Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

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Over the past two decades, attacks on healthcare in situations of armed conflict have been reported at alarming levels. By collecting data on these attacks, states can better understand the scale and scope of the problem, protect health services and workers, and prevent future attacks.

On December 1st, IPI with the support of the Government of Spain, cohosted an event on “Strengthening Data to Protect Healthcare in Conflict Zones: Toward the Implementation of UN Commitments.” The policy forum provided an opportunity to discuss IPI’s new issue brief entitled “Strengthening Data to Protect Healthcare in Conflict Zones” co-authored by Susannah Sirkin and Rohini Haar, including their recommendations on ways to better use existing data-collection methods and mechanisms to prevent and protect against attacks on medical care in armed conflict.

The forum brought together representatives of UN agencies, humanitarian organizations, member states, and civil society organizations to discuss some of the policy and technical challenges related to collecting robust data on attacks against healthcare in armed conflict. It also reflected on ways to strengthen data collection and reporting with the goal of enhancing prevention and protection. “Acknowledging and reporting the violence is a first and necessary step to preventing violence,” said Susannah Sirkin, co-author of the report. Panelists also emphasized the importance of publishing data as an accountability measure. “There is no strong evidence that the publication of data detailing attacks on health care facilities results in increased security risks,” explained Leonard Rubenstein, Chair of the Safeguarding Health in Conflict Coalition.

Speakers further considered opportunities to address policy and technical challenges and examined how improved data collection may build on existing data processes, including the World Health Organization’s Surveillance System for Attacks on Healthcare and the work of the Safeguarding Health and Conflict Coalition and Insecurity Insight.

Opening remarks:
Adam Lupel, Vice-President and COO, International Peace Institute
H.E. Agustín Santos Maraver, Permanent Representative of Spain to the UN

Speakers:
Rohini Haar, Adjunct Professor, University of California, Berkeley, practicing emergency medicine physician, and co-author of the report
Susannah Sirkin, Independent Consultant and co-author of the report
Hyo Jeong Kim, Technical Officer, Attacks on Health Care initiative, World Health Organization Emergency Programme
Maciej Polkowski, Head, Health Care in Danger Initiative, International Committee of the Red Cross
Leonard Rubenstein, Chair, Safeguarding Health in Conflict Coalition
Tobijo Denis Sokiri Moses, Technical Advisor, The Rescue Initiative-South Sudan

Moderator:
Agathe Sarfati, Senior Policy Analyst, International Peace Institute

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Gendered analyses of violence often focus narrowly on women and overlook the importance of understanding masculinities. To bridge this gap in understanding, IPI in partnership with the UN Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), the Permanent Mission of Mexico to the UN, and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), cohosted a policy forum on “Masculinities in Peace and Security.” The November 30th event convened researchers, practitioners, and policymakers for a focused discussion on masculinity and violent extremism.

The UN Security Council held an Arria-formula meeting in July 2021, chaired by Mexico with the co-sponsorship of Estonia, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States, to discuss how gender stereotypes, masculinities, and structural gender inequalities influence terrorism and violent extremism. Specifically, this Arria-formula meeting explored the ways in which understanding masculinities could promote better prevention of, and response to, violent extremist and terrorist groups.

In June 2022, IPI and CTED published “Masculinities and Violent Extremism,” a joint policy report that explored how violent extremist groups across the ideological spectrum exploit masculinities in their efforts to recruit and retain members, the links between extremist violence and gender inequality within society, and how masculinities produced by state actors can feed into and mutually reinforce those produced by violent extremists.

This policy forum presented the key findings of the IPI and CTED report and provided policymakers and researchers with an opportunity to reflect on the relevance of focusing on masculinities in preventing and countering terrorism and violent extremism. “This is not a niche topic,” said David Scharia, Chief of Branch at CTED, in his opening remarks. “We must continue to strengthen our understanding of gender perspectives and gender inequalities in violent extremism.”

The discussion further emphasized the need for masculinities analysis and expansive thinking about gender. “Gender often becomes shorthand for ‘women,’” said Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism. “However, the construction of masculinity is incredibly relevant to work on violent extremism.” The policy forum concluded by exploring areas for future growth, including further research on LGBT issues and the rights of the child.

Opening remarks:
David Scharia, Chief of Branch, UN Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate
H.E. Alicia Guadalupe Buenrostro Massieu, Deputy Permanent Representative of Mexico to the UN

Panelists:
Gretchen Baldwin, Researcher, Gender, Peace Operations and Conflict Management, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Aleksandra Dier, Gender Coordinator, UN Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate
Robert Nagel, Research Fellow, Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security
Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism (virtual)
Pablo Arrocha Olabuenaga, Legal Adviser, Permanent Mission of Mexico to the UN

Moderator:
Phoebe Donnelly, Senior Fellow and Head of the Women, Peace, and Security Program, International Peace Institute

When the cover decision of the UN climate change conference (COP27) in Sharm-El-Sheikh was finally accepted by all parties, it was clear that the EU had only been moderately successful. So the question remains if the EU could have done more. Or could it have engaged differently to achieve a more ambitious result of COP27, in particular with regards to reducing emissions or international climate finance? This blog post discusses key lessons for the EU as it prepares for the next rounds of global climate negotiations, including COP28 in Dubai. It suggests for the EU to act decisively in the months ahead, to enter the negotiations in good time and to demonstrate resolve on key issues, now including Loss and Damage. This requires the EU to dedicate more time and energy into its climate diplomacy and to live up to its announcements and pledges with commensurate resources politically, technically and, indeed, financially.

When the cover decision of the UN climate change conference (COP27) in Sharm-El-Sheikh was finally accepted by all parties, it was clear that the EU had only been moderately successful. So the question remains if the EU could have done more. Or could it have engaged differently to achieve a more ambitious result of COP27, in particular with regards to reducing emissions or international climate finance? This blog post discusses key lessons for the EU as it prepares for the next rounds of global climate negotiations, including COP28 in Dubai. It suggests for the EU to act decisively in the months ahead, to enter the negotiations in good time and to demonstrate resolve on key issues, now including Loss and Damage. This requires the EU to dedicate more time and energy into its climate diplomacy and to live up to its announcements and pledges with commensurate resources politically, technically and, indeed, financially.

When the cover decision of the UN climate change conference (COP27) in Sharm-El-Sheikh was finally accepted by all parties, it was clear that the EU had only been moderately successful. So the question remains if the EU could have done more. Or could it have engaged differently to achieve a more ambitious result of COP27, in particular with regards to reducing emissions or international climate finance? This blog post discusses key lessons for the EU as it prepares for the next rounds of global climate negotiations, including COP28 in Dubai. It suggests for the EU to act decisively in the months ahead, to enter the negotiations in good time and to demonstrate resolve on key issues, now including Loss and Damage. This requires the EU to dedicate more time and energy into its climate diplomacy and to live up to its announcements and pledges with commensurate resources politically, technically and, indeed, financially.

It is anticipated that the 15th Conference of the Parties (COP15) of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), held in Montreal, Canada, in December 2022, will agree on an ambitious, specific and measurable global biodiversity framework. However, governments alone are unlikely to reverse negative trends in biodiversity. This correspondence suggests that a biodiversity action agenda that mobilizes nature recovery actions from across society — including businesses, investors, civil society groups and local communities — should be included as a complement to governmental efforts. If governments can agree on a strong framework, an action agenda can create productive links between multilateral and transnational actions. However, if governments fail to agree on an ambitious framework the action agenda can help to sustain action and build momentum. The article argues that the action agenda should be complementary, catalytic, collaborative, comprehensive and credible to generate enthusiasm for a diverse array of actors to take biodiversity action.

It is anticipated that the 15th Conference of the Parties (COP15) of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), held in Montreal, Canada, in December 2022, will agree on an ambitious, specific and measurable global biodiversity framework. However, governments alone are unlikely to reverse negative trends in biodiversity. This correspondence suggests that a biodiversity action agenda that mobilizes nature recovery actions from across society — including businesses, investors, civil society groups and local communities — should be included as a complement to governmental efforts. If governments can agree on a strong framework, an action agenda can create productive links between multilateral and transnational actions. However, if governments fail to agree on an ambitious framework the action agenda can help to sustain action and build momentum. The article argues that the action agenda should be complementary, catalytic, collaborative, comprehensive and credible to generate enthusiasm for a diverse array of actors to take biodiversity action.

It is anticipated that the 15th Conference of the Parties (COP15) of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), held in Montreal, Canada, in December 2022, will agree on an ambitious, specific and measurable global biodiversity framework. However, governments alone are unlikely to reverse negative trends in biodiversity. This correspondence suggests that a biodiversity action agenda that mobilizes nature recovery actions from across society — including businesses, investors, civil society groups and local communities — should be included as a complement to governmental efforts. If governments can agree on a strong framework, an action agenda can create productive links between multilateral and transnational actions. However, if governments fail to agree on an ambitious framework the action agenda can help to sustain action and build momentum. The article argues that the action agenda should be complementary, catalytic, collaborative, comprehensive and credible to generate enthusiasm for a diverse array of actors to take biodiversity action.

In recent years, the ten elected members of the Security Council, now commonly referred to as the E10, have come to play a more prominent role. Although there were previous periods when elected members were active and took initiative, the space for such contributions began to shrink in the mid-2000s. The emergence of the E10 as a construct and a more cohesive coalition on the Security Council is thus recent. Despite elected members’ different levels of commitment to collective E10 initiatives, and although the Council’s five permanent members have greater capacity, permanence, and veto power, there is a sense that the E10 have been able to influence the work of the Council, including its working methods, thematic issues, and some country-specific files.

This paper presents a broad policy perspective on lessons from both individual elected members and from the E10 as a group. It examines the E10’s recent engagement on the Council and offers lessons for how elected members can most effectively prepare for their term, serve on the Council, and ensure their legacy.

The paper concludes with reflections on the future of the E10 in a fragmented Security Council. While the E10 as a group have reached a level of maturity, their ability to coordinate across a diverse group whose effectiveness depends on several internal and external factors may have reached a natural limit. The E10’s composition, individual members’ level of commitment to collective E10 initiatives, and the group’s leadership all impact the E10’s ability to influence the work of the Council. While the E10 have been collectively successful at promoting certain issues and files and at making the Council more transparent, individual members have and will continue to have different views on many issues on the agenda. They will also continue to face structural inequalities when it comes to penholding and chairing subsidiary bodies.

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Africa and the European Union (EU) have a shared interest in providing reliable and clean energy to their citizens, despite this being a rather heated moment of Africa-Europe relations in the area of climate and energy cooperation. Tensions concern the perceived protectionist slant of the European Green Deal, the EU’s “dash for gas” in Africa as part of its strategy to become more independent of Russian imports, and multilateral climate issues, such as at COP27 the balance between climate finance, loss and damage, and climate ambition. Hydrogen technologies have been prominent in discussions between the EU and African countries since the 2020 political push for hydrogen in Europe. In theory, cooperation on hydrogen may benefit both continents. Yet, techno-economic issues remain unsettled, and a framework for cooperation needs to be set up that includes both environmental and social criteria, economic benefits, as well as investments in industrialisation for producer regions. Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JETPs) have so far been targeted mainly at countries with rapidly growing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, such as South Africa and Indonesia. While this is a legitimate focus, it risks leaving out most African countries, in particular the least developed ones. JETPs in Africa could focus on access to clean energy and bring important innovations in terms of country ownership and donor coordination.

Africa and the European Union (EU) have a shared interest in providing reliable and clean energy to their citizens, despite this being a rather heated moment of Africa-Europe relations in the area of climate and energy cooperation. Tensions concern the perceived protectionist slant of the European Green Deal, the EU’s “dash for gas” in Africa as part of its strategy to become more independent of Russian imports, and multilateral climate issues, such as at COP27 the balance between climate finance, loss and damage, and climate ambition. Hydrogen technologies have been prominent in discussions between the EU and African countries since the 2020 political push for hydrogen in Europe. In theory, cooperation on hydrogen may benefit both continents. Yet, techno-economic issues remain unsettled, and a framework for cooperation needs to be set up that includes both environmental and social criteria, economic benefits, as well as investments in industrialisation for producer regions. Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JETPs) have so far been targeted mainly at countries with rapidly growing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, such as South Africa and Indonesia. While this is a legitimate focus, it risks leaving out most African countries, in particular the least developed ones. JETPs in Africa could focus on access to clean energy and bring important innovations in terms of country ownership and donor coordination.

Africa and the European Union (EU) have a shared interest in providing reliable and clean energy to their citizens, despite this being a rather heated moment of Africa-Europe relations in the area of climate and energy cooperation. Tensions concern the perceived protectionist slant of the European Green Deal, the EU’s “dash for gas” in Africa as part of its strategy to become more independent of Russian imports, and multilateral climate issues, such as at COP27 the balance between climate finance, loss and damage, and climate ambition. Hydrogen technologies have been prominent in discussions between the EU and African countries since the 2020 political push for hydrogen in Europe. In theory, cooperation on hydrogen may benefit both continents. Yet, techno-economic issues remain unsettled, and a framework for cooperation needs to be set up that includes both environmental and social criteria, economic benefits, as well as investments in industrialisation for producer regions. Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JETPs) have so far been targeted mainly at countries with rapidly growing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, such as South Africa and Indonesia. While this is a legitimate focus, it risks leaving out most African countries, in particular the least developed ones. JETPs in Africa could focus on access to clean energy and bring important innovations in terms of country ownership and donor coordination.

Drawing on the institutional approach, we describe the remarkable expansion of entrepreneurship in an under conflict area (Amuda-North east Syria), and explore its possible role in the future peace in Syria. Our findings indicate that; with the collapse of formal institutions constraining entrepreneurship, the disruption of supply chains and the weakness of new institutions; the entrepreneurs can depend on informal institutions that embrace entrepreneurship and deploy individual and social resources to exploit productive opportunities. Furthermore, those entrepreneurs have a possible positive role in the future development and peace.

Drawing on the institutional approach, we describe the remarkable expansion of entrepreneurship in an under conflict area (Amuda-North east Syria), and explore its possible role in the future peace in Syria. Our findings indicate that; with the collapse of formal institutions constraining entrepreneurship, the disruption of supply chains and the weakness of new institutions; the entrepreneurs can depend on informal institutions that embrace entrepreneurship and deploy individual and social resources to exploit productive opportunities. Furthermore, those entrepreneurs have a possible positive role in the future development and peace.

Drawing on the institutional approach, we describe the remarkable expansion of entrepreneurship in an under conflict area (Amuda-North east Syria), and explore its possible role in the future peace in Syria. Our findings indicate that; with the collapse of formal institutions constraining entrepreneurship, the disruption of supply chains and the weakness of new institutions; the entrepreneurs can depend on informal institutions that embrace entrepreneurship and deploy individual and social resources to exploit productive opportunities. Furthermore, those entrepreneurs have a possible positive role in the future development and peace.

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