Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Nucleus-outgrower schemes (NOSs) are supposed to be a particularly effective private-sector mechanism to support smallholder farmers and contribute towards mitigating the problematic aspects of pure large-scale agricultural investments. This discussion paper uses panel household survey data collected in two rounds in Zambia to analyse some agro-ecological and socio-economic impacts of the outgrower programme of one of the largest agricultural investments in Zambia: Amatheon Agri Zambia (AAZ) Limited. The descriptive results show that the type of participation in the programme varies across participants and components, with most participating in trainings. Econometric results suggest the following key findings. First, although the overall impact of the AAZ outgrower programme on the uptake of conservation agriculture practices is robust and promising, impacts on the adoption of other agricultural technologies is less obvious and the effect depends on the type of support provided. Second, the programme has had a significant impact on maize productivity promoted in the initial phase but not on the other crops – mainly oilseeds – promoted later. Third, the initially less productive farmers seem to benefit slightly more than already better performing ones. Fourth, although the impact on overall household security was insignificant, there is some suggestive evidence (although the effect is weak) that the programme has a positive effect on improving women’s uptake of micronutrients. Finally, our findings show that the three components of the programme (trainings, seed loans and output purchases) have different effects on the adoption of sustainable agricultural practices and productivity, and to some extent on food security. Overall, the results suggest that NOSs, with all their risks, can play a role in the adoption of sustainable agricultural practices, improving farm-level agricultural technologies, providing input credit, and thereby improving productivity and smallholder livelihoods. However, this is not automatically the case, as it crucially depends on the design and management of the project; the availability of good policies and institutions governing the rules of operation; the types of crops promoted; the duration of the project; and the political commitment of host countries, among others.

The UN Security Council is expected to renew the mandate of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) in December 2022. The upcoming negotiations among council members will unfold against the backdrop of renewed fighting between the Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC) and the M23 rebel group. And while several regional diplomatic initiatives are underway, the security and humanitarian conditions continue to worsen in the eastern provinces of the DRC, with persistent threats to human rights and the protection of civilians.

In this context, the International Peace Institute (IPI), Security Council Report, and the Stimson Center co-hosted a roundtable discussion on November 15, 2022. This roundtable offered a platform for member states, UN officials, civil society stakeholders, and independent experts to share their assessments of the situation in the DRC in a frank and collaborative manner. The discussion was intended to help the Security Council make more informed decisions with respect to the prioritization and sequencing of MONUSCO’s mandate and the mission’s strategic orientation and actions on the ground.

Participants agreed that MONUSCO’s strategic vision and priority tasks are still relevant to the UN’s overall engagement in the country. They also emphasized that the current mandate provides the mission with appropriate guidance to pursue the strategic direction provided by the Security Council, but some areas need to be refined for the mission to better address the ongoing crisis and new priorities. The mission will likely need to balance the following issues over the next mandate cycle:

• Strengthening MONUSCO’s capabilities to conduct proactive, robust, and mobile protection efforts in eastern DRC;
• Bridging the expectations gap on the protection of civilians by communicating what MONUSCO can achieve under its mandate as well as the limits of MONUSCO’s partnership with the FARDC;
• Establishing a constructive dialogue between MONUSCO and the East African Community’s regional force to deconflict and coordinate operations on the ground while encouraging compliance with international humanitarian law and international human rights law;
• Supporting the government’s efforts to build national capacity to implement its Demobilization, Disarmament, Community Recovery and Stabilization Program (P-DDRCS);
• Capitalizing on its good offices to coordinate and harmonize the Luanda and Nairobi processes;
• Expanding civic engagement in the formal political process and making the process more inclusive; and
• Working with regional partners to lay the groundwork for balanced bilateral agreements fostering long-term sustainable economic cooperation.

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Recently, awareness about climate change has increased. Behavioural changes and micro-level and macro-level actions towards low-carbon economies are becoming more widespread, propelled by increasing scientific evidence and climate activism. As individuals continue to become more climate-conscious, climate-mitigation legislation has also gained traction. In 2019, the European Commission agreed on the European Green Deal, which included a recommendation to phase out new financing for fossil fuel projects in third countries. This recommendation was reiterated at the COP26 in Glasgow, by the European Investment Bank, and more recently by the European Commission in preparation for the COP27 in Cairo. Against this background, the European Parliament recently adopted resolution 2022/2826(RSP), broadly condemning alleged human rights violations linked with the planned construction of the East African Crude Oil Pipeline (EACOP). Alongside the human rights questions, the European Parliamentarians also argue that the project will both increase emissions and cause ecological damage—and so, in line with European climate policies, they argue that the project should close.
In this essay, I use the example of EU resolution 2022/2826(RSP) and the debates surrounding it to argue that whilst debates following this and similar resolutions supporting blanket bans on fossil fuel investments in low-income countries might be well-intentioned, a more differentiated view of the implications of these resolutions is necessary, especially considering developing countries’ needs and preferences. Blanket application of climate strategies developed in the Global North (such as stopping funding fossil fuel extractions in low-income countries) can be deeply unfair and unjust, and entrench more poverty than they hope to reduce. Moreover, these debates tend to focus on the policy needs of the Global North, with limited regard to Global South contexts and needs. This is especially significant in the context of aiming for just energy transitions, in which low-income countries are not left worse off without fossil fuel extraction.

Recently, awareness about climate change has increased. Behavioural changes and micro-level and macro-level actions towards low-carbon economies are becoming more widespread, propelled by increasing scientific evidence and climate activism. As individuals continue to become more climate-conscious, climate-mitigation legislation has also gained traction. In 2019, the European Commission agreed on the European Green Deal, which included a recommendation to phase out new financing for fossil fuel projects in third countries. This recommendation was reiterated at the COP26 in Glasgow, by the European Investment Bank, and more recently by the European Commission in preparation for the COP27 in Cairo. Against this background, the European Parliament recently adopted resolution 2022/2826(RSP), broadly condemning alleged human rights violations linked with the planned construction of the East African Crude Oil Pipeline (EACOP). Alongside the human rights questions, the European Parliamentarians also argue that the project will both increase emissions and cause ecological damage—and so, in line with European climate policies, they argue that the project should close.
In this essay, I use the example of EU resolution 2022/2826(RSP) and the debates surrounding it to argue that whilst debates following this and similar resolutions supporting blanket bans on fossil fuel investments in low-income countries might be well-intentioned, a more differentiated view of the implications of these resolutions is necessary, especially considering developing countries’ needs and preferences. Blanket application of climate strategies developed in the Global North (such as stopping funding fossil fuel extractions in low-income countries) can be deeply unfair and unjust, and entrench more poverty than they hope to reduce. Moreover, these debates tend to focus on the policy needs of the Global North, with limited regard to Global South contexts and needs. This is especially significant in the context of aiming for just energy transitions, in which low-income countries are not left worse off without fossil fuel extraction.

Recently, awareness about climate change has increased. Behavioural changes and micro-level and macro-level actions towards low-carbon economies are becoming more widespread, propelled by increasing scientific evidence and climate activism. As individuals continue to become more climate-conscious, climate-mitigation legislation has also gained traction. In 2019, the European Commission agreed on the European Green Deal, which included a recommendation to phase out new financing for fossil fuel projects in third countries. This recommendation was reiterated at the COP26 in Glasgow, by the European Investment Bank, and more recently by the European Commission in preparation for the COP27 in Cairo. Against this background, the European Parliament recently adopted resolution 2022/2826(RSP), broadly condemning alleged human rights violations linked with the planned construction of the East African Crude Oil Pipeline (EACOP). Alongside the human rights questions, the European Parliamentarians also argue that the project will both increase emissions and cause ecological damage—and so, in line with European climate policies, they argue that the project should close.
In this essay, I use the example of EU resolution 2022/2826(RSP) and the debates surrounding it to argue that whilst debates following this and similar resolutions supporting blanket bans on fossil fuel investments in low-income countries might be well-intentioned, a more differentiated view of the implications of these resolutions is necessary, especially considering developing countries’ needs and preferences. Blanket application of climate strategies developed in the Global North (such as stopping funding fossil fuel extractions in low-income countries) can be deeply unfair and unjust, and entrench more poverty than they hope to reduce. Moreover, these debates tend to focus on the policy needs of the Global North, with limited regard to Global South contexts and needs. This is especially significant in the context of aiming for just energy transitions, in which low-income countries are not left worse off without fossil fuel extraction.

In several African regions, economic integration has successfully reduced tariff protection by freezing the opportunity to raise applied tariffs against fellow integration partners above those promised. We examine whether these regional tariff commitments have come at the expense of adverse side-effects on the prevalence of non-tariff trade barriers. Comparing the effects of applied tariff overhangs – the difference between MFN bound tariffs and effectively applied tariffs – towards all vis-à-vis African trading partners on SPS and TBT notifications of 35 African WTO members from 2001-2017, we find no general relationship between tariff overhangs and import regulation in our preferred model setting. Larger tariff overhangs specific to intra-African trade relations, however, increase the probability of SPS measures and TBT and thereby contrast with the common assumption of the former functioning as a flexible policy valve. We see the nature of Africa’s formal trade relations as an explanation for these findings. While regional tariff commitments have not only significantly moved African countries away from multilateral commitments, they have also sharply reduced their tariff policy space within Africa, thus seemingly leaving regulatory policy as one of the few legitimate options to level the playing field with the by far closest market competitors.

In several African regions, economic integration has successfully reduced tariff protection by freezing the opportunity to raise applied tariffs against fellow integration partners above those promised. We examine whether these regional tariff commitments have come at the expense of adverse side-effects on the prevalence of non-tariff trade barriers. Comparing the effects of applied tariff overhangs – the difference between MFN bound tariffs and effectively applied tariffs – towards all vis-à-vis African trading partners on SPS and TBT notifications of 35 African WTO members from 2001-2017, we find no general relationship between tariff overhangs and import regulation in our preferred model setting. Larger tariff overhangs specific to intra-African trade relations, however, increase the probability of SPS measures and TBT and thereby contrast with the common assumption of the former functioning as a flexible policy valve. We see the nature of Africa’s formal trade relations as an explanation for these findings. While regional tariff commitments have not only significantly moved African countries away from multilateral commitments, they have also sharply reduced their tariff policy space within Africa, thus seemingly leaving regulatory policy as one of the few legitimate options to level the playing field with the by far closest market competitors.

In several African regions, economic integration has successfully reduced tariff protection by freezing the opportunity to raise applied tariffs against fellow integration partners above those promised. We examine whether these regional tariff commitments have come at the expense of adverse side-effects on the prevalence of non-tariff trade barriers. Comparing the effects of applied tariff overhangs – the difference between MFN bound tariffs and effectively applied tariffs – towards all vis-à-vis African trading partners on SPS and TBT notifications of 35 African WTO members from 2001-2017, we find no general relationship between tariff overhangs and import regulation in our preferred model setting. Larger tariff overhangs specific to intra-African trade relations, however, increase the probability of SPS measures and TBT and thereby contrast with the common assumption of the former functioning as a flexible policy valve. We see the nature of Africa’s formal trade relations as an explanation for these findings. While regional tariff commitments have not only significantly moved African countries away from multilateral commitments, they have also sharply reduced their tariff policy space within Africa, thus seemingly leaving regulatory policy as one of the few legitimate options to level the playing field with the by far closest market competitors.

Noting that few studies to date have investigated the determinants of social cohesion in a comprehensive and systematic manner, this paper examines the macro-level determinants of social cohesion using a panel of up to 92 developing and developed countries for the period 1990–2020. Employing the system GMM dynamic panel data estimator, which addresses endogeneity concerns by means of internal instruments, I find that the levels of education, government size, globalisation, and economic development have significantly positive effects on most dimensions of a country’s social cohesion. In contrast, inflation, corruption and income inequality are detrimental to social cohesion.

Noting that few studies to date have investigated the determinants of social cohesion in a comprehensive and systematic manner, this paper examines the macro-level determinants of social cohesion using a panel of up to 92 developing and developed countries for the period 1990–2020. Employing the system GMM dynamic panel data estimator, which addresses endogeneity concerns by means of internal instruments, I find that the levels of education, government size, globalisation, and economic development have significantly positive effects on most dimensions of a country’s social cohesion. In contrast, inflation, corruption and income inequality are detrimental to social cohesion.

Noting that few studies to date have investigated the determinants of social cohesion in a comprehensive and systematic manner, this paper examines the macro-level determinants of social cohesion using a panel of up to 92 developing and developed countries for the period 1990–2020. Employing the system GMM dynamic panel data estimator, which addresses endogeneity concerns by means of internal instruments, I find that the levels of education, government size, globalisation, and economic development have significantly positive effects on most dimensions of a country’s social cohesion. In contrast, inflation, corruption and income inequality are detrimental to social cohesion.

To bridge the telecom gap between people in rural and urban areas, and between landlocked and coastal countries, African governments and the African Union have supported the continent’s infrastructure development in the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) sector. At the same time, China has increasingly shown an interest in investing in ICT in Africa in order to export its manufacturing products, develop its technology and acquire foreign technology, as well as contributing to its global influence in ICT as stipulated in China’s 12th Five-Year Plan (2011–2015) and 14th Five-Year Plan (2021–2025). China’s increasing interest in ICT and the growing presence of Chinese telecom companies in Africa have contributed to a resurgence of the European Union’s motivation to re-engage in Africa’s ICT sector. This Policy Brief discusses whether, in the development of the African ICT sector, there is an alignment between Chinese telecom companies’ engagement in Africa and the interests of African countries. It argues that while Chinese investment interests meet Africa’s need for the development of its ICT sector, help bridge the telecom gap and contribute to connectivity across the continent, there are risks, challenges and concerns surrounding China’s engagement in African countries’ ICT sector.

To bridge the telecom gap between people in rural and urban areas, and between landlocked and coastal countries, African governments and the African Union have supported the continent’s infrastructure development in the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) sector. At the same time, China has increasingly shown an interest in investing in ICT in Africa in order to export its manufacturing products, develop its technology and acquire foreign technology, as well as contributing to its global influence in ICT as stipulated in China’s 12th Five-Year Plan (2011–2015) and 14th Five-Year Plan (2021–2025). China’s increasing interest in ICT and the growing presence of Chinese telecom companies in Africa have contributed to a resurgence of the European Union’s motivation to re-engage in Africa’s ICT sector. This Policy Brief discusses whether, in the development of the African ICT sector, there is an alignment between Chinese telecom companies’ engagement in Africa and the interests of African countries. It argues that while Chinese investment interests meet Africa’s need for the development of its ICT sector, help bridge the telecom gap and contribute to connectivity across the continent, there are risks, challenges and concerns surrounding China’s engagement in African countries’ ICT sector.

To bridge the telecom gap between people in rural and urban areas, and between landlocked and coastal countries, African governments and the African Union have supported the continent’s infrastructure development in the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) sector. At the same time, China has increasingly shown an interest in investing in ICT in Africa in order to export its manufacturing products, develop its technology and acquire foreign technology, as well as contributing to its global influence in ICT as stipulated in China’s 12th Five-Year Plan (2011–2015) and 14th Five-Year Plan (2021–2025). China’s increasing interest in ICT and the growing presence of Chinese telecom companies in Africa have contributed to a resurgence of the European Union’s motivation to re-engage in Africa’s ICT sector. This Policy Brief discusses whether, in the development of the African ICT sector, there is an alignment between Chinese telecom companies’ engagement in Africa and the interests of African countries. It argues that while Chinese investment interests meet Africa’s need for the development of its ICT sector, help bridge the telecom gap and contribute to connectivity across the continent, there are risks, challenges and concerns surrounding China’s engagement in African countries’ ICT sector.

To bridge the telecom gap between people in rural and urban areas, and between landlocked and coastal countries, African governments and the African Union have supported the continent’s infrastructure development in the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) sector. At the same time, China has increasingly shown an interest in investing in ICT in Africa in order to export its manufacturing products, develop its technology and acquire foreign technology, as well as contributing to its global influence in ICT as stipulated in China’s 12th Five-Year Plan (2011–2015) and 14th Five-Year Plan (2021–2025). China’s increasing interest in ICT and the growing presence of Chinese telecom companies in Africa have contributed to a resurgence of the European Union’s motivation to re-engage in Africa’s ICT sector. This Policy Brief discusses whether, in the development of the African ICT sector, there is an alignment between Chinese telecom companies’ engagement in Africa and the interests of African countries. It argues that while Chinese investment interests meet Africa’s need for the development of its ICT sector, help bridge the telecom gap and contribute to connectivity across the continent, there are risks, challenges and concerns surrounding China’s engagement in African countries’ ICT sector.

To bridge the telecom gap between people in rural and urban areas, and between landlocked and coastal countries, African governments and the African Union have supported the continent’s infrastructure development in the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) sector. At the same time, China has increasingly shown an interest in investing in ICT in Africa in order to export its manufacturing products, develop its technology and acquire foreign technology, as well as contributing to its global influence in ICT as stipulated in China’s 12th Five-Year Plan (2011–2015) and 14th Five-Year Plan (2021–2025). China’s increasing interest in ICT and the growing presence of Chinese telecom companies in Africa have contributed to a resurgence of the European Union’s motivation to re-engage in Africa’s ICT sector. This Policy Brief discusses whether, in the development of the African ICT sector, there is an alignment between Chinese telecom companies’ engagement in Africa and the interests of African countries. It argues that while Chinese investment interests meet Africa’s need for the development of its ICT sector, help bridge the telecom gap and contribute to connectivity across the continent, there are risks, challenges and concerns surrounding China’s engagement in African countries’ ICT sector.

To bridge the telecom gap between people in rural and urban areas, and between landlocked and coastal countries, African governments and the African Union have supported the continent’s infrastructure development in the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) sector. At the same time, China has increasingly shown an interest in investing in ICT in Africa in order to export its manufacturing products, develop its technology and acquire foreign technology, as well as contributing to its global influence in ICT as stipulated in China’s 12th Five-Year Plan (2011–2015) and 14th Five-Year Plan (2021–2025). China’s increasing interest in ICT and the growing presence of Chinese telecom companies in Africa have contributed to a resurgence of the European Union’s motivation to re-engage in Africa’s ICT sector. This Policy Brief discusses whether, in the development of the African ICT sector, there is an alignment between Chinese telecom companies’ engagement in Africa and the interests of African countries. It argues that while Chinese investment interests meet Africa’s need for the development of its ICT sector, help bridge the telecom gap and contribute to connectivity across the continent, there are risks, challenges and concerns surrounding China’s engagement in African countries’ ICT sector.