.
This recent European heat wave points to how climate change is also a menace to wealthier countries … today and more so tomorrow when rising CO2 emissions drive even more frequent and severe weather events
Whether it is the middle or working classes, or even the well-to-do, life can start to shrink in the face of extreme weather. It was ironic (perhaps the better word is sad) to see a number of events during London’s Climate Action Week cancelled because of soaring temperatures.
Staying home often becomes the best option, but it only really works as a refuge if you can afford air conditioning.
Those without need to hope to find the rare air-conditioned mall or other commercial space to escape to.
Probably the only ones who remain impervious to surging temperatures are the very rich who can jump on a plane at a moment’s notice to flee to another part of the globe that isn’t facing a heat wave. And all the while, the high temperatures and resulting surge in air-conditioning demand are putting a severe strain on Europe’s electricity grids, raising the possibility of even more disruptive blackouts.
Some analysts have argued that this record heat wave is being driven by the accumulation of high levels of CO2 in the atmosphere generated by the burning of fossil fuels. The analysis linking this particular heat wave to fossil fuel use is complex and beyond my competence (I am an energy expert, not an atmospheric specialist).
However, what is clear from scientists is that we can expect more of these types of extreme weather events as we continue to pour massive amounts of additional CO2 into our atmosphere from the combustion of fossil fuels (currently, over 35 gigatons each year).
Distressingly, climate change will mess with our lives in many ways beyond extreme heat. From wildfires that burn businesses and homes (including of the wealthy as last year’s fires in Hollywood showed), to higher winds that knock down electricity poles and trees, to reoccurring flooding that ravage towns (as Germany has experienced), to an uptick in heat-related deaths and other climate-related health risks, all the while simultaneously slowing economic activity as nature wreaks havoc on the normal ordering of our lives, jobs and economies. It may not add up to a climate apocalypse, but it is far from a minor inconvenience simply to be ignored.
And importantly, as the old Bachman-Turner Overdrive song says, when it comes to the destructive power of climate change, “You Ain’t Seen Nothing Yet.” Indeed, we can expect worse in the future if we don’t curtail greenhouse gas emissions.
Yes, climate change will have a particularly severe impact on the world’s poorest countries. In that regard, Mr. Gates is totally correct. But this recent European heat wave points to how climate change is also a menace to wealthier countries … today and more so tomorrow when rising CO2 emissions drive even more frequent and severe weather events.
So, when politicians and pundits try to limit the impact of climate change to the world’s poorest, or worse, try to wipe it out of our political and policy discourse, let us remember these past weeks and that, aside from the uber rich, climate change is a threat to all.
Philippe Benoit is managing director for Global Infrastructure Advisory Services 2050, specializing in international energy and climate issues.
Rather than adapting to persistent low fertility, population ageing, and slower labor-force growth, many governments continue to pursue policies aimed at reversing these trends and restoring demographic conditions more characteristic of the mid-20th century. Credit: Shutterstock
By Joseph Chamie
PORTLAND, USA, Jul 3 2026 (IPS)
Demographic realities are well documented, and governments have long been aware of the profound demographic changes now underway. Nevertheless, many policymakers continue to discount or ignore these demographic trends.
This reluctance often reflects the tension between short-term political priorities and long-term demographic realities. As a result, governments are frequently unwilling to acknowledge the full scale of the major demographic transformations reshaping their societies.
In some cases, demographic denialism serves to protect entrenched political or economic interests. More often, however, it reflects an unwillingness to confront politically difficult policy choices, such as raising taxes, expanding immigration, increasing retirement ages, or committing additional resources to pensions, healthcare, and other social welfare programs.
Many countries are already experiencing population decline, with deaths exceeding births. In 63 countries, home to about 28% of the world’s population, population size has already peaked. Over the next thirty years, the populations of an additional 48 countries and areas are also expected to reach their peak before entering a period of decline
Because demographic change typically unfolds gradually, politicians often prioritize policies that deliver immediate political or economic benefits over reforms designed to address long-term challenges such as population decline and demographic ageing. Electoral incentives and short-term political considerations often outweigh the need to adapt to evolving demographic realities.
Governments may also downplay demographic trends because doing so enables them to pursue short-term political priorities and ideological objectives while postponing the more difficult fiscal and policy adjustments required by demographic change.
Moreover, some policymakers continue to pursue measures intended to restore the demographic patterns of the recent past, despite the limited likelihood that such efforts will succeed.
The demographic conditions of the 20th century were historically exceptional. Population growth, fertility rates, age structures, declining mortality, and gains in life expectancy all reached unprecedented levels, particularly during the second half of the century. These conditions were the product of a unique combination of historical, economic, technological, and public health factors and are unlikely to be repeated. Rather than attempting to recreate the demographic environment of the past, governments should focus on adapting institutions, policies, and public finances to contemporary demographic realities.
The world’s population nearly quadrupled during the 20th century, rising from 1.6 billion in 1900, to 2.5 billion in 1950, and then to 6.2 billion by 2000.
Today, the global population is approximately 8.3 billion, more than five times its size in 1900. Although the world’s population is expected to continue growing, the rate of growth has slowed dramatically. According to current projections, the global population is expected to peak at approximately 10.3 in the mid-2080s before declining slightly to around 10.2 billion by the end of the century (Table 1).
Source: United Nations.
The world’s population growth rate, which was 1.7% in 1950, rose to a peak of about 2.3% in the early 1960s. By the end of the 20th century, it had declined to about 1.4%. In 2026, the global growth rate is estimated at approximately 0.8% and is projected to continue decreasing, reaching about -0.1% by the end of the century.
Moreover, many countries are already experiencing population decline, with deaths exceeding births. In 63 countries, home to about 28% of the world’s population, population size has already peaked. Over the next thirty years, the populations of an additional 48 countries and areas are also expected to reach their peak before entering a period of decline.
Fertility levels have also fallen dramatically from the relatively high levels of the mid-20th century. The global fertility rate, which averaged more than five births per woman in the late 1950s, had declined to about half that level by the beginning of the 21st century. By 2026, the world’s fertility rate is estimated at approximately 2.2 births per woman. Furthermore, more than half of all countries now have fertility rates below the replacement level of approximately 2.1 births per woman.
Population ageing is another defining demographic trend. In 1950, only about 5% of the world’s population was aged 65 or older. By 2026, that proportion had more than doubled to nearly 11%. The proportion of the population aged 85 and older has increased even more rapidly, rising from just 0.2% in 1950 to about 1% in 2026.
As populations age, people are also living longer than ever before. Global life expectancy at birth has increased substantially, from about 46 years in 1950 to approximately 74 years in 2026.
Life expectancy at age 65 has also risen substantially. Globally, it increased from about 11 additional years in 1950 to approximately 18 additional years by the mid-2020s. In many countries, however, the gains have been greater, with life expectancy at age 65 exceeding 20 years. In Japan and France, for example, a 65-year-old can expect to live approximately 23 additional years (Figure 1).
Source: United Nations.
Rather than adapting to persistent low fertility, population ageing, and slower labor-force growth, many governments continue to pursue policies aimed at reversing these trends and restoring demographic conditions more characteristic of the mid-20th century.
In many low-fertility countries, governments have devoted substantial public resources to pro-natalist measures such as cash transfers, tax incentives, subsidized childcare, and housing assistance. While these policies may ease short-term financial constraints for families, they have generally produced only modest and often temporary increases in fertility rates.
At the same time, despite rising old-age dependency ratios and persistent labor shortages, immigration policy remains politically contentious, and, in some countries, highly restrictive. This has occurred alongside growing fiscal strain on pay-as-you-go pension systems and increasing demand for healthcare and long-term care services.
Although life expectancy continues to increase, especially at older ages, reforms such as gradually raising retirement ages, broadening the tax base, restructuring pension systems, and adapting healthcare financing have often advanced slowly because of political resistance. As a result, fiscal adjustments frequently lag behind demographic change, contributing to mounting budgetary pressures and, in some cases, greater intergenerational tension.
In some countries, political leaders have responded to inconvenient demographic trends by weakening the independence of statistical agencies, reducing funding for demographic research and data collection, firing statisticians, sidelining professional expertise, or publicly questioning well-established demographic evidence. Such actions can make it more difficult for policymakers and the public to assess demographic change accurately, evaluate policy options, and develop effective long-term responses.
Similarly, rather than modernizing public safety nets, diversifying revenue sources, or implementing gradual reforms to retirement and pension systems, many governments postpone difficult policy decisions to minimize electoral backlash. Prolonged delays, however, can undermine the long-term financial sustainability of public programs and increase the likelihood that pension and social insurance trust funds will become insolvent or require abrupt corrective measures.
Another form of political avoidance is the maintenance of restrictive immigration policies despite persistent labor shortages. In many countries, immigration has historically helped offset population decline driven primarily by sustained below-replacement fertility. Without sufficient immigration, population decline and demographic ageing are likely to accelerate in these societies.
The major demographic shifts of the 21st century – including population decline, demographic ageing, sustained below replacement fertility, increasing longevity, migration, refugee movements, and asylum pressures – are well documented and widely recognized. Nevertheless, many governments continue to prioritize efforts to reverse these trends while devoting comparatively less attention to adapting institutions and public policies to long-term demographic realities.
Rather than focusing primarily on restoring the demographic conditions of the recent past, policymakers may benefit from placing greater emphasis on adapting economic, fiscal, and social institutions to the demographic realities of the present and the decades ahead. Such an approach recognizes demographic change not as a temporary departure from historical norms, but as a defining structural feature of the 21st century that requires sustained institutional adaptation rather than attempts at demographic restoration.
Joseph Chamie is a consulting demographer, a former director of the United Nations Population Division, and author of numerous publications on population issues.