Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

The term “social contract” is increasingly used in social science literature but is rarely well operationalised. We define social contracts as sets of agreements between societal groups and their sovereign on rights and obligations toward each other. The notion of social contracts helps to compare state-society relations in different countries and at different times. After independence, MENA countries had similar social contracts, which were then challenged by the Arab uprisings in 2010-11. Since then, social contracts in MENA countries have developed in different directions.

The term “social contract” is increasingly used in social science literature but is rarely well operationalised. We define social contracts as sets of agreements between societal groups and their sovereign on rights and obligations toward each other. The notion of social contracts helps to compare state-society relations in different countries and at different times. After independence, MENA countries had similar social contracts, which were then challenged by the Arab uprisings in 2010-11. Since then, social contracts in MENA countries have developed in different directions.

Global funding flows are critical to the success of community-centered peace and development. Local leaders often perceive complex international funding mechanisms as barriers to their work, and as ignoring or undervaluing their leadership. As a result, a great deal of potential for communities to create peace and development initiatives remains untapped.

IPI and Catalyst for Peace (CFP) co-hosted a May 21st virtual discussion on the ways global funding systems can support community-led action. The online panel and discussion, “Funding and Design for Local Ownership: What Helps? What Hurts?” was an open, inclusive, and transparent discussion among different stakeholders in the global funding system. Participants engaged in an imaginative conversation about how national and international funding mechanisms can better support the emergence of strong, inclusive communities that are able to resolve conflicts and come together around clear priorities.

Participants also addressed how funders can support community leadership in response to the global pandemic. Speakers shared specific examples from their work that demonstrated inclusive funding design. They also spoke on specific challenges that inhibited local leadership and community engagement.

Some of the key lessons mentioned:

The value of local ownership and innate community resources

• It is critical to ensure communities are the drivers of change. International partners must help create systems that support community ownership and leadership in sustainable development.
• Funding the community is sometimes treated as “overhead,” something to minimize, when really it is the investment that needs to be made.
• A school in a community built by outside contractors collapsed: the lesson the contractors learned was to involve the community in any new projects.
• In one country, an impeccable financial audit of funding revealed very few traces of misuse of funds from a locally-owned sustainable development project. When mechanisms are created for community ownership and dialogue with local officials, they feel ownership and accountability. The community members were watching and monitoring how the money was spent.
• In another country, villages were capable of doing themselves at a fraction of the cost what big contractors could do.
• What is needed: a process of consultation—go and ask communities what to do, what they need, then they will be able to say this project is theirs. Outside funders or organizations should not do anything without involvement and leadership from the community.

Making funding systems effective

• Funding is usually based on needs assessment, calculating what is not there, so the funder can bring it in. It is imperative, though, to understand the strengths, resources, and assets that the community can bring to the task.
• Despite the pressures of COVID-19, there is an abundance of funding. Funders everywhere are looking for good projects to invest in. What is missing is the design work that connects that funding to the right local processes and systems. Investment needs to be made into building financial and accounting piping that connects funding activities to work that needs to be done.
• The top-down funding approach is less aware of the community needs. The solutions need to be locally owned. When the whole system is visible as nested, connected layers, there is no top down or bottom up funding flows. Peace is built from the inside out.
• Aid from the international community is often given to solve problems, and more is given when those problems are not solved. Financial aid alone will not be effective if it is poured endlessly into a broken system. Work to repair and strengthen local systems that are under stress can help.

Funding challenges and what comes next

• What does not work is fragmentation and questioning whether the community should be at the center.
• There is a tension between effective practice the constraints of For many practitioners, supporting local organizations is the most sustainable and responsible practice. For big bureaucracy, their responsibility is pushing money by the end of the fiscal year, so lots of shortcuts and mistakes happen.
• The peacebuilding community can get caught up in its own language and it sounds incomprehensible to others that are looking at the same things and using different language to solve those same problems.
• The UN’s attitude can be top-down. Every year they hold a women and youth open call, with standards so high that local peacebuilders can never reach the requirements, and until these procedures are reviewed, the piping of the funds will never work. Member states and those who contribute to the peacebuilding fund must lead this. If they say they want to shift powers to change agency, to listen to locals, it will happen.

IPI and CFP aim to build on these conversations, especially best practices for funders and how different parts of the system (organizations, government, and funders) can work together to center local, community leadership.

The UN Security Council is expected to renew the mandate of MINUSMA in June 2020. The upcoming mandate renewal negotiations offer Council members the opportunity to take stock of progress in the UN’s stabilization efforts in Mali and refine its strategic engagements with the country. Ahead of the negotiations, IPI, the Stimson Center, and Security Council Report organized a virtual workshop on May 20th, 2020, to discuss MINUSMA’s mandate and political strategy.

This workshop provided a forum for member states, UN stakeholders, and outside experts to share their assessments of the situation in Mali. The discussion was intended to help the Security Council make more informed decisions with respect to the strategic orientation, prioritization, and sequencing of the mission’s mandate and actions on the ground. This event was convened with support from the Government of Canada.

The workshop’s discussions focused on recent developments in Mali and on the mission’s current mandate. Participants highlighted recent opportunities and challenges for consolidating political reforms and implementing key provisions of the peace agreement.

Some key points made by participants included:

• MINUSMA’s current strategic priorities (supporting the implementation of the peace agreement and support to stabilization of Mali’s center region) are relevant and position the mission well to engage on its comparative advantages in support of Mali;
• Mali is defined by a complex and ever-changing political and security landscape, and MINSUMA is an important actor but not the only one required to address the structural drivers of violence;
• This is a clear political moment for Malian actors to consolidate gains in the peace process and continue through with envisioned political reforms;
• While focus is on short term needs, it is important that the entire UN (including the mission) begin to mobilize support for Mali’s peacebuilding, governance and development needs in order to help the country move towards a more sustainable peace.

The discussions underscored the centrality of MINUSMA’s support to the protection of civilians and the pursuit of a stronger, Malian-led approach to human rights, accountability, and effective state institutions. Discussants reflected on MINUSMA’s stabilization role in the context of a landscape filled with many national and international actors, and that it may take additional time for the UN to see gains from the shifts embedded within the mission’s 2019 mandate.

The mission is continuing to implement its mandated priorities despite the exceptional circumstances stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic. The UN (through MINUSMA) has signed three memorandums of understanding with the Malian Ministry of Health and Social Affairs to support national responses to the crisis. Nonetheless, the medium-term implications of the pandemic and mitigation responses remain uncertain for the country and the mission. How the situation evolves will likely impact MINUSMA’s trajectory and operations in the coming months.

Interview with Senior Researcher Helene Maria Kyed, editor of the book

The military use of “positive psychology” rejects a liberal memory culture that sees war as inherently traumatic

Die Corona-Krise hält die Welt im Bann. Während die unmittelbaren Risiken der Pandemie breit diskutiert werden, gilt dies eher selten für die zu erwartenden immensen Auswirkungen auf die Ernährungssicherheit der absolut Armen. Sie ent-stehen hauptsächlich durch Lockdown-Maßnahmen (LD-M) zur Bekämpfung der Ansteckung und beeinträchtigen schon jetzt über viele Wirkungsketten alle vier Säulen der Ernährungssicherheit: Der Zugang zu Nahrungsmitteln wird sich bei abnehmenden Einkommen und schwindender Kaufkraft massiv verschlechtern, die Verfügbarkeit durch Input-, Ernte-, Handels- und Transportausfälle wahrscheinlich ebenfalls. Die neue Instabilität kann sich leicht auf andere Bereiche wie Migration, Sicherheit und Staatlichkeit ausdehnen. Insbesondere Frauen und oft auch Kinder sind gefährdet.
Dabei sind verschiedene Haushaltstypen ganz unterschiedlich betroffen. Folgenschwer wird diese Krise zunächst für die nicht landwirtschaftlich orientierten Haushalte, meist städtische Arme. Sofern sie Bezüge zur Landwirtschaft haben, können sie von Nahrungsmitteltransfers profitieren oder zurück-/ teilmigrieren. Subsistenzorientierte kleinbäuerliche Haushalte, die den Großteil der Ärmsten stellen, werden von den Ernährungskonsequenzen dieser Krise (anders als bei naturbedingten Krisen) zumindest kurzfristig weniger betroffen sein. Größere landwirtschaftliche Betriebe, die verlässlich Nahrungsmittel für den Markt produzieren können, dürften sich als eine Stabilitätssäule in und nach der Krise erweisen, sofern für sie relevante Märkte nicht massiv einbrechen.
Insgesamt werden die Auswirkungen der Corona-Krise auf Ernährung, neben der Ausgestaltung der LD-M, insbesondere davon abhängen, wieweit die Wirtschaft sowie die Entflechtung der Landwirtschaft vom Rest der Wirtschaft entwickelt ist und wieweit Staat und wohlhabendere Schichten die Möglichkeit haben und behalten, Transfers zu leisten. In ärmeren Ländern gilt, dass bei der Abwägung von Corona-Bekämpfung und Wirtschaft letztere einen höheren Stellenwert haben muss als in reicheren Ländern: Die LD-M bedrohen in armen Ländern Leben und Gesundheit. Ausdrücklich wird hier betont, dass es bei „Wirtschaft“ um die komplexen Wirkungsketten Richtung Ernährungssicherheit geht, nicht nur um Wachstum und Jobs.
Für die Länder des armen Südens sollten Corona-Strategien daher anders aussehen als im globalen Norden und in Schwellenländern. Für die Entwicklungszusammenarbeit heißt dies zunächst, die Entwicklung spezifischer lokaler Strategien zu unterstützen. Beiträge müssen kurzfristig und flexibel v.a. Aufklärung, Gesundheit und Hygiene adressieren und ggf. Geld- und Nahrungsmitteltransfers sowie Beschäftigungsprogramme umfassen. Dabei sollten Wirtschaftsstrukturen und -akteure geschützt und gestützt werden. Die Resilienz gegenüber der Corona-Epidemie und anderen Epidemien kann mittelfristig insbesondere durch die Förderung nachhaltiger Landwirtschafts- und Ernährungssysteme gestärkt werden.
Dabei darf die Resilienz gegenüber anderen Krisentypen nicht vernachlässigt werden, bei denen teilweise andere Wirkungsketten aktiv und damit Maßnahmen nötig sind. So schädigen klimabedingte Krisen oft die lokale Landwirtschaft; der Zugang zum Weltagrarmarkt ist dann ein wichtiger Schutz. Die Forschung lehrt, dass umfassende Resilienz am besten über eine Mischung aus wirtschaftlicher Diversität, Rücklagenbildung, offenen Agrarmärkten, Versicherungen und sozia-len Sicherungssystemen erzielt werden kann.

Die Corona-Krise hält die Welt im Bann. Während die unmittelbaren Risiken der Pandemie breit diskutiert werden, gilt dies eher selten für die zu erwartenden immensen Auswirkungen auf die Ernährungssicherheit der absolut Armen. Sie ent-stehen hauptsächlich durch Lockdown-Maßnahmen (LD-M) zur Bekämpfung der Ansteckung und beeinträchtigen schon jetzt über viele Wirkungsketten alle vier Säulen der Ernährungssicherheit: Der Zugang zu Nahrungsmitteln wird sich bei abnehmenden Einkommen und schwindender Kaufkraft massiv verschlechtern, die Verfügbarkeit durch Input-, Ernte-, Handels- und Transportausfälle wahrscheinlich ebenfalls. Die neue Instabilität kann sich leicht auf andere Bereiche wie Migration, Sicherheit und Staatlichkeit ausdehnen. Insbesondere Frauen und oft auch Kinder sind gefährdet.
Dabei sind verschiedene Haushaltstypen ganz unterschiedlich betroffen. Folgenschwer wird diese Krise zunächst für die nicht landwirtschaftlich orientierten Haushalte, meist städtische Arme. Sofern sie Bezüge zur Landwirtschaft haben, können sie von Nahrungsmitteltransfers profitieren oder zurück-/ teilmigrieren. Subsistenzorientierte kleinbäuerliche Haushalte, die den Großteil der Ärmsten stellen, werden von den Ernährungskonsequenzen dieser Krise (anders als bei naturbedingten Krisen) zumindest kurzfristig weniger betroffen sein. Größere landwirtschaftliche Betriebe, die verlässlich Nahrungsmittel für den Markt produzieren können, dürften sich als eine Stabilitätssäule in und nach der Krise erweisen, sofern für sie relevante Märkte nicht massiv einbrechen.
Insgesamt werden die Auswirkungen der Corona-Krise auf Ernährung, neben der Ausgestaltung der LD-M, insbesondere davon abhängen, wieweit die Wirtschaft sowie die Entflechtung der Landwirtschaft vom Rest der Wirtschaft entwickelt ist und wieweit Staat und wohlhabendere Schichten die Möglichkeit haben und behalten, Transfers zu leisten. In ärmeren Ländern gilt, dass bei der Abwägung von Corona-Bekämpfung und Wirtschaft letztere einen höheren Stellenwert haben muss als in reicheren Ländern: Die LD-M bedrohen in armen Ländern Leben und Gesundheit. Ausdrücklich wird hier betont, dass es bei „Wirtschaft“ um die komplexen Wirkungsketten Richtung Ernährungssicherheit geht, nicht nur um Wachstum und Jobs.
Für die Länder des armen Südens sollten Corona-Strategien daher anders aussehen als im globalen Norden und in Schwellenländern. Für die Entwicklungszusammenarbeit heißt dies zunächst, die Entwicklung spezifischer lokaler Strategien zu unterstützen. Beiträge müssen kurzfristig und flexibel v.a. Aufklärung, Gesundheit und Hygiene adressieren und ggf. Geld- und Nahrungsmitteltransfers sowie Beschäftigungsprogramme umfassen. Dabei sollten Wirtschaftsstrukturen und -akteure geschützt und gestützt werden. Die Resilienz gegenüber der Corona-Epidemie und anderen Epidemien kann mittelfristig insbesondere durch die Förderung nachhaltiger Landwirtschafts- und Ernährungssysteme gestärkt werden.
Dabei darf die Resilienz gegenüber anderen Krisentypen nicht vernachlässigt werden, bei denen teilweise andere Wirkungsketten aktiv und damit Maßnahmen nötig sind. So schädigen klimabedingte Krisen oft die lokale Landwirtschaft; der Zugang zum Weltagrarmarkt ist dann ein wichtiger Schutz. Die Forschung lehrt, dass umfassende Resilienz am besten über eine Mischung aus wirtschaftlicher Diversität, Rücklagenbildung, offenen Agrarmärkten, Versicherungen und sozia-len Sicherungssystemen erzielt werden kann.

Die Corona-Krise hält die Welt im Bann. Während die unmittelbaren Risiken der Pandemie breit diskutiert werden, gilt dies eher selten für die zu erwartenden immensen Auswirkungen auf die Ernährungssicherheit der absolut Armen. Sie ent-stehen hauptsächlich durch Lockdown-Maßnahmen (LD-M) zur Bekämpfung der Ansteckung und beeinträchtigen schon jetzt über viele Wirkungsketten alle vier Säulen der Ernährungssicherheit: Der Zugang zu Nahrungsmitteln wird sich bei abnehmenden Einkommen und schwindender Kaufkraft massiv verschlechtern, die Verfügbarkeit durch Input-, Ernte-, Handels- und Transportausfälle wahrscheinlich ebenfalls. Die neue Instabilität kann sich leicht auf andere Bereiche wie Migration, Sicherheit und Staatlichkeit ausdehnen. Insbesondere Frauen und oft auch Kinder sind gefährdet.
Dabei sind verschiedene Haushaltstypen ganz unterschiedlich betroffen. Folgenschwer wird diese Krise zunächst für die nicht landwirtschaftlich orientierten Haushalte, meist städtische Arme. Sofern sie Bezüge zur Landwirtschaft haben, können sie von Nahrungsmitteltransfers profitieren oder zurück-/ teilmigrieren. Subsistenzorientierte kleinbäuerliche Haushalte, die den Großteil der Ärmsten stellen, werden von den Ernährungskonsequenzen dieser Krise (anders als bei naturbedingten Krisen) zumindest kurzfristig weniger betroffen sein. Größere landwirtschaftliche Betriebe, die verlässlich Nahrungsmittel für den Markt produzieren können, dürften sich als eine Stabilitätssäule in und nach der Krise erweisen, sofern für sie relevante Märkte nicht massiv einbrechen.
Insgesamt werden die Auswirkungen der Corona-Krise auf Ernährung, neben der Ausgestaltung der LD-M, insbesondere davon abhängen, wieweit die Wirtschaft sowie die Entflechtung der Landwirtschaft vom Rest der Wirtschaft entwickelt ist und wieweit Staat und wohlhabendere Schichten die Möglichkeit haben und behalten, Transfers zu leisten. In ärmeren Ländern gilt, dass bei der Abwägung von Corona-Bekämpfung und Wirtschaft letztere einen höheren Stellenwert haben muss als in reicheren Ländern: Die LD-M bedrohen in armen Ländern Leben und Gesundheit. Ausdrücklich wird hier betont, dass es bei „Wirtschaft“ um die komplexen Wirkungsketten Richtung Ernährungssicherheit geht, nicht nur um Wachstum und Jobs.
Für die Länder des armen Südens sollten Corona-Strategien daher anders aussehen als im globalen Norden und in Schwellenländern. Für die Entwicklungszusammenarbeit heißt dies zunächst, die Entwicklung spezifischer lokaler Strategien zu unterstützen. Beiträge müssen kurzfristig und flexibel v.a. Aufklärung, Gesundheit und Hygiene adressieren und ggf. Geld- und Nahrungsmitteltransfers sowie Beschäftigungsprogramme umfassen. Dabei sollten Wirtschaftsstrukturen und -akteure geschützt und gestützt werden. Die Resilienz gegenüber der Corona-Epidemie und anderen Epidemien kann mittelfristig insbesondere durch die Förderung nachhaltiger Landwirtschafts- und Ernährungssysteme gestärkt werden.
Dabei darf die Resilienz gegenüber anderen Krisentypen nicht vernachlässigt werden, bei denen teilweise andere Wirkungsketten aktiv und damit Maßnahmen nötig sind. So schädigen klimabedingte Krisen oft die lokale Landwirtschaft; der Zugang zum Weltagrarmarkt ist dann ein wichtiger Schutz. Die Forschung lehrt, dass umfassende Resilienz am besten über eine Mischung aus wirtschaftlicher Diversität, Rücklagenbildung, offenen Agrarmärkten, Versicherungen und sozia-len Sicherungssystemen erzielt werden kann.

This paper examines the political economy of development policy through the prism of four country case studies (Egypt, India, South Africa and Turkey) of the automotive industry. The objective is not simply to examine the developmental impact of automotive policy, but to illustrate how the policy regime has been the outcome of a contested process. Early growth in the auto sector in the four case countries was enabled by rents from protected markets. The emergence of competitive firms is critically dependent on the nature of state–business relationships and the net outcome of the rent-seeking process in the sector. This hinges on the bargaining power of business, foreign or domestic, vis à vis the government. If firms capture subsidies in return for support to weak and vulnerable ruling coalitions, the auto sector in that country can become the classic case of an infant industry remaining stunted. Where the distribution of power is such that ruling coalitions are able to discipline firms in the auto sector, so that they become globally competitive, developmental outcomes have been positive.

This paper examines the political economy of development policy through the prism of four country case studies (Egypt, India, South Africa and Turkey) of the automotive industry. The objective is not simply to examine the developmental impact of automotive policy, but to illustrate how the policy regime has been the outcome of a contested process. Early growth in the auto sector in the four case countries was enabled by rents from protected markets. The emergence of competitive firms is critically dependent on the nature of state–business relationships and the net outcome of the rent-seeking process in the sector. This hinges on the bargaining power of business, foreign or domestic, vis à vis the government. If firms capture subsidies in return for support to weak and vulnerable ruling coalitions, the auto sector in that country can become the classic case of an infant industry remaining stunted. Where the distribution of power is such that ruling coalitions are able to discipline firms in the auto sector, so that they become globally competitive, developmental outcomes have been positive.

This paper examines the political economy of development policy through the prism of four country case studies (Egypt, India, South Africa and Turkey) of the automotive industry. The objective is not simply to examine the developmental impact of automotive policy, but to illustrate how the policy regime has been the outcome of a contested process. Early growth in the auto sector in the four case countries was enabled by rents from protected markets. The emergence of competitive firms is critically dependent on the nature of state–business relationships and the net outcome of the rent-seeking process in the sector. This hinges on the bargaining power of business, foreign or domestic, vis à vis the government. If firms capture subsidies in return for support to weak and vulnerable ruling coalitions, the auto sector in that country can become the classic case of an infant industry remaining stunted. Where the distribution of power is such that ruling coalitions are able to discipline firms in the auto sector, so that they become globally competitive, developmental outcomes have been positive.

In a new bookchapter DIIS-Seniro Researcher Stefano Guzzini explores the combination of realist foreign policy doctrine with constructivist theory.

In 2017, the UN launched a system-wide effort to support the implementation of the sustaining peace agenda in Burkina Faso. Since then, a rapidly deteriorating security situation and an imminent humanitarian crisis have forced the UN, the Burkinabe government, and their partners to recalibrate their efforts. This ongoing recalibration, together with the changes resulting from the UN development system reforms, makes this an opportune moment to assess the state of efforts to sustain peace in Burkina Faso.

This paper examines the implementation of the UN’s peacebuilding and sustaining peace framework in Burkina Faso, looking at what has been done and what is still needed. It focuses on the four issue areas highlighted in the secretary-general’s 2018 report on peacebuilding and sustaining peace: operational and policy coherence; leadership at the UN country level; partnerships with local and regional actors; and international support.

Burkina Faso provides lessons for how the UN’s sustaining peace efforts can respond to growing needs without a change in mandate. Continued support for the UN resident coordinator in Burkina Faso is necessary to ensure that these efforts are part of a holistic approach to the crisis, together with local, national, and regional partners. Such support could underpin Burkina Faso’s status as a buffer against spreading insecurity in the Sahel and make the country a model for the implementation of the sustaining peace agenda in conflict-prone settings without UN missions.

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New book on how a rising rightwing in Europe and the US is rewriting the ’lessons’ of the twentieth century

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“The coronavirus pandemic has taught everyone a valuable lesson in globalization: what happens anywhere affects everywhere, and no country is safe until all countries are safe,” said Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey and Co-Chair of the Friends of Mediation Groups in the United Nations, Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). “We must keep multilateralism alive,” he declared.

Mr. Çavuşoğlu was addressing a May 19th virtual event, cosponsored by IPI and the Antalya Diplomacy Forum, titled “How the Coronavirus Pandemic Affects Conflict Dynamics and Mediation: New Challenges to Peace and Security.” Underlining the impact of the pandemic on efforts towards peaceful resolution of conflicts and the importance of collective global action, he said that countries must make international organizations “relevant and credible” in the fight against the virus and its effects. “We must address the plight of vulnerable groups, and we must ensure the uninterrupted flow of humanitarian aid.”

He warned that terrorist and extremist groups would seek to exploit the current disorder for their own malign purposes. “The enemies of a rules-based order will look for an opportunity to take unilateral steps,” he said. “This is not the time to further weaken the existing mechanisms. Multilateralism should not be another casualty of COVID-19. And it is not strong rhetoric but rather effective cooperative action that will save the day.”

IPI President Terje Rød-Larsen, the event’s moderator, observed that the coronavirus crisis presented obstacles to traditional tools for the maintenance of peace and security including UN peacekeeping, mediation, and peacebuilding.

He signaled “the potential for increased instability as the pandemic disrupts humanitarian aid or exacerbates inequality and political division.”

Pekka Haavisto, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Finland and Co-Chair of the Friends of Mediation Groups in the UN and OSCE, said that the current crisis underlined the need for supporting multilateralism and in particular the UN and the World Health Organization (WHO). He argued that while the pandemic posed serious threats to peace processes and transitions to peace now underway, it alternatively could provide “a positive opening for peace processes” and pointed to the example of the conflicted Indonesian province of Aceh, which achieved peace in the aftermath of being devastated by a tsunami in 2004.

The international community ought to be alert to “swiftly supporting” such positive openings, he said, but he also cautioned that some countries were exploiting the situation by locking down their societies with “too harsh conditions on the restrictions” that ended up jeopardizing human rights and challenging democratic values.

Marginalized groups were particularly vulnerable and subject to added stress, and he singled out girls and women as potential targets of such abusive actions. “We know from many peace processes how crucial women and girls are to such processes,” he added. He said that though digital technology was being manipulated by purveyors of disinformation, it also represented a key “peacebuilding tool” and served the purpose of contacting and organizing young people in the service of peacemaking.

Ignazio Cassis, Federal Councillor, Head of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs of Switzerland, and Co-Chair of the Friends of Mediation Group in the OSCE, said Switzerland had adopted border control and security measures to combat the virus that, while innovative, were “exceptional to a democracy like ours” and were already being regularized by the parliament which was restoring the necessary checks and balances. “But for Switzerland, one essential element that has not changed with the crisis is that more than ever, we stand ready to support dialogue efforts and peace negotiations and to mediate where we are invited to do so.”

Describing the depth of Switzerland’s involvement, he said that while digital technology was valuable in enabling remote contact with parties in conflict, “peace will always require the physical presence and trust of very real women and men.” He characterized the country’s commitment as “all hands on deck, and that is the call for us all.” To Switzerland, he said, “mediation is about trust, patience, and preparing the grounds for future negotiations.”

Rosemary DiCarlo, Under-Secretary-General, UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, said that the pandemic had “hit conflict settings particularly hard.” Alluding to some of the negative consequences that Secretary-General António Guterres had alerted the Security Council to, she listed an erosion of trust in public institutions over their failure to deal promptly with the crisis, economic fallout that could lead to civil unrest, the postponement of elections, and violent actors exploiting the situation. “And all this at a time when mediation efforts are needed now more than ever.”

She reported that while there had been widespread positive initial responses to the Secretary-General’s March 23rd call for a global ceasefire, “unfortunately they have not translated to concrete change on the ground. Regrettably, the guns are yet to be silenced.” She noted that fighting had continued in places like Libya, Afghanistan, Syria, and Yemen. In addition, “extremists have urged followers to take advantage of COVID-19 including by spreading disinformation.” She said that the UN “must continue to apply pressure on conflict parties and those outside supporting them politically or with weapons to stop.”

She acknowledged that the crisis had stilled the conventional practice of diplomacy but asserted that UN envoys and missions around the world were exerting themselves to “reignite the political processes to engage in contact with conflict parties and other stakeholders,” often through the use of digital technology. “Now, the path ahead is not easy, but nobody said it would be. To succeed, the international community will have to come together decisively to make sure the early gains, now fading, lead to lasting peace.”

In a question and answer session, the speakers fielded questions on establishing a set of best practices for handling future pandemics, ensuring that the needs of refugees and internally displaced persons were met in pandemic responses, shifting mediation to an online platform, encouraging greater women’s participation in mediation efforts, and trying to prevent the COVID-19 crisis from derailing intra-Afghan talks among warring parties in the current peace negotiations in Afghanistan. The questioners were Priyal Singh, Researcher, Institute for Security Studies (ISS), South Africa; Waleed Al-Hariri, Sanaa Center for Strategic Studies, Yemen; Prisca Manyala, President, National Student Association, Democratic Republic of the Congo; Pravina Makan-Lakha, Femwise-Africa, and Aisha Khurram, student, Kabul University and former Afghan Youth Representative to the UN.

Burak Akçapar, Director-General for Foreign Policy, Analysis, and Coordination, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, made welcoming remarks on behalf of the Antalya Diplomacy Forum, and IPI President Terje Rød-Larsen moderated the discussion.

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Addressing resilience in Danish development policy

Maturing ‘techvelopment’