European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Liselotte Jensen.

The European Union (EU) is legally bound by the Climate Law to reach climate neutrality by 2050 and deliver negative emissions from that year on. To do so, carbon emissions must be significantly reduced and any remaining greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions balanced, and subsequently exceeded, by sequestration or removals, to limit and ultimately reverse the warming of our planet.

In its December 2021 communication on sustainable carbon cycles, the Commission outlined various approaches to capture and store or sequester carbon dioxide emissions, or capture already released carbon dioxide directly from the atmosphere to reduce the concentration and thereby its warming effect. Various solutions, both technology- and nature-based, are being brought forward to this end. A key challenge will be to ensure permanence of carbon dioxide removals, whether in underground geological storage or through actively managed natural processes, such as carbon farming and management practices in the land use, land-use change and forestry sectors.

Many products today, such as plastics and chemicals, are produced using virgin fossil-based carbon resources. The Commission therefore also aims to push for product and process innovation to substitute current fossil-based feedstock with sustainably sourced bio-based materials, or through the circular economy, to ensure that carbon integrated in products is recycled and remains stored. More CO2 transport infrastructure is essential to increase the reuse of captured carbon.

At the end of 2022, the Commission plans to put forward a legislative proposal on a European framework for the certification of carbon removals, which could lead to a market for carbon removals, further incentivising measures to increase carbon sequestration and storage. Ensuring high environmental integrity and adequate monitoring and reporting frameworks is crucial, while also taking into account potential trade-offs or co-benefits of potential solutions.

Read this briefing on ‘Sustainable carbon cycles: Promoting removal, storage and recycling‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Carbon flows EU-27 (2018)

Written by Pieter Baert (1st edition).

In most countries in the European Union (EU) and in the rest of the world, debt is treated more favourably from a tax perspective than equity, with interest payments to loans generally being tax deductible. In contrast, costs related to equity financing, such as dividends, are mostly non-tax deductible. This unequal treatment between debt and equity induces a bias towards debt in businesses’ investment decisions and can therefore lead to high levels of indebtedness in the European corporate sector. On 11 May 2022, to support the creation of a harmonised tax environment that places debt and equity financing on an equal footing across the EU, the European Commission presented a proposal for a debt-equity bias reduction allowance (DEBRA). The DEBRA lays down rules on both a tax allowance on increases in equity and on a limitation of the tax deductibility of interest payments.

Versions

• October 2022: Debt-equity bias reduction allowance (1st edition)

Proposal for a debt-equity bias reduction allowance and limiting the deductibility of interest for corporate income tax purposes Committee responsible:Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON)COM(2022)0216
11.5.2022Rapporteur:Luděk Niedermayer (EPP, Czechia)2022/0154(CNS)Shadow rapporteurs:Evelyn Regner (S&D, Austria)
Gilles Boyer (Renew, France)
Gunnar Beck (ID, Germany)
Michiel Hoogeveen (ECR, Netherlands)Consultation procedure (CNS) – Parliament adopts a non-binding opinion Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Suzana Anghel.

On 6 and 7 October 2022, the EU Heads of State or Government will meet in Prague for an informal meeting of the European Council, preceded by the inaugural meeting of the European Political Community (EPC). Seventeen non-EU European heads of state or government will join the EU-27 leaders for the first meeting of the European Political Community. The 44 leaders are expected to focus, in smaller groups, on peace and security, climate and energy, migration and economic cooperation. They could also grasp the opportunity to define jointly the modes and pace of future political and security cooperation under the new EPC format. At their subsequent informal European Council meeting, EU leaders will discuss Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, energy (notably a possible gas price cap), as well as economic issues. These three interlinked topics have been on their agenda since the outbreak of Russia’s war on Ukraine. Reaffirming unity and a common vision will be central to the meeting, which serves as preparation for the regular European Council meetings of October and December 2022, at which decisions are expected to be taken. As with other such meetings held earlier this year, the European Parliament’s President, Roberta Metsola, will attend the informal European Council meeting.

Inaugural meeting of the European Political Community

On 6 October 2022, EU leaders will meet with 17 non-EU European heads of state or government for the first meeting of the European Political Community in Prague. Six Western Balkans countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia), five Eastern Partnership countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine) as well as Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey and the United Kingdom will participate. The meeting will be held at the invitation of the European Council President, Charles Michel, and the Czech Prime Minister, Petr Fiala, whose country currently holds the rotating presidency of the Council of the EU.

Origin, initial reactions and aim of the European Political Community initiative

On Europe Day 2022, the French President, Emmanuel Macron, proposed to create a European Political Community, a framework that should foster cooperation with like-minded non-EU European partners in areas such as security, energy, transport and infrastructure. Although he stressed right from the outset that the EPC’s aim would be to ‘complement’ and not to substitute the enlargement process, the proposal evoked mixed reactions in the Western Balkans and wariness in Ukraine. Touring the Western Balkans in the following weeks, President Michel championed the proposal, stressing that its aim was ‘not to replace the EU accession process’ but to allow ‘immediate political integration’ and ‘regular political dialogue among leaders’. President Michel then coined the term ‘European geopolitical community’, placing foreign policy cooperation at its core; he suggested that participating states should ‘meet at least twice a year’ at leaders’ and ministers’ level. The European Council discussed the EPC in June 2022, when they agreed that the objective was ‘to foster political dialogue and cooperation to address issues of common interest so as to strengthen the security, stability and prosperity of the European continent’, and confirmed that there was no intention to replace enlargement.

Inaugural meeting agenda, format and possible outcome

The agenda consists of a mix of plenary sessions and roundtable discussions, whilst also enabling bilateral meetings. There will be four parallel roundtable discussions allowing European leaders to focus in smaller groups on the following subjects: 1) peace and security; 2) energy and climate; 3) economy; and 4) migration. The thematic roundtables format was used at the EU-African Union summit of 17 February 2022, where each roundtable was co-chaired by several participating countries. It remains to be seen whether the meeting will bring greater clarity to the concept, focus, structure and frequency of meetings of the new EPC. President Michel outlined that ‘no formal written outcome’ of the meeting is envisaged.

Informal meeting of European Council members

The Prague informal European Council meeting, which President Michel will chair, follows the tradition established in recent years of organising informal meetings hosted in and by the country holding the rotating Council presidency. The objective is to allow EU leaders to build unity on topics discussed informally and hence prepare well in advance of upcoming regular meeting(s) at which decisions are expected to be taken. The indicative leaders’ agenda released in September 2022 confirms this approach. The topics listed for the informal Prague meeting – Russia’s war on Ukraine, energy and economic affairs – are the same as those listed for the regular European Council meetings of 20-21 October 2022 and 15‑16 December 2022. EU leaders might also address, in light of possible developments, other pressing foreign policy issues. Given the informal nature, no conclusions are expected, although President Michel has issued ‘oral conclusions’ after such meetings in the past.

Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine

EU leaders have discussed Ukraine at their six meetings held thus far in 2022. They will consider recent developments on the ground, where Ukraine is engaged in a robust counter-offensive aimed at recovering its territory illegally occupied by Russia. EU leaders will most probably condemn the sham annexation referendums organised by Russia in Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia, and reaffirm support to Ukraine’s territorial integrity within the country’s internationally recognised borders. Sanctions will most probably be at the core of discussions, testing the EU’s unity in countering Russia. The new package includes a cap on Russian oil export prices, which would translate a G7 agreement from September 2022 to EU level; yet Member States are still divided on this issue. At the UN General Assembly, President Michel had stressed that ‘because we must stop the Kremlin’s war machine, massive economic sanctions were unavoidable’. He also underlined that Russia’s actions in Ukraine are acts of war, pointing to the mobilisation of reservists. EU leaders will most certainly consider several other issues, including accountability for war crimes perpetrated in Ukraine and food (in)security, as well as EU humanitarian, financial, economic and military aid.

Energy

Energy has been a rolling item on the European Council’s agenda since last autumn, when EU leaders first addressed the spike in prices. The renewed price rise could trigger a discussion on energy affordability, bringing to the fore the issue of a price cap on gas transactions. This idea, while being supported by 15 Member States, was absent from the measures agreed at the extraordinary Energy Council of 30 September 2022. Such a cap would be distinct from possible further sanctions on Russia in the form of a gas price cap. Another topic for EU leaders to consider could be the reform of the electricity market, including by decoupling gas and electricity prices. Moreover, the Heads of State or Government are likely to discuss the means of protecting critical infrastructure, following the acts of sabotage on the Nord Stream pipeline, which, as tweeted by President Michel, ‘appear to be an attempt to further destabilise energy supply to EU’. EU leaders could take stock of preparations for the winter undertaken at their request by the European Commission and the Member States. In her State of the Union address, the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, underlined that the EU agreed on the joint storage of gas, and that storage facilities across the EU were 84 % full in early September 2022. She has also warned against Russia’s continued manipulation of the European energy market and stressed the importance of phasing out dependency on Russian fossil fuels, a commitment that EU leaders assumed earlier this year.

Economic situation

EU Member States face high inflation rates, estimated at 9.1 % for the euro area and at up to 10.1 % for the EU as a whole in August 2022. This is a sharp increase compared to July 2021, when euro-area inflation stood at 2.2 % and overall EU inflation at 2.5 %. The spike in energy and food prices, exacerbated by Russia’s war on Ukraine, is largely at the root of these high inflation rates. President von der Leyen has stressed that Russia’s war on Ukraine ‘is a war on our energy, a war on our economy, a war on our values and a war on our future’. EU leaders might consider ways to curb inflation, and discuss economic growth as well as reform, including of the energy market. In July 2022, the European Parliament held a debate on the cost of living and the means available to ‘help citizens cope with the rising cost of living’.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Outlook for the meetings of EU leaders in Prague on 6 and 7 October 2022‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Negreiro and Maria Niestadt (2nd edition).

The 2014 Regulation on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market (eIDAS Regulation or eIDAS) was the first digital identity legislation to provide the basis for cross-border electronic identification, authentication and website certification throughout the EU. Application of eIDAS has been mixed. However, the pandemic increased the need for such solutions to be put in place to access public and private services.

On 3 June 2021, the Commission put forward a proposal building on the eIDAS framework, with the aim of giving at least 80 % of citizens the possibility to use a digital identity to access key public services by 2030 and to do so across EU borders. The updated European digital identity framework would also allow citizens to identify and authenticate themselves online (via their European digital identity wallet) without having to resort to commercial providers, a practice that raises trust, security and privacy concerns. In parallel, the Commission adopted a recommendation to design a toolbox supporting the framework so as to avoid fragmentation and barriers due to diverging standards.

Within the European Parliament, the file has been assigned to the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE). In the draft report, published on 31 May 2022, the rapporteur Romana Jerković (S&D, Croatia) proposed significant changes to the regulation, particularly regarding the European digital identity wallet. The Council has not yet reached a general approach on the file.

Versions

• October 2022: Updating the European digital identity framework (2nd edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 as regards establishing a framework for a European Digital Identity Committee responsible:Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE)COM(2021)0281
3.6.2021Rapporteur:Romana Jerković (S&D, Croatia)2021/0136(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Riho Terras (EPP, Estonia)
Alin Mituța (Renew, Romania)
Mikuláš Peksa (Greens/EFA, Czechia)
Paolo Borchia (ID, Italy)
Dace Melbārde (NA, Latvia)
Elena Kountoura (The Left, Greece)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Vote in committee on draft report

Written by Claudia Vinci.

In 2020, there were over 76 million cattle in the European Union (EU) and beef production reached 6.8 million tonnes – output that makes the EU the world’s third largest producer, after the United States and Brazil. The sector is diverse in terms of herd size, farm structure and geographical distribution of farms between EU regions.

Beef is an important element of most European diets, and it is the third most widely consumed meat in the world. EU beef, together with other EU food products, is known for its quality, and widely exported to third countries. To facilitate trade, the EU negotiates bilateral free trade agreements with those countries.

While offering a wide range of opportunities, the opening of global markets can also have a negative impact on the EU beef industry: beef produced outside the EU is more competitive, which threatens to weaken EU internal production.

In recent years, threats other than the opening of new markets have been putting pressure on EU beef producers. These include the declining consumption of red meat, citizens’ concerns about environmental impact, climate change and animal welfare, and low farm incomes.

The EU’s common agricultural policy offers a wide range of instruments to support farmers and address market changes. These instruments include export refunds, public intervention, and private storage aid. Farmers should also now be able to exert greater leverage over big retailers with the protection provided by the 2019 Unfair Trading Practices Directive.

Read the complete briefing on ‘European Union beef sector: Main features, challenges and prospects‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

EU exports: Beef and veal (million tonnes) EU imports: Beef and veal (million tonnes) EU production of bovine meat in 2018-2020 (thousand tonnes) Farms with specialist cattle-rearing and fattening: Distribution across EU Member States, 2016 Farms with specialist cattle-rearing and -fattening: Standard output, 2016 Organic livestock: bovine animals (by head of cattle, 2020)

Written by Krisztina Binder.

In 1994, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), in cooperation with its partner organisations, designated 5 October as World Teachersˈ Day. It commemorates the adoption, in 1966, of a set of guidelines to promote teachersˈ status, and the adoption, in 1997, of a recommendation on the status of higher-education teaching personnel. Since 1994, the teaching profession has been celebrated internationally on 5 October.

World Teachersˈ Day is perhaps one of the global anniversaries that touches everyone most directly. After all, almost everybody remembers a favourite teacher who motivated them to learn and inspired them to explore. This is not a coincidence, as educational research reveals a broad consensus on teacher quality having the greatest impact on student achievement of all in-school factors.

However, across the world, education systems and the teaching profession face problems, many of which are shared. One of these is the global shortage of teachers. For instance, estimations made in 2021 revealed that 15 million more teachers were needed in sub-Saharan Africa; in recent years, many education systems across Europe have also been affected by shortages. Increased class sizes lead to overworked teachers and negatively impact studentsˈ achievements. Moreover, the imbalanced distribution of teachers across subjects, particularly leading to shortages in subjects such as mathematics and technology, and in certain geographical areas, mainly rural and remote locations, also proves problematic. Gender imbalances at different levels of education are also a worldwide phenomenon. While, in sub-Saharan Africa for instance, there are fewer opportunities for women to become a teacher in secondary education, 72 % of the approximately 6 million schoolteachers in the European Union were women, according to 2017 figures.

Furthermore, fewer young people are entering the profession and qualified teachers are leaving the field, creating an ageing teacher population. Several factors drive these trends, including, among others, a perceived low value and status of the profession, general dissatisfaction with salaries, precarious employment conditions, the burden of administrative tasks and higher expectations in terms of student outcomes.

The COVID-19 pandemic that disrupted education services and led to school closures has presented teachers with even more challenges. For instance, to be able to maintain contact with students, teachers had to adapt their practices to online and remote education. They were also expected to support their students’ psychological wellbeing in unfavourable circumstances by, for example, promoting social interaction among them. However, in some cases, the teachersˈ own physical and mental health was also impacted, as they experienced stress and suffered from burnout.

Recent coronavirus-related developments again highlight the fundamental role played by teachers in our societies as a driving force for our education systems contributing to social, economic and cultural life. Moreover, the crisis brought about a renewed awareness of teachersˈ situation and the problems facingthe profession. It is in the shared interest of our communities to develop policy responses that raise the status of teachers and reinstate the attractiveness of the education profession. These include measures on initial preparation and professional development, employment prospects, remuneration, and teaching conditions. Other initiatives should also be explored, such as involving the teaching personnel in creating more adaptive education systems and in innovating teaching practices.

Education policy lies primarily with the Member States; the role of the European Union is to encourage cooperation and support national actions. The European Parliament has expressed continued support for teachers to help them face the challenges of their profession. In its 2021 resolution on the European Education Area, the Parliament called for better recognition of the teaching profession, and stressed, among other things, that teachers and educators should be adequately remunerated for their work. In its 2022 resolution on an EU strategy to promote education for children in the world, the Parliament acknowledged and expressed appreciation for the work delivered by teachers in the context of the pandemic. In May 2021, Members adopted the 2021‑2027 edition of the Erasmus+ programme, with almost doubled funding enabling it to reach more teachers and students.

Main sources:

• Ivana Katsarova, Nadejda Kresnichka-Nikolchova, Teachers: Contributing to the EUˈs future, At a glance, Infographic, European Parliament, EPRS, October 2019
• Ivana Katsarova, Teaching careers in the EU: Why boys do not want to be teachers, Briefing, European Parliament, EPRS, February 2020
• UNESCO, Education International, ILO, UNICEF, World Teachersˈ Day 2021: Teachers at the heart of education recovery, Concept note, 2021
•  UNESCO, ILO, UNICEF, Education International, World Teachersˈ Day 2022: The transformation of education begins with teachers, Concept note, 2022
• European Commission, European Education and Culture Executive Agency, Motiejūnaitė-Schulmeister, A., De Coster, I., Davydovskaia, O., et al., Teachers in Europe : careers, development and well-being, Birch, P.(editor), Publications Office of the European Union, 2021

Written by Gyorgyi Macsai (Members’ Research Service) with Igor Tkalec (GlobalStat, EUI).

The infographic illustrates the economic development in the United States in comparison with the EU economy in the past decade. Besides showing strong economic recovery capacity in both regions, it gives an insight into economic phenomena, such as rising inflation and growing public debt – unfavourable trends that started before 2022, a year marked by war in Europe. It also portrays trade relations between the two blocs, which, despite having suffered during the COVID-19 pandemic, grew to record levels in EU exports of goods and services in 2021. This is a further updated edition of an infographic, the last edition of which was published in June 2021.

Read this at a glance note on ‘United States: Economic indicators and trade with EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Henrique Morgado Simões (1st edition).

On 5 April 2022, the Commission presented a proposal for a regulation on fluorinated greenhouse gases that would repeal Regulation (EU) No 517/2014. The proposal is amongst the last in the ‘fit for 55’ package, aiming to align EU climate and energy laws with the EU Climate Law’s 2030 target.

The proposal aims to further reduce emissions of fluorinated greenhouse gases (F-gases). It would change the existing quota system, gradually reducing the supply of hydrofluorocarbons (HFC) to the EU market to 2.4 % of 2015 levels by 2048. It would also ban F-gases in specific applications and update the rules in respect to implementing best practices, leak checking, record keeping, training, waste treatment and penalties. The current licensing system and labelling obligations would be strengthened in order to improve enforcement of trade restrictions. Finally, the proposal would align EU legislation with the requirements of the Montreal Protocol to reduce production of HFCs.

In Parliament, the proposal is being discussed in the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI).

Versions

• September 2022: Review of the Regulation on fluorinated greenhouse gases: Fit for 55 package (1st edition)

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on fluorinated greenhouse gases, amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 517/2014 Committee responsible:Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI)COM(2022) 150
5.4.2022Rapporteur:Bas Eickhout (Greens/EFA, the Netherlands)2022/0099(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Stelios Kympouropoulos (EPP, Greece)
Günther Sidl (S&D, Austria)
Ondřej Knotek (Renew, Czechia)
Danilo Oscar Lancini (ID, Italy)
Alexandr Vondra (ECR, Czechia)
Nikolaj Villumsen (The Left, Denmark)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Monika Kiss.

After the lifting of COVID-19 related health restrictions, figures in the transport sector are slowly returning to pre-pandemic levels. According to EUROCONTROL 2022‑2024 forecasts, 9.5 million flights are expected in the aviation sector this year, corresponding to 85 % of 2019 levels, despite the impact of the invasion of Ukraine and global economic challenges. Measures concerning take-off and landing slots should reflect this evolution.

Background

The allocation of airport slots is regulated under the Slot Regulation (EEC Regulation 95/93). Airlines granted a slot at an airport may use the entire range of infrastructure necessary for the operation of a flight at a given time (runway, taxiway, stands and for passenger flights, terminal infrastructure). Changing figures in the volume of air traffic meant an update of the legislation was needed.

The Commission’s December 2011 airport package included a legislative proposal to review the Slot Regulation. The proposal aimed at ensuring optimal allocation and use of airport slots in congested airports and fair competition between operators. The Council adopted its general approach in October 2012 and the Parliament adopted its first reading position in December 2012. In its position, the Parliament aimed to introduce a number of additional measures designed to strengthen the independence of slot coordinators across Europe, and make slot allocation more transparent. The Parliament also sought to strengthen the coordinator’s functions and the independence of the coordinator’s supervisory board. The Parliament rejected proposals to raise the ‘slot series usage rate’ to 85 % and to increase the minimum number of weekly slots for priority allocation. The proposal is currently awaiting Council’s first reading position and remains blocked in the Council.

The Parliament’s resolution of 16 February 2017 had urged the Council and Member States to make swift progress on deadlocked files, including this one. Furthermore, in its aviation strategy for Europe from June 2019, the European Commission urged the Council and the Parliament to adopt the revised regulation swiftly, to enable the optimal use of the busiest airports and to provide clear benefits to the EU economy.

The COVID-19 pandemic and its aftermath

In 2020, after the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic and the related lockdown measures, air traffic fell steeply. However, airlines are required to use 80 % of their slots to secure their slot portfolios for the following season – should they not reach this threshold, the slots go to the slot pool for reallocation. To temporarily waive the rules on take-off and landing slot utilisation, the European Council suspended airport slot use requirements (the ‘use it-or-lose-it’ rule) from March to 24 October 2020. This measure was extended again until 27 March 2021, to avoid the environmental harm caused by running empty flights (‘ghost flights‘) for the sole purpose of retaining slots for the following season.

Due to some recovery in the demand for air travel, the European Commission proposed in December 2020 to return to the ‘use it-or-lose-it’ rule, to maximise benefits for the greatest number of slot users, consumers and connectivity. After discussions in the Council and Parliament, the agreed threshold was set at 50 % for the summer season, running from 28 March to 30 October 2021. In addition, the Commission was given delegated powers for one year to decide on the extension of the temporary measures and to amend the slot use rate within a 30‑70 % range. The Commission has extended the measures to the winter season, running from 31 October 2021 until 27 March 2022, with the same 50 % threshold. In December 2021, the Commission extended the slot relief rules for the 2022 summer scheduling season, running from 28 March 2022 until 29 October 2022, with a threshold of 64 %. The ‘justified non-use of slots’ exception was also extended.

On 12 July 2022, the European Commission proposed to return to a higher slot use rate (80 % of the 2019 figures) as of 30 October 2022 – reflecting the increasing demand, but simultaneously allowing the possibility to continue to make use of the ‘justified non-use of slots’ (JNUS) tool. In the Parliament, Members are expected to vote on the proposal during the October I session.

Written by Maria Diaz Crego and Micaela Del Monte (1st edition).

Over the years, techniques to limit freedom of expression have been refined, in innovative ways, often taking advantage of a legal void or grey zones between legal norms. One of these techniques is that of ‘SLAPPs’ (strategic lawsuits against public participation), a term coined by George Pring and Penelope Canan in the 1980s to indicate an abusive or meritless lawsuit filed against someone for exercising their political rights or freedom of expression in relation to matters of public interest. The purpose of SLAPPs is not to seek justice but to intimidate, silence and drain the financial and physical resources of the targeted victims. Ultimately, SLAPPs have a ‘chilling effect’ that goes beyond the individual case and undermines the building up of a healthy and pluralistic civic space in which citizens can actively participate. Although originally the SLAPPs phenomenon mainly affected activists, environmentalists and citizens who made themselves heard on matters of social relevance, today it affects all individuals who, in the name of public interest, denounce abuses of various kinds committed by both public and private actors.

On 27 April 2022, the European Commission put forward a proposal for a directive aimed at protecting persons who engage in public participation against manifestly unfounded or abusive civil court proceedings with cross-border implications, which is now being analysed by the co‑legislators. The proposal is accompanied by a recommendation to the Member States setting out guidance to address purely domestic cases of SLAPPs.

Versions

• September 2022: Strategic lawsuits against public participation (1st edition)

Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on protecting persons who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded or abusive court proceedings (‘Strategic lawsuits against public participation’) Committee responsible:Legal Affairs (JURI)COM(2022) 177 final
22.4.20222Rapporteur:Tiemo Wölken (S&D, Germany)2022/0117(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Magdalena Adamowicz (EPP, Poland)
Ilana Cicurel (Renew, France)
Marie Toussaint (Greens/EFA, France)
Jorge Buxadé Villalba (ECR, Spain)
Manon Aubry (The Left, France)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Draft report

Written by Sebastian Clapp and Philippe Perchoc.

As part of its Jean Monnet seminar series, the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) organised a two-day seminar entitled ‘European strategic autonomy, sovereignty and responsibility: Opportunities and challenges in the shadow of Russia’s war on Ukraine’ in Bazoches and Paris on 8 and 9 July 2022. The panellists included representatives of the Council, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Globsec, Institut Jacques Delors, the German Marshall Fund and a former Ukrainian Deputy Minister of Defence and staff from the secretariats of Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) and Sub-committee on Security and Defence (SEDE).

The first part of the event took place at OECD Headquarters in Paris. In his opening statement, Secretary-General of the European Parliament, Klaus Welle, underlined that the war in Ukraine has triggered a return of geopolitics to Europe. He posed the questions whether Russian President Vladimir Putin is proposing a new bipolar world order, with Russia and China constituting one pole, and whether there is a new era of clashing value systems. If so, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alone does not have all the tools necessary to counter the new Russian threat. However, the European Union (EU), with its comprehensive approach, could provide a large part of the answer. He noted that, with the return of geopolitics, it is critical for the EU to act geopolitically and to work with partners. Important steps were taken at the Versailles Summit when it comes to European defence and strategic autonomy and with the Strategic Compass. Nevertheless, the EU will need support from the United States to build up European resilience. It will be especially important to align defence procurement and boost joint deterrence and defence, together with the USA.

The first panel examined the implications of the Russian war on Ukraine for EU strategic autonomy. Panellists reflected on the broader and longer-term trends linked to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, with a particular emphasis on food security, energy and defence. The effects of the war on Ukraine on global food security were underlined. Already increasing before the war, global hunger has now become fundamentally worse, not least as Ukraine was the biggest supplier of wheat to the World Food Programme. More and more countries will now be dependent on food aid, and at higher prices. The participants also considered the looming energy crisis. Worryingly, US liquified natural gas (LNG) will not be enough to substitute for Russian gas and will be prohibitively expensive; some speakers argued that the EU is not doing enough to solve the energy crisis. On defence, panellists emphasised that, while the possibility of war has always existed, the EU approach was one of ‘waiting for problems to go away’. This has failed. One panellist emphasised that is essential to pay attention to what is happening outside the West, pointing to the importance of finding a way to ‘co-exist with China’.  

The event continued at the Jean Monnet House in Bazoches on the following day. In her opening message, President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola, emphasised the historic importance of the Jean Monnet House to European integration and highlighted that Jean Monnet and his guests discussed the first, albeit unsuccessful, projects for a European Defence Community at the house. She underlined that in a time of great geopolitical threat, strategic autonomy has become more pertinent than ever, , and outlined the key areas the EU27 leaders have identified as most important to the strategic sovereignty of the Union (defence, energy, the economy and food security). The first European integration projects were centred around energy, and today this issue is back on the table. She also noted that, in the face of Russia’s war on Ukraine, the EU reacted collectively and decisively and took unprecedented action in the area of sanctions, energy and military aid and focused most on the area of defence and the key measures agreed to in the Strategic Compass and Versailles Declaration.

In her introductory remarks, Vice-President Eva Kailli (S&D, Greece) emphasised that the EU has shown unity in response to recent crises, but noted that the EU lacks foresight. She underlined that a deeper analysis of what is coming is necessary, to ensure better preparedness. The EU must switch from shortsighted policies to long-term strategies based on foresight. Foresight is essential to building a ‘real preparedness plan’ for key areas, such as energy, defence, and raw materials. Foresight is also key to the EU’s green and digital transitions. Eva Kaili commended the European Parliament’s pioneering role in integrating foresight into policy-making, through the European Strategy and Policy Analysis System (ESPAS) and the Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA). She also emphasised the EPRS’s adoption of foresight practices and underlined that the EPRS and STOA provide lawmakers with ‘clarity and perspective’, allowing Members to ‘see and plan further’. 

The second panel discussed the progress made in the EU’s pursuit of strategic autonomy/strategic sovereignty in the past six months, drawing on the Strategic Compass and on the Versailles agenda, and reflected on the challenges facing the EU’s capacity to act and to build resilience. Participants highlighted the European Defence Fund as one of the most important initiatives of recent times, with EU co-financing of defence procurement an extremely promising way forward for EU defence policy (vaccine procurement during COVID‑19 was given as an example of successful joint procurement), that complements NATO. However,  greater ambition and new sources of funding are necessary. The importance of critical technologies and reduction of strategic dependencies was also highlighted during the session. Commission initiatives, such as the roadmap on critical technologies for security and defence and the defence investment gap analysis were highlighted. The defence of the Eastern flank of NATO was also discussed, with a particular emphasis on scenarios looking at how the war on Ukraine will end and what the consequences could be for European defence.

The final session explored the importance of partnerships under the theme ‘From strategic autonomy to strategic responsibility? Partnering in times of great crisis’. Panellists discussed the state-of-play of the EU’s partnerships and cooperation with NATO, the USA, the United Kingdom and ‘like-minded partners’ and its implications for security and defence, energy and the economy. In terms of continued US commitment to NATO, the importance of the next US elections was underlined and the risks of a further shift in US foreign policy priorities towards the Indo-Pacific were discussed. One panellist suggested a transatlantic Erasmus programme to foster transatlantic cooperation in future generations. On Ukraine, the effectiveness of EU support to Ukraine including weapons deliveries to Ukraine was discussed. The European Parliament’s support to the Ukrainian Parliament was also underlined. Panellists discussed the UK’s partnerships with the EU, underlining that to the UK, EU foreign policy remains essential across the UK political spectrum; with the UK also supporting stronger EU-NATO cooperation. The session concluded that the war on Ukraine has underlined the alignment of the EU, the UK and the US on defence matters.

This meeting was the second in an annual series on strategic autonomy held at the Jean Monnet house. This year’s session was an occasion to reflect and discuss in a very different context to the first session in 2021. With these regular meetings, EPRS hopes to contribute to continued European and transatlantic dialogue.

Written by Aidan Christie.

The European Parliament traditionally holds two plenary sessions in Strasbourg in the month of October, and for the first of them, Members will focus on events beyond the EU’s borders. The key debate this session, on Wednesday morning, will address, with the Council and Commission, the latest developments in Russia’s war on Ukraine. The debate comes in the context of Russia’s recent escalation of the conflict and its attempts to annex additional areas of Ukrainian territory. A further topical debate will discuss the problems of anti-European and anti-Ukrainian propaganda circulated within the EU in support of Russia. Following last month’s debate on energy prices, Members are due to vote a resolution on the issue, as Europe seeks ways to deal with the energy price and supply crisis ahead of the winter season.

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On Monday evening, Members will debate provisional agreements reached with Council negotiators on two proposals that aim to create a European Health Union. Drawn up in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, the European Commission’s plans aim to ensure the EU is better prepared for future health threats. The proposed regulation on serious cross-border health threats would ensure the EU and each Member State have in place complementary preparedness plans for health crises. These would be coordinated, and regularly reviewed and updated. In addition, networks would be developed to improve contacts and knowledge-sharing among epidemiological and medical surveillance bodies. The proposed extension of the mandate of the European Centre for Disease Control (ECDC) would broaden its role to monitor health systems across the EU, and ensure data are made available to address all major health threats.

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Later that evening, Parliament will address measures to bring the latest rules of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) into EU law. The western Indian Ocean is a key fishing ground for tuna for the EU fishing fleet, with a catch of some 217 000 tonnes in the area in 2020. As a contracting party to the IOTC, the EU is obliged to ensure its conservation and fisheries management measures are taken over into EU law. Members are due to vote on an agreement reached with the Council on the proposed measures.

On Tuesday, the long-running issue of compatibility of chargers for electronic devices – such as smart phones, tablets, cameras, headphones, game consoles and portable speakers – is finally due to be resolved, when Members vote on the proposal on a common charger for such devices. With a voluntary approach from industry not having reduced the numbers of chargers needed by consumers, nor their frustration at not having a compatible one to hand, the Commission proposed to standardise chargers using the USB Type-C connector and port. Members will vote on the text agreed with the Council in trilogue, which should simplify life for consumers and reduce electronic waste.

During Tuesday’s voting session, Members will vote on a range of legislative proposals, including one on the establishment of an EU customs single window, enabling traders and shippers to deal with all the varied documentary requirements – such as those relating to health, the environment, agriculture, and compliance with standards, as well as customs – through a single electronic gateway. Another proposal to be voted is that on the modernisation of the way agricultural statistics are collected in the EU, specifically on new rules for data on input and output of agricultural activity, including use by farmers of agro-chemicals.

Tuesday afternoon in the plenary session will feature, among other debates, two rounds of question time, where Members have the chance to pose questions on specific topics. First, to a member of the Commission, on the issue of tackling depopulation through cohesion policy instruments, and then to the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, on heightening tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Among other foreign policy issues to be tackled in Tuesday afternoon’s debates are the protests in Iran, following the death in police custody of Mahsa Amini. Iran has seen growing protests across the country, and their increasingly brutal repression by the authorities, since the death of Amini on 16 September. The 22-year-old Kurdish woman was arrested for allegedly violating the Iranian law requiring women to wear a veil. The protests are reportedly being led by women in solidarity with Amini, but commentators underline that the demonstrations also come in a context of deteriorating economic conditions and the soaring cost of living.

Members will also consider a set of recommendations to the Commission, Council and High Representative on EU policy on the Horn of Africa. The eight countries in this region suffer from violent conflict and food insecurity, but are of strategic interest for the EU, being on major trading routes through the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. EU policy towards the region is shifting from one focused on development to take much greater account of security concerns. Parliament is due to consider a report from the Committee on Foreign Affairs, which assesses the strategy on the Horn of Africa agreed by the Council in May 2021. The report makes recommendations on implementation of the strategy, in particular underlining the need to combat the influence of third parties in the region that do not act under similar values to those of the Union.

On Wednesday, after debating Russia’s war in Ukraine, Members will turn to another situation with pressing humanitarian needs, the widespread flooding in Pakistan. The country is prone to extreme weather events, and since early 2022 has experienced a run of exceptional weather, with heat waves being followed by the heaviest monsoon rains in over a century. Over a third of the country has been under water, equivalent to an area three times the size of Portugal. More than 1 600 people have been killed, many times that injured, and some 8 million have been displaced. On top of damage to houses, infrastructure and farms have also been badly hit.

Visit the Parliament’s website for the full agenda for the week’s plenary session.

Related EPRS publications:

Protests in Iran over the death of Mahsa Amini

The floods in Pakistan and the global and EU humanitarian responses

European Health Union: Regulating cross-border threats to health, and a renewed ECDC mandate

A common charger for electronic devices: Revision of the Radio Equipment Directive

The Horn of Africa

Customs single window

Transposition of management measures for Indian Ocean tuna fisheries

Statistics on agricultural input and output

Question time: Tackling depopulation through cohesion policy instruments

Question time: Heightening tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan

Written by Anna Caprile and Eric Pichon.

Besides huge human losses and destruction, Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine – the ‘breadbasket of Europe’ – has triggered energy and food supply challenges, exacerbating existing food systems vulnerabilities, already weakened under the effect of climate change and the COVID‑19 pandemic.

Fears of an unprecedented global food crisis similar to, or even worse than, the 2007‑2008 crisis have mounted, magnifying ripple effects for security, migration and political instability. The supply shock provoked by the blockade of Ukrainian exports, coupled with record price levels for energy and basic commodities, led several nations to adopt export restrictions, fuelling market shocks and speculative operations, leading to unpredictability in global food supply.

As the war continues and the stakes become higher, Russia has increasingly been using food shortage fears as a new weapon in its hybrid war, and food security has been at the top of the international political agenda since February 2022.

The response of the international community, including a United Nations–Turkey-brokered agreement to unblock exports from Black Sea ports, has calmed fears of an imminent widespread food global crisis. A number of food import and food aid-dependent countries, however, remain highly vulnerable to food price and foreign exchange volatility.  

This publication updates and expands an ‘at a glance’ note from April 2022.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Russia’s war on Ukraine: Impact on global food security and EU response‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Global exports of basic commodities: Russia’s and Ukraine’s shares (2021)

Written by Agnieszka Widuto.

Since Russia invaded Ukraine, Europe has found itself in an energy crisis. Skyrocketing gas and electricity prices, coupled with energy supply concerns, have obliged the European Union (EU) to take action to mitigate the situation.

Reducing energy consumption is seen as one of the key measures the EU Member States can take to reduce energy bills and tackle supply issues. It can help them reduce their energy import dependency and prepare for a winter of possible gas supply disruptions. It can also help the EU reach its climate goals in line with the European Green Deal.

The EU has taken a number of steps both to align its policies with more ambitious climate goals and to boost energy independence. In terms of long-term measures, the Energy Efficiency Directive is currently being revised to increase the EU-wide targets for the reduction of energy consumption by 2030. Similarly, the Energy Performance of Buildings Directive is also under revision to further improve the energy efficiency of buildings. One of the ways to achieve this would be through an enhanced energy performance certification system, boosting renovation rates and popularising solar panels.

Further EU measures aimed at saving energy and reducing demand in the short term include: a plan to reduce gas demand so as to ensure sufficient supplies in the winter; a proposed reduction of electricity demand as part of efforts to combat high energy prices; and an EU energy saving plan under REPowerEU, to cut the EU’s reliance on Russian fossil fuels. Key actions leading to reduced energy consumption include stepping up building renovation, implementing energy efficiency solutions, accelerating the rollout of renewables and promoting behavioural change by means of information campaigns. Reducing energy demand is part of broader ongoing efforts to address the energy crisis, complementing action aimed at diversifying imports, boosting EU energy production and redesigning the EU energy market.

The European Parliament has supported measures to reduce energy demand reduction, improve energy efficiency and increase energy savings in a number of resolutions.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Energy saving and demand reduction‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Andrés García Higuera.

Artificial intelligence (AI) has been the subject of such strong political and social debate that the question of its suitability for its main original purpose – improving supply chain efficiency – may come as a surprise. What if AI really could help strategic sectors cope with pressure? More specifically, could the agri-food sector benefit from this technology to compensate for the shortages broadly forecast as a result of today’s crises?

The crisis resulting from the unprovoked Russian attack on Ukraine shows the huge impact that disruptions on supply chains can have on the EU economy, not least in its agri-food sector. Providing outstanding benefits and challenges, AI has applications at various stages of the agri-food chain, including but not limited to precision farming, value chain integrity, personalised nutrition, reduction and prevention of food waste, enhancement of food safety, and transparency and traceability in the agri-food chain. The technology also has the potential to reshape the agri-food sector; mark a successful transition to climate-neutral Agriculture 4.0; and spur progress toward meeting Sustainable Development Goal 2 to end hunger, achieve food security, improve nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture.

According to a recent Eurobarometer publication on agriculture, nearly half of Europeans think that securing a stable food supply in the EU at all times should be a main common agricultural policy (CAP) objective. As with other technological advances, AI in this domain comes with its own set of benefits, risks, ethical issues and societal implications. Questions raised with respect to AI include how to balance potential benefits against possible risks; how to govern the use of these technologies; and how to incorporate socio-ethical value considerations into the policy and legal frameworks under development.

The reinforcing effect of combining AI with other new technologies is sure to disrupt many sectors, including agri-food. As the role of AI in agriculture and food production has grown in importance in recent years, the agricultural sector has witnessed increased use of sophisticated equipment, such as robots, satellites, drones, other automated vehicles and sensor-based monitoring and irrigation systems. These pieces of machinery serve as sources of data, for example concerning production processes and conditions on the farm, including data on crop growth, soil characteristics, pests, and weather conditions. In automated systems, AI allows real-time monitoring and analysis of agricultural processes, generating critical knowledge to fine-tune strategies for optimal resource utilisation, boosting productivity while minimising environmental impact. The use of AI in supply chain management is also gaining relevance, as the provision of seeds, fertilisers, cattle feed and water resources becomes more complex; and the same is happening with the final products. Tracking systems based on the internet of things (IoT), such as those relying on radio-frequency identification (RFID), have become essential to improving supply chain efficiency and ensuring product quality and customer safety.

Potential impacts and developments

A recent STOA study analysed the potential of precision agriculture for the future of farming in Europe. The potential applications of AI in the agri-food sector go even further. They can help to improve the way food is processed, packaged, stored, transported, prepared, served, eaten and not wasted. Along the agri-food chain, automation, robotisation and AI can help achieve greater productivity while reducing the need for a human workforce. In addition, plant breeding can help to make food production more sustainable, by developing crop varieties that require fewer inputs, for instance. Moreover, genome editing can enable the targeted alteration of a few DNA letters within the existing genetic blueprint of an organism. From the identification of genetic variants to agricultural production and changes in consumer behaviour, AI has the potential to become a game-changing technology in the agri-food domain.

While holding great promise, this rapidly developing field nevertheless raises concerns regarding equitable access, privacy and liability, as well as bias, inclusiveness, accuracy, data set availability and representativeness, data ownership, cybersecurity and the terms used to integrate big data and AI technologies into agri-farm systems. As various AI applications are gradually implemented, they may lead to the loss of user self-determination and agency, and widen the digital divide. They may also open the agri-food sector to non-traditional actors, support new generations of farmers, contribute to the loss of traditional jobs, and enable the development of new business models. Lastly, the digitalisation of agriculture, including AI applications, does not automatically lead to greater sustainability. If data and AI-based solutions are geared only to making traditional agricultural practices more productive, this could actually amplify the negative impact of unsustainable farming practices. It is essential to use AI’s potential to address the profound challenges facing the current food system and ensure citizens enjoy the benefits of AI without being exposed to unnecessary risks.

Anticipatory policy-making

The application of AI in the agri-food chain has to be considered in the context of the objectives and initiatives relating to the relevant EU legislation and policies. These include the European Green Deal, the CAP, the farm to fork strategy, as well as the proposed AI act. Attention should also be paid to the agricultural specificities of different EU regions and Member States, and the diversity of actors in the agri-food chain.

The proposed EU AI act’s high-risk AI list (Annex III) does not explicitly mention AI applications in agriculture. However, it could be argued that several actual or foreseeable AI applications in agriculture would fall within the scope of that list, especially since that list is neither exhaustive nor fixed. As AI can control food production, even select livestock or which crops to grow depending on a series of factors that may include geopolitical and strategical considerations, this would mean increasing the collection and sharing of data – to be used first to adjust decision-making processes based on machine learning and then as inputs for subsequent decisions. To make these strategical decisions as efficient as possible, farmers will have to share data to an extent that may present problems in a competitive market. And this may include the collectivisation of data at supranational level, which may also pose geo-strategical concerns. These considerations need to be taken into account while developing European legislation, such as the data act still under discussion, and also when deploying adopted regulations, such as the Data Governance Act.

The growing complexity of the management process in the agri-food sector can also have the effect of increasing inequalities by making these tools more readily available to bigger producers and leaving smaller farmers, unable to adapt, behind. Furthermore, there is growing concern about bias in the decision-making process that may prioritise some producers over others, depending on their size, type of production or region. Ensuring proper deployment of AI applications would require the development of a risk governance framework for anticipating and predicting concerns relating to data management and AI applications in the agri-food domain. This would have to include the classification and assessment of risks, as well as risk monitoring and management. A strict liability approach can be complemented with legislative sandboxes, given the need to maintain a balance between the objective of protecting people and society on the one hand and fostering innovation arising from the constant and rapid developments in the AI field on the other.

There is much to be gained, given that AI was first developed by industry as a tool to help improve efficiency in production and logistics. Crisis management requires the same elements as coping with the complexity and unpredictability of supply chains. In the context of the European Green Deal, AI has huge potential to help optimise the management of production and distribution of strategic goods – applications very close to its original purpose. These could include: microchips; water and energy generation and transport (from hydrocarbons to renewables, hydrogen and grid management); as well as fertilisers; pesticides; and food products such as meat and grain.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘What if AI could make the agri-food sector more resilient?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘What if AI could make the agri-food sector more resilient?’ on YouTube.

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Written by Magdalena Pasikowska-Schnass and Agnieszka Widuto.

Culture plays a fundamental role in human life. It is also an essential source of identity, at local, regional, national and European levels, while making a significant contribution to the EU economy. EU cultural policy relates to cultural heritage, i.e. cultural sites and museums, but also to the cultural and creative sector, for instance the audiovisual and design sectors.

The EU supports culture through a variety of initiatives, including the European Capitals of Culture scheme. A number of EU programmes also offer funding for cultural projects, for instance the Creative Europe programme, Horizon Europe and New European Bauhaus. Several regional policy funds meanwhile provide support for cultural events, the regeneration of cultural sites, the preservation of cultural heritage, cultural tourism, and cultural and creative sector businesses.

The COVID-19 pandemic has had a significant impact on the cultural and creative sector, as repeated lockdowns saw the closure of cultural institutions and infrastructure. As one of the worst affected sectors of the economy, the EU included culture in its coronavirus response investment initiatives and the REACT-EU (Recovery Assistance for Cohesion and the Territories of Europe) programme aimed at dealing with the consequences of the pandemic.

Local and regional authorities have a role to play in supporting cultural life and participation in their communities. Arts and cultural facilities are usually associated with urban centres, though they also have potential in non-urban areas, small towns and rural communities. The presence of cultural sites increases the attractiveness of a region, while well-developed cultural and creative sectors help to enhance the regional economy. Culture can also play an important role in the regeneration of disadvantaged and post-industrial areas. The European Parliament has called for increased support for culture as part of the post-pandemic recovery efforts. As Europe emerges from the crisis, culture can help to strengthen regional development.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Culture and regional development‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘Culture and regional development’ on YouTube.

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Written by Marcin Szczepański.

The EU-US Trade and Technology Council (TTC) was formally launched during the EU-US Summit in June 2021 to intensify transatlantic cooperation, expand bilateral trade and investment, and reinforce the parties’ technological and industrial leadership. Another aim is to ensure that trade and technology serve society and economy while preserving shared values. The TTC has held two high-level political meetings, in September 2021 in Pittsburgh and in May 2022 in Paris-Saclay. These meetings steer cooperation within the TTC and guide its 10 working groups whose remit includes technology standards, secure supply chains, tech regulation, global trade challenges, climate and green technologies as well as investment screening and export controls.

Since its launch, the TTC has created a community of experts and policy-makers from both sides of the Atlantic who now regularly work together. Joint work in areas such as standards, integrity of information, supply chains, green public procurement and addressing non-market practices has yielded the TTC’s first successful steps. Moreover, Russia’s war on Ukraine is thought to have strengthened both the transatlantic relationship as a whole and the TTC, which has played a key role in ensuring swift and coordinated roll-out of export controls. After the war broke out, the TTC started supporting coordinated economic action to counter Russia’s autocratic attempts to also undermine the security of other nations. Yet, while the TTC has done well in areas related to war, some underline that it must deliver tangible results across all the work strands to increase its importance and impact.

So far, the TTC has focused mostly on information-sharing, joint mapping, risk identification and exploring options for closer cooperation in the future. Its success may well depend on the degree of alignment the parties can achieve across the policy areas and on whether they can move from joint identification of issues to elaborating common responses and solutions to them. The European Parliament supports the establishment and work of the TTC, while calling for a more democratic scrutiny over it. The next TTC meeting will take place before the end of 2022 in the United States.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU-US Trade and Technology Council Impact of the war in Ukraine and the way forward‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Main EU and US export controls on trade with Russia since the invasion of Ukraine

Written by Isabelle Gaudeul-Ehrhart.

Welcome to the European Parliament Info Hub. Located next to the Agora Simone Veil, just outside the main European Parliament buildings in Brussels, this cosy new space has been designed for a well-informed public who are already on the Esplanade and are curious to know more about European affairs and the history of European integration. Amongst the highlights, the Info Hub shines a spotlight on the speeches that have made Europe.

The European Parliament Info Hub is a comfortable and welcoming space where you can broaden your knowledge of current affairs and explore topical content, or delve deeper into background material offered by Parliament’s communication and research services. You can dip into open access research material, attend regular policy talks and civil society events, or challenge your thinking at the Info Hub’s temporary exhibitions. The Hub also offers numerous in-person and on-screen activities, from presentations about the EU and its institutions, policies and legislation to videos, podcasts, a ‘What Europe does for me‘ touch screen, and a selection of speeches that have made Europe.

A selection of videos to celebrate the power of the spoken word in powerful, moving, visionary speeches

The European Union we know today is not the result of treaties and legislation only. It is also a vibrant project, strengthened over the years – decades, actually – with women and men calling to citizens as well as leaders, mobilising words, emotions and arguments, with a view to rally people around their vision. We have gathered videos of these speeches and made them available in their original languages as well as with subtitles in all official languages. Some are well-known, others are unusual, all are worth a look.

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The speeches cover subjects ranging from history to peace, hope, values and challenges. Come and watch these women and men, leaders, activists, historians, etc., from our shared past or more recent history, delivering speeches to Europeans.

An informal opening of the Info Hub took place on 13 July, with European Parliament Secretary‑General Klaus Welle, Director-General for Communication Jaume Duch Guillot and acting Director-General for the European Parliamentary Research Service Étienne Bassot – you can see them in this photograph watching the video ‘Powerful, moving, visionary: Speeches that have made Europe‘.

European Parliament Secretary‑General Klaus Welle, Director-General for Communication Jaume Duch Guillot and acting Director-General for the European Parliamentary Research Service Étienne Bassot

You too can visit the Info Hub individually or in small groups from Monday to Friday from 9 am to 6 pm, and on Saturdays and Sundays from 10 am to 6 pm.

Written by Clément Evroux.

Since the Lisbon strategy, launched by the European Council on 23-24 March 2000, the EU’s ambition has been to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world. The growing effects of the ecological crisis, from climate change to the loss of biodiversity, digitalisation and mounting geopolitical tensions have broadened the scope of innovation policies to the transformations required by both sustainability and preparedness to crises, such as the Covid-19 pandemic.

Today, the EU’s innovation performance gives a mixed picture. While the EU has managed to keep its scientific base at the forefront of the global race, it has not been able to disseminate the new knowledge, technologies and solutions created by EU actors across Member States. Consequently, since the early 1990s, the euro area’s average productivity rate has lagged behind that of the United States, and the gap in productivity among EU regions signals the existence of an innovation divide.

With the adoption of a communication on a new European innovation agenda on 5 July 2022, the European Commission aims to encourage innovators to make better use of EU single market finance opportunities, as well as to attract new private and public investors to reinforce EU financial and capital markets.

The communication presents a set of legislative and non-legislative initiatives based on five flagships areas – access to finance; framework conditions for deep tech innovation; tackling the innovation divide; deep tech talents; and improving innovation policies – which cut across the von der Leyen Commission’s political priorities. The initiatives will allow EU investment to be targeted to promoting scale-up of EU innovative businesses, and to provide additional cooperative opportunities for all EU actors in the fields of education and research and innovation (R&I). The forthcoming adoption of the revised State aid framework for R&I is expected to incentivise further national and regional R&I investments, thus delivering on the five flagships.

Read the complete briefing on ‘A new European innovation agenda‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

The European Commission’s President, Ursula von der Leyen, unveiled a package of measures to curb energy prices, which skyrocketed in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and stressed the EU’s unwavering solidarity with Ukraine, in her annual State of the Union address delivered on 14 September. The plan envisages cuts in the use of electricity across the bloc, a cap on the revenues of companies which produce electricity at low cost, aid for companies and individuals hit by the energy crisis and, possibly, mandatory limits on the price of gas.

On Ukraine, von der Leyen promised to maintain EU sanctions on Russia, to continue financial aid to the country devastated by the war, and work to ensure Ukraine’s seamless access to the EU’s single market. During her speech to the European Parliament in Strasbourg, she also vowed determination in pursuing green energy goals, including the creation of a hydrogen energy market. She said the Commission would propose new ideas for the EU’s economic governance, including more flexibility on Member States’ paths to debt reduction, and an SME relief package that would include a single set of tax rules for doing business in Europe.

This note offers links to recent commentaries and reports from international think tanks on the State of the Union and related issues. Recent papers on the war on Ukraine can be found in a recent edition of What Think Tanks are Thinking, and on the energy crisis in another publication from the series.

What’s next for European energy security? Our experts decipher the State of the European Union address
Atlantic Council, September 2022

A grand bargain to steer through the European Union’s energy crisis
Bruegel, September 2022

Germany must shake off its habit of finding excuses for inaction
Brookings Institution, September 2022

European unity can endure the winter of discontent
Carnegie Europe, September 2022

Five lessons on international rule of law support
Carnegie Europe, September 2022

In this State of the Union, President von der Leyen must say it loud and clear: Business as usual is over
Centre for European Policy Studies, September 2022

The EU needs a bigger playing field, not a level playing field
Centre for European Reform, September 2022

The economic basis of democracy in Europe
Chatham House, September 2022

How deliberative and participatory processes can save democracy from itself
Friends of Europe, September 2022

Energy unity or breakup? The EU at a crossroads
Istituto Affari Internazionali, September 2022

In defence of the Union’s values and economy: State of the Union address
Polish Institute of International Affairs, September 2022

Beyond European strategic autonomy?
Centre for European Reform, August 2022

The U.S. could cope with deglobalisation, Europe couldn’t
Centre for European Reform, August 2022

A German Proposal that may finally break the EU fiscal rules stalemate
German Council on Foreign Relations, August 2022

Taking stock, moving forward: Reflections following the conference on the Future of Europe
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, August 2022

After the Conference on the Future of Europe: Time to make reforms happen
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, August 2022

Legal options for a green golden rule in the European Union’s fiscal framework
Bruegel, July 2022

EU enlargement in a new light
Bruegel, July 2022

The awakening of geopolitical Europe?
Carnegie Europe, July 2022

Third time lucky? How to appoint the next president of the European Commission
Centre for European Policy Studies, July 2022

With a looming winter gas crisis, the EU doesn’t need an empty symbol of solidarity
Centre for European Policy Studies, July 2022

Overall, the French EU Council Presidency was a success… but not everyone agrees
Centre for European Policy Studies, July 2022

The European (geo)political community and enlargement reform: Two important but separate discussions
European Policy Centre, July 2022

Europe’s moment of truth: United by adversity?
European Policy Centre, July 2022

Fragmentation risk in the euro area: no easy way out for the European Central Bank
Bruegel, June 2022

Yet another failure of EU leadership in the Western Balkans
Centre for European Policy Studies, June 2022

The European Council and Council of the EU: What lessons from Covid-19 decision-making?
Centre for European Policy Studies, June 2022

Peace versus justice: The coming European split over the war in Ukraine
European Council on Foreign Relations, June 2022

Moving EuropE Together, through citizens’ deliberations
European Policy Studies, June 2022

Adding ambition to Europe’s unity
European Policy Studies, June 2022

After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine: Unity is good, but ambition is better
European Policy Studies, June 2022

Towards transnational lists in 2024?
Jacques Delors Institute, June 2022

European confederation: A much-maligned concept
Jacques Delors Institute, June 2022

Spitzenkandidaten: Oui ou non?
Jacques Delors Institute, June 2022

EU democracy after the Conference on the Future of Europe
Carnegie Europe, May 2022

The good, the bad and the ugly of the Conference on the Future of Europe
Centre for European Policy Studies, May 2022

Will the EU rethink enlargement?
Centre for European Reform, May 2022

The European Political Community: A new anchoring to the European Union
Jacques Delors Institute, May 2022

Read this briefing on ‘The State of the Union‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.