European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

Russia’s war on Ukraine has sent global food prices soaring. It has fuelled inflation in the European Union, the United States and many other countries, while threatening hunger in some poorer regions. Russia and Ukraine play a major role in food and fertiliser supply. They export about 30 per cent of the world’s wheat and 75 per cent of its sunflower oil. Some countries in Africa and the Middle East are nearly 100-per cent dependent on Russian or Ukrainian food. According to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, food prices in May were up by nearly 30 per cent from a year earlier. Western countries are debating a plan to open up supply chains, for example by unblocking Ukrainian ports on the Black Sea, and to provide foodfinancing to developing countries.

This note gathers links to the recent publications and commentaries from international think tanks on the impact of the war on global and European food markets. Analyses on the Ukraine war and its implications for the energy market can be found in a previous edition of the ‘What Think Tanks are Thinking’ series.

The war in Ukraine triggered a global food shortage
Brookings Institution, June 2022

Food security: The role and limits of international rules on export restrictions
Bruegel, June 2022

Russia is intensifying the global food crisis
Centre for Eastern Studies, June 2022

Can the West afford to let the world go hungry? Overcoming challenges to establishing a humanitarian corridor in the Black Sea
Istituto Affari Internazionali, June 2022

Authoritarian leaders are turning to food export bans amid war in Ukraine
Peterson Institute for International Economics, June 2022

Production and export of food from Ukraine during the war with Russia
Centre for Eastern Studies, May 2022

Sustainable agriculture and food systems
Chatham House, May 2022

Why Ukraine’s ports are vital for global food prices
Heritage Foundation, May 2022

India’s wheat export ban: Bad economics, good politics, modest impact
Peterson Institute for International Economics, May 2022

The Ukraine war and food security in Africa: ‘Meeting the acute needs is not solving the general problem’
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, May 2022

The Ukraine war is deepening global food insecurity: What can be done?
United States institute of Peace, May 2022

The Ukraine war and threats to food and energy security
Chatham House, April 2022

Ukraine’s bread basket is emptying fast
Chatham House, April 2022

How Russia’s war in Ukraine could amplify food insecurity in the Mideast
Council on Foreign Relations, April 2022

Food crisis: Wheat imports from Russia and Ukraine
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, April 2022

Food price inflation continues to worsen: Here’s what should be done about it
Heritage Foundation, April 2022

Rising food prices: Global risks and vulnerabilities
Italian Institute for International Political Studies, April 2022

Russia’s war with Ukraine will force the acceleration of food production reforms in Africa
Polish Institute of International Affairs, April 2022

The Russian invasion of Ukraine endangers African food security in the long-term
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, April 2022

Obscured by the energy crisis, a food crisis unfolds
Atlantic Council, March 2022

East Africa’s growing food crisis: What to know
Brookings Institution, March 2022

The impact of the war in Ukraine on food security
Bruegel, March 2022

The economic policy consequences of the war
Bruegel, March 2022

Russia’s invasion leaves North Africa with a food crisis: What can Europe do?
European Centre for Development Policy Management, March 2022

Putin’s war: Driving Ukrainians into hunger, and the rest of the world as well
Friends of Europe, March 2022

Long-run impacts of the conflict in Ukraine on food security in Africa
Institut für Weltwirtschaft Kiel, March 2022

Guerre en Ukraine: Comment sauver la sécurité alimentaire sans sacrifier la transition agroécologique ?
Terra Nova, March 2022

Read this briefing on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine and food security‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Frederik Scholaert.

The Russian war against Ukraine has led to high operating costs for the seafood sector. In late March 2022, the EU responded with temporary State aid and exceptional support for the current programming period under the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund (EMFAF). On 23 April 2022, the Commission adopted a new proposal amending the fund for the 2014-2020 programming period, so that its remaining budget can also be used to support the sector. During the July plenary session, Parliament is due to vote on its position on the file.

Background

The Russian war against Ukraine has significantly affected fishermen, aquaculture farmers and fish‑processing companies. In particular, increased energy prices threaten the profitability of the fishing industry. The monthly marine gasoil price increased from about €0.60 per litre in January 2022 to €1.00 in May 2022. While the EU sanctions do not include a ban on seafood trade, with the exception of some luxury seafood products, trade flows have been severely hampered, especially for EU fish-processing companies that rely on supplies of whitefish from Russia. In addition, Black Sea fisheries face a direct security threat.

First package of measures

In March 2022, the Commission adopted a package of measures to support the economy in the context of Russia’s invasion. Temporary State aid rules allow fishery and aquaculture companies to receive up to €35 000 in aid, and all companies affected by the crisis to get liquidity support and compensation for the high energy prices. In addition, the Commission triggered the EMFAF Regulation crisis mechanism, by declaring an event causing significant disruption to markets. This allows Member States to compensate operators for lost income or additional costs and producer organisations for the storage of fishery products.

Commission proposal

On 13 April 2022, the Commission adopted a new proposal to amend the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF) – the predecessor of the EMFAF – which covered the 2014-2020 programming period. This would allow the taking of similar emergency measures to those activated under the EMFAF, namely financial compensation for additional costs, for income forgone and for the storage of products. Temporary cessation of fishing activities would be supported where they are currently unsafe. The proposal comes in the form of an amending regulation, as the EMFF does not contain a crisis mechanism to trigger emergency measures in the event of a crisis.

European Parliament position

Given the urgency of ensuring aid to the sector, Parliament’s Committee on Fisheries (PECH) acted quickly on the legislative proposal. On 20 June 2022, PECH unanimously adopted its report on the file, in which it proposed extending support for temporary cessation to all fishing activities where economic viability is impeded. As the PECH report is aligned with the position of the Council, no interinstitutional negotiations will be needed. The text is scheduled to be voted in plenary in July 2022.

First-reading report: 2022/0118(COD); Committee responsible: PECH; Rapporteur: Nuno Melo (EPP, Portugal). For further information, see the EPRS ‘At a glance’ note on the first package of measures.

Read this at a glance on ‘Russia’s war against Ukraine: Support for the seafood sector using leftover 2014-2020 budget‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Isabel Teixeira Nadkarni (Legislative Planning and Coordination Unit, Directorate-General for the Presidency).

INTRODUCTION

Czechia is a parliamentary republic with a head of government – the prime minister – and a head of state – the president. The current Prime Minister is Petr Fiala, from the Civic Democratic Party (ODS). He has been in office since November 2021 and was preceded by Andrej Babiš (2017-2021), the founder of the party ANO 2011. Czech President Miloš Zeman was first elected to the post in 2013 and had previously served as prime minister, from 1998 to 2002.

The supreme executive body is the government. It is led by the prime minister and appointed by the president of the republic. The president also appoints other government members based on the prime minister’s recommendations. Before it is installed, the government must win a vote of confidence in the Chamber of Deputies.

The Spolu alliance, formed for the 2021 legislative election, was composed of the Civic Democratic Party (ODS), KDU-ČSL (Christian and Democratic Union), and TOP 09 (Tradition, Responsibility, Prosperity). It currently governs the country in a coalition with the Pirates and Mayors’ alliance.

The Czech Parliament is bicameral. The upper house is the Senate (81 members elected for six years) and the lower house is the Chamber of Deputies (200 members elected for four years). There are currently seven parties in the Chamber of Deputies:

• ANO 2011 (ANO) – 72 members
• Civic Democratic Party (ODS) – 34 members
• Mayors and Independents (STAN) – 33 members
• Christian and Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People’s Party (KDU-ČSL) – 23 members
• Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD) – 20 members
• TOP 09 – 14 members
• Czech Pirate Party (Pirati) – 4 members

All of these parties except the SPD also have seats in the Senate, where the Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD) and the Green Party (Z) also have seats. The Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM) holds no seats in the Chamber or the Senate but has one elected member of the European Parliament and representatives at regional level.

Czechia will hold the Presidency of the Council of the EU for the second time. The previous time was in the first half of 2009, coinciding with the last months of the sixth legislative term of the European Parliament and with the European elections, held between 4 and 7 June 2009.

The programme of the Trio formed together with France and Sweden has as its thematic priorities to protect citizens and freedoms; to promote a new growth and investment model for Europe; to build a climate-neutral, green, fair and social Europe; and to promote Europe’s interests and values in the world.

PART A: POLITICAL PRIORITIES OF THE CZECH PRESIDENCY

The Czech Presidency comes at a crucial time for the EU, faced with the challenges posed by the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine. Politically, the current security and geo-political situation will have an impact on the work of the Presidency and could well dominate the coming six months. Many issues will need to be addressed, particularly in the field of defence, refugees, displaced persons, financial aid and the accession perspective for Ukraine.

The ramifications of the war, including its impact on energy policy and the ‘Fit for 55’ package, on the EU’s economic recovery and its democratic resilience, as well as on the unity and internal dynamics of the Union, are likely to be high up on the agenda.

The motto of the Czech Presidency, ‘Europe as a task’, is inspired by a speech delivered by former Czech President Václav Havel in Aachen, at the Charlemagne Prize ceremony, in 1996. The triple challenge is to ‘rethink, rebuild, repower’ Europe.

The Czech priorities for the second half of 2022 will focus on the following topics:

• Managing the refugee crisis and Ukraine’s post-war recovery,
• Energy security,
• Strengthening Europe’s defence capabilities and cyberspace security,
• Strategic resilience of the European economy,
• Resilience of democratic institutions.

In light of the developments brought about by the Ukrainian refugee crisis, the Presidency aims to take work forward on the Pact on Migration and Asylum, presented by the Commission on 23 September 2020 (both Parliament and Council still have to adopt their respective positions on the proposals). The Czech Presidency will build on the principles of solidarity, efficiency and flexibility in this area.

The Fit for 55 climate package will also be high on the Czech Presidency’s agenda. Ensuring access to affordable, sustainable and reliable energy sources is one of the biggest challenges the EU is facing. In the next six months, the green and digital transitions will continue to be in the spotlight, but also security, in particular the implementation of the Strategic Compass, approved by the Council on 21 March 2022. The Czechs are due to take forward the Versailles agenda, based on the declaration adopted by EU leaders on 10-11 March 2022, which outlines how the EU can bolster defence capabilities, reduce energy dependency and build a more robust economic base.

The Czech Presidency will lead crucial legislative files in the Council, such as those in the Fit for 55 package, through interinstitutional negotiations and will be closely involved in the initiatives aimed at mitigating the impact of the energy crisis in Europe, including the RePowerEU plan. An important aspect is the diversification of sources including logistics, energy savings and acceleration of the transition to low-emission and renewable energy sources. The Presidency will work on the implementation of the regulation of gas reserves, i.e. filling storage facilities in the run-up to winter, and the promotion of voluntary joint purchases, so that the EU uses its combined weight in a similar way as with the purchase of Covid-19 vaccines.

Strengthening the single market, boosting innovation and competiveness, and reducing dependence on hostile or unstable regimes will be paramount for the resilience of the European economy. The European Chips Act, which aims to bolster Europe’s competitiveness and resilience in semiconductor technologies and applications, is a key proposal for the Czech Presidency, alongside the Artificial Intelligence Act and cybersecurity. It will also strive for the adoption of the European Digital Identity Wallet (a secure and trustworthy pan-European tool for proving a citizen’s identity) and the creation of an efficient and fair data market.

In 2022, the Single Market celebrates its 30th anniversary. Taking into account the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic in the single market and the challenging geopolitical context, the EU will need to identify further growth potential and address businesses and consumers’ concerns. Measures to ensure food security inside and outside the EU in light of the Russian invasion of Ukraine should also be considered during the coming months.

Furthermore, the Czech Presidency plans to focus on a number of trade agreements, with South American countries, Australia and New Zealand. Cooperation with Indo-Pacific partners is also due to be a priority issue, particularly in areas such as cybersecurity, supply chain security and space.

On social policy, the Czech Presidency will continue with the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights. The Trio committed itself to improving working conditions, including in the digital economy and for people working through platforms, to tackle gender inequalities in the labour market, including through measures to close the gender pay gap and through the promotion of equal opportunities for women and men to reconcile work, family and private life.

As regards democratic resilience, the Czechs aim to focus on media freedom (the Commission is due to present the European Media Freedom Act proposal in the third quarter of 2022), on transparency in financing political parties in the EU and on the rule of law, including in Hungary and Poland.

Still on the topic of democratic resilience, the Czech Presidency is expected to make progress on the proposal on Strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) and on the proposal on transparency and targeting of political advertising.

In relation to the ongoing hearings under Article 7(1) TEU concerning Poland and Hungary, in a resolution approved on 5 May 2022 the European Parliament urged the upcoming presidencies to organise the hearings ‘regularly and at least once per presidency’. It called on the Council to ensure that hearings under Article 7(1) TEU also address new developments, including those related to violations of fundamental rights. The Council has so far organised five hearings on Poland and, by the end of May 2022, four hearings on Hungary within the framework of the General Affairs Council (GAC).

The Western Balkans region is also due to be among the regional priorities of the Czechs.

PART B: TOPICAL INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES Conference on the Future of Europe

The follow-up of the Conference on the Future of Europe’s final report – with 49 proposals to reform the EU, including Treaty change – delivered to the Presidents of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on 9 May 2022, will also need to be carried out by the Czech Presidency. In the 18-month programme of the Council, the French, Czech and Swedish Presidencies state that, based on the political conclusions of the Conference, ‘they will begin implementing them, as appropriate’.

The Czech Presidency aims to make use of these ideas and to create a space for the continuation of the debate. While implementing the European Year of Youth 2022, the Presidency will put emphasis on improving dialogue with young people and promoting their participation in political/policy processes.

EU budget for 2023

The draft general budget for 2023, presented by the Commission on 7 June 2022, will have to be negotiated between the Czech Presidency of the Council and the European Parliament by the end of this year. Uncertainty in the economic outlook persists, in the light of factors such as supply chain disruption, high energy prices, rising inflation and the continuing Covid-19 pandemic, as well as the consequences of the war in Ukraine.

The EU budget will continue to mobilise significant investments to boost Europe’s strategic autonomy, the ongoing economic recovery, safeguard sustainability and create jobs. It should prioritise green and digital investments while addressing pressing needs arising from recent and current crises. Additional proposals to finance the impact of the war in Ukraine both externally and internally are due to be tabled later in the year, on the basis of a more precise assessment of needs.

Furthermore, in its resolution on general guidelines for the preparation of the 2023 budget, approved in plenary on 5 April 2022, Parliament stresses that ‘a revision of the current MFF [Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027] is indispensable’, calling on the Commission to ‘assess when an MFF revision would be appropriate’.

Reform of the Electoral Act

Following Parliament’s legislative resolution on the reform of the EU’s electoral law, adopted on 3 May 2022, the Czech Presidency is due to steer negotiations in the Council, where unanimity will be needed on this matter. The formalisation of the lead candidate (Spitzenkandidat) process and the introduction of a Union-wide constituency, from which 28 members of the European Parliament would be elected (transnational list), are among Parliament’s proposals.

Programming of legislative priorities: Joint Declaration

It is also under the Czech Presidency that the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission should agree on the joint programming of legislative priorities in the form of a Joint Declaration, signed by the three Presidents, which is expected to cover 2023 as well as the first half of-2024, to coincide with the next European elections. The Czech Presidency will also carry on with the implementation of the Joint Declaration 2022, as negotiated at the end of the Slovenian Presidency.

The need to address the consequences of the war in Ukraine and the conclusions of the Conference on the Future of Europe are among the issues that should be reflected in the Commission work programme (CWP) for 2023. The current situation and the need to adopt emergency measures may require that the Commission postpones some of the initiatives planned for 2022 (the Commission has committed itself to duly inform Parliament of any delays).

Read this briefing on ‘Priority dossiers under the Czech EU Council Presidency‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Luisa Antunes.

The rapid growth of genetic databases worldwide, coupled with fast-decreasing costs and the rapid pace of technological change, has increased the possibility of every human genome on Earth being sequenced this century. This raises ethical and legal questions on data privacy and ownership. While a global genetic database would revolutionise preventive medicine and research, new forms of surveillance, discrimination and power imbalances could emerge. The global interplay between the individual, the state and private individuals could shift, requiring modern and flexible legislation to protect the rights of the individual.

When genome-sequencing technology – the ability to read each ‘letter’ of our DNA code – was first developed in the 1970s, it involved a laborious process of sequentially identifying each base pair (between A, T, G or C). This revolutionary technology became the ‘gold standard’ used until the 2000s, including in the first successful cloning of a mammal, Dolly the sheep, born in 1996. The 1990s also saw a race for the first human genome sequence, achieved in 2001. Newer, next-generation sequencing techniques have since evolved, allowing for faster and cheaper results. Where sequencing a human genome (more than 3 billion base pairs) cost US$95 million in 2001, it is now feasible for under €500 and within 24 hours. Yet, the first fully complete human genome sequence was only published in early 2022, with the sequencing of the missing 8 %.

Alongside these technological advances, the last 30 years have seen the emergence of DNA databases hosted by governments and companies for forensic or health purposes. The first was created in the United Kingdom in 1995. It hosts DNA from 6.6 million individuals linked to crime scenes, but has been accused of racial bias, since 40 % of the DNA samples came from males of ethnic minority origin, in contrast to 9 % from white men. The United States database (with 9 million profiles) has come up against the same criticism. Questions of data privacy and human rights loom over China’s profiling of more than 40 million individuals, including ethnic minorities. In Kuwait, DNA testing was made mandatory for the entire population in 2015 as an anti-terrorism measure, a requirement abandoned only two years later, because of privacy concerns. Closer to home, France hosts the EU’s biggest forensic database, with 1.9 million DNA profiles, while Interpol has access to 54 national DNA databases.

Health genetic testing started in the mid-1980s, to detect cystic fibrosis and other rare genetic conditions. Estonia and Iceland were pioneers, with 15 % and 8 % of their respective populations now sequenced, which has allowed research on national ancestry and the epidemiology of rare genes. The UK, the Faroe Islands and three northern provinces in the Netherlands also have large databases. The USA has sequenced 1 million genomes. In Dubai, a large-scale project was launched in 2018, to prevent genetic disease. In Russia, the processing of personal data, including beliefs and sexual identity, is permitted for research purposes without personal consent. Privately owned databases entered the market in the late 1990s. They offer direct-to-consumer (DTC) genetic testing for genealogy and health purposes. The largest are AncestryDNA, with 14 million records, followed by 23andMe (9 million), MyHeritageDNA (3 million), and Family Tree DNA (2 million).

We carry 10 times more microbial cells in our bodies than human cells. The bacteria and other microorganisms that live in our skin, intestines, mouth and sexual organs contribute to the normal functioning of the immune system and help combat the development of several diseases, including Covid‑19. It can therefore be argued that a world human genome database would not be complete without including microbiome data. The Human Microbiome Project, which ran from 2007 to 2016, collected 32 terabytes of metagenomic data on the link between our microbiota and common diseases.

Potential impacts and developments

The rapid development of public and private databases, along with fast-declining costs and ever-evolving technology, is opening the door to a future where all human genomes could be sequenced. However, the first impact may well be the production of copious amounts of data, requiring improved data processing and storage.

The medical field is likely to be revolutionised, with advances in the research and treatment of both common and rare diseases. Medical research may become more equitable, if the genetic diversity of existing databases, currently heavily biased towards those of European descent, is widened. BRCA1/2 gene screening made news headlines in 2015, when actor and United Nations (UN) Special Envoy Angelina Jolie went public with her decision to undergo a double mastectomy to reduce her chances of developing breast cancer. Preventive medicine could become standard in the detection of cancers and Alzheimer’s disease. However, genetic predisposition is not always deterministic, as environment, personal health and life choices also play a significant role in disease development. Genetic screening has also been shown to temporarily increase psychological stress for individuals. Should genome editing lead to increased population longevity, it is to be expected that there will be implications for demography, the economy, education, employment, the environment, healthcare, housing and pensions .

In evolutionary anthropology, a recent study revealed links between genetics and migratory historical events during the Spanish Reconquista. The large hereditary investigation market opened by DTC testing could have serious consequences, if information on all human genomes becomes freely accessible, with implications for family relations, as well as data ownership and privacy rights, in the particular cases of sperm donation and adoption.

Genetic surveillance will also be affected. In a world where everyone has their genome sequenced, a clear legal framework will be crucial in defining who has access to and who owns the data (the state, private companies and/or individuals). One option would be for every human to have their own DNA privately stored and to be able to decide when to share it with trusted entities – doctors for example.

Questions of data privacy also link to ethical and equity issues. Widely accessible genetic information could open the door to new forms of discrimination in the workplace (recruitment based on genetic disease risk), in education (selection based on genetic traits), in healthcare and by insurance companies (more expensive rates for those with unfavourable traits).

Anticipatory policy-making

In a future where all human genomes are sequenced, legislators will need to address ethical and privacy concerns. This calls for interdisciplinary ethical bodies with experts in legal, societal and medical fields. The UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) considers genetic data to be a human rights issue. The 1997 Oviedo Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (not yet signed by all EU Member States) is the only international legally binding instrument on the protection of human rights in biomedicine, including genetic data. Genomic sequencing has since expanded, and framework gaps and the need for privacy safeguards have become increasingly clear. As genetic data has become a source of profit for insurance and DTC companies, future legislation will need to differentiate between commercial and public health interests. While restrictive legislation on accessing genetic data might offer protection against discrimination, the same restrictions could prevent researchers from investigating novel medical approaches. Two legislative acts are relevant in this field. The European Commission’s European health data space (EHDS) proposal is aimed at ensuring a clear legal framework, while empowering individuals’ control over their health data. The proposed AI act will play a key role in genetic data governance, as digital rights extend to personal genetic data. On the privacy of genetic data, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) offers a starting point for effective policy-making. Legislation will need to address companies offering DTC testing, where a regulated market could help set up quality assurance for genetic testing services. The Council of Europe has adopted a recommendation stating that insurance companies should not request genetic testing. Finally, EU legislation should address the potential international impacts of sequencing all human beings. International agreements on genetic data usage are desirable; otherwise, countries with fewer regulations could offer loopholes for more heavily regulated business sectors in the EU.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘What if we sequenced all human genomes?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘What if we sequenced all human genomes?’ on YouTube.

Written by Agnieszka Widuto.

The Sustainable Development Goals were established in 2015 as part of the United Nations (UN) 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The signatories adopted a policy framework with 17 goals, addressing issues such as poverty, hunger, health and wellbeing, education, gender equality, environment and climate, strong institutions, peace and justice. Sustainable development aims at balancing social, economic and environmental aspects, seeing them as interconnected.

The European Union (EU) has contributed to both setting and implementing the SDGs. It has committed to deliver on the 2030 Agenda through its internal and external policies, as outlined in the Towards a Sustainable Europe by 2030 reflection paper, the European Green Deal and the European Commission’s political priorities and work programme. To measure their progress towards achieving the goals, EU Member States prepare voluntary national reviews, in line with UN guidelines. EU-level progress is measured through a set of indicators adapted to the EU context, and Eurostat publishes annual monitoring reports on the results. The objectives of the SDGs were integrated into the European Semester in 2019.

The SDGs also have a regional dimension, sometimes called ‘localisation’. Achieving around 65 % of the targets is estimated to depend on input from local and regional authorities. Numerous regions and cities, including in the EU, have expressed support for the SDGs and many have integrated them in their policy frameworks. Efforts to localise the SDGs are ongoing and regional achievements are featured in the national reviews presented at international conferences. Monitoring SDGs at the regional level can thus help support the overall implementation of the SDGs, reinforce national efforts, support regional development strategies, and provide a broader picture of within-country trends. The European Parliament has expressed its support for an EU sustainable development strategy and enhanced involvement of regional, local and civil society stakeholders in SDG implementation.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in EU regions‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in EU regions‘ on YouTube.

Written by Clare Ferguson.

The last plenary session before the summer recess takes place in Strasbourg on 4-7 July 2022, with Members set to consider a packed agenda of policy decisions, many of which address the new geopolitical and economic realities resulting from Russia’s war against Ukraine. Unsurprisingly therefore, Czechia’s priorities for its second six-month Presidency of the Council of the EU include protecting EU citizens and freedoms, and its interests and values on the world stage; providing momentum for growth and investment; and supporting the ongoing EU climate and social policies. Members will consider the planned programme of activities, which began on 1 July 2022, in a key debate on Wednesday morning. A debate on the conclusions of the 23-24 June 2022 European Council meeting will follow. This session’s ‘This is Europe‘ debate is scheduled to take place on Tuesday morning, with the Prime Minister of Greece, Kyriakos Mitsotakis.

Parliament is set to approve two important pieces of proposed legislation following a debate on Monday evening, – the digital markets act and the digital services act – following a political agreement reached between the co-legislators. The digital markets act is the EU’s answer to tackling the dominance of a few large platforms that act as gatekeepers, controlling access to digital markets, and distorting competition. Through its three main provisions, the legislation should provide a definition of a large platform (those with €7.5 billion in annual turnover and €75 billion in market capitalisation), will oblige them to ensure their services are interoperable, and will ban them from giving preference to their own products in search results or re-using personal data. The European Commission will enforce the law, with the possibility to levy fines of up to 20 % of a company’s worldwide turnover. The new digital services act should boost consumer protection through rules promoting a safer and more transparent online environment. Parliament has ensured that the new law makes the platforms hosting online search engines, social media and marketplace platforms, responsible for protecting users against harmful and illegal content. Online platforms will also be obliged to be more transparent and accountable, with larger platforms subject to stricter rules. The European Commission will share enforcement with national authorities, according to the size of the platform concerned.

On Monday evening, and in advance of an important step set for 1 January 2023, Members are expected to consider a Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) report on Croatia’s pathway to its adoption of the euro. The report concurs with European Commission and European Central Bank assessments that price stability, fiscal sustainability, exchange rate fluctuations and long-term interest rates in the country prove that Croatia is ready to adopt the euro. The legal act is expected to be adopted by the Council in July.

Against the background of Russia’s continued aggression against Ukraine, and following EU leaders’ 23 June decision to grant EU candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova and to confirm Georgia’s European perspective, Members turn once again to prospects for EU enlargement, this time in the Western Balkans. Members are set to debate Foreign Affairs (AFET) Committee reports on the Commission’s 2021 assessment of accession prospects for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Kosovo[1] on Tuesday afternoon. The AFET report on Bosnia and Herzegovina underlines the pressing need for a broader strategic and security approach to the Western Balkans, and calls for elections and electoral reform to go ahead in the country as planned. The AFET committee notes Kosovo‘s intention to apply for EU membership in 2022, but stresses that, as for other new applicants, there is no fast-track procedure. While judicial independence and reform is one issue to resolve before Kosovo can advance its European ambitions, another is the normalisation of relations with Serbia. While the committee reconfirms unequivocal support for the EU-facilitated Belgrade–Pristina dialogue, the AFET report on Serbia‘s progress towards accession in 2021 obviously underlines the country’s ambivalent attitude to EU policies and values and its reluctance to stand against Russia.

In the context of Russia’s war against Ukraine, Members are set to vote on additional crisis measures to support the EU fishery and aquaculture sectors on Wednesday lunchtime. Given the urgency to act, Parliament’s Committee on Fisheries (PECH) swiftly approved the proposal to provide support for the seafood sector, hard-hit by rising fuel prices and trade disruption, by using amounts leftover from the 2014‑2020 budget.

Returning to the ‘Fit for 55’ package aimed at cutting EU emissions, Members will consider a Committee on Transport and Tourism (TRAN) report on the proposed RefuelEU aviation initiative on Thursday morning. While the initiative seeks to increase availability of sustainable aviation fuels at EU airports, the TRAN committee seeks a wider scope, proposing that more sustainable fuels are made available at more airports and for more aircraft. While the report seeks a wider definition of renewable fuel to include electricity, it supports the exclusion of food and feed based fuel, as well as further research into alternatives.

Ahead of the 15th Conference of the Parties (COP15), Parliament will use the revived ‘question time’ scheduled for Tuesday afternoon to scrutinise the Commission on EU biodiversity protection. Parliament strongly supports the current initiatives to protect and restore biodiversity in the EU, and advocates EU-wide mandatory pesticide reduction.

Finally, Parliament is committed to making EU laws and policies simpler and easier for people and businesses. On Thursday morning, Members consider a Legal Affairs Committee (JURI) report that seeks to strengthen the EU strategy on better regulation, outlined in the Commission’s 2021 communication. The JURI committee insists on the need for transparency and openness, particularly as regards the Regulatory Scrutiny Board and the ‘one in, one out’ approach, whereby each new piece of legislation adopted leads to the removal of an older or outdated law. The committee also wishes to see children’s rights mainstreamed throughout EU legislation.

[1] This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.

Written by Anna Caprile and Eric Pichon.

At least one of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) set by the United Nations (UN) will be missed in 2030 – SDG 2 – ‘zero hunger’ – also endangering the accomplishment of the rest of the SDG goals under Agenda 2030. Hunger and malnutrition are rising dramatically across the world, a trend aggravated by the pandemic. In 2020, 811 million people in the world were facing hunger, the highest level since 2014, and 3 billion people were without access to a healthy diet. The fight against hunger and malnutrition has been the focus of two global summits, namely the UN Food Systems Summit (September 2021), which committed to a deep reform of global food systems, and the Nutrition for Growth Summit (December 2021), which saw the biggest pledge since 2013. In the EU itself, considered one of the most food-secure regions in the world, nearly 7 million people were already experiencing severe food insecurity before the pandemic, and malnutrition is on the rise, as demonstrated by obesity and pre-obesity prevalence rates.

SDG 2 aims not only at achieving food security but also at improving nutrition and promoting sustainable agriculture. These objectives have been mainstreamed in the recently reformed common agricultural policy and the ‘farm to fork’ and biodiversity strategies. In developing countries, the EU is strongly committed to achieving SDG 2. The EU institutions and Member States, which collectively provide more than half of official development assistance worldwide, have reaffirmed this commitment in the new European ‘consensus on development’. Alongside development aid, the EU has several levers at its disposal to act on food insecurity causes, such as security and defence missions and comprehensive strategies in conflict areas, as well as substantial research capacities. >The fact that its internal policies, in particular agricultural, climate and trade policies, have a spill-over effect on other food systems in the world, in particular in poorer countries, also make the EU a significant player.

Read the complete briefing on ‘SDG 2 – zero hunger, and EU action against hunger and malnutrition‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘SDG 2 – zero hunger, and EU action against hunger and malnutrition‘ on YouTube.

Written by Frederik Scholaert and Karin Jacobs.

The United Nations 2030 Agenda and the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), adopted in 2015, set the global roadmap for achieving sustainable development. It includes SDG 14 on ‘life below water’, which focuses on the sustainability of the oceans, thereby recognising their essential role in life on our planet. Oceans contain 80 % of all life forms, produce more than 50 % of the Earth’s oxygen and play a central role in regulating the climate. In addition, the ‘blue economy’ provides 4.5 million direct jobs in the EU. It covers traditional sectors, such as fisheries, maritime transport and coastal tourism, as well as innovative sectors, such as renewable ocean energy and the blue bioeconomy, which show great potential for sustainable blue growth. However, human activities threaten the health of our oceans. The effects of climate change are devastating, resulting in rising water temperatures, acidification, increased flooding and loss of marine biodiversity. The combination with other man-made stressors, such as pollution, including from land-based resources, and overexploitation of marine resources exacerbates the problem, reduces the resilience of oceans and poses a serious threat to the planet as a whole.

To manage maritime activities sustainably and cope with different environmental pressures, the EU has implemented a wide range of policies. This includes established policies, such as the common fisheries policy, the marine strategy framework directive and the maritime spatial planning directive, as well as specific legislation related to marine litter. Other new initiatives under the European Green Deal also play an important role in relation to ocean governance and sustainable blue growth, such as the 2030 biodiversity strategy, the offshore renewable energy strategy, the ‘Fit for 55’ package and the new guidelines on aquaculture. The external dimension of EU policies, its international ocean governance agenda and its global commitments make the EU a global player in shaping ocean governance and contribute to its commitment to deliver fully on SDG 14. On the occasion of World Oceans Day on 8 June 2022, this publication provides an overview of the main EU policies and initiatives in the field of ocean governance.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU action on ocean governance and achieving SDG 14‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘EU action on ocean governance and achieving SDG 14‘ on YouTube.

Written by Vivienne Halleux (1st edition).

The European Green Deal envisages a review of measures addressing pollution from large industrial installations, with a view to aligning existing legislation with the EU’s zero pollution ambition, as well as its energy, climate and circular economy policy goals. On 5 April 2022, the European Commission tabled a proposal to revise the Industrial Emissions Directive, the main European Union instrument regulating pollutant emissions from industry, together with a proposal to revise the Regulation establishing the European Pollutant Release and Transfer Register, related to environmental information. The proposal aims at upgrading the existing register to a more comprehensive and integrated industrial emissions portal, enabling more accurate monitoring of the environmental performance of large industrial activities. The main changes proposed include better alignment with the Industrial Emissions Directive, both in terms of activities covered and reporting level; inclusion of reporting on the use of resources; and integration in the database of additional relevant environmental data reported under other related EU legislation.

In Parliament, the file has been referred to the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety. The same rapporteur and shadow rapporteurs will handle the revision of the European Pollutant Release and Transfer Register Regulation and that of the Industrial Emissions Directive.

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• June 2022: Establishing an industrial emissions portal (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on reporting of environmental data from industrial installations and establishing an industrial emissions portal Committee responsible:Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI)COM(2022) 157
05.04.2022Rapporteur:Radan Kanev (EPP, Bulgaria)2022/0105 (COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Mohammed Chahim (S&D, the Netherlands)
Michal Wiezik (Renew, Slovakia)
Eleonora Evi (Greens/EFA, Italy)
Anna Zalewska (ECR, Poland)
Marisa Matias (The Left, Portugal)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Vivienne Halleux.

Covering some 52 000 large agro-industrial installations EU-wide, the Industrial Emissions Directive is the main EU instrument regulating pollutant emissions from industry. The proposal for a revision tabled by the European Commission on 5 April 2022 aims to bring it into line with the EU’s zero pollution ambition, energy, climate and circular economy policy goals under the European Green Deal. The main changes include expanding the scope (in terms of sectors covered and thresholds), strengthening permit requirements to authorise installations to operate, and measures to promote innovation.

Stakeholders’ reactions to the text were mixed. Industry and farming representatives expressed strong concerns about the added complexity, timeliness and practical implementation of the proposal. While welcoming many improvements, non-governmental organisations criticised the missed opportunity to make the directive fit for climate protection, and the proposed new regime for intensive livestock rearing. In Parliament, the file has been referred to the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI), which appointed Radan Kanev as rapporteur.

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• June 2022: Revision of the Industrial Emissions Directive (1st edition)

Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2010/75/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 on industrial emissions (integrated pollution prevention and control) and Council Directive 1999/31/EC of 26 April 1999 on the landfill of waste Committee responsible:Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI)COM(2022) 156
05.04.2022Rapporteur:Radan Kanev (EPP, Bulgaria)2022/0104 (COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Mohammed Chahim (S&D, the Netherlands)
Michal Wiezik (Renew, Slovakia)
Eleonora Evi (Greens/EFA, Italy)
Anna Zalewska (ECR, Poland)
Marisa Matias (The Left, Portugal)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report Sectoral shares of IED installations in 2018

Written by Ralf Drachenberg.

The June 2022 European Council meeting marked a potentially historic moment: EU leaders granted Ukraine and Moldova candidate status and also confirmed Georgia’s European perspective. Although highly anticipated, this major step was neither obvious nor uncontroversial, as for the first time it concerned a country still at war, generating intense discussions both within the European Council and with partner countries. On Ukraine, EU leaders took stock of the situation in the country, confirmed their commitment to increased military support and financial assistance, and called on like-minded partners to align with EU sanctions. Regarding relations with non-EU partners in Europe, the European Council had its first strategic discussion on the ‘European political community’ concept (EPC), with a possible first EPC summit to take place under the upcoming Czech Presidency. Turkey’s assertiveness in the eastern Mediterranean and the Belarus people’s right to ‘free and fair elections’ were also discussed.

On other topics, however, not least on the Conference on the Future of Europe, the results were underwhelming, as EU leaders took no concrete follow-up decision, simply leaving it to each EU institution to do so within its own sphere of competence. Moreover, no breakthrough was possible regarding the Western Balkans – neither at the leaders’ meeting nor at the European Council itself.

The last component of the two days of meetings saw a Euro Summit in inclusive format. EU leaders discussed two major issues, the current economic situation, notably the rise in prices of energy, food and commodities, and the EU’s financial architecture, reiterating their commitment to the completion of the banking and capital markets unions.

1. General aspects

The European Council meeting began with the customary address by the President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola, who had also attended the Western Balkans Leaders’ Meeting the same morning. She stressed that ‘this is a moment where we must remain together. It is a moment we did not choose, but one that we have no choice but to meet’. Her intervention was followed by a discussion in which at least 10 EU Heads of State or Government took part, indicating that the interest in and quality of the exchanges with the President of the Parliament continue to increase.

The President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, addressed the European Council once again (remotely), reaffirming that Ukraine was capable of becoming a fully fledged member of the European Union.

The President of the European Council, Charles Michel, did not use the opportunity of this meeting to update the indicative Leaders’ Agenda. It was last updated in December 2021, and covered the period up to March 2022.

On the suggestion of the Prime Minister of Italy, Mario Draghi, the organisation of another special European Council meeting, either before or just after the summer break, and dedicated to economic issues, was debated within the European Council, with varying opinions expressed on the idea.

2. European Council meeting Wider Europe

EU leaders held a first exchange of views on French President Emmanuel Macron’s proposal to launch a ‘European political community’ (EPC), and will revert to the subject at one of their forthcoming meetings. The aim of the EPC would be to ‘strengthen the stability and security of the European continent’ and ‘offer a platform for political coordination’ with ‘all European countries with whom we have close relations’, with meetings taking place at leaders’ level. While stressing that the Western Balkan countries had reacted ‘rather in a positive and favourable way’ to the EPC concept, Charles Michel – and the European Council conclusions – strongly underlined that the EPC was not seen as an alternative to enlargement, so reassuring those countries that had expressed concerns prior to the meeting.

Ukraine

EU leaders discussed Russia’s war on Ukraine once again, reaffirming the latter’s legitimate right to defend itself, its territorial integrity and its sovereignty. They deplored the attacks targeting the civilian population and infrastructure, and called on Russia to ‘immediately and unconditionally withdraw all its troops and military equipment from the entire territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders’. The European Council reconfirmed the EU’s staunch support for Ukraine, and discussed humanitarian, financial, economic, social and military aid. As regards financial assistance, European leaders took note of the fact that the European Commission would be presenting a proposal for macro-financial assistance of up to €9 billion, which they had green-lighted at their meeting on 30-31 May 2022. On military support, they confirmed the EU’s commitment, and called on the Council to ‘swiftly work on a further increase of military support’. Since the start of the war, the EU has committed €2 billion under the European Peace Facility.

EU leaders stressed that international humanitarian law ‘must be respected’, reiterated their demand that Russia allow the immediate return of Ukrainians, in particular children abducted to Russia, and stressed that war crimes will be prosecuted and punished. No further sanctions were agreed, the focus being put on implementation and avoidance of circumvention. The EU leaders agreed that the sanctions had mounted pressure on Russia, calling on like-minded partners to align with the EU sanctions, and on the Council to finalise the ‘decision adding the violation of Union restrictive measures to the list of EU crimes’. The European Council also strongly emphasised that, by weaponising food in its war against Ukraine, Russia was solely responsible for the current food crisis, and reiterated its call on Russia to cease these detrimental activities. In recent speeches, Charles Michel had clearly underlined that food security issues were not caused by EU sanctions, but rather by Russia ‘stealing grain, blockading ports’ and targeting agricultural resources. A central point in the discussion concerned how to get millions of tonnes of Ukrainian grain out of the country. To this end, EU leaders signalled their support for solidarity lanes and for the UN’s attempts to unblock exports through an agreement on secure corridors between Russia, Turkey and Ukraine. In order to respond effectively to global food security concerns, the European Council also called on the Commission and the Member States to increase their support for developing countries with supply chain issues, help them develop their manufacturing capacities, and hasten the delivery of relevant initiatives from the EU-African Union Summit.

Main message of the President of the European Parliament: Roberta Metsola warned against ‘war fatigue’ fuelled by inflation and disinformation. She stressed that the EU needed ‘to break free from Russian energy’, start preparing the next sanctions package, push back against false food security narratives, and avoid new ‘iron curtains and spheres of influence’. She expressed her support for an expansion of solidarity lanes, and stressed that Russia was responsible for any impending food crisis.

EU membership applications of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia

The European Council took the important decision to grant candidate country status to Ukraine and Moldova, and to offer a European perspective to Georgia. The three countries’ progress towards membership would be subject to conditionality. However, only Georgia still needs to first fulfil certain conditions set by the European Commission in its opinion issued in response to the membership applications. Prior to the summit, Roberta Metsola and Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas had issued a joint opinion piece, in which they stressed that a clear message to Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia would give ‘hope’ and show ‘a strong signal of belief in shared European values’. Just before the summit started, the European Parliament adopted a resolution supporting candidate country status for Ukraine and Moldova and Georgia, by a majority of 529 votes.

EU leaders noted that enlargement was a merit-based process and that each country’s progress would be assessed individually against the Copenhagen criteria, albeit also with respect to the ‘EU’s capacity to absorb new members’ – a criterion that clouds clarity on the final outcome

Main message of the President of the European Parliament: Roberta Metsola stressed that it ‘would have been a historically wrong decision not to grant candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova today, or give a clear perspective to Georgia’.

Western Balkans

Prior to the European Council meeting, EU and Western Balkan leaders met for a leaders’ meeting, which some Balkan leaders had even threatened to boycott. Given the disappointment expressed by Western Balkan countries on the lack of progress on their membership applications, no declaration was adopted. Their criticism even prompted Charles Michel to adjust the order of the agenda points at the European Council, initiating a roundtable discussion on the Western Balkans ahead of that on the membership application of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia.

The High Representative/Vice President of the European Commission Josep Borrell stated that ‘we are not where we should be with the Western Balkans’. In that context, he stressed the importance of rethinking the decision-making process and pointed to the failure of the unanimity rule.

The European Council conclusions expressed ‘full and unequivocal commitment to the EU membership perspective of the Western Balkans’, recalled the ‘reversible and merit-based’ principle of the revised enlargement methodology, stressed the importance of reforms and of an independent judiciary, and called for the fight against corruption to continue. However, EU leaders also felt the need to clarify the ‘status’ of three applicant countries: North Macedonia, Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, giving an encouraging tone to the conclusions. The EU leaders called ‘for a swift resolution’ of the dispute between Bulgaria and North Macedonia, ‘so that accession negotiations could be opened without delay’. The French Presidency presented a proposal, which received the backing ‘in extremis’ of the Bulgarian parliament on 24 June 2022; it now requires the approval of North Macedonia to enable a breakthrough. EU leaders also called urgently for ‘tangible progress’ to be made on resolving outstanding disputes, particularly in the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue on normalisation of relations between Serbia and Kosovo, which is a prerequisite for progress on Serbia’s accession process. The European Council had a long discussion on Bosnia and Herzegovina. Welcoming the political agreement of 12 June 2022, EU leaders indicated that they would be ready to grant candidate country status as soon as the 14 priorities identified in the Commission’s opinion had been implemented, notably the long overdue constitutional and electoral reform.

Main message of the President of the European Parliament: Roberta Metsola called for the launch of accession negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia and for Kosovo to be granted visa liberalisation. She stressed that the Western Balkan countries ‘need to see hope lead to results’.

Conference on the Future of Europe (CoFoE)

Discussions on the follow-up to the Conference on the Future of Europe were rather short and the results were underwhelming. The European Council only ‘took note’ of the CoFoE proposals. While calling for ‘an effective follow-up ‘, they did not provide concrete guidelines in this respect, just stating that each EU institution should do this ‘within their own sphere of competences’, rather than doing it jointly among the EU institutions. EU Heads of State or Government also noted the importance of ensuring that citizens are informed of the follow-up to the proposals made in the report. The president of France, Emmanuel Macron, indicated that the European Council would continue with its debate on this issue.

Main message of the President of the European Parliament: Roberta Metsola told the EU Heads of State or Government to be ambitious and to enhance the Union’s capacity to act in vital areas such as health, energy, defence and fundamental values. She stressed that the Parliament’s views, as expressed in its two resolutions, should not be ignored. She reiterated the Parliament’s desire to hold a convention, which would ‘keep the conversation on our EU project going’. Ms Metsola also confirmed Parliament’s readiness to face the challenges jointly with the other EU institutions and Member States. 

Economic issues

As anticipated in the EPRS outlook for the meeting, EU leaders generally endorsed the integrated country-specific recommendations. They welcomed the fulfilment by Croatia of all the convergence criteria to join the euro area, endorsed the Commission’s proposal that Croatia should adopt the euro on 1 January 2023, and invited the Council to adopt the relevant Commission proposals swiftly.

Given the reluctance of certain EU Member States towards market intervention at EU level, EU leaders reiterated their call on the Commission to explore with international partners ways of curbing rising energy prices, including the feasibility of introducing temporary price caps where appropriate. Faced with Russia’s weaponisation of gas, the European Council invited the Commission to pursue its efforts to secure energy supply at affordable prices.

3. Euro Summit

EU leaders also held a Euro Summit meeting in inclusive format, with all 27 Member States participating, as well as the President of the European Central Bank, Christine Lagarde, and the President of the Eurogroup, Pascal Donohoe. They discussed the current economic situation in the EU, notably rising inflation, which as Charles Michel stated, is ‘a major concern for all of us’. He underlined that ‘Russia’s war of aggression is pushing up the price of energy, food and commodities, and that all of this has a direct impact on our citizens and businesses’. EU leaders agreed to coordinate their economic responses to the rising cost of living closely. In their statement, EU leaders reiterated their commitment to completing banking union, with future steps to follow, and called for efforts to deepen the capitals market union to be stepped up.

Read this briefing on ‘Outcome of the meetings of EU leaders on 23-24 June 2022‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Angelos delivorias (1st edition).

The second Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID II) and the Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation (MiFIR) are the principal texts regulating investment services and activities in the EU. Following an extensive consultation and in light of the recent developments in the context of the coronavirus pandemic, the European Commission proposed the establishment of an EU-wide consolidated tape for shares, bonds, exchange-traded funds (ETFs) and derivatives, as well as making targeted changes to market structure, so as to increase transparency and strengthen the competitiveness of EU financial markets. Consolidated tape is a high-speed electronic system that reports the latest price and volume data on sales of exchange-listed stock.

The files are currently under review by the co-legislators. Within the European Parliament, they have both been assigned to the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs. The draft reports are expected soon.

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• June 2022: Amendments to MiFID II and MiFIR: The EU’s markets in financial instruments (1st edition)

Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2014/65/EU on markets in financial instruments
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 as regards enhancing market data transparency, removing obstacles to the emergence of a consolidated tape, optimising the trading obligations and prohibiting receiving payments for forwarding client orders Committee responsible:Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON)COM(2021) 726 and
COM(2021) 727, 25.11.2021Rapporteur:Danuta Maria Hübner (EPP, Poland)2021/0384(COD) and 2021/0385(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Eero Heinäluoma (S&D, Finland)
Nicola Beer (Renew Europe, Germany)
Karima Delli (Greens/EFA, France)
Gunnar Beck (ID, Germany)
Johan Van Overtveldt (ECR, Belgium)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report © ekapolsira / Adobe Stock

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

Inflation has risen to levels not seen in 40 years in the euro area or in many other countries, forcing some central banks to raise interest rates in a context that bodes ill for economic growth. Initially driven by post-pandemic supply shortages and then by soaring energy prices, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, inflation is now becoming increasingly broadly based, affecting everything from food and services to household goods. Dissatisfaction with the rising cost of living is leading to social protests, increasing political risks for many countries. In the euro area, price growth was 8.1 % in May year-on-year, more than four times the European Central Bank’s target.

This note gathers links to the recent publications and commentaries from many international think tanks on resurgent inflation. Many earlier publications on inflation can be found in a previous edition of the ‘What Think Tanks are Thinking’ series.

The Fed has regained the initiative, but at a cost
Atlantic Council, June 2022

Fragmentation risk in the euro area: No easy way out for the European Central Bank
Bruegel, June 2022

5 key takeaways on inflation from the May CPI report
Brookings Institution, June 2022

Can child care and pre-K help reduce inflation?
Brookings Institution, June 2022

What if the Federal Reserve books losses because of its quantitative easing?
Brookings Institution, June 2022

Demand- and supply-side factors behind the higher inflation
Centre for Social and Economic Research, June 2022

The ECB’s normalisation path
Centre for European Policy Studies, June 2022

IfO Economic Forecast Summer 2022: Inflation, supply bottlenecks and war slow down economic recovery in Germany
IfO, June 2022

Weltwirtschaft im Sommer 2022: Inflationsschub bremst die Expansion
Kiel Institute, June 2022

Stagflation and fragmentation: The euro area at crossroads
LUISS School for European Political Economy, June 2022

How money printing destroyed Argentina and can destroy others
Mises Institute, June 2022

The Fed tries to get ahead of inflation
Peterson Institute for International Economics, June 2022

How free trade can fight inflation: More competition means lower prices
Peterson Institute for International Economics, Foreign Affairs, June 2022

To fight inflation, cutting tariffs on China is only the start
Peterson Institute for International Economics, June 2022

Measures to combat inflation and its effects
Austrian Institute of Economic Research, May 2022

Three headaches for the European Central Bank
Bruegel, May 2022

Inflation-related updates to ‘Recession Remedies’
Brookings Institution, May 2022

Wages, pensions and household income have risen in real terms over the past 25 years
DIW, May 2022

The Ukraine war and inflation
IfO, May 2022

We must not override the signal function of the price!
IfO, May 2022

Our economy needs a good dose of customer-driven deflation
Mises Institute, May 2022

Brexit is driving inflation higher in the UK than its European peers after identical supply shocks
Peterson Institute for International Economics May 2022

Impact of the war in Ukraine on the debate on the future of agriculture in the EU
Polish Institute of International Affairs, May 2022

Is a recession coming? A key indicator is also the king of mixed messages
Rand Corporation, May 2022

Le nouveau manuel politique de la zone euro
Terra Nova, May 2022

Rising cost of living and poverty
Austrian Institute of Economic Research, April 2022

Fiscal support and monetary vigilance: Economic policy implications of the Russia-Ukraine war for the European Union
Bruegel, April 2022

From low to high inflation: Implications for emerging market and developing economies
Centre for Economic Policy Research, April 2022

Rental inflation and stabilisation policies: international evidence and the Irish experience
Economic and Social Research Institute, April 2022

German economy slowed down by war, inflation and Chinese lockdowns
DIW, April 2022

Political shocks and inflation expectations: Evidence from the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine
IfO, April 2022

Comment se protéger au mieux de l’inflation ?
Institut Thomas More, April 2022

Economic prospects call for high inflation and slowing global growth
Peterson Institute for International Economics, April 2022

Die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung im Ausland: Krieg in der Ukraine belastet die Weltwirtschaft und bringt weiteren Inflationsschub
RWI, April 2022

Read this briefing on ‘The return of inflation‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Tambiama Madiega, Polona Car and Maria Niestadt with Louise Van de Pol.

One of the most talked about concepts in modern technology, the metaverse can be described as an immersive and constant virtual 3D world where people interact by means of an avatar to carry out a wide range of activities. Such activities can range from leisure and gaming to professional and commercial interactions, financial transactions or even health interventions such as surgery. While the exact scope and impact of the metaverse on society and on the economy is still unknown, it can already be seen that the metaverse will open up a range of opportunities but also a number of risks in a variety of policy areas.

Major tech companies are scaling up their metaverse activities, including through mergers and acquisitions. This has given impetus to a debate on how merger regulations and antitrust law should apply. Business in the metaverse is expected to be underpinned largely by cryptocurrencies and non-fungible tokens, raising issues of ownership, misuse, interoperability and portability. Furthermore, the huge volume of data used in the metaverse raises a number of data protection and cybersecurity issues (e.g. how to collect user consent or protect avatars against identity theft).

There is considerable scope for a wide range of illegal and harmful behaviours and practices in the metaverse environment. This makes it essential to consider how to attribute responsibility, inter alia, for fighting illegal and harmful practices and misleading advertising practices, and for protecting intellectual property rights. Moreover, digital immersion in the metaverse can have severe negative impacts on health, especially for vulnerable groups, such as minors, who may require special protection. Finally, the accessibility and inclusiveness of the metaverse remain areas where progress has still to be made in order to create an environment of equal opportunities.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Metaverse: Opportunities, risks and policy implications‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson and Katarzyna Sochacka.

The highlight of the June II 2022 plenary session was the vote to overwhelmingly endorse the granting of candidate status to Ukraine and Moldova, and – once it meets the conditions set out by the Commission – Georgia. On the evening of 23 June, EU leaders did indeed follow suit. Members debated preparations for that European Council meeting taking place on 23-24 June 2022, including the meeting with Western Balkan leaders on 23 June. The Parliament also debated with the Commission and Council the use of national vetoes undermining the global tax deal, and held debates, inter alia, on implementation and delivery of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, and the future of EU international investment policy. Parliament adopted its position, following the urgent procedure, on exceptional temporary support under the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development in response to the impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. A ‘This is Europe’ debate was held with the Prime Minister of Croatia, Andrej Plenković. Finally, in a formal sitting, Members heard an address by Hakainde Hichilema, President of the Republic of Zambia.

Gas storage

Members debated an urgent proposal to boost gas storage in Europe, to reduce dependency on Russian gas. As Members endorsed the provisional agreement reached between the Parliament and Council, the measures should already take effect this summer. EU countries should fill 85 % of their storage sites by November 2022, with fair burden-sharing ensured according to national consumption levels, and joint purchases encouraged. While broadly in agreement with the Commission’s proposal to prepare for severing trade with Russian suppliers, Parliament’s negotiators were successful in adding provisions to take account of national variations, such as derogations for isolated gas markets in Ireland, Malta and Cyprus.

Fit for 55

The EU has committed to a 55 % cut in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030, and climate neutrality by 2050, with the proposals under the ‘fit for 55’ package aimed at turning this ambition into reality. Following Parliament’s rejection of the Committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) report on the Commission’s proposal to align the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) with this target during the June I plenary session, Members adopted a set of amendments re-tabled by ENVI that include the amendments that were carried by the June I plenary, as well as other compromise amendments related to the linear reduction factor, the timing for phasing out free ETS allowances, and the corresponding phase-in of the carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM). Members also adopted their position on the revision of the CBAM to place a carbon price on certain imported products and phase out free emissions allowances for European industry. Because CBAM is tightly linked to the ETS file, it too was referred back to committee without a vote during the June I session. Members adopted the significant amendments to the original proposal included in the ENVI report. Members also completed the adoption of the Parliament’s position on the Social Climate Fund, intended to help those most affected by the green transition, following the vote on amendments in the June I session. The Parliament is thus ready to negotiate with the Council on all three files, along with the other fit for 55 package proposals adopted earlier in the month.

Recovery and Resilience Facility

Parliament’s role in scrutiny and oversight is key to ensuring that measures intended to support the post-pandemic recovery benefit EU citizens. Members debated and adopted a joint report of the Committees on Budgets and on Economic and Monetary Affairs on implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF). This report aims at providing Parliament’s input to the July review of RRF implementation. It highlights the RRF’s key role in the EU’s economic recovery, and in making the EU more resilient, competitive and strategically autonomous. The report notes that successful implementation is key to ensuring long-term impact and economic growth in the EU, pointing to the RRF’s stabilising effects to date. Urging Member States to provide the Commission with sufficient information to ensure effective reporting, the committees also stressed the importance of regular scrutiny and monitoring of RRF expenditure and compliance with the rule of law, where the report warns that reimbursement should be possible in case of non-compliance. Taking stock of EU countries’ use of the funding available to date, the report also highlights the RRF’s potential to boost EU prosperity and urges Member States to take advantage of the loans available.

Amending budget No 3 – Financing reception costs of people fleeing Ukraine

Members debated and adopted an amending budget to provide EU funding to finance the continued cost of welcoming refugees from Ukraine. It strengthens the financing of the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) and the Border Management and Visa Instrument (BMVI). The additional €99.8 million in commitment appropriations and €76 million in payment appropriations for AMIF and €100 million in payment appropriations for BMVI will help to ensure that people fleeing Ukraine benefit from adequate initial reception conditions in Member States.

2021 Report on Montenegro

Continuing the annual assessment of progress by candidate countries, Members debated the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) report on the Commission’s 2021 report on Montenegro’s EU accession negotiations. Despite recent political upheaval in the country, Parliament is keen to promote stability in its neighbourhood through the accession process. However, while the AFET report welcomes the new government, it also points out that Montenegro must continue to ensure a functioning parliamentary democracy and the necessary EU-related reforms. Any new candidates for EU membership will have to reach the same democratic and economic standards

Future of EU-Africa trade relations

Parliament adopted a resolution based on a Committee on International Trade (INTA) report that considers how to foster ethical and sustainable trade relations with African countries, in the light of the fast-changing global trade situation. The report calls for EU assistance to integrate the continent into the global economy through robust EU-Africa trade relations, as well as to help African countries to counter the effects of Covid‑19 and the war on Ukraine.

Accession to the Hague Convention

Members followed the Legal Affairs Committee recommendation and gave consent to the EU’s accession to the Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters. By requiring its signatories to recognise and enforce judgments given in civil or commercial matters in other signatory countries, the convention is intended to reduce the difficulties experienced in making legal claims by businesses who trade across borders, and particularly for EU citizens and companies doing business in the USA.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

The Fisheries (PECH) Committee’s decision to enter into interinstitutional negotiations on the proposal for a regulation as regards specific measures to alleviate the consequences of the military aggression of Russia against Ukraine on fishing activities and to mitigate the effects of the market disruption was endorsed without a vote.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Plenary round-up – June II 2022‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Tarja Laaninen.

‘The war on Ukraine is also a war on information’, says Reporters Without Borders (RSF). On 16 June 2022, the Committee on Culture and Education (CULT), together with the Civil Liberties (LIBE) and Foreign Interference (INGE) committees, held an exchange of views on ‘Media freedom, protection of journalists and the fight against disinformation in the context of the war in Ukraine’. Speakers from journalists’ organisations, media professionals in exile and Commission representatives outlined their views on recent events in the light of their impacts on journalism and media freedom.

Four months since the brutal invasion of Ukraine began, Russian armed forces are deliberately targeting and killing journalists and bombing broadcasting equipment. ‘In 2022, 13 journalists in Europe alone lost their lives when on duty, 12 of them while reporting the war’, Renate Schröder from European Federation of Journalists (EFJ) told the audience. In parallel, Kremlin crackdowns mean that Russians have been left with no access to domestic sources of independent information covering the events in Ukraine. A recently-adopted law threatens anyone spreading ‘false information’ – which includes using the word ‘war’ – with up to 15 years in prison.

‘In the beginning of the war, we did not have equipment, we didn’t even find helmets; nobody was prepared for the war’, the panellists told the event. A good protective kit costs at least €1 000. With the help of UNESCO and various journalist organisations, safety equipment such as helmets and bulletproof vests, satellite phones, solar batteries and first aid kits were gathered and sent in. The most important thing, according to the experts, is to support continued journalism in Ukraine: to help local journalists so that they can keep on reporting on what is happening on the ground. ‘For this, money is needed’, said Oliver Money-Kirely from the International Press Institute (IPI): ‘The priority is to keep [the] Ukrainian media running, pay salaries, help displaced journalists’. The structure for solidarity is already in place on both the European and Ukrainian sides, he said, with bi-monthly meetings taking place. RSF has set up two Press Freedom Centres in Ukraine – in Lviv and Kyiv – to support journalists by distributing equipment, giving physical and online safety training and offering psychological support.

In the new emergency support programme for Ukraine, €15 million has been earmarked for measures to strengthen the media in Ukraine. Ukrainian journalists based in Ukraine or in the candidate countries to the EU can also benefit from support from the EU-funded Media Freedom Rapid Response project, which provides for grants of up to €5 000, and can cover needs such as medical assistance, subsistence, relocation costs and psychological support. The Journalists-in-Residence programme is already offering temporary shelter to a number of journalists in Leipzig and Milan.

In Russia, it is essential to help the few remaining independent journalists. For the journalists who have left the country, it is important to enable them to work from abroad: they need help with equipment, with setting up digital newsrooms, and with digital security and other ways of ensuring that information can still get into Russia. The hundreds of journalists in exile from Russia are in a precarious situation, many with very short residence permits – often only for six months, depending on the country – and their credit cards blocked. Nevertheless, many of them are determined to keep working to inform the Russian public. There are plans to create a community of journalists in exile from Russia who are in need of financial and technical help, and to set up offices for international cooperation in Paris, Riga and Amsterdam.

RSF has used ‘mirror site’ technology to unblock access to Meduza, the most popular Russian independent news website. With technical assistance from hackers, ICT specialists and engineers in several European countries, RSF is able to quickly create an exact copy or ‘mirror of a censored site and place it on content delivery networks that also host many other services and therefore cannot be easily blocked.

Soon after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the EU adopted sanctions against state-owned outlets Russia Today and Sputnik. Their broadcasting in or directed at the EU is now suspended. With the recently adopted sixth package of sanctions, which comes into force on 25 June, the ban will extend to three more Russian media outlets. These are exceptional measures and target the core of the Kremlin disinformation and war propaganda machine in the EU. Some EU countries have also taken measures against additional Russian channels, which is possible under the Audiovisual Media Services Directive.

On disinformation, the Commission is in close dialogue with the signatories of the new Code of Practice on Disinformation, signed on 16 June, in order to receive weekly updates on how they are monitoring and limiting disinformation linked to the Russian invasion, for instance closing accounts and stepping up cooperation with fact-checkers. The European External Action Service’s EUvsDisinfo websites are continuing to expose disinformation – originating in pro-Kremlin media – that is spread across the EU and Eastern Partnership countries. On 21 June, the Council approved conclusions on the protection and safety of journalists and media professionals, pointing to a Council of Europe report that the number of alerts about serious threats to the safety of journalists and media freedom in Europe has almost doubled since 2016.

However, complex interactions between the media and audiences also pose challenges in the EU: a sobering report from the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, published in June 2022, shows that a significant portion of the European population does not trust the media. There are big differences between countries: whereas in Finland, overall trust in traditional news is 69 %; in Germany, the figure is 50 %, in Poland 42 %, in Spain 32 % and in France only 29 %. Worryingly, a growing proportion of Europeans are avoiding the news altogether, for various reasons. In Denmark, 20 % of the people asked said they actively avoided the news, while in Sweden this was the case for 32 % of respondents, and in Romania 40 %. According to the report, selective news avoidance has also increased – most likely as a result of the difficult and depressing nature of the coverage.

Written by Carmen-Cristina Cîrlig with Romy Louisa Boden (1st edition).

The European Commission proposed a revision of Directive 2008/99/EC on the protection of the environment through criminal law in December 2021. The proposal intends to clarify some of the terms contained in the directive and includes an updated list of environmental crime offences, harmonised sanction types and levels, measures to strengthen international investigation and prosecution, improvements to the collection of statistical data and measures to improve national enforcement chains. Ultimately, the revision aims to increase the effectiveness of investigation and prosecution of environmental criminal offences across the European Union. Parliament’s Legal Affairs (JURI) Committee is the committee responsible for drawing up the draft report on the proposal.

Version

• June 2022: Revision of Directive 2008/99/EC: Protection of the environment through criminal law (1st edition)

Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of the environment through criminal law and replacing Directive 2008/99/EC Committee responsible:Legal Affairs (JURI)COM(2021) 851
15.12.2021Rapporteur:Antonius Manders (EPP, Netherlands)2021/0422(COD)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Ralf Drachenberg.

A series of sensitive topics feature on the agenda of the last regular European Council meeting before the summer break, taking place on 23-24 June. Considering the magnitude of the issues at stake, this European Council meeting – if successful – could become a milestone summit. Notably, EU leaders are expected to consider granting candidate country status to Ukraine and Moldova, most probably with certain specific conditions, to reaffirm the Western Balkans’ European perspective, and to consider the proposal put forward by the President of France, Emmanuel Macron, to create a European Political Community. They will also discuss developments in and support for Ukraine following Russia’s military aggression, as well as the broader consequences of the war, including food security. As at past meetings since the outbreak of the war, the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, may once again address the European Council. EU leaders could also consider the situation in the eastern Mediterranean, a topic they last discussed at the request of the President of Cyprus, Nikos Anastasiades, at the special European Council meeting of 30-31 May 2022. To what extent EU leaders will discuss the follow-up to the Conference on the Future of Europe remains uncertain.

1. European Council agenda points

Charles Michel is expected to use the opportunity of the 23-24 June European Council to update the indicative Leaders’ Agenda, setting a timetable for key issues to be discussed by the EU Heads of State or Government at upcoming meetings. The latest version expired in March 2022.

Following the opening address by the President of the Parliament, Roberta Metsola, the President of France, Emmanuel Macron, as leader of the country holding the six-month rotating presidency of the Council of Ministers, is expected to provide an overview of progress made in implementing previous European Council conclusions. An outstanding task for the European Council is the adoption of the new ‘strategic guidelines for legislative and operational planning’ within the area of freedom, security and justice, which were expected to be updated in the spring of 2020. More than two years later, and despite more than 20 European Council meetings in the meantime, EU leaders have yet to comply with this Treaty obligation (Article 68 TEU).

2. European Council meeting Wider Europe

As confirmed in the invitation letter from the President of the European Council, Charles Michel, EU leaders will ‘hold a strategic discussion on the European Union’s relations with its partners in Europe’ and consider the recent initiative by President Macron aimed at creating a European Political Community (EPC). In a non-paper circulated ahead of the meeting, France has outlined its vision of the EPC, which would be a body for political cooperation with democratic, non-EU European partners, including countries in the Western Balkans and the Eastern Partnership, as well as other like-minded partners. It would not substitute for the enlargement process, but instead could contribute to the ‘security, stability and prosperity of our continent’. President Michel has supported the initiative, underlining that the EPC’s aim is ‘not to replace the EU accession process’, but to grant ‘immediate political integration’ and facilitate regular political dialogue. The initiative initially drew criticism from Ukraine, which perceived it as an attempt to sidestep its EU membership application. During a visit to Kyiv on 16 June, the leaders of France, Emmanuel Macron, of Germany, Olaf Scholz, of Italy, Mario Draghi, and of Romania, Klaus Iohannis, expressed their support for granting ‘immediate’ candidate status to Ukraine. With this visit, they addressed Ukraine’s concerns, while paving the way to a more consensual debate on the EPC at the forthcoming European Council meeting.

Ukraine

EU leaders will discuss, for the fifth time since the start of the war, Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine. They will most probably call again on Russia to withdraw from Ukraine, reaffirm Ukraine’s legitimate right to defend itself, and condemn Russia’s war crimes as well as its breaching of international law and international humanitarian law. They might also reiterate their earlier call for the return of Ukrainians deported to Russia. In a recent resolution, the Lithuanian Parliament pointed to the 200 000 children ‘exiled’ to Russia, stressing the breach of international law and calling on ‘the UN and the EU to use the principle of universal jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute those involved in supervising the deportation of Ukrainians’.

Sanctions have been a recurrent topic on the European Council’s agenda since the outbreak of the war, with EU leaders green-lighting six packages so far. At the previous special European Council meeting on 30-31 May 2022, several EU leaders, including the Prime Minister of Estonia, Kaja Kallas, called on EU leaders to go beyond the current set of sanctions. A seventh package of sanctions was brought up for discussion by Poland during the Foreign Affairs Council on 20 June. EU leaders could also discuss sanctions at their meeting, and recall the importance of implementing them in close cooperation with like-minded partners.

EU leaders could discuss humanitarian aid, as well as further civilian and military assistance. The amount of military assistance agreed since the beginning of the war under the European Peace Facility (EPF) amounts to €2 billion, representing over a third of the envelope agreed for the EPF for the 2021-2027 period.  

Food security has become a recurrent item on the European Council agenda since the Versailles summit of 10-11 March 2022, being considered either as a stand-alone point or as part of the debate on the situation in Ukraine. Russia has been attacking silos, blocking Ukraine’s ability to export grain by sea, and even resorting to grain theft. To avoid shortages and a global food crisis, sustained efforts are being made to export Ukrainian grain, mainly through Romania and Poland, despite ‘bottlenecks’. Addressing the UN Security Council, President Michel stressed that ‘Russia is solely responsible for this food crisis’ and for ‘preventing Ukraine from planting and harvesting’. Turkey has shown readiness ‘to host a four-way meeting with the United Nations, Russia and Ukraine to organise the export of grain through the Black Sea’. At the Foreign Affairs Council on 20 June, the High Representative/Vice-President of the European Commission, Josep Borrell, spoke of the growing risk of famine in Africa as a direct consequence of Russia’s war on Ukraine. He underlined the EU’s support for ‘UN efforts to de-block the exports from Ukraine’, stressing once again that the food crisis is not the result of EU sanctions.

EU Membership applications of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia

The European Council is expected to consider whether to grant candidate status to Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. In its opinion presented on 17 June 2022, the European Commission recommended candidate status for Ukraine and Moldova, while stressing that Georgia ‘must first meet certain conditions before receiving candidate status’. For Ukraine and Moldova, the European Commission stressed that candidate status is granted on the assumption that the two countries stay the course on reforms, accelerate judicial reform efforts, continue and deliver on ‘the commitment to fight corruption’, and strengthen efforts to eliminate the oligarchs’ ‘influence of vested interests in economic, political, and public life’. Prior to being granted candidate status, Georgia would have, inter alia, to ‘adopt and implement a transparent and effective judicial reform strategy’ and work towards free and independent media.

It remains to be seen to what extent the European Council will follow the European Commission’s opinion, what specific conditions would be put in place, and for which countries, if not for all. The debate might be less heated than initially expected, following the positive outcome of the four leaders’ visit to Kyiv as well as the readiness of several Member States, including the Netherlands and Denmark, to support granting Ukraine candidate country status. If granted candidate country status, the three countries could access funds under the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance

Western Balkans

Following the EU–Western Balkans leaders’ meeting, which precedes the European Council on the morning of 23 June, EU leaders are likely to discuss the outcome of the meeting and reaffirm the region’s ‘unequivocal EU membership’ perspective. In this context, EU leaders might recall the principles and methodology governing the enlargement process, and call on countries from the region to work towards solving their outstanding disputes. The Western Balkans are a key priority for the EU, which is aware of the fragile regional situation and of Russia’s disinformation there. Visiting the region, President Michel stressed that the Western Balkans are a ‘strategic priority’ for the EU, that the EU–Western Balkans leaders’ meetings will help to strengthen ‘political cooperation and coordination’, and that ‘launching accession negotiations with both North Macedonia and Albania as soon as possible is a top priority’ for the Union.

Conference on the Future of Europe

EU leaders are supposed to discuss the follow-up to the Conference on the Future of Europe (CoFoE), and examine whether their views align with the CoFoE proposals. EPRS research (see ‘The Conference on the Future of Europe and the European Council‘) has shown that there is significant convergence between the results of the CoFoE and the priorities of the European Council as expressed in its strategic agenda for 2019-2024 and in its conclusions over the last three years.

Although the French Minister for European Affairs, Clément Beaune, representing the rotating Council Presidency, expressed his hope of prioritising the follow-up of the CoFoE at this European Council meeting, it is currently not certain whether an extensive discussion will take place on this topic.

The European Parliament has clearly signalled its preferences as to how to follow up on the results of the CoFoE. On 9 June, it adopted a resolution in which it argued that the Treaties need to be amended to make the EU better prepared for future crises, and called for a Convention to be convened for that purpose.

While Parliament’s position is clear, a joint Council position still needs to be established, with initial discussions at the General Affairs Council meeting of 21 June not progressing to that stage. Currently, Member States hold different positions. While 13 Member States have expressed their opposition to Treaty change, six other Member States have indicated that they ‘remain in principle open to necessary Treaty changes that are jointly defined’, emphasising the need for ‘an inter-institutional process to coordinate consensus-building in the Council, European Parliament and the Commission’.

EU leaders, such as French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi and Irish Taoiseach (Prime Minister) Micheál Martin – the latter two in their speeches as part of Parliament’s ‘This is Europe’ series of debates – have already expressed their support for Treaty change, if necessary. Consequently, it is still open whether EU Heads of States or Government will solely reiterate that ‘an effective follow-up to this report is to be ensured by the institutions, each within their own sphere of competences and in accordance with the Treaties’, or if they will go further.

On 17 June, Vice-Presidents of the European Commission Dubravka Šuica, Věra Jourova and Maroš Šefcovic presented the Commission’s communication on the Conference on the Future of Europe. The Commission’s position is that the follow-up is a shared responsibility of the EU institutions, according to their institutional remit and in respect of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.

To follow up on the proposals of the CoFoE, the Commission sets out four categories of responses: i) existing initiatives that address the proposals; ii) those which the European Parliament and the Council are called upon to adopt; iii) planned actions which will deliver on the ideas, building in new reflections from the Conference; and iv) new initiatives or areas of work inspired by the proposals, falling within the remit of the Commission. To keep citizens informed and to keep up the momentum, a Conference feedback event will be organised in autumn 2022.

Considering the proposal to hold a Convention, the Commission stressed that it ‘stands ready to fully play its institutional role in the procedure set out in Article 48 of the Treaty on European Union, and in particular to give its opinion in response to a consultation by the European Council’.

Economic issues

EU Heads of State or Government are expected to endorse the 2022 country-specific recommendations (CSR), which set the goals for Member States’ fiscal and economic policies, outlining necessary structural reforms, thus concluding the policy-guidance phase of the European Semester.

EU leaders will welcome the fulfilment by Croatia of all the convergence criteria as set out in the Treaty and endorse the European Commission’s positive recommendation on Croatia joining the euro area on 1 January 2023. The Eurogroup has already endorsed the Commission’s recommendation, on 17 June 2022, and the European Council will most likely call on the Council to adopt swiftly the relevant Commission proposals.

3. Euro Summit

On 24 June, EU leaders will convene for a Euro Summit meeting in inclusive format, in order to review progress on completing banking union and the capital markets union. As the March 2022 Euro Summit meeting was cancelled due to lack of time, EU Heads of State or Government will discuss these issues together for the first time since December 2021.

EU leaders will consider the results of the meeting of the Eurogroup on 16 June, which saw progress on banking union but failed to agree on the Commission’s 2015 proposal for a European deposit insurance scheme (EDIS). EU leaders will most likely reiterate the need for further progress to be made in these areas.

Read this briefing on ‘Outlook for the meetings of EU leaders on 23-24 June 2022‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Suzana Anghel.

On 23 June 2022, for the first time since the start of Russia’s war on Ukraine, the Heads of State or Government of the EU and of the six Western Balkan countries will meet for a leaders’ meeting in Brussels. The discussion will focus on enlargement, energy, security and defence, and youth. Discussion of Emmanuel Macron’s ‘European Political Community’ proposal is not on the agenda, but it could come up during the debate.

Background

On 18 May 2022, the President of the European Council, Charles Michel, announced the holding of a meeting of EU and Western Balkan leaders, with the aim of promoting ‘enhanced EU–Western Balkans engagement’. The meeting, to be organised in cooperation with the current French Presidency of the Council of the European Union, will focus on enlargement, energy, security and defence, and youth. It will take place in Brussels, on the morning preceding the European Council meeting of 23-24 June 2022. Back in December 2021, when presenting the priorities of the French Presidency of the Council, French President Emmanuel Macron indicated that a conference on the Western Balkans would be organised in June 2022. He also stressed that the Western Balkans were at the ‘heart of Europe’. He pointed to the then already tense regional situation, underlined the Union’s responsibility – urging it to re-engage with and invest in the Western Balkans – and called for support in countering disinformation. The President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola, may also attend the leaders’ meeting.

International and regional context

Russia’s war on Ukraine has reshaped Europe’s security architecture. Analysts warn of possible ‘aftershocks in the Balkans’, stressing that more must be done to counter disinformation originating in Russia, and to boost ‘energy diversification and infrastructure’, so as to reduce the region’s dependence on Russia and China. The five Western Balkan countries that are members of the United Nations – Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia – voted in favour of the United Nations General Assembly resolution condemning Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. Unity in condemning the aggression did not, however, translate into unity in setting up and implementing sanctions on Russia. Only Albania, Kosovo*, Montenegro and North Macedonia have so far joined the EU in imposing sanctions on Russia. The three countries in the region that are members of NATO – Albania, North Macedonia and Montenegro – have provided Ukraine with military equipment and assistance. In contrast, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia have refused to impose sanctions on Russia, with Serbia even prolonging its gas contract, although they have maintained EU accession as a priority for their countries.

The meeting format and venue

The EU leaders and the leaders of the six Western Balkan countries will meet in Brussels for a leaders’ meeting as opposed to a regular EU–Western Balkans summit. The main difference between the two types of meeting lies in the role played by the rotating Presidency of the Council of the EU. At past EU–Western Balkans summits, the rotating Bulgarian, Croat and Slovenian Presidencies played central roles in preparing the meetings, considering it the pinnacle of their respective presidencies. The forthcoming EU–Western Balkans leaders’ meeting takes place during the French Presidency of the Council, but does not represent its core event, which was the Versailles Summit of 10-11 March 2022. The choice of venue – Brussels – is yet another confirmation of the less prominent role of the rotating presidency in the meeting; thus, Charles Michel and his team will have the upper hand in managing the proceedings.

The main agenda points

The topics on the agenda – energy, security and defence, and youth – are not new. They belong to the key priorities discussed at past EU–Western Balkans summits and/or outlined in the declarations adopted by the EU leaders, ‘in consultation with Western Balkans leaders’, in Sofia (2018), Zagreb (2020) and Brdo (2021).

Energy is by far the most challenging topic in the context of Russia’s war on Ukraine, and high dependency on Russian fossil fuels. At Versailles, EU leaders decided to phase out the Union’s dependence on Russian fossil fuels. They reached out to the Western Balkan countries, with a call ‘to enhance connectivity with our immediate neighbourhood’ and, at subsequent meetings, agreed on a voluntary joint procurement mechanism for gas, liquefied natural gas and hydrogen, open to the region. On security and defence, cooperation is multifaceted, covering areas ranging from Western Balkan countries contributions to EU missions and operations, to security sector reform and intelligence cooperation. With respect to youth, leaders may take stock of progress made in the implementation of the ‘innovation agenda for the Western Balkans’ launched in Brdo. Youth policies are key to stabilising the region and reversing existing trends that make the Western Balkans a ‘net emigration’ region.

State of play on enlargement

Progress is lacking on enlargement, despite the revised methodology from 2020, which allows countries to ‘phase in’ to EU programmes. Montenegro and Serbia are the frontrunners, although the pace remains rather slow. Furthermore, Serbia’s proximity to Russia and reluctance to advance in resolving its dispute with Kosovo could result in an even slower pace. Solving neighbourly disputes remains one of the main criteria for EU accession. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz has underlined that, ‘when a brutal war is being waged in our immediate neighbourhood, it is of central importance that both countries (Serbia and Kosovo) gradually resolve their conflict’. Two other countries – Albania and North Macedonia – are waiting for accession negotiations to begin. Despite several calls, including from Germany, to solve the outstanding  dispute, Bulgaria is still blocking the opening of accession negotiations with North Macedonia; with an indirect impact on Albania. The remaining two countries – Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo – are lagging behind owing to the absence of reforms and, in the case of the former, political instability, which a newly brokered political agreement could, if implemented in full, help overcome.

Past declarations were rather similar in content and messages – focusing inter alia on counter-terrorism cooperation, illegal migration and the European perspective of the Western Balkans – and were frequently addressed by the European Council in connection with the region. The word ‘enlargement’ appears only in the Brdo Declaration, where EU leaders underlined that ‘fair and rigorous conditionality and the principle of own merits’ should apply, inviting countries from the region to stay on course with their reforms. In a direct attempt to counter mounting disinformation, the Brdo Declaration stated that the EU is ‘the region’s closest partner, main investor and principal donor’.

European political community initiative

On 9 May 2022, President Macron invited the EU and like-minded non-EU countries in Europe to consider forming a ‘European political community‘ (EPC), to ‘complement’ but not substitute for the enlargement process. The proposal is expected to be debated during the forthcoming European Council meeting under the agenda point ‘wider Europe’. The EPC proposal has raised criticism from Ukraine, which initially saw it as an attempt to sideline its application for EU membership. The proposal has received mixed reactions in countries in the Western Balkans, with some, including North Macedonia, viewing it as ‘an excellent opportunity to unite countries that failed or did not want to join the bloc at a given moment, given the new geopolitical situation’. Touring the region ahead of the EU–Western Balkans leaders’ meeting, Charles Michel stressed that the aim was ‘not to replace the EU accession process’ but to grant ‘immediate political integration’ and allow regular political dialogue among leaders’, and hence stimulate progress on EU integration and accession.

European Parliament position

In an exceptional development, Parliament’s political group leaders adopted a joint statement ahead of the 23-24 June European Council meeting, expressing support for the Western Balkans on their EU integration path, and calling on the EU leaders to ‘maintain’ the Union’s ‘long-standing commitment’ to the region.

Read this at a glance note on ‘EU – Western Balkans leaders’ meeting of 23 June 2022‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Jakub Przetacznik with Simona Tarpova.

Russia launched its war on Ukraine on 24 February 2022, but Russian cyber-attacks against Ukraine have persisted ever since Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, intensifying just before the 2022 invasion. Over this period, Ukraine’s public, energy, media, financial, business and non-profit sectors have suffered the most. Since 24 February, limited Russian cyber-attacks have undermined the distribution of medicines, food and relief supplies. Their impact has ranged from preventing access to basic services to data theft and disinformation, including through deep fake technology. Other malicious cyber-activity involves sending of phishing emails, distributed denial-of-service attacks, and use of data-wiper malware, backdoors, surveillance software and information stealers.

Organisations and governments around the world have not been indifferent to the hybrid risks thus posed. EU-, US- and NATO-led initiatives have been carried out with the aim of neutralising cyber-threats and protecting essential infrastructure. As part of these initiatives, the EU has activated its Cyber Rapid Response Teams (a project under Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in the area of security and defence policy), to support Ukraine’s cyber-defence. Non-government and private players have supported Ukraine through various cyber-resilience activities. Since the beginning of the invasion, a significant number of counter-attacks have been launched by independent hackers, affecting the Russian state, security, banking and media systems.

The European Parliament has called for stepping up cybersecurity assistance to Ukraine and for making full use of the EU’s cyber-sanctions regimes against individuals, entities and bodies responsible for or involved in the various cyber-attacks targeting Ukraine.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: Timeline of cyber-attacks‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Timeline of cyber-attacks on Ukraine