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Une mesure inscrite à l’article 157 du projet de loi de finances 2026 vise à modifier les règles douanières pour certains biens stratégiques. Le gouvernement […]

L’article La liste des équipements et véhicules neufs autorisés à l’importation est apparu en premier sur .

TASR: Minden kétséget kizáróan sikerült igazolni, hogy a vádlott a terrortámadás különösen súlyos bűncselekményét követte el – jelentette ki szerdán David Lindtner, Robert Fico (Smer) kormányfő jogi képviselője a Besztercebányai Speciális Büntetőbíróságon (ŠTS), Juraj Cintula tárgyalásán, aki tavaly május 15-én merényletet követett el a kormányfő ellen. A bíróság október 21-én hirdet ítéletet.

Während Goalie Kristian Pilipovic sein Comeback gibt, knackt die Offensive der Kadetten Schaffhausen zum fünften Mal hintereinander die 35-Tore-Marke. GC Amicitia Zürich ist auswärts gegen den Ligakrösus chancenlos.

La Commission électorale nationale autonome (CENA) a publié, à travers un communiqué, ce mercredi 8 octobre 2025, le calendrier électoral devant servir à l'organisation des élections couplées communales et législatives de 2026. Selon ce calendrier, l'affichage de la liste électorale démarre le 15 octobre 2025 avec l'Agence nationale d'identification des personnes (ANIP). Cette étape sera suivie de l'enregistrement des déclarations de candidatures à l'élection des membres des conseils communaux le 24 novembre 2025. La campagne électorale démarre le 26 décembre 2025, et le scrutin 11 janvier 2026.

Le calendrier au complet

Defence Commissioner Andrius Kubilius says Mediterranean countries are on the frontline and have “different needs”

Man kann es fast nicht glauben, aber es ist Tatsache: Luca Cereda (44) und Paolo Duca (44) sind nicht mehr bei Ambri. Ihre Reise in der sportlichen Verantwortung ihres Herzensklubs bis zum unwürdigen Abgang im Zeitraster.

Bestimmte Berufe sind mit einem besonderen Unfallrisiko verbunden. Eine Suva-Studie hat das Risiko für Berufsunfälle in verschiedenen Bereichen verglichen. Blick verrät, welche Berufe in der Schweiz besonders riskant sind und welche Unfälle am häufigsten passieren.

J. Cintula szinte semmit nem mondott a bírósági tárgyalás során, de a szerdai (10. 8.) záróbeszédében mindent elárult. Teljesen nyilvánvaló, hogy nem személyes motívumok vezették, hanem kifejezetten politikai célja a merénylettel – jelentette ki Katarína Habčáková ügyész a Besztercebányai Speciális Büntetőbíróságon (ŠTS).

Es ist ein Schlag ins Gesicht der Angehörigen der vier Todesopfer. Thomas Nick (heute 42), der vor zehn Jahren in Rupperswil AG eines der schlimmsten Verbrechen der Schweizer Kriminalgeschichte begangen hat, soll nun eine Therapie erhalten. Wie ist das möglich?

Mit der Parlamentsentscheidung ist der Weg frei für Verhandlungen mit Kommission und Rat, die ihr Mandat bereits im Mai beschlossen hatten.

Oxfam and CARE Climate Justice Centre argue that wealthy nations are profiteering through climate finance loans. Credit: CARE Climate Justice Center

By Oxfam and CARE Climate Justice Center
THE HAGUE, Netherlands , Oct 8 2025 (IPS)

New research by Oxfam and the CARE Climate Justice Centre finds developing countries are now paying more back to wealthy nations for climate finance loans than they receive—for every USD 5 they receive, they are paying USD 7 back, and 65 percent of funding is delivered in the form of loans.

This form of crisis profiteering by rich countries is worsening debt burdens and hindering climate action. Compounding this failure, deep cuts to foreign aid threaten to slash climate finance further, betraying the world’s poorest communities, who are facing the brunt of escalating climate disasters.

Some key findings of the report:

• • Rich countries claim to have mobilized USD 116 billion in climate finance in 2022, but the true value is only around USD 28–35 billion, less than a third of the pledged amount.
  • Nearly two-thirds of climate finance was made as loans, often at standard rates of interest without concessions. As a result, climate finance is adding more each year to developing countries’ debt, which now stands at USD 3.3 trillion. Countries like France, Japan, and Italy are among the worst culprits.
  • Least Developed Countries got only 19.5 percent and Small Island Developing States 2.9 percent of total public climate finance over 2021-2022 and half of that was in the form of loans they have to repay.
  • Developed nations are profiting from these loans, with repayments outstripping disbursements. In 2022, developing countries received USD 62 billion in climate loans. We estimate these loans to lead to repayments of up to USD 88 billion, resulting in a 42 percent ‘profit’ for creditors.
  • Only 3 percent of finance is specifically aimed at enhancing gender equality, despite the climate crisis disproportionately impacting women and girls.

“Rich countries are treating the climate crisis as a business opportunity, not a moral obligation,” said Oxfam’s Climate Policy Lead, Nafkote Dabi. “They are lending money to the very people they have historically harmed, trapping vulnerable nations in a cycle of debt. This is a form of crisis profiteering.”

This failure is occurring as rich countries are conducting the most vicious foreign aid cuts since the 1960s. Data by the OECD shows a 9 percent drop in 2024, with 2025 projections signaling a further 9–17% cut.

As the impacts of fossil fuel-fueled climate disasters intensify—displacing millions of people in the Horn of Africa, battering 13 million more in the Philippines, and flooding 600,000 people in Brazil in 2024 alone—communities in low-income countries are left with fewer resources to adapt to the rapidly changing climate.

“Rich countries are failing on climate finance and they have nothing like a plan to live up to their commitments to increase support. In fact, many wealthy countries are gutting aid, leaving the poorest to pay the price, sometimes with their lives,” said John Norbo, Senior Climate Advisor at CARE Denmark. “COP30 must deliver justice, not another round of empty promises.”

Adaptation funding is also critically underfunded, receiving only 33 percent of climate finance, as investors favor mitigation projects with more immediate financial returns.

Ahead of COP30, Oxfam and CARE are calling on rich countries to:

Live up to climate finance commitments: Provide the full USD 600 billion for 2020–2025 and clearly outline how they plan to scale up to the agreed USD 300 billion annually, and lead on the USD 1.3 trillion Baku to Belém roadmap.

• • Stop crisis profiteering: Drastically increase the share of grants and highly concessional finance to prevent further indebting the world’s most climate-vulnerable communities.
  • Multiply adaptation finance: Commit to at least triple adaptation finance by 2030, using the COP26 goal to double adaptation financing by 2025 as a baseline.
  • Provide finance for loss and damage: The global Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage must be adequately capitalized. Victims of climate change must not continue to be ignored.
  • Mobilize new sources of finance: Raise funds by taxing the super-rich, which in OECD countries alone can raise 1.2 trillion a year, and the excess profit of fossil fuel companies globally, which could raise 400 billion per year annually.

You can read the full report here.

The CARE Climate Justice Center (CJC) leads and coordinates the integration of climate justice and resilience across CARE International’s development and humanitarian work. The CJC is an initiative powered by CARE Denmark, CARE France, CARE Germany, CARE Netherlands, and CARE International UK.

Results of a global survey by Oxfam International and Greenpeace show 8 out of 10 people support paying for public services and climate action through taxing the super-rich.

The research was conducted by first-party data company Dynata in May-June 2025, in Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Kenya, Italy, India, Mexico, the Philippines, South Africa, Spain, the UK and the US.

The survey had approximately 1 200 respondents per country, with a margin of error of +-2.83%. Together, these countries represent close to half the world’s population.

IPS UN Bureau Report

 

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Excerpt:

Nearly two-thirds of climate finance was made as loans, often at standard rates of interest without concessions, research by Oxfam and CARE Climate Justice Centre has found.

Im September 2023 brachte Netflix mit «Beckham» eine Dokumentation über den Aufstieg von David Beckham heraus. Nach dem Megaerfolg zieht der Streaming-Gigant nun nach und beleuchtet in «Victoria Beckham» die Karriere seiner Ehefrau. Und diese verrät Überraschendes.

Thylane Blondeau wurde einst zum schönsten Mädchen der Welt ernannt. Inzwischen ist die Französin erwachsen. Sie hat aus dem damaligen Titel so einiges gemacht.

Depuis plusieurs mois, le JNIM, groupe affilié à Al-Qaïda, impose un blocus économique sur les transporteurs maliens, interdisant le ravitaillement en carburant vers Bamako. Après Ségou, Sikasso, Nioro et Kayes, la capitale Bamako subit à son tour les effets de ce « djihad économique », tandis que l’État tente de maîtriser la situation.

Machtübergabe oder Machterhalt? CEO Gilles Andrier zieht sich noch nicht zurück, sondern wird Präsident des Verwaltungsrats.

Ungenutzter Wohnraum ist ein Luxus, den sich die Schweiz eigentlich nicht leisten kann. Doch gerade viele halbleere Bauernhäuser stehen ausserhalb der Bauzone. Das will eine Interessensgemeinschaft im Kanton Freiburg nun ändern.

Le projet de la loi des Finances 2026 (PLF 2026) prévoit d’introduire des modifications dans la réglementation du transport de devises et d’objets de valeur […]

L’article Devises, métaux précieux… Le PLF 2026 durcit les contrôles pour les voyageurs en Algérie est apparu en premier sur .

Mobilezone will sich in Zukunft voll auf die Schweiz konzentrieren: Die Handyladenkette verkauft ihr sowieso schon schwächelndes Deutschland-Geschäft.

Written by Sebastian Clapp.

EU Member States’ defence expenditure rose significantly between 2021 and 2024. The EU has introduced several initiatives to complement national efforts in order to boost defence spending and collaboration.

Member States’ defence budgets

After severely under-investing in defence for years, EU Member States have significantly increased their defence spending since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. In 2021, the combined defence budgets of the 27 EU Member States amounted to around €218 billion. In 2024, defence spending across the EU-27 already amounted to €343 billion, or 1.9 % of the EU’s gross domestic product. Projections indicate that in 2025. expenditure could reach €392 billion at current prices (€381 billion in 2024 prices), or 2.1 % of GDP. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states agreed to a new defence investment commitment of 5 % of GDP at the 2025 NATO Summit in The Hague. By 2035, they vowed to dedicate a minimum of 3.5 % of GDP each year, to fund core defence needs and fulfil capability targets. In addition, they will allocate up to 1.5 % of GDP annually to tasks such as safeguarding critical infrastructure, securing networks, enhancing civil preparedness and resilience, fostering innovation, and reinforcing the defence industrial base. Increasing the guideline from 2 % to 3.5 % of GDP will demand significant additional spending for the 23 NATO member states that are also EU members, requiring an extra €254 billion and raising total defence expenditure to around €635 billion, according to the European Defence Agency.

Despite EU Member States’ sustained efforts to enhance readiness and strengthen their armed forces, they continue to lag behind other major powers in overall defence spending. The United States has consistently devoted over 3 % of GDP to defence since 2008; in 2024, it spent €845 billion, or 3.1 % of GDP – nearly two and a half times the combined EU total of €343 billion. EU defence budgets are set nationally, leading to fragmentation, duplication of effort and reduced efficiency. Although EU spending exceeds that reported by Russia (€107 billion) and China (€250 billion) – and those amounts are probably much higher than officially communicated – these countries are likely to achieve greater cost-effectiveness due to centralised planning, lower prices and less fragmentation. Russia’s defence budget reached an estimated €234 billion in 2024 in purchasing power parity terms (about 5.5 % of GDP) and is projected to rise further.

EU defence funding programmes

While defence remains a national competence, the EU plays a complementary role by reinforcing Member States’ efforts through both support for higher national defence spending and the use of EU budgetary resources. The EU has launched a range of programmes to encourage stronger collaboration:

• the European Defence Fund (EDF), a €8 billion fund (2021-2027) to boost the competitiveness of the European defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB) by incentivising joint research and development of defence equipment. The EDF received a €1.5 billion increase through the mid-term review of the multiannual financial framework (MFF); however, rather than being used for additional projects under the EDF, these funds were earmarked for the future European defence industry programme (EDIP). By March 2025, the European Commission had adopted five annual EDF work programmes, committing a total of €5.4 billion to collaborative defence research and capability development (around €6 billion including the precursor programmes EDIDP and PADR);
• the 2023 Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP), with a budget of €500 million. Through ASAP, the EU offered funding to strengthen industrial production capacities for ground-to-ground and artillery ammunition, as well as missiles;
• the 2023 European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act (EDIRPA), an EU instrument with a budget of €310 million aimed at incentivising cooperation in defence procurement between Member States to jointly coordinate and acquire the most urgent defence product needs. Five projects were selected, e.g. Mistral air defence systems;
• the proposed €1.5 billion European defence industry programme, which is still under negotiation and would run until the end of 2027. EDIP translates the objectives of the European defence industrial strategy into concrete action. It consolidates two existing EU initiatives – EDIRPA and ASAP – and introduces new rules designed to strengthen security of supply and promote sustained armaments cooperation;
• theEuropean Peace Facility (EPF), a fund worth over €17 billion financed outside the EU budget for a seven-year period (2021 to 2027) that aims to enhance the EU’s ability to prevent conflicts, build and preserve peace, and strengthen international security. Between 2022 and 2024, the EU mobilised €6.1 billion under the EPF to address Ukraine’s pressing military and defence needs. Together with the military support provided by EU Member States, overall EU support for the Ukrainian army is estimated at €63.2 billion;
• the ReArm Europe Plan/Readiness 2030. Member States aim to mobilise €800 billion under the plan to finance a massive ramp-up of defence spending through:
  • activation of the national escape clause under the stability and growth pact, allowing Member States to increase defence spending. The Commission estimates that a €650 billion fiscal space could be achieved if all EU Member States gradually increase their defence spending, reaching the maximum of 1.5 % of GDP by the end of the four-year national escape clause activation period. The Council has activated flexibility in EU fiscal rules at the request of only 15 Member States so far to increase defence spending; this is EU Member States’ defence spending;
  • the €150 billion Security Action for Europe (SAFE) loan instrument. The funds will be raised on capital markets and disbursed to interested Member States on demand, based on national plans. SAFE was adopted in May 2025; 19 Member States have so far requested a SAFE loan;
  • contributions from the European Investment Bank Group (EIB): the EIB, which has revised its lending policy and created a Security and Defence Office, plans to allocate 3.5 % of its 2025 financing (about €3.5 billion) to security and defence projects. Through the Defence Equity Facility, the European Investment Fund will invest €175 million between 2024 and 2027 to mobilise about €500 million for private funds targeting innovative dual-use defence technologies;
  • making existing EU instruments more flexible to allow greater defence investment: for instance, the European Parliament and the Council have adopted amendments to the EU cohesion policy to better address current and emerging strategic challenges, including security and defence;
• military mobility budget: the EU has a dedicated budget of €1.7 billion for military mobility projects under the Connecting Europe Facility for the 2021-2027 period. Three calls for proposals in the field of military mobility were carried out in 2021, 2022 and 2023. In total, 95 projects were selected (all funds in the current MFF have already been allocated);

Moreover, the Commission has proposed €131 billion for defence and space in the 2028-2034 MFF.

European Parliament position

Parliament has repeatedly urged higher defence spending, supporting both increased national budgets and greater funding for EU defence programmes alongside deeper cooperation among Member States.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU defence funding‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.