Central Europe

2021 ist ein wichtiges Jahr für die Zusammenarbeit Europas mit seinen Nachbarn im Nahen Osten und in Nordafrika (MENA). Die Corona-Pandemie zwang die Europäische Union (EU) bei der Erstellung ihres neuen Mehrjahreshaushalts, die politischen, wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Prioritäten ihrer Kooperation mit den MENA-Ländern sowie die ihrer Mitgliedstaaten zu überdenken. Ihr Potenzial, die Beziehungen zwischen Staat und Gesellschaft in den MENA-Ländern positiv zu beeinflussen, hat sie aber noch längst nicht ausgeschöpft. Die jüngste Mitteilung zur Europäischen Nachbarschaftspolitik (ENP) Süd vom Februar 2021 kündigt eine „neue Agenda“ für die Zusammenarbeit mit den MENA-Ländern an. Offensichtliche Zielkonflikte bleiben aber unausgesprochen, v.a. die Unvereinbarkeit des Strebens nach liberal-demokratischen und Wirtschaftsreformen, mehr Rechenschaftspflicht und der Achtung von Menschenrechten durch die MENA-Regierungen auf der einen Seite und einer restriktiven Handelspolitik der EU, Migrationssteuerung und sicherheitspolitischer Kooperation auf der anderen. Zudem mangelt es an bilateraler Koordination zwischen den EU-Mitgliedstaaten. Das Konzept des Gesellschaftsvertrags könnte helfen, diese Konflikte zu überwinden. Sie sind unvermeidlich, wenn inter-nationale Kooperation v.a. kurz- bis mittelfristige Ziele wie Migrationssteuerung, Resilienzförderung und Privatinvestitionen verfolgt. In autoritären Kontexten wird dadurch aber oft der Staat zu Lasten der Gesellschaft gestärkt, was zu Spannungen führt und nicht zur angestrebten Stabilität. Gesellschaftsverträge stärker zu beachten führt zu einer längerfristigen Perspektive. Sie beruhen auf der Erbringung von 3 „P“s durch den Staat: Protection (Schutz der Bürger), Provision (wirtschaftliche und soziale Dienstleistungen) und Participation (Teilhabe der Gesellschaft an Entscheidungen).
Das Konzept des Gesellschaftsvertrags kann Orientierung bei der gemeinsamen Ausrichtung und Organisation der Politik der EU und ihrer Mitgliedstaaten geben. Es verdeutlicht, wie die drei „P“s bei der Verbesserung des sozialen Zusammenhalts, der innerstaatlichen Beziehungen und der politischen Stabilität zusammenwirken. Dadurch hilft es, die Wirksamkeit, Kohärenz und Koordination der MENA-Politik der EU und ihrer Mitgliedstaaten zu verbessern. Einige Mitglieder fokussieren hierin auf Handel und Investitionen, andere auf politische Reformen und Menschenrechte und wieder andere auf Migrationssteuerung. Eine längerfristige Perspektive würde verdeutlichen, dass nachhaltigere Gesellschaftsverträge in den MENA-Ländern alle diesen Zielen dienlich sind. Alle Maßnahmen der Europäer sollten daher auf Reformen abzielen, die die Gesellschaftsverträge der MENA-Länder für alle Vertragsparteien, also Regierungen und gesellschaftliche Gruppen, akzeptabler machen. Im Idealfall werden solche Reformen von den Parteien auf Augenhöhe ausgehandelt. In der Praxis ist die Verhandlungsmacht der Gesellschaft aber oft begrenzt – weshalb europäische Politik die Gesellschaften stets mindestens so sehr stärken sollte wie die Regierungen. In diesem Papier werden vier Bereiche der Zusammenarbeit erörtert, die wirkungsvolle Treiber für Veränderungen in den Gesellschaftsverträgen darstellen: (i) Konfliktlösung, Friedenskonsolidierung und Wiederaufbau; (ii) Wiederaufbau nach der Corona-Pandemie: Gesundheit und soziale Absicherung; (iii) Partizipation auf lokaler, regionaler und nationaler Ebene; sowie (iv) Migration und Mobilität zum gegenseitigen Nutzen.

Die Frage, ob und wie sich Demokratie durch internationale Unterstützung fördern und schützen lässt, hat jüngst an Relevanz gewonnen. Zum einen hat der Abzug der NATO-Truppen aus Afghanistan eine öffentliche Debatte über die Grenzen von Demokratieförderung neu entfacht. Zum anderen wächst der Bedarf an internationalem Demokratieschutz angesichts zunehmender Autokratisierungstrends weltweit. Forschungsergebnisse des DIE zeigen: Wirksame Unterstützung von Demokratie ist möglich. Dabei sind sowohl der Schutz von zentralen demokratischen Institutionen wie Amtszeitbeschränkungen von Machthabern als auch die Förderung von demokratischen Kräften, die sich Autokratisierungsversuchen proaktiv widersetzen, zentral.
Seit 2010 zeichnen sich Autokratisierungstrends dadurch aus, dass sie bereits erreichte Demokratisierungserfolge oft schleichend erodieren und Autokratien festigen. Umgehungen und Aufhebungen präsidentieller Amtszeitbeschränkungen durch amtierende Präsidenten gehören zum typischen „Autokratisierungsbaukasten“. Amtszeitverlängerungen schränken demokratische Kontrolle ein und weiten die präsidentielle Macht aus.
Demokratieförderung und -schutz spielen eine relevante Rolle für den Erhalt präsidentieller Amtszeitbeschränkungen und damit für den Schutz von Demokratie. Sie tragen dazu bei, „Überlebenschancen“ von Amtszeitbeschränkungen zu verbessern. Je mehr internationale Demokratieförderung bereitgestellt wird, desto geringer das Risiko, dass Amtszeitbeschränkungen umgangen werden. Eine DIE-Analyse ergab z. B., dass eine moderat hohe Demokratieförderung von durchschnittlich US$ 2,50 pro Kopf über vier Jahre hinweg das Risiko der Umgehung einer präsidentiellen Amtszeitbeschränkung im Schnitt halbiert.
Basierend auf einer quantitativen Analyse und Fallstudien ergeben sich die folgenden Empfehlungen für internationale Demokratieförderer:
• Demokratieförderung und -schutz komplementär einsetzen. Einerseits gilt es, Demokratie stetig zu fördern, da die Organisations- und Oppositionsfähigkeit politischer und zivilgesellschaftlicher Akteure nur langfristig aufgebaut werden können. Anderseits müssen Demokratieschützer in politischen Krisen auch mit Ad-hoc-Maßnahmen und diplomatischen Mitteln kurzfristig reagieren.
• Demokratieförderung ist eine Risikoinvestition, die sich lohnt. Ob es gelingt, Demokratie langfristig zu fördern und vor Autokratisierung zu schützen, hängt vor allem von heimischen Kräften und Institutionen ab. Auch für sie sind politische Krisen ergebnisoffen. Während Untätigkeit Autokraten eher in die Hände spielt, birgt kontextsensibles Engagement immerhin die Möglichkeit, einen Beitrag zum Erhalt von Demokratie zu leisten.
• Demokratieschutz durch regionale Organisationen stärken. Regionalorganisationen wie die ECOWAS oder AU bieten regionalpolitische Strukturen, die helfen können, deeskalierend zu wirken und glaubwürdige Verpflichtungen vonseiten der Amtsinhaber zu gewährleisten. Internationale Geber könnten sich daher in demokratiekritischen Situationen mit Regionalorganisationen wirksam abstimmen.

Am 14. Juli 2021 hat die EU-Kommission den CO2-Grenzausgleichsmechanismus (Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, CBAM) als Teil ihres klimapolitischen Fit-for-55-Pakets vorgestellt. Die EU-Kommission hatte dieses handelspolitische Instrument 2019 im Rahmen des Green Deals angekündigt, um ambitioniertere klimapolitische Ziele umsetzen zu können, ohne dass energieintensive Sektoren ihre Emissionen ins Ausland verlagern (Carbon Leakage). Die CBAM-Vorlage sieht vor, Einfuhren in bestimmten energieintensiven EU-Sektoren mit einer zum CO2-Gehalt proportionalen Abgabe zu belasten: Der CBAM-Entwurf erweitert das bestehende EU-Emissionshandelssystem dahingehend, dass Importeure für im Ausland erworbene Güter aus besonders energieintensiven Sektoren (Stahl, Zement, Strom, Dünger und Aluminium) zum Kauf von CO2-Zertifikaten auf Basis von Emissionsdaten aus dem Ausland verpflichtet werden. Der CBAM soll vor allem eine ambitionierte Klimapolitik der EU befördern. Doch die aktuelle EU-Vorlage erweckt den Eindruck, dass es in erster Linie um die Verbesserung der heimischen Wettbewerbsfähigkeit geht – auf Kosten klimapolitischer Effektivität und auch auf Kosten einer entwicklungspolitischen Perspektive.
Die Gesetzesvorlage muss nun im Detail durch die EU-Mitgliedstaaten und das Europäische Parlament ausbuchstabiert werden. Dabei müssen neben der klimapolitischen Effektivität und der Vereinbarkeit mit WTO-Recht die Auswirkungen auf die europäischen Handelspartner und insbesondere auch die armen Entwicklungsländer berücksichtigt werden. Für viele Entwicklungsländer sind infolge des CBAM zusätzliche Exportkosten zu erwarten. Die EU sollte die damit verbundenen Nachteile für Entwicklungsländer sorgfältig bewerten und auf eine entwicklungsfreundliche Ausgestaltung des CBAM hinwirken. Der CBAM sollte im weiteren Gesetzgebungsverfahren der EU entsprechend nachgebessert werden.
• Die EU muss sicherstellen, dass arme Länder nicht negativ vom CO2-Grenzausgleich belastet werden. Least
Developed Countries (LDCs) sollten vom CBAM ausgenommen bleiben.
• Die EU sollte die vom CBAM betroffenen Entwicklungsländer gezielt unterstützen, z. B. durch Kapazitätsaufbau in Bezug auf die Umsetzung des CBAM und Möglichkeiten der CO2-Minderung in den betroffenen Sektoren.
• Die EU sollte Partnerländer mit niedrigen und mittleren Einkommen bei der Dekarbonisierung ihrer Fertigungsindustrien unterstützen.
• Die EU sollte die Einnahmen des CO2-Grenzausgleichs im Sinne eines revenue recyclings überwiegend für klimapolitische Zwecke im Ausland verausgaben.
Bei der Weiterentwicklung des CBAM sollten die betroffenen Länder durch Konsultationen und diplomatischen Austausch zukünftig stärker eingebunden werden.

Zunehmend und auf vielfältige Art und Weise zeigen deutsche Kommunen im In- und Ausland entwicklungspolitisches Engagement. Über die Hintergründe und Ausgestaltung ihres Engagements aber ist sehr wenig bekannt.
Vor diesem Hintergrund hat das Deutsche Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) eine Bestandsaufnahme der Kommunalen Entwicklungspolitik (KEpol) in Deutschland gemacht. Finanziert wurde sie von der Servicestelle Kommunen in der Einen Welt (SKEW). Auf Grundlage einer bereits 2009 vom DIE durchgeführten Studie (Fröhlich & Lämmlin, 2009) sollten Entwicklungstrends in diesem kommunalen Politikfeld ausgemacht werden. Zu diesem Zweck führte das DIE in Kooperation mit dem Deutschen Evaluierungsinstitut der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit (DEval) eine deutschlandweite Befragung von Kommunen durch, die auch vertiefende qualitative Interviews mit Vertreter*innen von Kommunen und relevanten Bundes- und Länderinstitutionen umfasste.
Wie die Ergebnisse zeigen, wächst in Deutschland die KEpol infolge verbesserter politischer Rahmenbedingungen und beeinflusst durch veränderte globale Leitbilder (z. B. Agenda 2030). Bei größeren Kommunen ist der Anteil entwicklungspolitisch aktiver Kommunen deutlich höher als bei kleineren. Häufig konzentrieren sich kleinere Kommunen auf niedrigschwellige Aktivitäten mit geringeren Anforderungen an das Projektmanagement wie z.B. die Förderung von fairem Handel.
In einigen Fällen organisieren sie sich in Verbundprojekten. KEpol umfasst ein breites thematisches Spektrum, das von der Informations- und Bildungsarbeit bis hin zu vielfältigen Partnerschaften mit Kommunen im Globalen Süden reicht. Bei den Kooperationen der kommunalen Verwaltungen nehmen die Zahl und die Vielfalt der Akteure sowie ihre Funktionen zu. Sie agieren als Umsetzende, Multiplikator*innen und Vernetzende. Dem internationalen Engagement und den entsprechenden Aktivitäten der Kommunen liegt nicht zuletzt ein Eigeninteresse zugrunde. Beispielsweise, um international Verantwortung zu übernehmen
oder um für neue Mitarbeitende attraktiv zu sein.
Entwicklungspolitik ist eine gemeinsame Aufgabe von Bund, Ländern und Kommunen. KEpol gehört dabei zu den freiwilligen kommunalen Tätigkeiten und wird daher nicht überall praktiziert. Oft sind personelle Kapazitäten unzureichend und benötigte Kenntnisse über die diversen Themenfelder komplex. Zum Teil schätzen Kommunen den mit dem KEpol-Projektmanagement verbundenen Aufwand als zu hoch ein.
Nichtsdestotrotz leisten Kommunen durch ihr Engagement einen zentralen Beitrag zur transnationalen Nachhaltigkeitspolitik. Sie ermöglichen es insbesondere, die globalen Ziele kontextspezifisch umzusetzen beziehungsweise sie zu lokalisieren. Als spezifischen Vorteil bietet KEpol die Nähe zu den Bürger*innen und den direkten Kontakt zu lokalen Akteuren im In- und Ausland. Zurzeit ist allerdings der kommunale Beitrag gemessen an den gängigen Maßzahlen und Indikatoren der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit (EZ) (etwa der Official Development Assistance, ODA) noch zu wenig erkennbar. Kommunen weiterhin und vor allem unbürokratisch zu unterstützen ist wichtig, damit KEpol in aktiven und bislang noch nicht aktiven Kommunen ihr volles Potenzial entfalten kann.

Langanhaltende Krisen und das vermehrte Auftreten von Naturkatastrophen führen dazu, dass eine nie dagewesene Zahl von Menschen auf humanitäre Hilfe angewiesen ist. Doch die Kluft zwischen dem Bedarf und den verfügbaren Mitteln der internationalen Gemeinschaft wird immer größer. Um diese Ressourcenlücke zu schließen, will die Europäische Union (EU) verstärkt sogenannte „Emerging Donors“ wie China, dazu ermutigen, ihre Finanzbeiträge zu erhöhen. Obgleich Chinas Beteiligung im internationalen humanitären System bislang zurückhaltend war, deutet sein verstärktes Engagement während der Corona-Pandemie auf eine veränderte Haltung hin. So hat China Hunderte Tonnen an persönlicher Schutzausrüstung (PSA) ins Ausland geliefert, medizinische Teams entsandt und 100 Millionen USD an die Weltgesundheitsorganisation (WHO) und die Vereinten Nationen (UN) gespendet.
Trotz der zunehmenden geopolitischen Spannungen zwischen China und der EU eröffnet der verstärkte humanitäre Einsatz Pekings die Möglichkeit für die EU, sich gemeinsam mit China im humanitären Sektor zu engagieren. Dabei sollte die EU eine langfristige Strategie für eine mögliche Zusammenarbeit im humanitären Bereich entwickeln. Ein Dialog, der die unterschiedlichen Ansätze beider Akteure berücksichtigt und sich auf Gemeinsamkeiten fokussiert, könnte die Tür zu einer möglichen Zusammenarbeit öffnen. Diese könnte nicht nur dazu beitragen, die Finanzierungslücke zu verkleinern, sondern würde auch das Potenzial für eine bessere Koordinierung bei der Bereitstellung von Hilfsmaßnahmen bergen.
China begreift humanitäre Hilfe als einen Bestandteil der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit, leistet den Großteil seiner Hilfe bilateral und engagiert sich hauptsächlich nach Naturkatastrophen. Die EU hingegen trennt ihre humanitäre Hilfe von Entwicklungszusammenarbeit und leistet humanitäre Hilfsmaßnahmen über Nichtregierungsorganisationen (NGOs), UN-Agenturen und das Internationale Komitee vom Roten Kreuz (IKRK).
Diese Analyse und Stellungnahme arbeitet die Merkmale der chinesischen humanitären Hilfe heraus und skizziert zwei Bereiche, auf die sich die EU in ihrem Bemühen um einen Dialog mit China konzentrieren könnte.
• Ernährungssicherheit: Ernährungsfragen und die Unterstützung bei der Lebensmittelversorgung stellen einen Schlüsselbereich des Engagements beider Akteure dar. Die EU sollte sich dafür einsetzen, dass China seine Beiträge zur globalen Ernährungssicherheit über das Welternährungsprogramm (World Food Programme – WFP) aufstockt. Damit könnte ein politischer Dialog darüber einhergehen, wie sich die Zusammenarbeit bei der Gewährleistung der Ernährungssicherheit intensivieren ließe.
• Vorausschauende humanitäre Hilfe: China hat besonders beim Umgang mit Naturkatastrophen eine große Expertise aufgebaut. Eine verbesserte Katastrophenvorsorge ist eine der Prioritäten im Strategieplan der Generaldirektion Europäischer Katastrophenschutz und humanitäre Hilfe (DG ECHO) für 2020–2024. Da beide Parteien ein Interesse an vorausschauender humanitärer Hilfe haben, kann der Wissensaustausch in diesem Bereich ein Wegbereiter für eine zukünftige Zusammenarbeit sein.

Die Corona-Pandemie ist eine weltweite Gesundheitskrise, die eng mit der globalen Biodiversitätskrise verwoben ist. Sie entstand durch einen zoonotischen Erreger, der von Wildtieren auf den Menschen übersprang. Viren können sich in gestörten Ökosystemen leicht ausbreiten, und mit zunehmendem Kontakt zwischen Menschen und Wildtieren wächst das Risiko einer Übertragung. Der Naturschutz kann entscheidend dazu beitragen, das Risiko weiterer Pandemien zu verringern; gleichzeitig wirkt sich die aktuelle Pandemie in vielerlei Hinsicht auf den Naturschutz aus. In dieser Analyse und Stellungnahme schlagen wir Strategien zur Minderung der negativen Auswirkungen der Pandemie auf den Naturschutz im Globalen Süden vor. Viele Zoonosen haben dort ihren Ursprung, und die Lebensgrundlagen sind stark von natürlichen Ressourcen abhängig. Das Paper erläutert die wirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen der Pandemie auf Naturschutzgebiete sowie die spezifischen Folgen für den Tourismus und den Wildtier-handel – zwei Sektoren, die eng mit solchen Schutzgebieten verbunden sind.
Mit dem pandemiebedingten wirtschaftlichen Abschwung geraten die natürlichen Ressourcen in vielen Ländern unter Druck: Für den Naturschutz vorgesehene Mittel werden in den Gesundheitssektor umgeleitet, Länder senken ihre Naturschutzstandards, um die Wirtschaft anzukurbeln, und die arme Bevölkerung in ländlichen Regionen greift zum Überleben auf geschützte natürliche Ressourcen zurück. Diese Trends beschleunigen den Verlust der biologischen Vielfalt und der Ökosystemleistungen, schaffen günstige Bedingungen für das Auftreten von Zoonosen und bedrohen die Lebensgrundlagen der Menschen.
Vor der Corona-Pandemie war der naturnahe Tourismus eine Multi-Milliarden-Dollar-Industrie. Der vorübergehende Einbruch des Tourismus hat positive wie auch negative Auswirkungen auf die nachhaltige Entwicklung. Nachteile erleiden einerseits viele Angestellte im Tourismussektor, die ihren Arbeitsplatz und ihre Lebensgrundlage verloren haben. Außerdem ist eine wichtige Finanzierungsquelle für das Management von Schutzgebieten weggefallen. Andererseits hat der vorübergehend rückläufige Tourismus der Natur Zeit gegeben, sich zu erholen, während der Rückgang des internationalen Flugverkehrs die globalen Kohlenstoffemissionen dieses Sektors gesenkt hat.
Der Wildtierhandel – ein wichtiger Faktor in der Verbreitung von Zoonose-Erregern – wurde infolge der Pandemie in einigen Ländern verboten. Doch soziale Schutzmaßnahmen für lokale Gemeinschaften, die von Proteinen aus Wildtieren abhängig sind, fehlen noch weitgehend.
Um diese Herausforderungen zu bewältigen, empfehlen wir, den Naturschutz weiterhin ganz oben auf die internationale Agenda zu setzen, insbesondere inmitten der aktuellen globalen Gesundheitskrise, die sich mit der fortschreitenden Zerstörung von Ökosystemen schnell wiederholen könnte. Umweltgesetze müssen aufrechterhalten und Finanzmittel zur nachhaltigen Sicherung von Lebensgrundlagen zur Verfügung gestellt werden. Die Wiederbelebung des naturnahen Tourismus sollte unterstützt werden, da er nicht nur finanzielle Mittel für den Naturschutz, sondern auch Einkommen für lokale Gemeinden generieren kann. Gleichzeitig sollte die Tourismusindustrie ihren ökologischen Fußabdruck weiter reduzieren. Die Eindämmung des Wildtierhandels muss so gestaltet sein, dass der Proteinbedarf von Gemeinschaften gedeckt bleibt.

Um katastrophale Folgen für Mensch und Natur zu vermeiden, sind entschlossene Maßnahmen zur Eindämmung des Klimawandels erforderlich. Trotz dieser Dringlichkeit reichen die derzeit umgesetzten und geplanten Maßnahmen zur Bekämpfung des Klimawandels nicht aus, um die 2015 in Paris festgelegten globalen Ziele zu erreichen. Ein Grund für die derzeit unzureichende Umsetzung sind die wahrgenommenen negativen Verteilungseffekte. Durch die Verteuerung von Gütern können Klimaschutzmaßnahmen sowohl die Armut als auch die Ungleichheit steigern. Darüber hinaus können sie zu Störungen auf Arbeitsmärkten und mehr Arbeitslosigkeit führen, insbesondere in Sektoren und Gebieten, die von fossilen Brennstoffen abhängig sind. Infolgedessen haben öffentliche Proteste in vielen Ländern die Umsetzung der Klimapolitik bisher blockiert oder verzögert.
Neue Forschungsansätze, die in dieser Analyse und Stellungnahme erörtert werden, sorgen langsam für eine Trendwen-de. Erstens hat sich gezeigt, dass eine CO2-Bepreisung in Entwicklungsländern im Gegensatz zu den hochentwickelten Volkswirtschaften nicht regressiv wirken muss. In eine ähnlich positive Richtung gehen Studien, wonach das Erreichen der Klimaziele zu einem geringen Nettozuwachs an Arbeitsplätzen führen wird. Dennoch werden sowohl der Effekt der CO2-Bepreisung als auch die Auswirkungen der Klimapolitik auf Arbeitsmärkte Verlierer*innen hervorbringen: Preiser-höhungen würden die Armut verschärfen, da einkommensschwächere Haushalte mehr Geld für die gleichen Güter aus-geben müssten; ebenso werden bestimmte Länder, Sektoren, Gebiete und Arbeitnehmer*innen (z. B. Geringqualifizierte) von Arbeitsplatzverlusten oder -störungen betroffen sein.
Zweitens können Haushalte und Arbeitnehmer*innen, die von der Klimapolitik beeinträchtigt sind, im Rahmen von Maßnahmen zur sozialen Sicherung entschädigt werden, um negative Verteilungseffekte abzufedern. Höhere Preise können auch durch Geldtransfers an Haushalte kompensiert werden, die nur durch einen Teil der Einnahmen aus klima-politischen Maßnahmen wie einer Kohlenstoffsteuer finanziert werden können. Ähnlich verhält es sich mit Arbeits-markteffekten: Maßnahmen zur sozialen Absicherung, insbesondere arbeitsmarktpolitische Maßnahmen wie Umschu-lungen und Arbeitslosenunterstützung, können deutlich dazu beitragen, die Bedürfnisse der negativ betroffenen Arbeit-nehmer*innen zu erfüllen.
Es ist klar, dass ökologische und soziale Ziele sich nicht gegenseitig ausschließen müssen. Mit einem geeigneten
Policy-Mix lassen sich sowohl Armut als auch Umweltzerstörung reduzieren. Diese politischen Auswirkungen müssen allerdings breiter kommuniziert werden, um die Akzeptanz von Klimapolitiken zu erhöhen. Dies wird teilweise bereits durch aktuelle Pläne wie den europäischen Green Deal erreicht. Aus Sicht der Forschung und Politik sind mehr Studien in Entwicklungsländern erforderlich, die auch Erkenntnisse über nicht-marktbezogene klimapolitische Maßnahmen her-vorbringen und über den kurzfristigen Effekt höherer Preise auf die Kaufkraft der Haushalte hinausgehen. Nicht zuletzt kann die internationale Zusammenarbeit eine wichtige Rolle bei der politischen Koordinierung, der Finanzierung und dem Aufbau von sozialen Sicherungssystemen in Ländern mit niedrigem Einkommen spielen.

Diese Veröffentlichung stellt eine von sechs Analysen sektorenübergreifender Herausforderungen für Wasser-Governance dar, die als Teil des STEER-Forschungsprojekts durchgeführt wurden und deren Resultate in separaten Analysen und Stellungnahmen vorliegen.
Südafrikas Wassergesetzgebung ist international anerkannt für ihre ambitionierte Umsetzung des integrierten Wasserressourcenmanagements (IWRM). IWRM ist ein Konzept, das entwickelt wurde, um komplexe Herausforderungen im Bereich Wasser anzugehen, indem es die Beziehungen zwischen Land und Wasser berücksichtigt und den Wissensstand für andere Wasser nutzende Sektoren und Akteur*innen erweitert. Die Beteiligung von und Koordination zwischen Interessensvertreter*innen, Schlüsselaspekte des IWRM, stehen im Gegensatz zu einem hierarchischen Führungsstil, wie er von den meisten Regierungen praktiziert wird. Wir sehen drei Herausforderungen bei der Umsetzung von IWRM in Südafrika: Erstens, ein duales Governance-System: Die Landschaft der für das Einzugsgebietsmanagement relevanten südafrikanischen Organisationen besteht aus Organisationen des westlichen Governance- und des traditionellen Governance-Systems. Das westliche Governance-System umfasst Organisationen wie das Department of Water and Sanitation (DWS), das mit der Bewirtschaftung der Wasserressourcen beauftragt ist, und das Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, das sich mit der traditionellen Führung in verschiedenen Fragen einschließlich des Landmanagements abstimmt. Gegenwärtig arbeiten diese Organisationen in Land-Wasser-Fragen nicht im erforderlichen Maße zusammen. Zweitens, eine mangelnde Umsetzung der Wassergesetzgebung: Das südafrikanische Wassergesetz von 1998 sieht Behörden für Einzugsgebietsmanagement (Catchment Management Agencies, CMAs) als Netzwerk-Governance-Strukturen vor, die die Einzugsgebiete auf lokaler Ebene bewirtschaften und alle Wassernutzer*innen einbeziehen sollen. Doch nach über 20 Jahren sind diese Strukturen nicht umgesetzt worden. Dies ist auf einen Konflikt von Governance-Stilen zwischen den Stakeholder integrierenden CMAs und dem expertengesteuerten, hierarchischen DWS zurückzuführen. Drittens, Konflikt zwischen Governance-Stilen: In Ermangelung einer CMA haben sich im uMngeni-Einzugsgebiet mehrere informelle oder nicht gesetzlich verankerte Netzwerk-Governance-Strukturen entwickelt (z.B. Foren für Einzugsgebietsmanagement und die uMngeni Ecological Infrastructure Partnership). In einigen Fällen befinden sich Repräsentant*innen dieser Strukturen und Regierungsvertreter*innen im Konflikt über unterschiedliche Ansätze des Wissensmanagements und der Entscheidungsfindung; diese Unterschiede wurzeln in ihrem jeweiligen Governance-Stil. In den vergangenen Jahren hat das DWS einen Prozess zur Erarbeitung der formal notwendigen Strategie des Einzugsgebietsmanagements eingeleitet, der von den Stakeholdern verlangt, sich zu beteiligen und ihre Bedürfnisse zu formulieren. Dieser Prozess könnte zu einem vermittelnden Instrument für Konflikte zwischen den Akteur*innen werden.
Wir machen folgende Vorschläge:
1. Um IWRM umzusetzen ist die Integration der traditionellen Führungsebene in Planungsprozesse auf kulturell sensible Weise von entscheidender Bedeutung.
2. Netzwerkstrukturen – von der Regierung gestaltet oder selbst organisiert – können das zur Umsetzung von IWRM erforderliche Sozialkapital auf lokaler und regionaler Ebene schaffen.
3. Um zwischen vorhandenem hierarchischen und Netzwerk-Governance-Wissen zu vermitteln, sollten Managementstrategien auf einem hybriden Governance-Stil beruhen.

Neben der Aufmerksamkeit, die der Blockchain-Technologie (BT) durch ihren Einsatz in Kryptowährungen zuteilwurde, hat sich für die BT einigermaßen unbemerkt von der Öffentlichkeit ein weiteres Einsatzfeld entwickelt: das in der Lieferkette. Lieferketten sind in den vergangenen Jahren immer fragmentierter und globaler geworden, sodass Produkte von der Rohstoffgewinnung häufig bis zum Verkauf unzählige Produktionsschritte durchlaufen, die von Firmen in unterschiedlichen Ländern durchgeführt werden. Die Sicherung der Qualität und Nachhaltigkeit der Produktion in vorangehenden Schritten stellt für viele folgende Produktionsschritte – und so letztlich auch für die Endverbraucher – eine große Herausforderung dar. Die BT verspricht in diesem Zusammenhang große Fortschritte. Einfach gesagt ermöglicht die Blockchain, Daten in einem Netzwerk zu verifizieren, fälschungssicher und rückverfolgbar abzuspeichern und für alle Teilnehmer*innen des Netzwerkes einsehbar zu machen.
Die möglichen Vorteile der BT liegen zum einen auf der Seite der Konsument*innen, die die Herkunft von Produkten nachvollziehen können. Das erleichtert nachhaltigen Konsum. Sie liegen zweitens auf der Seite der Produzent*innen, wenn Teile ihrer Lieferketten automatisiert werden und sie ihre Produktqualität und -herkunft kostengünstig nachweisen können. Drittens wird mit der BT die Hoffnung verbunden, dass Lieferketten durch sie inklusiver für kleine und mittelgroße Zulieferer*innen werden können, besonders in Entwicklungsländern. Die BT kann einfacher Vertrauen auch in die von Ihnen gelieferten Zwischengüter schaffen und so Eintrittsbarrieren abbauen. Zusammengenommen könnte die BT daher dazu beitragen, Konsum und Produktion ökologischer, sozial gerechter und inklusiver zu gestalten und so nachhaltige Entwicklung voranzubringen.
Bisher haben vor allem sehr große Unternehmen in Pilotprojekte investiert. Einige Produkte können inzwischen sowohl von Firmen als auch von Endverbrauchern in Echtzeit auf ihre Produktionsweise und Herkunft überprüft werden. Während die BT jedoch eingetragene Daten sicher speichert und miteinander „verkettet“, kann die Technologie als solche noch nicht die Korrektheit der eingetragenen Daten sichern. Diese verbleibende Unsicherheit im Digital-Analog-Link kann durch die Verbindung mit anderen Technologien, wie etwa dem Internet der Dinge (Internet of Things, IoT), gestärkt werden. Die Einhaltung etwa von Arbeits-, Umwelt- oder Tierwohlstandards kann aber nach wie vor weitestgehend nur durch unabhängige analoge Audits überprüft werden. Ein Einsatz der BT bringt daher besonders in solchen Sektoren potenziell umfassende Vorteile, in denen der Digital-Analog-Link erfolgreich überbrückt werden kann, wie etwa im Lebensmittelsektor oder bei besonders hochwertigen Rohstoffen.
Für den Einsatz der BT auch von kleinen Zuliefer*innen in Entwicklungsländern sind oftmals die nötigen Bedingungen von digitaler Bildung, Ausstattung, und Infrastruktur nicht gegeben. Hier müssten nationale und internationale Entwicklungspolitiken ansetzen, damit BT-Lösungen ihre Vorteile für inklusive Produktion entfalten können. Auch allgemeine technologische Standards können helfen, Monopolbil-dungen in der Technologieentwicklung durch multinationale Konzerne entgegenzuwirken. Damit könnte die Politik dazu beitragen, das Interesse der Konsument*innen und Produzent*innen mit dem der kleinen und mittleren Unternehmen (KMUs) in der Lieferkette in Einklang zu bringen.

This report is for media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared to the previous day. The Mission recorded a significant level of fighting during the night of 5-6 August in Donetsk region. The SMM analysed craters in Krasnohorivka, Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove) and Sakhanka. It observed weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas. The Mission noted the absence of 12 towed howitzers from permanent storage sites in “LPR”-controlled areas. It faced four freedom-of-movement restrictions, all in areas not controlled by the Government. The SMM received concrete responses to recent incidents by the Ukrainian Armed Forces representative at the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination, but no such information regarding incidents that took place in areas not controlled by the Government.

The SMM noted fewer ceasefire violations[1] in Donetsk region compared to the previous reporting period.

On the evening of 4 August, while in Donetsk city centre the SMM heard in two minutes 14 undetermined explosions 6-8km north-north-west of its position. On the night of 5-6 August, the SMM heard 42 undetermined explosions, including 30 assessed as anti-aircraft cannon rounds, 7-10km north of its position.

On night of 4-5 August, whilst in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 8-10km north-west of its location. Earlier that evening, the SMM had heard in one minute 20 explosions assessed as outgoing mortar rounds, explosions assessed as automatic-grenade-launcher and recoilless-gun rounds as well as heavy-machine-gun bursts 700-1000m north of its position 7km north of Horlivka. While in Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard two explosions assessed as impacts of 82mm mortar rounds 4-5km south-east of its location.

The SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) between 21:39 and 21:48 on 4 August recorded 11 rocket-assisted projectiles fired from west to east and one undetermined explosion at unknown distance north-west of its position. During the night of 5-6 August, in about three hours, the camera recorded 118 undetermined explosions as well as bursts of tracer fire (in sequence) from south-west to north-east, west to east and east to west.

Positioned in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard within 50 minutes in the afternoon 94 undetermined explosions assessed as rounds of different weapons (82mm and 120mm mortar, automatic grenade launcher), as well as heavy-machine-gun fire 4-6km south-east of its position. In the course of the day, whilst positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard 20 undetermined explosions at locations ranging from 2 to 6km west, west-north-west and north-north-west of its position.

In one hour in the morning, whilst in Svitlodarsk, the SMM heard 26 undetermined explosions 10-12km north-west, and four undetermined explosions 10-12km north-north-east of its position. In the night hours of 5-6 August, within just over two hours around midnight from the same location, the SMM heard 42 explosions, including 30, which it assessed as impacts of 120mm mortar rounds 4-5km south-east of its position. In Horlivka, on the same night, the SMM heard 43 explosions, including 27 it assessed as outgoing mortar rounds 7-9km north-west of its position.

In Luhansk region the SMM noted fewer ceasefire violations compared to the previous day, with no ceasefire violations recorded during the night of 4 August. Positioned 2km north of “LPR”-controlled Hannivka (58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard one undetermined explosion 5-15km west of its position. Positioned in “LPR”-controlled Veselohorivka (65km west of Luhansk), within about 20 minutes, the SMM heard over a dozen bursts of small arms 2km east of its position.

The SMM followed up on civilian casualties and conducted crater analysis. At the Kalinina hospital morgue in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city, the SMM accompanied by Russian Federation Armed Forces officers at the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC), observed the body of a woman with extensive shrapnel injuries to her head, neck, limbs and torso. According to the autopsy report, she had succumbed to shrapnel injuries she had received due to triggering a booby trap while working in her garden in Donetsk city’s Petrovskyi district on 4 August.

On 4 August, in “DPR”-controlled Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, 23km north-east of Mariupol) the SMM saw four fresh craters, all of which it assessed as caused by 120mm mortar rounds. The SMM assessed the first crater near an abandoned house as caused by a round fired from a westerly direction. The second crater was in the backyard of a house inhabited by an elderly woman and the SMM assessed that the round had been fired from a south-westerly direction. The last two craters were located near a road in the same area and the SMM assessed that one round had been fired from a north-north-westerly direction and the other – from a north-westerly direction. According to residents, the shelling had taken place between 06:00-06:35 on 3 August. No casualties were reported.

In Sakhanka (“DPR”-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw three fresh craters. The first crater was 20m away from an electricity sub-station and the SMM assessed it as caused by a projectile fired from a westerly direction. The SMM saw shrapnel damage to the sub-station. The SMM assessed the second crater, which was located in a field at the outskirts of the village, as caused by a 120mm mortar round fired from a north-westerly direction. The third crater was located in the backyard of a house inhabited by a middle-aged woman and the SMM saw two broken windows. The SMM assessed it as caused by a projectile fired from a north-north-westerly direction. Residents told the SMM that the shelling had occurred on 3 August at 22:30. No casualties were reported.

In Molodizhne (“DPR”-controlled, 20km south of Donetsk) the SMM saw nine fresh impact sites in a “detention” facility guarded by armed “DPR” members. One impact had caused the south-east part of the flat roof of an administrative building to partially collapse. The remainder of the impacts had struck the hard surface of the yard. The SMM assessed four of the craters as caused by 122mm or 152mm artillery rounds fired from a south or south-westerly direction, while a fifth had been caused by a projectile of unknown calibre fired from a northerly direction. The SMM was unable to analyse the remainder of the craters as they had been tampered with. According to the “head” of the facility, the shelling had occurred around midnight on 4 August. He also told the SMM that two “detainees” had sustained minor injuries. Medical personnel at the Dokuchaievsk hospital who treated them told the SMM that one had a shrapnel injury to his ankle and the other - to his chest and jaw. Both had been released back to the facility less than two hours after their arrival to the hospital. Near the facility, the SMM saw a two-storey house with a shattered window and spoke to a resident living in the house who stated that the window had been shattered by shrapnel around midnight on 4 August.

In government-controlled Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk) the SMM visited two residential properties reportedly shelled on the night of 4-5 August. At the first, the SMM saw a crater in the asphalt surface on the yard of the house, and minor shrapnel damage to the nearby east-facing wall. The SMM saw the tail fin of an 82mm mortar round stuck in the asphalt and assessed that the round had been fired from an east-south-easterly direction. At the second location, a five-storey apartment building, the SMM saw a direct impact on the east-facing wall and assessed it as caused by an 82mm mortar round fired from an east-north-easterly direction. No casualties were reported at either location.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Minsk Memorandum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal line, the SMM observed in government-controlled areas: one surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa, 120mm) westbound on the M04 (E50) road near government-controlled Selidove (41km north-west of Donetsk), and two tanks of unknown type in “LPR”-controlled areas of Zolote (60km north-west of Luhansk). 

Beyond the respective withdrawal line but outside assigned areas, the SMM observed 13 stationary tanks (T-64) at the training area near “LPR”-controlled Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification. In a government-controlled area beyond the respective withdrawal lines the SMM saw 11 multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS; BM21 Grad 122mm). The SMM also observed that one area continued to be abandoned, as it had been since 26 February, with 12 MLRS (BM21 Grad 122mm) and two surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10, 120mm) missing. In “DPR”-controlled areas, the SMM noted the presence of eight anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) and six self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm).*

The SMM revisited permanent storage sites, whose locations corresponded with the withdrawal lines. At “LPR”-controlled sites the SMM noted that 12 towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) were missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles in the security zone. In “LPR”-controlled Kalynove (60km west of Luhansk), the SMM observed one armoured personnel carrier (BTR-80) with 12 armed “LPR” members on board travelling west and one stationary combat engineering vehicle (IMR-2) on a tank (T-72) chassis.

The SMM continued to insist on accountability and responsibility for violations related to impediments to SMM monitoring and verification. The SMM continued to follow up on the incident of 2 August when SMM monitors were threatened at gunpoint at a known Ukrainian Armed Forces position near Lobacheve (17km north-west of Luhansk) (see: SMM Spot Report, 3 August 2016). At the JCCC in government-controlled Soledar (79km north of Donetsk), the Ukrainian Armed Forces representative presented the SMM with details of the investigations and disciplinary measures taken against the perpetrators. With regard to the shots fired at the SMM mini unmanned aerial vehicle near Lobacheve on 30 July (see SMM Daily Report 1 August 2016), the representative informed the SMM that the person responsible had been identified and he had disobeyed direct orders.

In relation to the violation near Lukove (72km south of Donetsk) (see: SMM Spot Report, 29 July 2016) in which armed individuals had threatened the SMM at gunpoint, Mr. Zakharchenko continued to refuse to meet the SMM in order to indicate effective steps taken in response.*

The SMM reminded the JCCC of continued restrictions and impediments to monitoring and verification, including in the areas near Zolote and Petrivske, and reminded the JCCC of its obligations under the Addendum to help ensure these and other violations were remedied as a matter of urgency. The SMM likewise reminded the JCCC that many of these restrictions were caused by mines, which the signatories of the Memorandum of September 2014 had insisted should be removed, and the Trilateral Contact Group's decision of 3 March, stipulating that the JCCC should be responsible for overall co-ordination of mine action, with the support of the SMM.

The SMM observed the presence of unexploded ordnance (UXO). The SMM revisited an area in Debaltseve (“DPR”-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk) where it had seen UXO assessed as an MLRS round (BM27 Uragan, 220mm; see SMM Daily Report 5 August 2016). A local farmer stated that “emergency services” had visited the site on 4 August and declared the rocket safe. He also showed the SMM another UXO on a footpath in the area, which the SMM assessed to be a 122mm artillery shell. The SMM informed the JCCC of the location of both pieces of UXO.

The SMM observed a new mine hazard sign 2km west of government-controlled Lobacheve (18km north-west of Luhansk) on the side of the road, which connects Lobacheve to government-controlled Lopaskyne (24km north-west of Luhansk). The sign read “Mines” in Russian and was hand-written on white cloth, which was hung on a movable wooden barrier.

The SMM continued to observe queues of pedestrians at the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge. In the morning between 09:09 and 10:09 the SMM saw 203 people (mixed gender and age) leaving government-controlled areas through the government checkpoint. In the same time period, the SMM saw 265 people (mixed gender and age) entering government-controlled areas through the same checkpoint. At 10:22, the SMM saw some 450 people still queuing to leave government-controlled areas. The SMM saw no traffic in the opposite direction. Between 15:45 and 16:15 the SMM observed 115 people (mixed gender and age) enter government-controlled areas through the government checkpoint. Within the same time frame, the SMM saw 132 people (mixed gender and age) proceed in the opposite direction.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

 

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• An armed “DPR” member stopped the SMM east of Oleksandrivske (formerly Rozy Lyuksemburg, “DPR”-controlled, 82km south of Donetsk), and prevented the SMM from proceeding further east. The SMM took an alternative route to Novoazovsk (“DPR”-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol). The SMM informed the JCCC.
• Four armed “LPR” members in two vehicles stopped the SMM in “LPR”-controlled areas of Zolote (60km north-west of Luhansk). An armed “LPR” member threatened one of SMM’s monitors with “arrest”, unless the SMM complied with their instruction not to stop at a pedestrian path leading to the railway tracks. The SMM informed the JCCC.

Conditional access:

• Armed men limited the SMM’s access to a weapons holding area. The gate was locked and the SMM was informed that the guard with the key was unavailable. The armed “DPR” members present only allowed two monitors and a language assistant to climb the wall (1.2m) in order to record the serial numbers of the designated weapons. The JCCC was informed.
• An armed “LPR” member stopped the SMM at the “LPR” checkpoint south of the bridge at government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk). He informed his superior and only allowed the SMM to proceed after noting down monitors’ names and IDs.

 

[1]  Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

 

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• Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 2 August 2016

This report is for media and the general public.

On 6 August at 07:51hrs the SMM heard an explosion approximately 3.9km east of its location in Luhansk city.

The SMM went to the site from where it had heard the explosion located at the intersection of Karpynsky and Vatutyn Street in Luhansk city, 500m north-east of SMM’s accommodation. The site was cordoned off, by so-called “LPR” “police” and the SMM could assess from a distance of approximately 15-30 meters, that an explosion had likely been caused by an improvised explosive device (assessed as approximately 1kg of high explosives) placed next to or in, a lamp post about two meters away from the vehicle, which was damaged and downed, at the side of the road. The SMM saw a black sport utility vehicle “Toyota Landcruiser Prado” severely damaged with windows shattered and front and side airbags deployed.

“LPR” “police” members at the site told the SMM that there were two casualties, without giving further details. Mr Vladislav Deynego, “LPR” member, told the SMM that Mr Plotnitsky was “in a bad condition and not able to receive visitors.”  At the time of writing, the SMM could not reach personnel at either of the two hospitals in Luhansk city for confirmation.

The SMM will continue following up to confirm the information, and observe further developments.

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WARSAW, 6 August 2016 – Michael Georg Link, Director of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), today criticized the call by the Prosecutor General of Tajikistan for the reintroduction of the death penalty, and expressed concern over recent discussions related to removing the bans on capital punishment in some other OSCE participating States.

“Countries in the OSCE have committed themselves to consider the complete abolition of capital punishment, not to reconsider that abolition,” the ODIHR Director said. “Yesterday’s call by the Prosecutor General in Tajikistan for the reintroduction of capital punishment in that country is completely out of place in a region where most of the countries recognize the inherently cruel, inhuman and degrading nature of a punishment that fails to act as a deterrent and makes any miscarriage of justice irreversible.”

Tajikistan’s Prosecutor-General, Yusuf Rahmon, told a press conference yesterday that perpetrators of premeditated murder, terrorists and traitors must be punished by death. His words followed similar statements by other leaders, among them President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey and President Viktor Orban of Hungary, suggesting that the reinstitution of the death penalty should be opened for discussion.

Tajikistan suspended the application of the death penalty in 2004, while Turkey and Hungary completely abolished capital punishment, in 2004 and 1990, respectively.

“Rather than reversing its course, it is my hope that Tajikistan will take further steps toward the complete abolition of the death penalty,” he said. “It is also my hope that Turkey, remains with the vast majority of the OSCE participating States and will continue to  act as a strong advocate for the global abolition, as it has in recent years.”

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KYIV, 5 AUGUST 2016 –OSCE Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings, Madina Jarbussynova, on Friday concluded an official visit to Ukraine aimed at raising awareness of human trafficking and the risks encountered by the most vulnerable groups as a consequence of the current crisis.

During her five-day visit, she met with representatives of the Donetsk Oblast state administration and female Internally Displaced People (IDPs) in Kramatorsk. Ambassador Jarbussynova also travelled to Kharkiv to talk to relevant civil society representatives about the situation on the ground, how to prevent the expansion of the conflict-driven human trafficking phenomenon, and to evaluate existing mechanisms of identifying, referring and assisting victims of trafficking in human beings.

“More than one-and-a-half million citizens have been displaced – a vast number that demands a comprehensive response,” Jarbussynova said. “This vulnerable group can easily find itself in situations where human trafficking may occur.”

In Kyiv, the OSCE Special Representative met with Ukrainian authorities to discuss progress in anti-trafficking measures and review future plans.

“The Government of Ukraine has recently demonstrated a high level of commitment to addressing human trafficking, particularly in enhancing its victim identification efforts and in filing cases to relevant courts”, said Jarbussynova.

At the same time, she noted that there are still considerable gaps in the National Referral Mechanism for victims, and that long-term, sustainable measures should be sought.

The Special Representative travels regularly to Ukraine, engaging with high-level authorities and holding training sessions together with the Special Monitoring Mission and the OSCE Project Co-ordinator to strengthen the capacity of the Ukrainian institutions and OSCE monitors to spot human trafficking trends and to report on alleged cases.

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This report is for media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region compared to the day before including more than 520 explosions. In Luhansk region the SMM noted a decrease in recorded ceasefire violations compared to the previous day. On the night of 4 August, the SMM heard single shots of small-arms fire in close proximity to  its base in Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov). The SMM analysed craters in Zaitseve, Luhanske and Novozvanivka. It observed weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line, and noted the absence of numerous weapons from permanent storage sites in government-controlled areas. The SMM followed up on reports of water and power supply cuts in areas of Avdiivka and Yasynuvata due to shelling. It faced four freedom-of-movement restrictions – two in government-controlled areas and two in areas not controlled by the Government.

The SMM noted a higher number of ceasefire violations[1] recorded in Donetsk region compared to the previous reporting period, including more than 520 explosions.

On the evening of 3 August, while in Donetsk city centre, the SMM heard 48 undetermined explosions 8-15km north-west of its position.

On the same night, whilst in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 104 undetermined explosions 7-10km north, and 12 explosions assessed as outgoing armoured personnel carrier (BMP-1, 73mm) cannon fire 5-8km north of its position.

The SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) between 21:35 and 22:31 of 3 August, facing north-east, recorded 63 undetermined explosions and 30 bursts in the following sequence: five bursts of undetermined tracer fire and 25 bursts of direct tracer fire from east to west, north to south, south to north, north-west to northeast, north-east to north-west, east to north-west, north-east to west, south-east to north-west.

The following day, positioned at the “DPR”-controlled Donetsk central railway station (6km north-west of the city centre), the SMM heard 236 undetermined explosions all at locations 3-10km ranging from north-west to north-east of its position. The most intense violence was noted between 08:14 and 08:42, when the SMM recorded 100 undetermined explosions 4-6km north-north-east of its position. 

Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 25 undetermined explosions and 13 outgoing explosions assessed as caused by automatic-grenade-launcher fire 1-7km west-south-west, west, west-north-west, north, north-north-east and north-east of its position. Positioned in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard 14 undetermined explosions 3-5km east and south-east of its position.

In Luhansk region the SMM noted a decrease in recorded ceasefire violations compared to the previous day, with no ceasefire violations recorded during the night of 3 August. Whilst in government-controlled Trokhizbenka (33km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 32 undetermined explosions 5-6km south of its position. While positioned 1.5km north-west of “LPR”-controlled Hannivka (58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard, within a half-hour period, more than 100 bursts of small-arms fire 1.5km east-south-east of its position – the location of a known shooting range – and assessed them as live-fire exercise – within the security zone – in violation of the ceasefire and of the Trilateral Contact Group decision on the prohibition of live-fire exercises within the security zone. Subsequently, while in the vicinity of a shooting range, the SMM saw five armed “LPR” members wearing ski masks with sniper rifles.

At 21:45 on 4 August, the SMM while at its base in “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk), heard 16 single shots of small-arms (pistol) fire at an undetermined location 100-150m away from the base. The SMM informed the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) and armed “LPR” members controlling area.

The SMM conducted crater analysis. In “DPR”-controlled parts of Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw a fresh crater in a field 60m away from a house and assessed it as caused by a mortar (82 or 120mm) round fired from a north-westerly direction. Residents told the SMM that shelling had occurred during the night of 2-3 August. Across the street, the SMM also saw a completely burnt and destroyed house and two neighbouring houses with minor damage. No casualties were reported.

In government-controlled Luhanske (59km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw four relatively fresh craters  with fragments of 120mm mortar rounds and 122mm artillery rounds in a garden of an inhabited house. The SMM was unable to determine the direction of fire due to contaminated craters after the recent heavy storms.

In government-controlled Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw four craters near an inhabited house and assessed two of them as caused by 82mm mortar and the other two as caused by 122m artillery rounds, all fired from an easterly direction. Two residents told the SMM that shelling had taken place during the night time two days prior.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Minsk Memorandum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal line, the SMM observed in government-controlled areas: five self-propelled howitzers (2S1Gvozdika, 122mm) in Tarasivka (43km north-west of Donetsk); four self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152 mm) in a military compound in Donske (57km south of Donetsk); one radio-guided anti-tank system (9K114 Shturm, 134mm) mounted on a stationary armoured tracked vehicle (MT- LB) in Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk). Aerial surveillance imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence on 3 August of 12 tanks together with other hardware including 19 armoured vehicles and 44 military-type trucks in an industrial complex in “DPR”-controlled Budonivskyi district of Donetsk city.

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification. In a government-controlled area beyond the respective withdrawal lines the SMM saw six towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm), while it noted as missing six towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) as first observed on 8 July. The SMM also observed that two areas continued to be abandoned, as they have been since 3 July, with 12 towed howitzers (D-30, 12mm) and six Addendum-regulated mortars (2B11, 120mm) missing.

The SMM revisited permanent storage sites, whose locations corresponded with the withdrawal lines. At Ukrainian Armed Forces sites, the SMM noted that 22 tanks (T-64) and seven mortars (five 2B9M, 82mm; and two BM-38, 82mm) remained missing. In addition, the SMM also observed missing for the first time 36 tanks (T-64) and seven mortars (BM-37, 82mm). The SMM noted that one of those sites continues to be abandoned and another site has been newly abandoned.

The SMM observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles (ACV) and anti-aircraft weapons in the security zone. In government-controlled areas the SMM saw: one anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) near Lomakyne (15km north-east of Mariupol); one light-armoured vehicle (Kraz Cougar) mounted with a heavy machine-gun heading north near Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk). In “LPR”-controlled areas, the SMM saw: one anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) at an “LPR” checkpoint south-east of Shchastia across the contact line; one infantry fighting vehicle (BTR) heading north near Kalynove (60km west of Luhansk). Aerial surveillance imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence on 3 August of 33 armoured vehicles and 169 military-type trucks in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city, in addition to aforementioned present in the same compound as the tanks (see above).

The SMM followed up on reports about cuts to water and power supply in areas of Avdiivka and Yasynuvata due to shelling. In Avdiivka, the Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) told the SMM that at around 23:00 on 3 August, water and power supply to the town had been interrupted as shelling had caused damage to power transmission lines and to the Donetsk water filtration station located between Avdiivka and Yasynuvata. At Yasynuvata railway station, an employee (a woman in her thirties), stated that at approximately 04:00 of the day the water supply had been interrupted affecting large parts of the town. She added that most residents currently used water from private wells and bottled water.

The SMM continued to follow up on the incident of 2 August when SMM monitors were threatened at gunpoint at a known Ukrainian Armed Forces position on the road from government-controlled Lopaskyne to Lobacheve (24 and 17km north-west of Luhansk, respectively) (see: SMM Spot Report, 3 August 2016). At the JCCC in government-controlled Soledar (79km north of Donetsk), the Ukrainian Armed Forces chief-of-staff told the SMM that the perpetrators had been identified. The SMM also requested the meeting with a senior “DPR” member to follow up on the incident of 29 July when SMM monitors were threatened at gunpoint by aggressive armed “DPR” members near Lukove (72km south of Donetsk) (see: SMM Spot Report, 30 July 2016). He subsequently  refused  the request.*

The SMM observed the presence of explosive remnants of war (ERW) in “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk). The SMM for the first time saw a tailfin of a multiple-launch rocket system (BM-27 Uragan, 220mm) stuck in soil 30m away from an inhabited house and some 50 rusty shells of 82mm mortars (without fuses) scattered in a nearby field.

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential infrastructure. Positioned on both sides of the contact line, the SMM monitored the cleaning and widening of canals that provide water to the Shchastia power plant, repair works to the Mykhailivka-Lysychansk high power line near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km north-west of Luhansk), repair works to gas pipelines in areas between “LPR”-controlled Slovianoserbsk and Pryshyb (28 and 34km north-west of Luhansk, respectively).

The SMM continued to observe queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. In the morning, at a checkpoint in “DPR”-controlled Olenivka (23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM observed 132 cars waiting in a queue to cross into government-controlled areas and six cars in the opposite direction. A man in his forties told the SMM that he had been waiting for four hours since 06:00. A man in his early thirties with his wife and 8-year-old son stated that they were travelling to receive medical treatment for his son in government-controlled areas, expressing his concern as his son should not stay in the sun for a long time.  

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• In government-controlled Hranitne (25km north of Mariupol), armed Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel did not allow the SMM to enter a military compound. The JCCC was informed.
• Armed Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel denied the SMM access to a military compound in government-controlled Myrne (40km north-east of Mariupol), citing orders from their superior. The JCCC was informed. 
• A senior “DPR” member refused to meet with SMM, when it attempted to follow up on the incident 29 July near Lukove.

Conditional access:

• Armed “LPR” members at a checkpoint immediately south of the bridge at Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north of Luhansk) allowed the SMM to proceed only after taking the names and ID card numbers of SMM monitors.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

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• Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 1 August 2016

MOSCOW, 5 August 2016 – On the occasion of the formal opening of the election observation mission (EOM) deployed by the OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) to observe the 18 September State Duma elections in the Russian Federation, the mission will hold a press conference in Moscow on Monday, 8 August 2016.

Jan Petersen, the head of the OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission, will introduce the role of the EOM and its upcoming activities.

Journalists are invited to attend the press conference at 15:00, Monday, 8 August, at Interfax, 1-ya Tverskaya-Yamskaya ul., 2 Moscow, 127006.

For further information, please contact Inta Lase OSCE/ODIHR EOM Media Analyst, at +79166214710 (mobile) or Inta.Lase@odihr.ru

or

Thomas Rymer, OSCE/ODIHR Spokesperson, at +48 609 522 266 (Warsaw mobile) or at thomas.rymer@odihr.pl.

 

 

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257951 Communication and Media Relations Section

Representatives of relevant ministries and other state agencies of Belarus, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan responsible for implementing provisions of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 on preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction met at an OSCE-supported peer review meeting in Minsk from 2 and 5 August 2016, to discuss progress in their work.

Experts from the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre, the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs and the UN Security Council’s 1540 Committee also attended the meeting, which was hosted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Belarus, and is the second event of its kind to be held in the OSCE region and in the world, and the first to be held in trilateral format.

Opening the event, Deputy Foreign Minister of Belarus Valentin Rybakov said that the issues of non-proliferation are among his country’s priorities in the area of international security.

He noted that Belarus was the first state of the former Soviet Union to voluntarily refuse the opportunity to possess weapons of mass destruction, and that the withdrawal of such weapons from the country’s territory was completed in 1996. Rybakov added that his country also initiated the adoption of the UN General Assembly resolution on prohibiting the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons.

Adriana Volenikova of the  OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre said regional co-operation on UNSCR 1540-related issues has become one of the most efficient means in bolstering national implementation and enhancing an open dialogue between countries that face similar challenges and benefit from close interaction in related areas.

The three States will work on a joint report on implementation and later submit it to the UNSC 1540 Committee and the UN Security Council.

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DUSHANBE, 5 August 2016 – Twenty officers  of the Tajik Border Troops, ranked between warrant officer and major, mainly coming from border detachments  on the Afghan and Tajik border, successfully completed a four-week course today on patrolling and leadership at the Gissar Training Centre in Dushanbe.

The course, organized by the OSCE Office in Tajikistan, focused on enhancing participants’ knowledge of conducting observation missions using topographical maps, satellite imagery and other tools. They also learned about reporting and analysis, repelling methods, communications and tactical movement.

Uniforms and common tactical equipment were given to each participant. Separate medical lessons were delivered by trainers from the United States Embassy in Tajikistan. The sessions on gender mainstreaming and demining awareness were delivered by experts of the OSCE Office. Two officers of the Tajik Border Troops, who previously passed the course, also supported the OSCE in delivering the lessons.

OSCE Office in Tajikistan Counter-terrorism and Police issues Adviser Wolfgang Nikolaus, congratulated the officers on completing the course and said: “The OSCE continues supporting efforts to enhance the capacity of Tajik Border Troops Staff by providing such high-quality training courses."

The course is the eighth to be held under the third phase of the Patrol Programming and Leadership Project. The Project aims to increase the capacities of Tajik border staff in detection and interdiction of illegal cross-border movements.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM noted a similar number of ceasefire violations recorded in Donetsk region compared to the day before. In Luhansk region the SMM noted an increase in recorded ceasefire violations compared to the previous day, with many concentrated around government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska and Trokhizbenka. The SMM analysed craters in Stanytsia Luhanska, Pobeda and Hnutove. It observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles and anti-tank missiles in the security zone. The SMM followed up on reports of civilian and military casualties. The SMM continued to observe queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. It monitored border areas not controlled by the Government and encountered one restriction. It faced another freedom-of-movement restriction, also in an area not controlled by the Government*.

The SMM noted a similar number of ceasefire violations recorded in Donetsk region compared to the previous reporting period.[1]

On the evening of 2 August, while in Donetsk city centre the SMM heard 22 undetermined explosions 7-10km north-west of its position.

Whilst in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard in the late evening of 2 August explosions assessed as 20 artillery impacts (122mm), eight mortar impacts (120mm) and  seven mortar impacts (82mm) 2km south- east its position; and 23 explosions assessed as outgoing artillery rounds (122mm) 3km south of its position.

Whilst in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard seven explosions assessed as outgoing recoilless-gun fire (SPG-9, 73mm) 0.7-1.5km north of its position and ten explosions assessed as outgoing mortar fire (82mm), 1-10km north of its position.

On 3 August, positioned during the day in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk city) the SMM heard 56 undetermined explosions 3-5km west, north-west and west-south-west of its position.

Positioned during the day in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk city) the SMM heard 49 undetermined explosions 4-5km south-east, south-south-east and south of its position.

Whilst in “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk) throughout the day, the SMM heard five single undetermined explosions 6-12km ranging from north-north-west to south-west of its position.

The SMM noted an increase in the number of ceasefire violations recorded in Luhansk region compared to the day before, with the majority taking place in government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk) and government-controlled Trokhizbenka (33km north-west of Luhansk). While in Stanytsia Luhanska in the late evening of 2 August, the SMM heard during a two hour period 48 undetermined explosions 3-5km south and south-south-west of its position; 14 explosions assessed as outgoing 73mm recoilless-gun (SPG-9) fire and 14 impacts of 73mm SPG-9 rounds, 17 rounds of outgoing automatic-grenade-launcher fire (AGS-17) and 17 AGS-17 impacts, and intensive small-arms  and heavy machine gun-fire 3.5-4km south of its position.

On 3 August in the morning while positioned in Trokhizbenka, the SMM heard 81 undetermined explosions 5-6km south of its position. In Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) throughout the day, the SMM heard ten undetermined explosions within a  40 minute period in the morning, 5km south of its position.

The SMM conducted crater analysis and followed up on reports of civilian and military casualties. At the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, approximately four metres south of the Ukrainian Armed Forces position closest to the bridge, the SMM observed a crater containing pieces of shrapnel which it assessed as caused by 82mm mortar rounds fired from an undetermined direction. Near the same location the SMM observed three fresh craters assessed as caused by grenade launcher (AGS-17) rounds fired from an undetermined direction. The SMM observed 25m south of the “LPR” forward position at the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, grenade launcher shrapnel lying on the ground. At the “LPR” checkpoint south of the bridge the SMM saw grenade launcher shrapnel lying on the ground approximately 15-20 metres north of the checkpoint. No craters were observed in either location.

The SMM observed four fresh craters at a farm in government-controlled Pobeda (27km west of Donetsk). Due to security concerns the SMM could not conduct crater analysis. The SMM saw from a distance that the craters were in soft ground and contained fragments of 125mm shells. The SMM saw that one shell had hit a concrete fence facing a southerly direction, while another shell had hit a pigsty. The director of the farm told the SMM that shelling had occurred on 2 August.

In government-controlled Hnutove (20km north-east of Mariupol) the SMM observed damage to a fence surrounding a house and damage to the roof of the house. The SMM saw shattered windows and shrapnel damage on the house’s wall facing a southerly direction. The SMM did not observe any crater.

In Stanytsia Luhanska medical personnel of the emergency department at the hospital confirmed to the SMM that two wounded Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers had been hospitalized on 2 August. Both soldiers had surgery at the hospital and one of them had been transferred on 3 August to a military hospital.  

At the hospital in “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk), the SMM followed up on the condition of the two civilians (a woman and a man) injured during the shelling in the night of 1-2 August (see SMM Daily Report, 3 August 2016). The medical personnel told the SMM that both patients were in critical condition. According to medical personnel, the female patient was still in the recovery unit, while the other had been transferred to Luhansk hospital for further treatment.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Minsk Memorandum.

An SMM unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted three self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and one tank (T-72) in government-controlled Kirove (44km north-east of Donetsk), in violation of the respective withdrawal lines.

Beyond the respective withdrawal lines, but outside assigned areas, the SMM observed: 15 towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) in government-controlled Khlibodarivka (65km south-west of Donetsk); and ten stationary tanks (T-64) at the training area near “LPR”-controlled Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk). Aerial surveillance imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence on 31 July of the 26 towed artillery pieces and 35 tanks together with other hardware including 96 armoured vehicles, 80 military-style trucks and 14 trailers near “LPR”-controlled Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification. In a “DPR”-controlled area beyond the respective withdrawal lines the SMM saw 16 mortars (PM-38, 120mm), 15 towed howitzers (D30, 122mm), could not account for two towed howitzers (D30, 120mm) and noted five additional such heavy weapons .

The SMM revisited permanent storage sites, whose locations corresponded with the withdrawal lines. At a Ukrainian Armed Forces site, the SMM noted that 40 tanks (T-64), seven anti-tank guns (five D-44, 85mm and two D-48, 85mm) and nine mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) remained missing  (first eight observed missing on 19 April, the last on 29 June 2016).

At a “DPR”-controlled site whose location corresponded with the withdrawal lines, the SMM observed that all weapons previously verified as withdrawn to the site were present.

The SMM observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles (ACV) and anti-tank missiles in the security zone. In government-controlled areas the SMM saw: two infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs, BMP-1) and two armoured personnel carriers, one of which had six anti-tank missiles mounted on its roof near Avdiivka (17km north-west of Donetsk); and at the northern outskirts of Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) the SMM saw an IFV (BMP-2), travelling north and one IFV (BMP-2) travelling towards the bridge.

In addition, an SMM UAV spotted one IFV (BMP) in government-controlled Kirove (44km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM followed up on the incident on 2 August when SMM monitors were stopped at a known Ukrainian Armed Forces position on the road from Lopaskyne (government-controlled, 24km north-west of Luhansk) to Lobacheve (government-controlled, 17km north-west of Luhansk (see SMM Spot Report, 3 August 2016). At the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) in government-controlled Soledar (79km north of Donetsk), the Ukrainian Armed Forces chief-of-staff told the SMM that an investigation was currently on-going and that findings should be soon presented.

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential infrastructure. Positioned on both sides of the contact line, the SMM monitored the cleaning of canals that provide water to the Shchastia power plant and repair works to the Mykhailivka-Lysychansk high power line near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to observe queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. At the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint at the H15 highway near Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM observed in the morning about 500 pedestrians and 145 civilian vehicles waiting to exit government-controlled areas. The SMM observed that the queue moved approximately 30 meters every 10-20 minutes. The SMM saw that three drivers alighted from their cars and walked towards the checkpoint. At this stage there were about 10—15 vehicles in front of them. They returned after 15 minutes and then drove their cars directly to the checkpoint surpassing the cars in front of them. The SMM spoke separately to several passengers and bus drivers who said that they have heard about bribery taking place at the checkpoints, but could not give concrete examples. At the first Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint north of the bridge at Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed in the morning approximately 200 pedestrians (mostly elderly people) waiting to proceed towards areas not controlled by the Government. The SMM observed that the elderly people in the queue were suffering from the heat. In the afternoon within 40 minute period the SMM saw 104 pedestrians leaving government-controlled areas and 84 pedestrians entering government-controlled areas.

The SMM monitored two border areas not controlled by the Government and was prevented from doing so by armed “LPR” members in Makariv Yar (formerly Parkhomenko, 28km east of Luhansk).* At the Marynivka border crossing point (78km east of Donetsk), the SMM observed 45 civilian cars (the majority with Ukrainian license plates and one with a “Novorossiya” sticker partially covering the plate) and two covered commercial trucks (also Ukrainian license plates) lined-up in a queue waiting to exit Ukraine.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

•  At the border crossing point near “LPR”-controlled Makariv Yar an armed “LPR” member told the SMM to leave the area and checked ID cards of the SMM monitors. The JCCC was informed.

Conditional access:

• Armed “LPR” members at a checkpoint immediately south of the bridge at Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north of Luhansk) allowed the SMM to proceed only after taking the names and ID card numbers of SMM monitors. 

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM noted a decrease in the number of ceasefire violations recorded in Donetsk region compared to the day before. In Luhansk the SMM noted an increase in recorded ceasefire violations on the day before, with many concentrated around “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov). A peaceful protest was held outside the SMM’s base in Kadiivka. Later, at the same location, the SMM heard bursts of small-arms fire in the vicinity of their base and saw an individual running from the area. An armed man at a known Ukrainian Armed Forces position threatened the SMM at gunpoint in Lobacheve. The SMM analysed craters on both sides of the contact line. It observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines. “LPR” members prevented the SMM from monitoring in border areas.

The SMM noted a decrease in the number of ceasefire violations recorded in Donetsk region compared to the day before[1].

On the evening of 1 August, while in government-controlled Mariupol, the SMM heard eight undetermined explosions at an unknown distance east and east-north-east of its position. On the same evening, the SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded fighting in the following sequence: five explosions (impacts) north-east, and fifty bursts of tracer fire from east in an unknown direction; four bursts of tracer fire from south-east to north-west; four undetermined explosions; 12 bursts of tracer fire from east to north and 34 air bursts from south-east to north-west.

While in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city centre in the early morning hours of 2 August, the SMM heard 67 undetermined explosions 5-15km north and north-west of its position.

Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk city) the SMM heard 21 undetermined explosions 2-5km west and north-west of its position. Later, positioned at the Yasynuvata railway station the SMM heard six undetermined explosions 4-6km north-west.

Positioned in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk city) the SMM heard

16 undetermined explosions and two explosions of automatic grenade launcher fire 3-4km ranging from south-east to south-west.

Positioned in government-controlled Mykolaivka (57km north of Donetsk) the SMM heard 22 mortar impacts (120mm), 30 mortar impacts (82mm) and 50 automatic grenade launcher impacts 5km south-east.

Positioned in government-controlled Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk) on the evening of 2 August, the SMM heard 23 undetermined explosions, 14 airbursts from an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) and multiple bursts of small-arms and heavy machine gun-fire 1-2km north.

The SMM noted an increase in the number of ceasefire violations recorded in Luhansk region compared to the day before, with the majority taking place in “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk). While in Kadiivka in the early morning of 2 August, the SMM heard 91 explosions, some of them assessed as impacts and some as outgoing rounds, 32 of which were in areas 5-10km north-north-west and 59 in areas 5-10km west and south-west. For an hour during this period of shelling, the electricity supply to the city was cut.

At 20:34 on 2 August, the SMM, positioned in one forward patrol base in Kadiivka, heard three bursts of small-arms fire 50-100m north of its location. At 20:45, while positioned at another patrol base, the SMM heard 4-5 bursts from an automatic rifle fired in the air 10-15m away, just beyond the perimeter fence. In the darkness the SMM observed a person running from the area. The SMM informed the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) and armed “LPR” members controlling the area.

In government-controlled parts of Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) while monitoring adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works, the SMM heard a mortar impact (possibly 82mm) and saw smoke rising approximately 1.5km east of its position. A short time later the SMM heard a further two mortar impacts approximately 1km east. Approximately an hour later the SMM heard six undetermined explosions 3-4km north and north-east of its position.

The SMM followed up on recorded ceasefire violations and conducted crater analysis. In “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka, the SMM observed craters at two locations. In Oleha Koshevoho  Street in a residential area in the south of the town the SMM analysed a fresh crater and assessed that it was caused by artillery (calibre unknown) fired from a westerly direction. A woman told the SMM that children had taken remnants of a shell from the crater. The SMM observed damage to adjacent houses, including shattered windows and shrapnel-damaged walls. Two residents (a 60 year-old man and a 70 year-old woman) said that the shelling, which had begun at about 01:30, had critically wounded a 50 year-old man who was taken to hospital.

At a second impact area in a residential area in the north of Kadiivka the SMM observed shell damage and analysed craters. The SMM observed a crater in the yard of a house, which it assessed to have been caused by artillery or rocket fired from a north-westerly direction. The SMM observed damage to the exterior walls of the house, broken windows and saw that the interior ceiling was damaged by shelling. A second crater was analysed in this area, and was assessed to have been caused by artillery or rocket fired from a westerly direction. A tree had sustained a direct hit from a shell. According to Russian Federation officers at the JCCC who were present, armed men had visited these impact sites and removed pieces of shrapnel. Nevertheless, the SMM observed pieces of shrapnel at these sites that indicated the use of artillery or rockets. Residents told the SMM that two women (70 and 79 years-old) were injured in the shelling and that both were hospitalized in Kadiivka, with one of them subsequently moved to Luhansk for further treatment.

On 1 August, near the government-controlled Maiorsk checkpoint (45km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw damage to checkpoint barriers and nearby trees. The SMM analysed a fresh crater and assessed it to have been caused by multiple-launch rocket systems (122mm, Grad) fired from a south-south-westerly direction. A Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier at the checkpoint nearby told the SMM that heavy shelling had taken place on the night of 31 July.

An armed man at a known Ukrainian Armed Forces position stopped two SMM vehicles in government-controlled areas travelling east on the road from Lopaskyne (government-controlled, 24km north-west of Luhansk) to Lobacheve (government-controlled, 17km north-west of Luhansk). The armed man, wearing military-style clothing with no marking, threatened at gunpoint one of the SMM monitors and said in Russian, “Stop. You are not going anywhere”. Later, four armed men arrived, some in military-style clothing and appearing to be intoxicated, carrying assault rifles (AK-74).  After 15 minutes the SMM was allowed to leave the area and proceed to Lobacheve (See SMM Spot Report, 3 August 2016).

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Minsk Memorandum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines the SMM observed 15 anti-tank guns (MT-12, Rapira 100mm) in “DPR”-controlled Zelene (28km east of Donetsk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification. In a government-controlled area beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM saw 18 towed howitzers (D-20, 152mm). In another government-controlled area the SMM saw 17 anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) but could not account for one. When the SMM asked a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier why one anti-tank gun had black soot on its muzzle break he said it was because it had recently been used in training exercises. One government-controlled area continued to be abandoned, as it has been since 19 December 2015, with all 12 mortars (2S12 Sani, 120mm) missing. The SMM observed that one area continued to be abandoned, as it has been for since 12 July 2015, with all six self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) missing.

The SMM revisited permanent storage sites, whose locations corresponded with the withdrawal lines. At one site in “DPR”-controlled areas the SMM observed that two tanks (T-64) were missing for the first time and other weapons had been added. Tank ammunition was seen stored next to tanks.

The SMM observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles (ACV) and anti-aircraft weapons in the security zone: two armoured personnel carriers (BTR-60) and two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM) near government-controlled Popasna (69km west of Luhansk). In “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka, the SMM observed an armoured tracked vehicle (MT-LB) travelling west in the direction of the contact line in a convoy of 20 military-type vehicles, one of which the SMM observed to be carrying approximately 125 anti-tank mines.

The SMM observed new mine hazard signs. Between Zolote (60km north-west of Luhansk) and “LPR”-controlled Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk) the SMM observed two new mine hazard signs on the sides of the road in the area of the proposed disengagement area.

The SMM requested that “DPR” members and officers at the JCCC follow-up the incident on 29 July when SMM monitors were threatened at gunpoint by aggressive armed “DPR” members near Lukove (72km south of Donetsk) (See SMM Spot Report, 30 July). In Lukove, the SMM met with “DPR” members, including from the “ministry of defence”. A “DPR” member who had threatened the SMM, apologised. “DPR” members told the SMM that an investigation is planned. The SMM await the response of “DPR” members to the violation.

During the afternoon of 2 August a group approximately 30 protestors (mainly young people) gathered in front of the SMM base in Kadiivka, some carrying signs with slogans such as, “OSCE is blind”. Local “police” was present. The protestors dispersed peacefully after an hour. At the same time in another part of Kadiivka, a stone was thrown at an SMM vehicle, causing no damage.

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential infrastructure. Positioned on both sides of the contact line, the SMM monitored the cleaning of canals that provide water to the Shchastia power plant and repair works to the Mykhailivka-Lysychansk high power line near Zolote. Following explosions in the area of Zolote the SMM left the area due to security concerns.

The SMM attempted to monitor border areas not controlled by the Government but was prevented from doing so by armed “LPR” members who stopped the SMM near Diakove (70km south-west of Luhansk).*

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• Armed “DPR” members prevented the SMM from travelling through a checkpoint towards the west of Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk). The JCCC was informed.
• A Russian Federation Armed Forces officer at the JCCC office in Yasynuvata denied the SMM access to the roof of the building to conduct ceasefire monitoring, citing security concerns. He refused to share his ceasefire violation log with the SMM.
• On 1 August, water company officials refused to meet the SMM in “LPR”-controlled Sorokyne (formerly Krasnodon, 43km south-east of Luhansk), claiming that the SMM needed permission from the “municipality” to hold such a meeting.
• On 1 August, in Sorokyne, the “director” of the cultural centre and the “deputy head” of the “culture department” in the town asked for the SMM’s patrol plan and to produce some sort of “registration” from “LPR” members in order to have a meeting. The SMM refused and left.
• Two armed “LPR” members stopped the SMM near Diakove and asked for a signed and stamped patrol plan in the Russian language. The SMM informed the JCCC. After 40 minutes of waiting the SMM left, and were unable to travel to their planned destination, “LPR”-controlled Leonove (formerly Chervonyi Zhovten, 82km south of Luhansk). The JCCC was informed.

Conditional access:

• Armed “DPR” members allowed the SMM to proceed through a checkpoint near “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve after checking the trunk of SMM vehicles.
• An armed “LPR” member at a checkpoint immediately south of the bridge at Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north of Luhansk) allowed the SMM to proceed only after taking the names of SMM monitors.

[1]Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

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