Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

With the first Global Stocktake to be presented at the 28th Conference of the Parties (COP28) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Dubai, the question of inadequate levels of climate finance for developing countries will again take centre stage. Ongoing efforts to reform climate finance include the negotiation of a New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) by the end of 2024; the structural reform of Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) to provide more climate finance and to lower the cost of capital; and the setting-up and integration of the new funding stream for loss and damage. Yet, there are other longstanding issues in international climate finance that likewise need to be addressed as part of these ongoing efforts, which are mainly related to the disentanglement of the development and climate finance regimes. Official Development Assistance (ODA), per definition, aims to promote the economic development and welfare of developing countries, and at the same time plays an increasing role in the global climate finance landscape. However, sourcing climate finance from ODA is already leading to a “crowding out” of limited ODA resources for its original purposes. Moreover, the current system of reporting on and accounting for climate finance provided through ODA has significant pitfalls and weaknesses. This paper discusses some of the key challenges caused by the blurring of the development assistance and climate finance regimes and argues that the NCQG process and the integration of loss and damage into the climate finance system must go hand in hand with a separation of climate and development finance accounting mechanisms whilst ensuring integrated policy responses. We address these issues in two parts: first we focus on the current system of reporting and accounting for international climate finance (as ODA); and second on the role of ODA to finance mitigation, adaptation, and loss and damage. We argue that there is a political necessity for distinguishing between ODA and climate finance (for transparency and credibility), which contrasts with the operational reality where co-benefits of projects and development finance must be achieved by integrating climate and non-climate objectives. In this regard, the paper analyses the implications of on-going negotiations under the UNFCCC around the NCQG and loss and damage for a necessary ODA reform. In particular, we make the following recommendations:
(1) Align the accounting and reporting system of the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) with the NCQG: one should separate climate and development finance; reduce over-reporting; and establish triangulation of climate finance data reported by donors.
(2) Introduce qualitative frameworks for monitoring and assessment of the impact of climate-related interventions; and define “fit-for-purpose” instru-ments and channels for the provision of climate finance.
Looking ahead, we expect discussions on a potential enlargement of the contributor base of climate finance to give new impetus to climate finance reform.

With the first Global Stocktake to be presented at the 28th Conference of the Parties (COP28) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Dubai, the question of inadequate levels of climate finance for developing countries will again take centre stage. Ongoing efforts to reform climate finance include the negotiation of a New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) by the end of 2024; the structural reform of Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) to provide more climate finance and to lower the cost of capital; and the setting-up and integration of the new funding stream for loss and damage. Yet, there are other longstanding issues in international climate finance that likewise need to be addressed as part of these ongoing efforts, which are mainly related to the disentanglement of the development and climate finance regimes. Official Development Assistance (ODA), per definition, aims to promote the economic development and welfare of developing countries, and at the same time plays an increasing role in the global climate finance landscape. However, sourcing climate finance from ODA is already leading to a “crowding out” of limited ODA resources for its original purposes. Moreover, the current system of reporting on and accounting for climate finance provided through ODA has significant pitfalls and weaknesses. This paper discusses some of the key challenges caused by the blurring of the development assistance and climate finance regimes and argues that the NCQG process and the integration of loss and damage into the climate finance system must go hand in hand with a separation of climate and development finance accounting mechanisms whilst ensuring integrated policy responses. We address these issues in two parts: first we focus on the current system of reporting and accounting for international climate finance (as ODA); and second on the role of ODA to finance mitigation, adaptation, and loss and damage. We argue that there is a political necessity for distinguishing between ODA and climate finance (for transparency and credibility), which contrasts with the operational reality where co-benefits of projects and development finance must be achieved by integrating climate and non-climate objectives. In this regard, the paper analyses the implications of on-going negotiations under the UNFCCC around the NCQG and loss and damage for a necessary ODA reform. In particular, we make the following recommendations:
(1) Align the accounting and reporting system of the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) with the NCQG: one should separate climate and development finance; reduce over-reporting; and establish triangulation of climate finance data reported by donors.
(2) Introduce qualitative frameworks for monitoring and assessment of the impact of climate-related interventions; and define “fit-for-purpose” instru-ments and channels for the provision of climate finance.
Looking ahead, we expect discussions on a potential enlargement of the contributor base of climate finance to give new impetus to climate finance reform.

The objective of this chapter is to investigate the linkages between trade policy and food security in the MENA region. It provides an overview of the theoretical nexus between international trade, trade policy, and food security. It also analyzes the status of food security in the MENA region and trends in trade policy between trade barriers and trade agreements. The repercussions of the current global shocks (COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian war on Ukraine) on food security, together with longstanding structural issues that undermine the region’s potential to achieve food security are also discussed. The chapter concludes with policy recommendations for enhanced food security in the region.

The objective of this chapter is to investigate the linkages between trade policy and food security in the MENA region. It provides an overview of the theoretical nexus between international trade, trade policy, and food security. It also analyzes the status of food security in the MENA region and trends in trade policy between trade barriers and trade agreements. The repercussions of the current global shocks (COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian war on Ukraine) on food security, together with longstanding structural issues that undermine the region’s potential to achieve food security are also discussed. The chapter concludes with policy recommendations for enhanced food security in the region.

The objective of this chapter is to investigate the linkages between trade policy and food security in the MENA region. It provides an overview of the theoretical nexus between international trade, trade policy, and food security. It also analyzes the status of food security in the MENA region and trends in trade policy between trade barriers and trade agreements. The repercussions of the current global shocks (COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian war on Ukraine) on food security, together with longstanding structural issues that undermine the region’s potential to achieve food security are also discussed. The chapter concludes with policy recommendations for enhanced food security in the region.

Bonn, 13. November 2023. Die jüngste Welle von Staatsstreichen in Afrika hat die internationalen Akteur*innen aufgeschreckt, die für demokratische Werte einstehen. Was in Mali nach regierungsfeindlichen Protesten im August 2020 begann, breitete sich bald wie ein unkontrollierbares ‚Harmattan-Feuer‘ auf fünf weitere Länder in der Sahelzone und in frankophonen Teilen von Zentral- und Westafrika aus und brachte die dortigen Regierungen zu Fall.

Während diese Putsche zwar einen besorgniserregenden Trend in Afrika markieren, scheinen sie unter der afrikanischen Bevölkerung jedoch auf breite Unterstützung zu stoßen. Es bleibt jedoch abzuwarten, ob diese Militärputsche die Erwartungen der Bürger*innen erfüllen werden. Denn so gut wie keiner der bisherigen Militärputsche – vor allem in der Region – hat der Bevölkerung Vorteile gebracht. Nun scheint sich der Staub gelegt zu haben und die internationalen Akteur*innen, denen an einer Demokratisierung gelegen ist, sollten aus dem Geschehenen Lehren ziehen, um weitere Putsche in Afrika zu vermeiden.

Internationale Akteur*innen sollten genau darauf achten, welche Arten von Demokratie sie in Afrika unterstützen. Gegenwärtig sind viele Länder Afrikas langjährige Wahlautokratien (Hybridregime), die sich schon lange hinter der Fassade von Wahlen als Demokratien ausgeben. Das Handeln bzw. Nichthandeln der internationalen Akteur*innen, die Demokratien in Afrika fördern wollen, lässt jedoch darauf schließen, dass sie diese Hybridregime kompromisslos unterstützen, statt sich für demokratischere Regimeformen einzusetzen. Fast 64 % der Netto-Entwicklungsleistungen aller Geber*innen fließen in Länder, die nach international anerkannten Demokratieindizes wie dem Varieties of Democracy Index als nicht vollständig demokratisiert gelten. Daraus folgt, dass Entwicklungsleistungen weiterhin dazu dienen können, unvollständige Demokratien zu stabilisieren.

Infolgedessen ist die Demokratie in Afrika nicht mehr als ein zyklisches Phänomen, das durch scheinbar erfolgreiche Wahlen herbeigeführt wird, die allerdings mit einer ganzen Reihe von systemischen Mängeln einhergehen. So waren zwischen 1990 und 2023 etwa 70 % der Regime in Afrika entweder geschlossene Autokratien (17,6 %) oder Wahlautokratien (51,7 %). Nur 25,1 % waren Wahldemokratien und 5,6 % liberale Demokratien. Die häufigste Regierungsform in afrikanischen Ländern scheint also die Wahlautokratie zu sein, die de facto ein Mehrparteiensystem ist, aber aufgrund erheblicher Unregelmäßigkeiten und Einschränkungen des Parteienwettbewerbs nicht demokratischen Standards entspricht.

Die Unterstützung dieser hybriden Regime als Standardform der Demokratie erweckt den Eindruck, dass funktionierende Demokratien vorhanden sind. Tatsächlich sind diese jedoch nicht nachhaltig, denn sie sehen weder eine vertikale noch eine horizontale demokratische Rechenschaftspflicht vor, während öffentliche Gelder und Ressourcen in großem Maßstab veruntreut werden. Die Bürger*innen geben ihre Stimme in der Erwartung ab, dass die von ihnen gewählten Politiker*innen ihre Wahlversprechen erfüllen. Aufgrund der institutionellen Schwächen und Inkohärenz von Wahlautokratien sind die Regierenden jedoch nicht verpflichtet, ihre Versprechen einzuhalten und können ungehindert ihre Macht missbrauchen. Und so kommt es, dass in vielen afrikanischen Ländern dringend benötigte öffentliche Güter fehlen, während sich korrupte Beamt*innen die Taschen füllen.

Besonders problematisch ist, dass sich diese Regime durch scheinbar demokratische Wahlen als Demokratien ausgeben. Die Bevölkerung, die unter der Unfähigkeit ihrer Regierung leidet, zweifelt zunehmend an der Idee der Demokratie, weshalb andere Regierungsformen wie die Militärherrschaft immer beliebter werden. Menschen in ganz Afrika unterstützen und feierten die Staatsstreiche – nicht etwa, weil sie demokratische Systeme an sich ablehnen, sondern weil sie unzufrieden damit sind, wie die ‚Demokratie‘ funktioniert bzw. nicht funktioniert.

Ein weiterer wichtiger Punkt sind ungerechte (post-)koloniale politische Vereinbarungen zwischen afrikanischen Regierungen und ehemaligen Kolonialmächten, denn sie schüren Feindseligkeiten und begünstigen Staatsstreiche. Dies zeigt etwa der antikoloniale Diskurs gegen Frankreich bei den jüngsten Putschen. Die Bürger*innen kritisieren ungerechte Steuerabkommen, die Monopolstellung von Air France in den frankophonen Ländern, die einseitige militärische Zusammenarbeit und die Dominanz französischer Unternehmen, z. B. in den Uranminen. Verstärkt wurden diese Ressentiments durch die Ambitionen konkurrierender Supermächte, sich in der Region Wettbewerbsvorteile und eine Vormachtstellung zu verschaffen. So soll Russland beispielsweise mit Desinformationskampagnen in afrikanischen Ländern die Stimmung zugunsten antidemokratischer Akteur*innen in der Region aufgeheizt haben. Die Militärjuntas in diesen Ländern beziehen sich oft strategisch auf Russland. Allerdings war Russlands Rolle in vielen dieser Länder bisher eher rhetorischer Natur.

Zusammenfassend lässt sich sagen, dass die Arbeit von demokratischen Akteur*innen, wie der ECOWAS, zur Stärkung der Demokratie über die Ermöglichung von Wahlen hinausgehen sollte. Außerdem ist es notwendig, die demokratischen Verfahren zu institutionalisieren und zu festigen. Der derzeitige Ansatz internationaler Akteur*innen, Hybridregime als gültige Form der Demokratie anzuerkennen, legt nahe, dass Wahlautokratien bereits liberalen Standards genügen würden. Allerdings gelten Wahlautokratien als eine fragile und defizitäre Form der Demokratie – weitere Schritte zur Demokratisierung sind notwendig. Zudem lässt sich die Zustimmung der afrikanischen Bevölkerung zur Demokratie nur dann gewinnen, wenn keine ungerechten (post-)kolonialen politischen Vereinbarungen mehr geschlossen werden.

Updating the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO) has become imperative to address the dynamic challenges confronting modern trade. Plurilateral agreements can be a viable option for responding to trade issues where achieving multilateral consensus in the full WTO membership is difficult. However, plurilaterals should follow an inclusive and development-focused framework for participation. They should have a layered architecture of rights and obligations and encompass capacity-building measures. WTO Members should also initiate plurilaterals on topics which are of particular concern to developing countries and which can help achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The G20 (Group of 20) can play a decisive role in fostering discussion and mutual understanding on plurilaterals.

Updating the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO) has become imperative to address the dynamic challenges confronting modern trade. Plurilateral agreements can be a viable option for responding to trade issues where achieving multilateral consensus in the full WTO membership is difficult. However, plurilaterals should follow an inclusive and development-focused framework for participation. They should have a layered architecture of rights and obligations and encompass capacity-building measures. WTO Members should also initiate plurilaterals on topics which are of particular concern to developing countries and which can help achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The G20 (Group of 20) can play a decisive role in fostering discussion and mutual understanding on plurilaterals.

Updating the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO) has become imperative to address the dynamic challenges confronting modern trade. Plurilateral agreements can be a viable option for responding to trade issues where achieving multilateral consensus in the full WTO membership is difficult. However, plurilaterals should follow an inclusive and development-focused framework for participation. They should have a layered architecture of rights and obligations and encompass capacity-building measures. WTO Members should also initiate plurilaterals on topics which are of particular concern to developing countries and which can help achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The G20 (Group of 20) can play a decisive role in fostering discussion and mutual understanding on plurilaterals.

This chapter offers a comprehensive and up-to-date evaluation of Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in Africa, with a specific focus on the motives, profiles and strategies of Chinese investors in Zambia and Angola. Drawing on fieldwork and extensive interviews conducted with relevant stakeholders and 50 Chinese companies in Zambia and Angola in 2019, the chapter sheds light on the considerable heterogeneity that exists amongst firms operating in Africa. The chapter goes beyond a surface-level examination by exploring the diverse motivations, including both push and pull factors that drive Chinese investment in these two Southern African countries. By challenging prevailing misconceptions and offering nuanced insights, this chapter contributes to our understanding of the heterogeneous and dynamic nature of Chinese investors in Zambia and Angola. Moreover, it argues that African agency should be also viewed through the lens of policy implementation and the ability to drive fundamental structural change.

This chapter offers a comprehensive and up-to-date evaluation of Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in Africa, with a specific focus on the motives, profiles and strategies of Chinese investors in Zambia and Angola. Drawing on fieldwork and extensive interviews conducted with relevant stakeholders and 50 Chinese companies in Zambia and Angola in 2019, the chapter sheds light on the considerable heterogeneity that exists amongst firms operating in Africa. The chapter goes beyond a surface-level examination by exploring the diverse motivations, including both push and pull factors that drive Chinese investment in these two Southern African countries. By challenging prevailing misconceptions and offering nuanced insights, this chapter contributes to our understanding of the heterogeneous and dynamic nature of Chinese investors in Zambia and Angola. Moreover, it argues that African agency should be also viewed through the lens of policy implementation and the ability to drive fundamental structural change.

This chapter offers a comprehensive and up-to-date evaluation of Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in Africa, with a specific focus on the motives, profiles and strategies of Chinese investors in Zambia and Angola. Drawing on fieldwork and extensive interviews conducted with relevant stakeholders and 50 Chinese companies in Zambia and Angola in 2019, the chapter sheds light on the considerable heterogeneity that exists amongst firms operating in Africa. The chapter goes beyond a surface-level examination by exploring the diverse motivations, including both push and pull factors that drive Chinese investment in these two Southern African countries. By challenging prevailing misconceptions and offering nuanced insights, this chapter contributes to our understanding of the heterogeneous and dynamic nature of Chinese investors in Zambia and Angola. Moreover, it argues that African agency should be also viewed through the lens of policy implementation and the ability to drive fundamental structural change.

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IPI hosted a policy forum on November 9th, entitled “Lessons from the Climate Ambition Summit: The Road to COP28” to discuss the outcomes from the Climate Ambition Summit held earlier this year and the lessons to carry into COP28.

The Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Climate Action and Just Transition, Selwin Charles Hart, sat down with IPI’s President, Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, to provide an updated look at the climate crisis in the current volatile geopolitical context. Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein opened the conversation with the question at the center of the climate emergency upon us: “We are weeks away from COP28 and the challenge has never been greater, are our goals still within reach?”

Selwin Hart’s answer focused on both the urgent challenges we face—namely, geopolitical division, a growing trust deficit between developed and developing countries, an ever-narrowing window of opportunity to avert the climate crisis—and the newly available avenues that provide some hope for the future. “We’ve never had this level of clarity on what needs to be done, by whom, and on what timeframe. The solutions to the climate crisis have never been cheaper or more accessible.”

The discussion highlighted one of the core areas for which the Peace‚ Climate‚ and Sustainable Development team at IPI has been able to provide crucial support, the Loss and Damage Fund. The Special Adviser to the Secretary-General detailed what will be needed for the fund in the future: “We need to remain vigilant to ensure that the fund works, that it is well resourced, that innovative sources are explored, & that this fund truly benefits people & communities on the frontlines of the climate crisis.”

Looking ahead, the speakers articulated the need for clear commitment, transparency, and concrete proposals of support from COP28 attendees.

In the lead-up to COP28, the event provided an important forum to discuss the fractured geopolitical environment, the ability of the multilateral system to deliver strong results against a ticking clock, and the possibility of long-term solutions.

Im Beitrag „Goethe goes UNO: Forschungsorientierte Lehre im Bereich der Vereinten Nationen“ stellen Samantha Ruppel (German Institute of Development and Sustainability, IDOS) und Julia Leib (Universität Leipzig) die Hintergründe eines Modellprojektes zur Simulation von transnationalen politischen Gremien vor. Auf der Ebene von Simulationsprojekten wie Planspielen wird in diesem Sinne ein Prozess politischer Bildung für Studierende der politischen Wissenschaft ermöglicht, der praxisbezogene Einblicke in politische Gremien mit aktivierenden Lehr-Lernsettings verknüpft. Dies wird im Sinne eines Lehrkonzeptes mit Bezug auf forschendes Lernen veranschaulicht, wobei spezifische Effekte für Studierende aus einer lernzielbezogenen Perspektive heraus reflektiert werden.

Im Beitrag „Goethe goes UNO: Forschungsorientierte Lehre im Bereich der Vereinten Nationen“ stellen Samantha Ruppel (German Institute of Development and Sustainability, IDOS) und Julia Leib (Universität Leipzig) die Hintergründe eines Modellprojektes zur Simulation von transnationalen politischen Gremien vor. Auf der Ebene von Simulationsprojekten wie Planspielen wird in diesem Sinne ein Prozess politischer Bildung für Studierende der politischen Wissenschaft ermöglicht, der praxisbezogene Einblicke in politische Gremien mit aktivierenden Lehr-Lernsettings verknüpft. Dies wird im Sinne eines Lehrkonzeptes mit Bezug auf forschendes Lernen veranschaulicht, wobei spezifische Effekte für Studierende aus einer lernzielbezogenen Perspektive heraus reflektiert werden.

Im Beitrag „Goethe goes UNO: Forschungsorientierte Lehre im Bereich der Vereinten Nationen“ stellen Samantha Ruppel (German Institute of Development and Sustainability, IDOS) und Julia Leib (Universität Leipzig) die Hintergründe eines Modellprojektes zur Simulation von transnationalen politischen Gremien vor. Auf der Ebene von Simulationsprojekten wie Planspielen wird in diesem Sinne ein Prozess politischer Bildung für Studierende der politischen Wissenschaft ermöglicht, der praxisbezogene Einblicke in politische Gremien mit aktivierenden Lehr-Lernsettings verknüpft. Dies wird im Sinne eines Lehrkonzeptes mit Bezug auf forschendes Lernen veranschaulicht, wobei spezifische Effekte für Studierende aus einer lernzielbezogenen Perspektive heraus reflektiert werden.