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• Turkey Has Established a Credible Presence in LAC:
  Since 2000, Turkey has expanded trade with Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) by over 450%, multiplied its diplomatic missions, and secured targeted investments in ports, energy, tourism, and infrastructure.
• Challenges and Competition: Turkey faces competition from China, the EU, and the US in LAC; third-party countries can learn from Turkey’s challenging experience.
• A Selective Middle-Power Strategy Is Driving Results:
  Rather than competing on scale with China, the US, or the EU, Turkey has relied on focused FTAs, business councils, logistics hubs, and niche economic diplomacy to “punch above its weight.”
• Diplomatic Visibility Generates Political Returns:
  Embassy expansion, high-level visits, and engagement with CELAC, MERCOSUR, and CARICOM have translated into multilateral support and increased political recognition across the region.
• Soft Power Compensates for Structural Weaknesses:
  Cultural exports, humanitarian aid via TİKA, scholarships, and media outreach have produced high-impact visibility and goodwill at relatively low cost, despite limited historical or cultural ties.
• Lessons for Third-Party Countries:
  Turkey’s experience shows that sustained engagement, institutional presence, and sectoral specialization can deliver influence in LAC without superpower resources.

Read here in pdf the Policy paper by Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, Senior Research Fellow, Head, ELIAMEP Turkey Programme and Grigoris Patsakis, Project Manager at the ELIAMEP Turkey Programme.

Introduction

Turkey has significantly expanded its economic, political, and cultural engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean.

Turkey has significantly expanded its economic, political, and cultural engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), transforming virtually non-existent ties into a dynamic partnership. Since 2000, trade between Turkey and LAC has increased by approximately 450 percent, reaching USD 17.4 billion in 2022. At the same time, Turkish investments in strategic sectors such as energy, tourism, and infrastructure highlight Ankara’s long-term and calculated approach to the region. This expansion is driven by Turkey’s “multi-dimensional” foreign policy, which combines trade agreements, diplomatic outreach, and cultural diplomacy to deepen its presence in LAC.

This policy paper addresses three central research questions: how Turkey’s engagement with LAC has evolved over time; what strategies, challenges, and limitations it faces in the region; and what lessons Turkey’s experience offers to third-party countries seeking to expand their own engagement with LAC. By examining Turkey’s implementation strategies, including free trade agreements (FTAs), infrastructure investments, and cultural diplomacy, the paper assesses both the effectiveness of Ankara’s approach and its broader applicability for other actors pursuing regional expansion.

The paper is structured as follows. First, it provides a historical overview of Turkey–LAC relations. Second, it examines Turkey’s economic, political, and cultural engagement strategies in the region. Third, it highlights key successes as well as persisting challenges. Fourth, it evaluates the overall effectiveness of Turkey’s policies. Finally, the paper offers policy recommendations and identifies transferable lessons for third-party countries seeking to overcome similar challenges in their engagement with LAC. The analysis draws on primary sources, including trade and investment data, as well as secondary sources such as peer-reviewed academic studies, think tank reports, and reputable news articles.

Overall, the paper concludes that Turkey has substantially expanded its diplomatic, economic, and cultural footprint in LAC, carving out niche areas of influence and fostering pragmatic partnerships across the region. Despite constraints related to geographic distance, competition, and the dominance of major global powers, Turkey’s experience demonstrates how a middle-size power can generate tangible economic outcomes and cultivate meaningful relationships, offering valuable lessons and inspiration for other countries seeking to engage with LAC.

A Historical Overview of Turkey–Latin America Relations

Its engagement was renewed in the 1990s, with the 1998 Action Plan and 2006’s “Year of Latin America and the Caribbean”.

Turkey’s first bonds with LAC date back to the early republican years. The League of Nations’ invitation to Turkey to join in 1932 was supported by several LAC states, and Turkey established its first Latin American embassy in Santiago in 1930. During the Cold War, relations stagnated due to Turkey’s NATO alignment. Its engagement was renewed in the 1990s, with the 1998 Action Plan and 2006’s “Year of Latin America and the Caribbean” in particular marking a more structured approach to LAC.

Turkey–Latin America Relations: The Economic, Political and Cultural Landscape

The $14 Billion Question: Turkey’s Economic Diplomacy in Latin America

Since 2000, trade between Turkey and Latin America has grown by 450 percent, surging from $1 billion in 2002 to $14 billion by 2024.

Over the past two decades, Turkey has significantly deepened its economic engagement with LAC, a market of 650 million people, driven by a “multi-dimensional foreign policy” approach. Through economic diplomacy, Turkey has effectively leveraged trade expansion strategies and agreements to strengthen its commercial ties. Since 2000, trade between Turkey and Latin America has grown by 450 percent, surging from $1 billion in 2002 to $14 billion by 2024, with Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia emerging as key partners.

Turkey has also pursued free trade agreements (FTAs) to reduce barriers and expand market access. It secured an FTA with Chile in 2011, while negotiations with Ecuador, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru remain ongoing. Additionally, Joint Economic Commissions and business councils, such as the Turkey-Brazil High-Level Cooperation Commission, facilitate sectoral collaborations in energy, mining, and infrastructure.

Beyond trade, Turkey’s economic engagement has also extended into the realm of investment, with its investments in LAC growing significantly. The 2014 Turkey-Colombia investment agreement, and projects like ANEX Tourism Group’s $1.8 billion hotel investment in Punta Cana, highlight this trend. Whereas, until the mid-2000s, KordSa (a subsidiary of Sabanci Holding) was the only Turkish company investing in the region, today over 20 Turkish companies are active, primarily in the automotive, mining, and transportation sectors. Notable projects include Yıldırım Holding’s $1.6 billion investment in port construction in El Salvador and Karpowership’s floating power plants in Cuba and Brazil.

Supporting this broader engagement, Turkish Airlines has significantly expanded its regional connectivity across LAC. The airline currently operates flights to São Paulo (GRU) and Rio de Janeiro (GIG) in Brazil; Buenos Aires (EZE) in Argentina; Mexico City (MEX) and Cancún (CUN) in Mexico; Bogotá (BOG) in Colombia; Panama City (PTY) in Panama; Caracas (CCS) in Venezuela; and Santiago (SCL) in Chile. The planned addition of Lima as its tenth destination in the region represents a further deepening of this network, strengthening connectivity with the Andean subregion and amplifying opportunities for trade, tourism, and business mobility, while reinforcing Turkey’s economic integration with LAC.

From Ankara to Latin America: Case Studies of Successful Economic Partnerships

Turkey has diversified its trade partnerships, engaging with countries of all sizes from Brazil to Suriname. 

It is also worth noting that Turkey has diversified its trade partnerships, engaging with countries of all sizes from Brazil to Suriname. This flexible approach demonstrates how third-party countries can expand their regional presence by tailoring strategies to different national profiles. To illustrate this, a selection of countries with varying population sizes has been made: Brazil, as a large country; Argentina, as a medium-sized state; Uruguay, as a smaller state; and Suriname, as a very small state.

• Brazil: In 2023, Turkey exported $992 million, including carbonates and motor vehicle parts, while Brazil exported $3.52 billion, led by soybeans and iron ore.
• Turkey’s exports to Brazil have increased at an annualized rate of 9.5%, from $629 million in 2018 to $992 million in 2023.

• Argentina: In 2023, Turkey exported $280 million to Argentina, including refined hydrocarbons and motor vehicles, while Argentina exported $585 million to Turkey, led by soybeans and dried legumes.
• Turkey’s exports to Argentina have increased at an annualized rate of 2.4%, from $249 million in 2018 to $280 million in 2023.
• Uruguay: In 2023, Turkey exported $181 million to Uruguay, with key exports being motor vehicles, parts and accessories, while Uruguay exported $354 million led by sulphate chemical woodpulp and bovine products.
• Turkey’s exports to Uruguay grew rapidly, increasing at an annualized rate of 23.6% from $62.8. million in 2018 to $181 million in 2023. Key Turkish exports included motor vehicle parts ($36.1 million), vehicle bodies ($17.8 million), and petroleum coke ($5.07 million).
• Suriname: Although a considerably smaller economy, trade reached $18.2 million in 2019, reflecting Turkey’s desire to engage with every economy in the region.

Atlantic Ambitions: Turkey’s Political Expansion in Latin America

Between 2015 and 2020, the Turkish President visited Latin America more frequently than all of his predecessors put together.

Meaningful political and economic cooperation has gained momentum during the AKP era. Particularly between 2002 and 2016, Turkey adopted a strategy of deeper regional integration characterized by:

• Trade agreements: Turkey has signed FTAs with inter alia Chile, and is actively working towards FTAs with Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, and Peru.

• Diplomatic expansion: In Latin America, Turkey initially maintained embassies only in Chile, Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Cuba, and Venezuela. Beginning in 2010, Ankara expanded its diplomatic presence with embassies in Colombia and Peru, followed by the opening of the Turkish Embassy in Ecuador in 2012. Between 2013 and 2014, new missions were established in the Dominican Republic, Panama, Costa Rica, and Guatemala. A further wave in 2018 included Trinidad and Tobago, Bolivia, Uruguay, and Paraguay, plus the opening of the embassy in El Salvador in 2022. Including the newly established (November 2025) embassy in Managua, Nicaragua, Turkey’s diplomatic footprint now extends to twenty missions. Overall, Turkey’s network of embassies in LAC grew from six in 2009 to twenty little more than a decade later, signalling a strong and sustained commitment to deepening political and diplomatic ties in the region.
• High-level visits: Turkey has also intensified its high-level diplomatic activity. Between 2015 and 2020, the Turkish President visited Latin America more frequently than all of his predecessors put together. This expansion of political dialogue was bolstered by reciprocal visits, beginning with Costa Rican President Óscar Arias’s 2009 trip to Turkey and followed by Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu’s 2014 visit to the Dominican Republic, where he signed cooperation agreements and described the country as a “star player” and “regional base” for Turkish businesses. Turkey also extended its diplomatic reach beyond major regional actors by cultivating ties with smaller states such as St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and made symbolic inroads with President Erdoğan’s 2015 visit to Cuba, which reflected its deliberately inclusive regional approach.

Importantly, this diplomatic engagement has often met with a positive response. In 2022, El Salvador’s President Nayib Bukele chose Turkey for his first official overseas visit, declaring that “El Salvador wants to be part of Türkiye’s growth”. This move highlighted the strategic importance he places on the two states’ collaboration. While Bukele’s Palestinian ancestry and his father’s conversion to Islam may be reasons for his sympathetic stance towards Turkey, there are more than personal links. Driven by shared priorities of development, autonomy, and diversified international alignments, the relationship reflects Turkey’s broader shift toward a multipolar diplomatic strategy.

Multilateral engagement: Turkey has expanded its presence in LAC by deepening its involvement in a broad range of regional and multilateral frameworks. This engagement includes obtaining observer status in key political and economic organizations such as the Organization of American States (OAS), the Association of Caribbean States (ACS), the Pacific Alliance, the Central American Integration System (SICA), and the Latin American Parliament (PARLATINO), as well as participating in the Ibero-American Summit. In addition, Turkey is a member of UN-affiliated regional bodies, notably the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), and has established institutional relations with the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS). Beyond these formal arrangements, Turkey actively engages with several parliamentary and consultative platforms, including the Central American Parliament (PARLACEN), the MERCOSUR Parliament (PARLASUR), the Parliamentary Confederation of the Americas (COPA), the Forum of Presidents of Legislative Bodies of Central America and the Caribbean (FOPREL), and Parliamentarians for the Americas (ParlAmericas), enhancing its diplomatic influence thereby and fostering political alliances across the region. Institutionally, too, Turkey has signalled its commitment by establishing a dedicated LAC Directorate within the Foreign Economic Relations Board (Dış Ekonomik İlişkiler Kurulu-DEİK), decoupling its operations from the North American division to create a standalone regional focus. This move acknowledged Turkey’s special cultural and strategic interest and promises more focused engagement with LAC. 

The Turkish Touch: Cultural and Humanitarian Diplomacy

…cultural impact is also evident in the popularity of “the Turkish name “Elif”, which became one of the most common names for newborns in Chile in 2016, surpassing traditional names such as Loreto and Veronica.

At the same time, Turkey’s engagement in LAC extends beyond trade and diplomacy into the realm of soft power, encompassing mass media, humanitarian aid, religion, and education.

Firstly, Turkish TV series have emerged as a key cultural diplomacy tool. For example, in Chile, “the Turkish series 1,001 Nights was the most-viewed program in 2014”, contributing to a 70% increase in tourists, particularly from Argentina and Brazil, with numbers reaching 165,000 by August 2018. The series’ cultural impact is also evident in the popularity of “the Turkish name “Elif”, which became one of the most common names for newborns in Chile in 2016, surpassing traditional names such as Loreto and Veronica”. Moreover, media expansion serves to reinforce this cultural influence. Notably, the TRT External Services Department launched TRT Español and TRT Português, while Anadolu Agency opened an office in Bogota.

Humanitarian diplomacy is another cornerstone of Turkey’s soft power. Through TİKA (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency), Turkey integrates long-term development into disaster relief, implementing over 400 projects across education, healthcare, agriculture, and infrastructure by 2022, with programme offices in Mexico and Colombia. 

Humanitarian diplomacy is another cornerstone of Turkey’s soft power. Through TİKA (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency), Turkey integrates long-term development into disaster relief, implementing over 400 projects across education, healthcare, agriculture, and infrastructure by 2022, with programme offices in Mexico and Colombia. Turkey’s development aid reached 0.95% of its Gross National Income (GNI) in 2021, surpassing the UN target of 0.7% and placing the nation second in the global rankings. This strategy underscores that humanitarian assistance cannot only coexist with diplomatic efforts; it can also strengthen them. Just as individuals appreciate support in times of crisis, so states respond positively to meaningful aid, which fosters both trust and deeper cooperation.

Third, Turkey leverages cultural and religious diplomacy. It has pursued a “build a mosque first” strategy with a view to fostering closer ties with Muslim communities in LAC and positioning itself as a protector of the Islamic world; for instance, it has proposed the construction of a mosque in Cuba. Fourthly, soft power initiatives have touched on the educational realm. Specifically, Turkey has promoted initiatives including scholarship programs and bilateral educational agreements, including those it has signed with Nicaragua. These initiatives have produced measurable outcomes, with 625 students from the region supported to date, including 294 who are currently studying in Turkey.

A Contested Space: Turkey’s Challenges and limits in Latin America

…competition from other powers aiming to strengthen their influence in the region, particularly China, the European Union, and the United States, which considers LAC part of its vital space. 

Alongside its growing engagement in LAC, Turkey has faced competition from other powers aiming to strengthen their influence in the region, particularly China, the European Union, and the United States, which considers LAC part of its vital space. Αs shown in Table 1, the steady influx of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into the region highlights China as a particularly strong competitor. Two-way trade between China and the CELAC bloc stood at $515 billion in 2024, according to Chinese customs data, up from $450 billion in 2023 and just $12 billion in 2000.

Second, the EU, after limited success with interregional agreements in the 1990s, has refocused through the Global Gateway initiative and pledged €45 billion in investments through 2027, with a focus on strategic sectors—such as digitalization, climate and energy, transport, health, education, and research (Table 4)—that match the key concerns of LAC citizens (Table 2). Furthermore, it is leveraging its reputation as a “best partner”, particularly in environmental policies and the reduction of social inequality (Table 3). Last but not least, the United States remains a dominant player, with $567 billion in goods traded in the first half of 2023 coupled with a 38% of regional FDI, largely concentrated in Brazil and Mexico.

Furthermore, the EU-MERCOSUR trade agreement, which was finally signed in January 2026 after more than 25 years of negotiations, represents a recent milestone in the EU’s growing influence. This comprehensive agreement creates one of the world’s largest free trade areas, covering industrial goods, agriculture, and services. While Turkey is not party to the EU-MERCOSUR agreement, it is affected indirectly through its customs union with the EU, which requires the alignment of external tariffs for industrial products. Hence, the tariff reductions on industrial goods traded between the EU and MERCOSUR countries also apply to Turkey, providing indirect benefits for Turkish exports of machinery, chemicals, and transport equipment. However, agricultural products and services remain outside the customs union, limiting Turkey’s ability to capture benefits in these sectors without separate bilateral negotiations. The agreement also strengthens EU agricultural exports through tariff-rate quotas for sensitive products such as beef, poultry, and sugar, while safeguarding domestic European markets from sudden import surges. 

Ambition Meets Reality: The Limits of Turkey’s Reach in Latin America and the Caribbean

Turkey’s interactions with LAC can be viewed in the context of an increasingly multipolar world, in which emerging powers compete for influence and diversify their alliances. Despite Ankara’s wild ambitions, its capacity in the region faces structural constraints. Turkey’s economy is facing several serious problems which limit its ability to sustain large and ambitious diplomatic and military projects. Geographically, the distance to LAC creates logistical challenges: trade requires long shipping routes, military cooperation is costly, and consistent diplomatic follow-up hard.

Turkey frequently resembles Tolkien’s Barad-dûr, the Black Tower of Sauron, which has a powerful but single and overextended eye that can project an intense focus, but only on one major theatre at a time.

Politically, Turkey faces a heavy agenda, which includes having to manage complex issues in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, and the Caucasus, while simultaneously navigating its relations with the EU and Russia—all of which demand constant attention and resources. In this regard, Turkey frequently resembles Tolkien’s Barad-dûr, the Black Tower of Sauron, which has a powerful but single and overextended eye that can project an intense focus, but only on one major theatre at a time. However, LAC demands consistent focus, not sporadic visibility.

Turkey’s governance model is another challenge It is assertive, personalized, and at times confrontational. As a result, it may work well with political figures like Bukele and Maduro. but appeal less to governments that value autonomy and democratic norms. Regardless of its two decades of political engagement, Turkey lacks deep historical, linguistic, or religious ties with LAC, and long-term investment is going to be required if Ankara is to continue growing its influence.

Soft power, a key tool for Turkey globally, faces limitations in LAC. Unlike in sub-Saharan Africa (South Africa, Uganda, Ethiopia etc) or the Middle East, where mosque-building and its role as “protector of Islam” enhance influence, Muslims in LAC constitute only 0.1% of the population. The effect of TV series is significant, but cannot be lasting unless more work is done. Lasting impact depends on meaningful engagement, such as humanitarian projects, development, education, and capacity-building projects,—e.g. the project in Suriname building irrigation system capacity.

To remain influential and surpass these limitations, Ankara must act steadily, track public perceptions on global issues in LAC.

To remain influential and surpass these limitations, Ankara must act steadily, track public perceptions on global issues in LAC (Table 2), and engage both major (Brazil, Argentina etc.) and smaller powers in order to secure a place for Turkey among the Perceived Best International Partners for Cooperation in Key Policy Areas (Table 3).

Taken together, these constraints show that Turkey’s ambitions in LAC face clear limitations, stemming from economic volatility, geographic distance, diplomatic overstretch, and weak cultural roots. But is it all doom and gloom? 

Table 1: Distribution of Foreign Direct Investment Inflows into Latin America and the Caribbean (11 Countries), by Origin, 2015–2023

 

Table 2: Public Perceptions of Global Problems in Latin America, by Priority (%)

Source: Latinobarómetro and Friedrich Ebert Foundation, “What Are Latin America’s Perceptions on the European Union?” (Survey, 2021), 7, data.nuso.org.

Table 3: Perceived Best International Partners for Cooperation in Key Policy Areas, by Public Opinion (%)

Source: Latinobarómetro and Friedrich Ebert Foundation, “What Are Latin America’s Perceptions on the European Union?” (Survey, 2021), 34, data.nuso.org.

Table 4: EU-Latin America and Caribbean Investment Agenda under Global Gateway

Source: “Source: European Commission, “EU-Latin America – Global Gateway projects examples”, Infographics, July 2023, Eurostat/GISCO, accessed February 23, 2025.”

 

Turkey’s Playbook: Is it Working?

What is Turkey seeking to achieve in LAC, and to what extent is it succeeding? More importantly, can Turkey’s initiatives enable it to assert influence and punch above its weight in a region increasingly dominated by larger geopolitical actors?

If Turkey is measured against its own past engagement, then the answer is positive. The numbers state this loud and clear.

The answer depends on the benchmark. If Turkey is measured against its own past engagement, then the answer is positive. The numbers state this loud and clear: under its Latin America and Caribbean Action Plan, Türkiye has tripled its diplomatic presence, while bilateral trade has surged fifteenfold. By these metrics, the playbook is working. However, when Turkey is compared to major competitors such as China, the United States, and the European Union, the picture is somewhat different. To assess whether Turkey’s playbook is working in these terms, it is first necessary to examine the concrete gains it has achieved in the region. These gains can be broadly grouped into three interrelated dimensions: the economic, the political, and the cultural.

Turkey’s diplomatic missions in LAC function as symbols of presence, but also as active hubs of economic diplomacy which facilitate high-level meetings, business delegations, and investment coordination.

Embassies are both politically and economically beneficial. Turkey’s diplomatic missions in LAC function as symbols of presence, but also as active hubs of economic diplomacy which facilitate high-level meetings, business delegations, and investment coordination. For instance, in El Salvador, embassy-supported engagements between Turkish firms, DEİK, and local authorities have helped generate memoranda of understanding that have advanced major projects, including the $1.6 billion port expansion by Yilport Holding, as well as facilitating the exploration of trade and investment prospects across multiple sectors. Similar embassy-backed business dialogues in Cuba have strengthened private trade contacts.

Politically, Turkey’s engagement in regional institutions such as CARICOM, MERCOSUR, the OAS, and CELAC has elevated its international profile and generated tangible gains, including robust LAC support for Turkey’s non-permanent seats on the UN Security Council in 2009–2010 and 2015–2016. This institutional visibility has also helped Ankara build regional backing for key foreign policy priorities, particularly the Palestinian cause. In 2019, President Erdoğan publicly thanked Bolivian President Evo Morales, stating “I thank Bolivia for its support of the Palestinian cause, particularly with regard to the status of Jerusalem and the protection of Palestinian civilians.” This alignment intensified after the 7 October 2023 Hamas attacks and subsequent Israeli reprisals, when countries such as Belize, Chile, Colombia, Honduras and Bolivia opted to adopt positions sharply critical of Israel, with Colombian President Gustavo Petro explicitly describing the situation as a “genocide”.

Turkey’s rhetoric and its foreign policy choices have positioned it as an alternative pole vis-à-vis the West, and especially the United States.

A further gain stemming from Turkey’s regional playbook lies in political recognition. By treating smaller and medium-sized Latin American states as meaningful partners, Ankara, a G20 country, enhances these states’ visibility; this reinforces their notion of being heard, while forging positive perceptions of Turkey as a respectful and accessible partner. At the same time, both Turkey’s rhetoric and its foreign policy choices have positioned it as an alternative pole vis-à-vis the West, and especially the United States. Several LAC governments view Ankara as a sympathetic actor in multilateral forums, especially vis-à-vis sanctions and external pressure. Turkey has consistently opposed such measures, rejecting sanctions against Nicaragua in 2021 and criticizing the U.S. embargo on Cuba. This stance reinforces perceptions of Turkey as a more understanding and solidaristic partner than larger powers, providing Turkey with domestic gains as it is perceived as the protector of the “weak”.

Socially, Turkey has built a favourable image in LAC through the popularity of its television series, which offer narratives and values distinct from Western models and have indirectly boosted tourism. Furthermore, by providing aid and development assistance, it not only improves local living conditions but also generates diplomatic and reputational capital at relatively low cost. Furthermore, by promoting the idea of Turkey as the global protector of Islam and attempting to bring Muslim communities in the region within its sphere of influence, Turkey gains additional domestic legitimacy while countering competition from other Muslim-majority countries pursuing similar agendas.

But can Turkey truly punch above its weight? The short answer is: not yet. It can rival neither China’s massive economic investment in the region, nor the United States entrenched political and economic influence, nor the European Union’s combination of financial resources and normative power. So, the key question is not simply what Ankara has achieved but how a middle power like Turkey is to stand out in LAC amidst giants like China, the US, and the EU. Turkey’s playbook, smart diplomacy, targeted economic initiatives and niche soft power provides some answers, but there are limits on what they can achieve. By studying these successes and constraints, other states can also craft tailored strategies to engage the region more effectively.

Conclusion 

Turkey’s engagement with LAC exemplifies how a middle power can expand its influence in a distant, multipolar region through a combination of economic diplomacy, political outreach, and cultural soft power. Over the past two decades, Ankara has achieved impressive results: trade has grown exponentially, diplomatic representation has multiplied, and cultural initiatives, from television series to humanitarian programmes, have cultivated visibility and goodwill. Turkey has effectively demonstrated that strategic, tailored engagement can yield tangible benefits even from afar. Its successes often rely on niche strategies, such as prioritizing smaller states, leveraging humanitarian aid, or promoting an “anti-imperialist” discourse as a protector of the weak.

Yet Turkey also illustrates the limits of ambition: geographic distance, economic volatility, and competition from global giants constrain its capacity to dominate. For third-party countries, Turkey’s playbook offers dual insights: first, it illustrates the importance of tailored strategies; and second, it demonstrates that influence is built over time through consistent engagement, an institutional presence, and the cultivation of trust-based relationships, rather than through short-term projects or opportunistic diplomacy.

Ultimately, Turkey’s experience reveals deeper lessons about contemporary global engagement based on state capacity. While it is difficult to compete with the superpowers in the arena, middle and smaller powers can still carve out meaningful influence for themselves through a combination of economic pragmatism, cultural resonance, and diplomatic creativity. With its diverse states, developmental needs, and desire for balanced partnerships, Latin America presents fertile ground for such strategies. But success demands patience, sustained investment, and the humility to recognize limits while leveraging unique advantages. In the 21st-century multipolar arena, Turkey’s journey offers a blueprint not just for expanding influence, but for doing so in a way that is adaptable, resilient, and strategically coherent. As the father of soft power Joseph Nye once said: “Power does not lie in brute strength, but in the ability to shape the preferences of others.”

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Ausschuss für auswärtige Angelegenheiten
Haushaltsausschuss
Ausschuss für internationalen Handel
Ausschuss für Sicherheit und Verteidigung

Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2026 - EP

Die Abgeordneten haben drei Gesetzgebungsakte angenommen, um der Ukraine angesichts des anhaltenden russischen Angriffskriegs ein EU-Darlehen in Höhe von 90 Mrd. € bereitzustellen.
Ausschuss für auswärtige Angelegenheiten
Haushaltsausschuss
Ausschuss für internationalen Handel
Ausschuss für Sicherheit und Verteidigung

Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2026 - EP

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Ausschuss für Sicherheit und Verteidigung

Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2026 - EP

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