Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

In low- and middle-income countries, too many people lack any kind of public support when illness, unemployment or environmental disasters strike. This is especially true of those who work in the informal sector . It is high time to establish universal social-protection schemes everywhere.

In low- and middle-income countries, too many people lack any kind of public support when illness, unemployment or environmental disasters strike. This is especially true of those who work in the informal sector . It is high time to establish universal social-protection schemes everywhere.

In low- and middle-income countries, too many people lack any kind of public support when illness, unemployment or environmental disasters strike. This is especially true of those who work in the informal sector . It is high time to establish universal social-protection schemes everywhere.

In Ländern mit niedrigem oder mittlerem Pro-Kopf-Einkommen sind viele Menschen nicht gegen Krankheiten, Arbeitslosigkeit und Umweltkatastrophen abgesichert – vor allem, wenn sie informell beschäftigt sind. Es ist höchste Zeit, flächendeckend universelle Sozialsysteme aufzubauen.

In Ländern mit niedrigem oder mittlerem Pro-Kopf-Einkommen sind viele Menschen nicht gegen Krankheiten, Arbeitslosigkeit und Umweltkatastrophen abgesichert – vor allem, wenn sie informell beschäftigt sind. Es ist höchste Zeit, flächendeckend universelle Sozialsysteme aufzubauen.

In Ländern mit niedrigem oder mittlerem Pro-Kopf-Einkommen sind viele Menschen nicht gegen Krankheiten, Arbeitslosigkeit und Umweltkatastrophen abgesichert – vor allem, wenn sie informell beschäftigt sind. Es ist höchste Zeit, flächendeckend universelle Sozialsysteme aufzubauen.

One third of the world population lacks social protection against health risks, as the International Labour Organization (ILO) reports in its World Social Protection Report 2020-22. In sub-Saharan Africa, the figure is even over 80 %. The implication is that many people cannot afford to see a doctor or go to hospital. In emergencies, they have to take on unsustainable debt. Masses do not get the vitally important treatment they need. Universal health protection coverage would change matters.

One third of the world population lacks social protection against health risks, as the International Labour Organization (ILO) reports in its World Social Protection Report 2020-22. In sub-Saharan Africa, the figure is even over 80 %. The implication is that many people cannot afford to see a doctor or go to hospital. In emergencies, they have to take on unsustainable debt. Masses do not get the vitally important treatment they need. Universal health protection coverage would change matters.

One third of the world population lacks social protection against health risks, as the International Labour Organization (ILO) reports in its World Social Protection Report 2020-22. In sub-Saharan Africa, the figure is even over 80 %. The implication is that many people cannot afford to see a doctor or go to hospital. In emergencies, they have to take on unsustainable debt. Masses do not get the vitally important treatment they need. Universal health protection coverage would change matters.

Laut World Social Protection Report 2020–22 der Internationalen Arbeitsorganisation (ILO) ist ein Drittel aller Menschen nicht gegen Gesundheitsrisiken abgesichert, in Subsahara Afrika sogar mehr als 80 Prozent. Viele können sich Besuche beim Arzt oder im Krankenhaus nicht leisten und müssen sich für lebensnotwendige Behandlungen überschulden. Universelle Systeme der Gesundheitssicherung würden dagegen helfen. Sie lassen sich über Steuern finanzieren – oder über Mitgliedsbeiträge, wobei auch hier fast immer eine Quersubventionierung nötig ist.

Laut World Social Protection Report 2020–22 der Internationalen Arbeitsorganisation (ILO) ist ein Drittel aller Menschen nicht gegen Gesundheitsrisiken abgesichert, in Subsahara Afrika sogar mehr als 80 Prozent. Viele können sich Besuche beim Arzt oder im Krankenhaus nicht leisten und müssen sich für lebensnotwendige Behandlungen überschulden. Universelle Systeme der Gesundheitssicherung würden dagegen helfen. Sie lassen sich über Steuern finanzieren – oder über Mitgliedsbeiträge, wobei auch hier fast immer eine Quersubventionierung nötig ist.

Laut World Social Protection Report 2020–22 der Internationalen Arbeitsorganisation (ILO) ist ein Drittel aller Menschen nicht gegen Gesundheitsrisiken abgesichert, in Subsahara Afrika sogar mehr als 80 Prozent. Viele können sich Besuche beim Arzt oder im Krankenhaus nicht leisten und müssen sich für lebensnotwendige Behandlungen überschulden. Universelle Systeme der Gesundheitssicherung würden dagegen helfen. Sie lassen sich über Steuern finanzieren – oder über Mitgliedsbeiträge, wobei auch hier fast immer eine Quersubventionierung nötig ist.

Conflicts around access to, control over, and quality of water accompany mining projects all over the globe. Often, they are associated with high intensity as means of contestation range from verbal complaints to protest marches, civil disobedience and violent confrontations. While numerous case studies on water-related mining conflicts exist, scholarship that synthesizes insights remains rare. In order to better understand the dynamics that lead to the escalation of conflicts and to further theory development on the role of, e.g., political economic contexts, hydro-social conditions and social relationships, a systematic overview of the existing empirical evidence is needed. Our meta-study of 53 water and mining conflicts identifies several combinations of conditions that are tied to large-scale mobilization and the use of civil disobedience measures, sabotage or hunger strikes by environmental defenders. As our results show, raised stakes and ontological differences, e.g. in situations where water is essential for livelihoods and cultural and spiritual practices, play a role, in particular when coupled with a lack of meaningful participation. Discursive or physical coercion by the state or by private security forces also intensify mobilization rather than containing it while the role of international NGOs is more ambiguous. To identify explanatory scenarios, we conducted a two-step, fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) based on data collected in a systematic literature review of peer-reviewed articles and book chapters. Taking its data from published research, our study identifies a geographic bias towards Latin America in academic literature on water and mining conflicts and points out topical blind spots. By looking for conditions that are consistently associated with high-intensity conflicts, it also provides insights on priority areas of engagement for community leaders, policy-makers, and private sector and civil society representatives seeking to avoid the escalation of conflicts.

Conflicts around access to, control over, and quality of water accompany mining projects all over the globe. Often, they are associated with high intensity as means of contestation range from verbal complaints to protest marches, civil disobedience and violent confrontations. While numerous case studies on water-related mining conflicts exist, scholarship that synthesizes insights remains rare. In order to better understand the dynamics that lead to the escalation of conflicts and to further theory development on the role of, e.g., political economic contexts, hydro-social conditions and social relationships, a systematic overview of the existing empirical evidence is needed. Our meta-study of 53 water and mining conflicts identifies several combinations of conditions that are tied to large-scale mobilization and the use of civil disobedience measures, sabotage or hunger strikes by environmental defenders. As our results show, raised stakes and ontological differences, e.g. in situations where water is essential for livelihoods and cultural and spiritual practices, play a role, in particular when coupled with a lack of meaningful participation. Discursive or physical coercion by the state or by private security forces also intensify mobilization rather than containing it while the role of international NGOs is more ambiguous. To identify explanatory scenarios, we conducted a two-step, fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) based on data collected in a systematic literature review of peer-reviewed articles and book chapters. Taking its data from published research, our study identifies a geographic bias towards Latin America in academic literature on water and mining conflicts and points out topical blind spots. By looking for conditions that are consistently associated with high-intensity conflicts, it also provides insights on priority areas of engagement for community leaders, policy-makers, and private sector and civil society representatives seeking to avoid the escalation of conflicts.

Conflicts around access to, control over, and quality of water accompany mining projects all over the globe. Often, they are associated with high intensity as means of contestation range from verbal complaints to protest marches, civil disobedience and violent confrontations. While numerous case studies on water-related mining conflicts exist, scholarship that synthesizes insights remains rare. In order to better understand the dynamics that lead to the escalation of conflicts and to further theory development on the role of, e.g., political economic contexts, hydro-social conditions and social relationships, a systematic overview of the existing empirical evidence is needed. Our meta-study of 53 water and mining conflicts identifies several combinations of conditions that are tied to large-scale mobilization and the use of civil disobedience measures, sabotage or hunger strikes by environmental defenders. As our results show, raised stakes and ontological differences, e.g. in situations where water is essential for livelihoods and cultural and spiritual practices, play a role, in particular when coupled with a lack of meaningful participation. Discursive or physical coercion by the state or by private security forces also intensify mobilization rather than containing it while the role of international NGOs is more ambiguous. To identify explanatory scenarios, we conducted a two-step, fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) based on data collected in a systematic literature review of peer-reviewed articles and book chapters. Taking its data from published research, our study identifies a geographic bias towards Latin America in academic literature on water and mining conflicts and points out topical blind spots. By looking for conditions that are consistently associated with high-intensity conflicts, it also provides insights on priority areas of engagement for community leaders, policy-makers, and private sector and civil society representatives seeking to avoid the escalation of conflicts.

Nach dem Einmarsch Russlands in die Ukraine haben viele westliche Länder Sanktionen gegen Russland verhängt, insbesondere gegen die Finanzwirtschaft. Doch zu einer Sanktion konnten sich die EU und auch Deutschland bisher nicht durchringen: ein Embargo auf den Import russischer Energieträger. Dieses vielfach kritisierte Zögern begründet die Bundesregierung mit den wirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen, die ein Importstopp für die deutsche Wirtschaft haben könnte. Denkbar ist aber auch, dass Russland seine Lieferungen aussetzt. Die vorliegende Modellrechnung zeigt, durch welche Wirkungskanäle – mit einem Fokus auf der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Nachfrage und vor allem dem privaten Konsum – ein Embargo oder Lieferstopp Deutschland treffen könnte. In dem Basisszenario erstrecken sich die BIP-Verluste über rund zehn Jahre und erreichen ihren Höhepunkt nach 18 Monaten mit einem Minus von drei Prozent. Gleichzeitig würde ein Importstopp zu einem Anstieg der Inflation um bis zu 2,3 Prozentpunkte führen. Das hier verwendete Modell wird dabei so aufgesetzt, dass es die Schwachpunkte einer kürzlich erschienenen Studie adressiert, indem es sowohl den privaten Konsum als auch die Wechselwirkungen im Euroraum miteinbezieht. Beide Studien zusammen ergeben ein immer besseres Bild der Wirkungsmechanismen eines Energieembargos auf die deutsche Wirtschaft. Das Modell macht eine Reihe von Annahmen, die in den meisten Fällen realistisch und angemessen sind. Jedoch muss betont werden, dass es noch nie ein solches Embargo in einer solchen Situation gegeben hat, so dass jegliche Annahmen mit Unsicherheit verbunden sind. Die Resultate auf Basis des Modells deuten die Größenordnung der Effekte eines Embargos an und sollen dazu dienen, der Politik eine Orientierung bei einem möglichen Lieferstopp zu geben.

The ongoing compound and acute crises of Covid-19 and the war in Ukraine meet longer-term but no-less pressing crises of social and environmental sustainability in and around agriculture, food and nutrition security. At the same time, they irritate existing frames on (and perceptions of) how to address trade and sustainability. External shocks must be increasingly considered when addressing food security, following the FAO’s observation that conflicts and migration have developed into major reasons for food insecurity and hunger. Additionally, climate change, biodiversity loss and human rights are generally most challenging and partially conflicting for many developing countries. They have to address them by aiming at increased and more nutritious food production, job creation, poverty alleviation and resilience to shocks of a still strongly growing and urbanising population. Many international mechanisms are already in place on agriculture and food systems which are almost unavoidably not (yet) sufficiently coordinated. A new generation of due diligence laws recently is added mostly by industrialised countries to that existing mix of policies in place addressing serious sustainability gaps of supply chains into these countries. However, these regulations also bear the risk of generating unintended negative consequences, particularly for smallholder farmers in poor countries. Against this background, we conclude for proposals at different degree of specificity: (i) Reacting to geopolitical risks: Immediate and long-term measures to safeguard food security in light of Russia’s War on Ukraine, (ii) Balancing and integrating food security and sustainability, (iii) Initiating a joint observatory on new due diligence measures, and (iv) Starting a process to improve harmonised global governance for agriculture and food systems.

The ongoing compound and acute crises of Covid-19 and the war in Ukraine meet longer-term but no-less pressing crises of social and environmental sustainability in and around agriculture, food and nutrition security. At the same time, they irritate existing frames on (and perceptions of) how to address trade and sustainability. External shocks must be increasingly considered when addressing food security, following the FAO’s observation that conflicts and migration have developed into major reasons for food insecurity and hunger. Additionally, climate change, biodiversity loss and human rights are generally most challenging and partially conflicting for many developing countries. They have to address them by aiming at increased and more nutritious food production, job creation, poverty alleviation and resilience to shocks of a still strongly growing and urbanising population. Many international mechanisms are already in place on agriculture and food systems which are almost unavoidably not (yet) sufficiently coordinated. A new generation of due diligence laws recently is added mostly by industrialised countries to that existing mix of policies in place addressing serious sustainability gaps of supply chains into these countries. However, these regulations also bear the risk of generating unintended negative consequences, particularly for smallholder farmers in poor countries. Against this background, we conclude for proposals at different degree of specificity: (i) Reacting to geopolitical risks: Immediate and long-term measures to safeguard food security in light of Russia’s War on Ukraine, (ii) Balancing and integrating food security and sustainability, (iii) Initiating a joint observatory on new due diligence measures, and (iv) Starting a process to improve harmonised global governance for agriculture and food systems.

The ongoing compound and acute crises of Covid-19 and the war in Ukraine meet longer-term but no-less pressing crises of social and environmental sustainability in and around agriculture, food and nutrition security. At the same time, they irritate existing frames on (and perceptions of) how to address trade and sustainability. External shocks must be increasingly considered when addressing food security, following the FAO’s observation that conflicts and migration have developed into major reasons for food insecurity and hunger. Additionally, climate change, biodiversity loss and human rights are generally most challenging and partially conflicting for many developing countries. They have to address them by aiming at increased and more nutritious food production, job creation, poverty alleviation and resilience to shocks of a still strongly growing and urbanising population. Many international mechanisms are already in place on agriculture and food systems which are almost unavoidably not (yet) sufficiently coordinated. A new generation of due diligence laws recently is added mostly by industrialised countries to that existing mix of policies in place addressing serious sustainability gaps of supply chains into these countries. However, these regulations also bear the risk of generating unintended negative consequences, particularly for smallholder farmers in poor countries. Against this background, we conclude for proposals at different degree of specificity: (i) Reacting to geopolitical risks: Immediate and long-term measures to safeguard food security in light of Russia’s War on Ukraine, (ii) Balancing and integrating food security and sustainability, (iii) Initiating a joint observatory on new due diligence measures, and (iv) Starting a process to improve harmonised global governance for agriculture and food systems.