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Publication d'un nouveau texte de l'ami Jurek. Je souscris personnellement à la troisième thèse.
A propos du Boeing abattu par un Bouk


Les déclarations russes relatives au Boeing du vol MH17 abattu au-dessus du Donbass ont beaucoup varié. La dernière explication donnée par la télévision à la population russe est que « le boeing a été abattu par un chasseur ukrainien ». D. Pieskov, porte-parole du Kremlin se contente de déclarer que le rapport du groupe international d'enquête n'a pas donné la « vérité dernière ». Mark Solonine, ingénieur en aéronautique et historien militaire russe, a écrit un long article dans son blog sur la destruction du Boeing MH17.
Tout d'abord il s'étonne que le Bouk qui a été envoyé dans le Donbass soit un seul matériel, ce n'est pas dans les habitudes militaires d'envoyer une pièce isolée, d'habitude on procède par batterie, par division, par unité structurale de l'armée. Ensuite ce Bouk était équipé de ses seuls 4 missiles sans autre approvisionnement. Enfin Solonine estime que pour les besoins en défense anti-aérienne des séparatistes contre l'aviation ukrainienne il n'y avait pas besoin d'une pièce aussi performante que le Bouk dont les missiles (peuvent atteindre des avions a plus de 18000 mètres d'altitude et à plus de 35 km de distance). La défense anti-aérienne des séparatistes pouvait être satisfaite par d'autres matériels automoteurs nettement moins performants, mais dont l'approvisionnement ne serait pas si limité. Solonine en tire la conclusion que la mission du Bouk n'était pas une mission militaire mais une mission spéciale organisée par un service spécial.
Le Bouk qui a traversé la frontière russo-ukrainienne à Lougansk dans la nuit du 16 au 17 juillet s'est rendu à Donetsk puis, sur ses propres chenilles, sans sa plate-forme de transport, dans un champ près de la bourgade de Piervomaïsky à 16 km de la frontière russo-ukrainienne. Si le Bouk devait protéger les unités séparatistes voisines de Saour-Mogila, Marinovka et Dmitrovka il aurait pu le faire à partir du territoire russe de l'autre côté de la frontière. Ce Bouk est reparti vers le territoire russe le 17 au soir après avoir lancé un missile et abattu le Boeing du vol MH17 vers 16h20. Autre bizarrerie : l'itinéraire du vol AEROFLOT SU2074 Moscou-Larnaka a été modifié plusieurs fois. Ainsi le vol Nord Sud du 14 juillet, de Moscou à Larnaka a évité le territoire ukrainien en le contournant par l'Est, le 15 juillet le vol est passé au-dessus du territoire ukrainien mais en contournant le Donbass par l'Ouest mais les 16 et 17 juillet alors que le Bouk était au Donbass, le vol passait en ligne droite en coupant le ciel du Donbass au-dessus de Lozovaya, Krasnoarmeïsk et Marioupol.
L'hypothèse du Boeing abattu par un avion ukrainien étant absolument non tenable, il reste finalement trois thèses à l'explication de la catastrophe :


1/ La première est celle de la confusion entre un avion militaire ukrainien et le Boeing (les Russes auraient eu vent qu'un Antonov-26 ukrainien devait survoler la région mais cela ne s'est pas produit) Par ailleurs, les formes, altitudes de vol et vitesses de ces deux avions ne sont pas sujettes à confusion. Cette thèse est soutenue, entre autres, par des politiciens russes d'opposition, Yavlinsky, Navalny, une journaliste, Youlia Latynina, s'exprimant régulièrement sur ''Ekho Moskvy'', ainsi que Mikhail Malychevsky , constructeur principal d'''Almaz-Antey'', entreprise qui fabrique des armes dont le Bouk. Il s'agit donc de gens qui, pour la plupart espèrent garder la possibilité de s'exprimer, et qui, craignant une rupture irrémédiable avec le Kremlin, pratiquent l'autocensure.
2/ La seconde thèse est que la mission du Bouk était d'abattre le SU2074 du vol AEROFLOT Moscou-Larnaka qui survolait le Donbass presque simultanément au Boeing malaisien du vol MH17 mais il y a eu une erreur due probablement au fait que le Bouk s'était mis en position de tirprès du village de Piervomaïsky et non de Piervomaïskoïe (il y a encore un troisième endroit qui s'appelle Piervomaïsk (du premier mai) dans le Donbass). Cette thèse à d'abord été soutenue, peu après l'attentat, par V. Nalivaytchenko, alors chef du SBU, service de sécurité ukrainien. Cette même thèse est soutenue par les Russes : M. Solonine, A. Venediktov, directeur d'''Ekho Moskvy'', S. Rabinovitch ii , économiste, A. Piontkovsky, politologue, A. Kokh, ancien très haut fonctionnaire sous Yeltsine. Selon cette thèse, cet attentat aurait été planifié parce que Poutine avait besoin d'un prétexte pour envahir totalement l'Ukraine et chauffer à blanc la haine des Russes contre les Ukrainiens. C'est à la même époque que la télévision russe passait des images et des histoires comme par exemple celle d'un petit garçon qui aurait été crucifié par les ''nazis ukrainiens'' dans le Donbass.
3/ La troisième thèse est que c'est bien le Boeing du vol MH17 qui devait être abattu et qui l'a été. Le but aurait été de forcer les Ukrainiens, alors en train de reprendre le Donbass, à s'arrêter en les accusant de cet attentat et parallèlement en effectuant des actions diplomatiques auprès du président Porochenko qui venait d'être élu. C'est le Russe A. Illarionov, ancien conseiller économique de Poutine qui a rompu avec Poutine en janvier 2005 lorsqu'il s'est aperçu que Poutine n'avait pas l'intention de respecter la démocratie qui soutient cette thèse et repousse catégoriquement les deux autres thèses. Il est à remarquer que la première thèse n'implique pas une responsabilité criminelle de Poutine ni un crime de guerre mais qu'elle est peu vraisemblable. Selon les deux autres thèses il s'agit d'un crime de guerre dont le Kremlin est forcément responsable.
Le 05/10/2016

Jurek


http://www.solonin.org/article_buk-na-donbasse-zachemhttp://aillarionov.livejournal.com/http://militaryarms.ru/boepripasy/rakety/buk-m1/http://www.kasparov.ru/material.php?id=57EE8FF65B6A9http://www.twitlonger.com/show/n_1so07ua

i Solonine énumère les matériels automoteurs « Osa » , « Tor », « Toungouska » et « Pantsir » qui peuvent atteindre des cibles à 5000-6000 m d'altitude et 8-12 km de distance ce qui est largement suffisant pour atteindre les Su-25 et An-26 qui équipent l'aviation ukrainienne.
ii Slava Rabinovitch parle également de l'attentat contre l'avion de ligne russe A-321 qui, partant de Charm-el-Cheikh, le 31 octobre 2015 a sauté au-dessus du Sinaï à cause d'un bagage piégé à détonateur et dispositif à retardement chimiques. (bagage appartenant à un passager russe qui, au dernier moment, n'a pas pris l'avion). L'hypothèse de Rabinovitch est que cet avion a été piégé par les services russes mais que le dispositif chimique fragile et peu fiable a fonctionné prématurément. L'avion russe ayant dû sauter au-dessus du territoire ukrainien et non du Sinaï.

The new European Border and Coast Guard Agency (EBCG) is established today, October 6, 2016.

This successor of the former Frontex (from French: Frontières extérieures for "external borders") is an agency of the European Union headquartered in Warsaw, Poland, tasked with border control of the European Schengen Area, in coordination with the border and coast guards of Schengen Area member states. Frontex was established in 2004 as the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders, and primary responsible for coordinating border control efforts.

In response to the European migrant crisis of 2015-2016, the European Commission proposed on December 15, 2015, to extend Frontex's mandate and to transform it into a fully-fledged European Border and Coast Guard Agency. On 18 December 2015, the European Council roundly supported the proposal, and after a vote by the European Parliament, the Border and Coast Guard was officially launched on 6 October 2016 at the Bulgarian external border with Turkey.

To enable the Agency to carry out its tasks, its budget would be gradually increased from the €143 million originally planned for 2015 up to €238 million in 2016, €281 million in 2017, and will reach €322 million (about US$350 million) in 2020. The staff of the agency would gradually increase from 402 members in 2016 to 1,000 by 2020.

The European Border and Coast Guard Agency is not a new body. It does not replace Frontex and it retains the same legal personality. What the Commission draft Regulation aims to do is to strengthen the mandate of the EU border agency, to increase its competences and to better equip it to carry out its operational activities. The new tasks and responsibilities of the Agency need to be reflected by its new name. It coordinates its work alongside the European Fisheries Control Agency and European Maritime Safety Agency with regard to coastguard functions.
The permanent staff of the Agency will be more than doubled between 2015 and 2020. The new proposal provides for a reserve of European border guards and technical equipment. The Agency will be able to purchase its own equipment (this is not a novelty). However - and this is new - the Member States where this equipment is registered (this refers mainly to big equipment items such as patrol vessels, air crafts, etc. which need a flag of state) will be obliged to put it at the Agency's disposal whenever needed. this will make it possible for the Agency to rapidly deploy the necessary technical in border operations. A rapid reserve pool of border guards and a technical equipment pool will be put at the disposal of the agency, intending to remove the shortages of staff and equipment for the Agency's operations.

A monitoring and risk analysis centre will be established, with the authorisation to carry out risk analysis and to monitor the flows towards and within the EU. The risk analyses includes cross-border crime and terrorism, process personal data of persons suspected to be involved in acts of terrorism and cooperate with other Union agencies and international organisations on the prevention of terrorism. A mandatory vulnerability assessments of the capacities of the Member States to face current or upcoming challenges at their external borders will be established. The Agency is able to launch joint operations, including the use of drones when necessary. The European Space Agency's earth observation system Copernicus provides the new Agency with real time satellite surveillance capabilities alongside the current Eurosur border surveillance system.

ember States will be able to request joint operations, rapid border interventions, and deployment of the EBCG Teams to support national authorities when a Member State experiences an influx of migrants that endangers the Schengen area. In such a case, especially when a Member State’s action is not sufficient to handle the crisis, the Commission will have the authority to adopt an implementing decision that will determine whether a situation at a particular section of the external borders requires urgent action at the EU level. Based on this decision, the EBCGA will be able to intervene and deploy EBCG Teams to ensure that action is taken on the ground, even when a Member State is unable or unwilling to take the necessary measures.

The right to intervene is a point of contention between a number of EU Members and the Commission, especially those Members whose borders form the external borders of the EU, such as Greece, Hungary, Italy, and Poland. They want to ensure that intervention is possible only with the consent of the Member States, whose external borders necessitate the presence of the ECBGA. Greece’s Alternate Minister for European Affairs, Nikos Xydakis, stated in an interview that while Greece is supportive of a common European action and of changing Frontex’s mandate, it wants the ECBGA to take complete charge of migration and refugee flows.

Tag: FRONTEXEBCG

The European Defence Agency (EDA) currently has several job openings in the different directorates: 15 temporary agents, five seconded national experts and one contractual agent. The profiles we’re looking for include director, head of unit, project officer and assistant positions across all EDA directorates. Candidates must apply via the EDA website.

Among the vacancies, you will find the position of Director Capability, Armament and Technology, Head of Unit Human Resources, Head of Unit Industry Strategy and Wider EU Policies, Policy Officer Industry Relations and Support, Project Officer Rotary Wing, Project Officer Maritime Capabilities or Personal Assistant to the Chief Executive and many more. Do not miss this chance and consult the EDA job portal for an overview of all open posts. Starting dates vary between March and October 2017.

The Agency is an “outward-facing” organisation, constantly interacting with its shareholders, the participating Member States, as well as with a wide range of stakeholders. It works in an integrated way, with multi-disciplinary teams representing all the Agency’s functional areas, to realise its objectives including its annual Work Programme and its rolling three-year Work Plan. Its business processes are flexible and oriented towards achieving results. Staff at all levels need to demonstrate the corresponding qualities of flexibility, innovation, and team-working; to work effectively with shareholders and stakeholder groups, formal and informal; and to operate without the need for detailed direction.

 

More information:

• Access the vacancy notices through our job portal

Written by Suzana Elena Anghel,

koya979 / Shutterstock.com

At three recent European Councils (December 2012, December 2013 and June 2015), the Heads of State or government have called for a deepening of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) namely by strengthening its crisis management dimension and further developing civilian and military capabilities. The June 2016 European Council reverted to security and defence policy with particular attention to the strengthening of the relationship with NATO, including on the development of complementary and interoperable defence capabilities.

But what are the achievements? Is there a way of measuring progress made over the past years? Is there a gap between intentions/declarations and deeds? What are the challenges and how to address them?

The European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) will address these questions at a roundtable discussion on ‘The European Council and CSDP: success or failure?’ on 27 September 2016, 13h30-15h00, in the European Parliament’s Library main reading room in Brussels. Participants at this roundtable debate are: Elmar Brok MEP, Chair of the European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs, General Jean-Paul Perruche, Former Director-General of the European Union Military Staff, Professor Alexander Mattelaer, Institute for European Studies, Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB), and Elena Lazarou, Policy Analyst, EPRS.

Registration
If you do not have an access badge to the European Parliament and are interested in attending the event, it is essential to register by Friday 23 September, using this link.

At the event the EPRS study on ‘The European Council and CSDP: Orientation and Implementation in the field of Crisis Management’ will be presented and discussed. This study assesses the planning, command and control of civilian and military CSDP missions and operations, progress made in developing civilian and military capabilities, particularly rapid response capabilities in the form of the EU Battlegroups, as well as challenges encountered during the force generation process, areas in which the European Council repeatedly called for further progress to be made.

 

Vous avez dirigé des journalistes au Japon. Comment les avez-vous recruté ? Quels types de journalistes cherchiez-vous afin de mener des mesures actives ?
Tout d'abord, le recrutement est un processus très long et compliqué. Il faut de deux à quatre ans pour achever un recrutement et avoir un agent qui travaille pour vous. Pour réussir cela, il vous faut utiliser tous les outils dont dispose notre profession. Nous effectuons au préalable une vérification complète des antécédents de la cible afin de définir l'angle d'attaque pour le recrutement. Un officier du KGB se focalise généralement sur deux types de journalistes. Le premier type est le journaliste spécialisé dans un domaine et qui détient des informations sensibles et est en contact avec les individus occupant des postes clés.

Stanislav LevchenkoQuels types de spécialistes le KGB recherche-t-il ?

Ceux qui ont développé une expertise dans les divers aspects de la vie politique, économique ou dans les affaires militaires. Je me concentrais sur les spécialistes de la politique. Un tel agent peut être utile de différentes manières. Il peut écrire des articles bien-sûr, qui défendent le point de vue et les objectifs de l'URSS sur un sujet particulier. De plus il peut vous donner accès à des informations sensibles qu'il aura collectées pour vous. Enfin, parce qu'il est un spécialiste, il est susceptible de connaître et d'interagir avec d'autres membres de l'élite. Vous pouvez demander à votre agent d'influence de mener divers opérations d'influence contre ces individus. Quatre des agents dont je m'occupais au Japon étaient d'éminents journalistes. Ils avaient des contacts à haut niveau au sein du Parti Socialiste et du Parti Libéral Démocrate et parmi des officiels du gouvernement, y compris des membres du Cabinet du Japon. Le journaliste me fournissait des informations secrètes ainsi que des documents. Je leur ai aussi fait mener plusieurs opérations d'influence contre des membres du gouvernement.
Quelle était la seconde catégorie de journalistes que vous recrutiez ?

Le second type de journaliste était celui qui disposait d'un large auditoire, ou qui travaillait pour un journal à grand tirage. Un des agents que le KGB dirigeait au Japon était le proche confident du propriétaire d'un des plus gros journaux japonais qui tirait à 3 millions d'exemplaires par jour. Il a été utilisé pour mener diverses mesures actives contre ce journal.
Pourriez-vous être un peu plus précis au sujet des méthodes de recrutement utilisées, et des opinions politiques des agents d'influence que vous dirigiez ? Combien d'agents dirigiez-vous ?
Une fois que la décision d'approcher un journaliste ou un autre membre de l'élite, diverses méthodes sont utilisées.  Il n'y a pas de mode opératoire général, on procède au cas par cas. Laissez-moi vous donner un exemple. En général, l'idée de base est de trouver un terrain d'entente ou un centre d'intérêt commun, et ainsi d'établir une relation personnelle avec la cible. Cette approche peut être appliquée à des cibles de tous bords politiques. Pour ceux dont les opinions penchent à gauche, le centre d'intérêt commun pourra se trouver sur le terrain idéologique. Pour quelqu'un de l'autre bord politique, le centre d'intérêt pourra être un problème particulier. Par exemple la cible peut être très favorable à Taïwan et opposée à un rapprochement entre la Chine et le Japon. Le centre d'intérêt commun est ici évident, et un accord peut être passé sur ce point particulier. Si l'individu était un journaliste, je l'assistais en lui fournissant de l'argent, ainsi qu'un soutien moral et des encouragements, mais aussi des informations et des documents.

Quelles autres méthodes sont utilisées pour effectuer un recrutement ? Est-ce que le chantage est utilisé pour le recrutement ou pour garder un agent actif ?

Bien qu'il soit de la première importance d'établir une relation sur un centre d'intérêt commun, l'argent est aussi utile. Certains individus, même ceux qui sont anti-soviétique, ne travailleront pour vous que pour de l'argent. L'argent détient un fort pouvoir de persuasion. D'un autre côté, je ne trouve pas que le chantage soit une technique très efficace. Bien sûr, le KGB s'en est servi. Personnellement, je n'aimais pas le chantage parce que j'avais le sentiment qu'il pouvait pousser l'agent dans les bras des services de contre-espionnage de la nation cible [NdT : voir la tentative avortée de recrutement par le chantage du journaliste américain J Alsop par le KGB].

Quelles étaient les opinions politiques des agents qui étaient sous votre responsabilité au Japon ? Combien d'agents avez-vous dirigé ?

Environ un tiers des agents sous mon contrôle étaient de conviction socialiste et marxiste. Un autre tiers était neutre politiquement, ou au centre. Le dernier tiers était à droite. En 1979, je m'occupais de 10 individus : des agents et d'autres en cours de recrutement ; avec qui j'avais entre 20 et 25 réunions clandestines par mois. Dans la Résidence de Tokyo, il y avait 5 officiers traitants qui s'occupaient des mesures actives au travers de 25 agents d'influence. Le nombre total d'officiers du KGB dans la Résidence de Tokyo était de 50 à 60.

Est-ce que la plupart des agents comprenaient qui vous étiez réellement ? Réalisaient-ils que vous étiez un officier du KGB ?

Je dirais que la majorité ne le savait pas. Ils croyaient que j'étais un correspondant de New Times et pas un officier du KGB.

Fournissiez-vous aux journalistes des informations, des documents à publier ? En d'autres termes, leur donniez-vous des histoires ou des articles ?

En ce qui me concerne, je décrivais les grandes lignes, les thèmes à aborder et je fournissais des informations ; mais c'est l'agent qui se chargeait de rédiger l'article. Je ne pensais pas que c'était une bonne chose de lui fournir un article complet, prêt à être publier. La raison est que chaque journaliste a un style et une méthode d'écriture particulier, et un article écrit par mes soins ou par quelqu'un à Moscou, pourrait détonner et ainsi mettre la puce à l'oreille des services de contre-espionnage du pays cible. En général, on fournit les thèmes, les lignes directrices et les objectifs. On fait des suggestions, et on discute avec l'agent de la manière de mettre en œuvre et de réaliser ces objectifs.

Avez-vous réussi à faire recruter d'autres agents par vos agents, en plus de leurs opérations de mesures actives ?

Il est très rare qu'un agent puisse effectuer un recrutement. Cela arrive, mais c'est très rare. Il est beaucoup plus fréquent qu'un agent vous aide à identifier une recrue potentielle. Une fois que la cible est identifiée, on peut commencer le long processus qui consiste à évaluer s'il est opportun de la recruter, et, le cas échéant, à déterminer la bonne manière de l'approcher. C'est principalement à cela que m'aidaient les agents qui étaient sous mon contrôle.

Comment déterminiez-vous quel agent devait accomplir une tâche particulière, ainsi que la conduite à suivre pour la mise en œuvre de telle ou telle opération ?

Comme je l'ai déjà dit, les opérations de mesures actives au Japon se fondaient sur les directives que nous recevions de Moscou.  Nous les recevions souvent quotidiennement, à raison de trois à cinq directives à la fois. Habituellement, les officiers responsables des mesures actives avaient une réunion avec le chef de groupe afin de déterminer la meilleure manière de mettre en œuvre ces directives. Un fois que l'on avait décidé de la marche à suivre, on en référait à Moscou pour obtenir son aval. Cela n'était pas nécessaire pour chaque opération, mais pour la plupart d'entre-elles.

[...]

Etiez-vous autorisés à faire preuve d'initiative ? Pouviez-vous modifier les ordres, puis les exécuter ?

Lors de nos réunions nous pouvions proposer des modifications des ordres et des consignes, il y avait une grande liberté d'action. Toutefois, dans la plupart des cas, nos plans étaient envoyés à Moscou pour y être avalisés. Nous ne prenions généralement pas d'initiatives sans la permission du Centre.

Comment mesuriez-vous l'efficacité des opérations menées par les officiers traitants ? Est-elle étroitement surveillée ? Quelle est l'importance des résultats ?

Les activités des officiers traitants sont étroitement surveillées et évaluées. Le succès a une importance cruciale. Toutefois il est parfois difficile d'évaluer le succès d'une opération. Certaines choses sont faciles à mesurer et à évaluer ; par exemple, la production d'un journaliste  (le nombre d'articles publiés ou la quantité d'informations confidentielles collectées) ou d'un parlementaire que vous avez recruté (faire certaines déclarations, lancer certaines discussions, ou créer au sein du Parlement une atmosphère favorable aux objectifs de l'URSS). Ces éléments sont évalués conformément à certains critères par nos supérieurs.

L'impact d'autres types d'opérations est en revanche plus difficile à mesurer. Par exemple, le succès des mouvements pacifistes en Europe, dans lesquels le KGB et le Département International étaient très largement impliqués, est indéniable. Toutefois le développement des mouvements pacifistes ne peut être seulement attribué au KGB et au DI. Ainsi, l'évaluation de l'efficacité des mesures actives dans la croissance des mouvements pacifistes est plus que subjective. Mais le chef de la résidence locale du KGB et le chef du groupe des mesures actives sont tout de même responsables de l'évaluation de telles activités.

[...]

Beaucoup d'observateurs à l'ouest minimisent l'utilisation d'agents d'influence, d'organisations internationales servant de couverture, ainsi que d'autres types de mesures actives. Que leur répondez-vous ?

Tout d'abord, il existe des indicateurs de l'importance que les Soviétiques donnent à ces activités. La quantité de mesures actives publiques ou clandestines est considérable, et cela peut être étudié et documenté. En tant qu'ancien membre du KGB, je peux vous dire que le KGB et le DI disposaient de toutes les ressources tant humaines que matérielles pour mener à bien cette entreprise considérable.

Source : Former CIA and KGB agents share inside look at espionageNous n'étions jamais à cours de moyens. Bien sûr ce n'est pas quelque chose de nouveau. Un examen de l'histoire du PC d'URSS démontrerait l'importance de telles tactiques. Une lecture attentive des déclarations et des écrits des dirigeants soviétiques donne un aperçu de l'importance de ces mesures. Bien que nous ayons discuté de leur efficacité plus tôt, laissez-moi insister de nouveau sur le fait que ces mesures actives sont évaluées selon des critères particuliers. Leur succès est d'une importance vitale. L'augmentation du recours aux mesures actives depuis les dix dernières années, est due aux progrès considérables faits dans la maîtrise de ces dites mesures.
Tiré de : "Dezinformatsia : The Strategy of Soviet Disinformation. 1984. pp 170-181"

A lire : Le KGB en France
             Oleg Kalugin sur la pénétration du KGB en France. 

China, the world’s largest oil consumer, has been increasing oil imports and feasting on the low crude oil prices. Could Russia and Saudi Arabia’s plan to stabilize crude oil prices cut into China’s oil hoarding plans?
Chinese oil imports have increased to 32.85 million tons in August, the second highest figure after the record 33.19 million tons import figures of December 2015. It’s a 7 percent increase over the same period last year, and a 6 percent increase over July. Currently, the Asian giant imports 66 percent of its crude oil requirements.
“Chinese oil majors are no longer under orders to increase domestic production, as they were doing so at a loss,” said Adam Ritchie, executive general manager for supply at Caltex Australia Ltd. “China’s change to let economics decide between imports and domestic production is a big change,” reports Bloomberg.
Russia and Saudi Arabia, the two largest suppliers, have been battling it out to increase their market share in China. While Russia has increased its market share in China from 12.6 percent last year to 13.6 percent this year, Saudi’s have seen their share dip from 15.1 percent to 14 percent during the same period.
“There’s a market-share battle going on mainly among the Middle East producers and Russia,” Olivier Jakob, managing director of Petromatrix, said by phone from Zug, Switzerland. “Rivals are making a big push into China,” reports Bloomberg.
An agreement between both the competing producer nations reduces the bargaining power of the Chinese refiners, who had started to choose the spot sales offered by Russia against the long-term contracts policy of Saudi Arabia.
Nevertheless, the Chinese can breathe easy, because like many other experts globally, even the Chinese analysts are not confident that the deal between Saudi Arabia and Russia will result in any substantive action.
"It will be very difficult to implement this agreement, as the volume for each exporter country is different. Many countries - producers of oil and gas rely on exports, so they are unlikely to agree to the terms of the agreement," a senior consultant for Sinopec Yang Qixisaid.
lire la suite.

Le canton de Genève a défini sa stratégie concernant RIEIII. Il table sur une perte nette de 440 millions.

Ma este, Biden alelnök látogatásának előestéjén megjelent az Indexen nagyelemzésem az amerikai-török kapcsolatok aktuális helyzetéről:

Nehéz lesz innen felállni

Nagy megtiszteltetés, hogy megjelenésekor a cikkem az Index címlapjának vezető híre:

Ma este, Biden alelnök látogatásának előestéjén megjelent az Indexen nagyelemzésem az amerikai-török kapcsolatok aktuális helyzetéről:

Nehéz lesz innen felállni

Nagy megtiszteltetés, hogy megjelenésekor a cikkem az Index címlapjának vezető híre:

Tartozom olvasóimnak az amerikai Demokrata Párt konvenciójának elemzésével, amelyre balatoni nyaralásom miatt kis csúszással kerítek sort. 

A legfontosabb megállapítások, amelyeket a konvencióval kapcsolatban tennék, a következők:

1. A Demokrata Párt konvenciója éppúgy, mint a Republikánus Párté, felszínre hozta a párt komoly belső feszültségeit, megosztottságát. Hillary Clinton előválasztási ellenfele, Bernie Sanders vermonti szenátor támogatói (legalábbis egy hangos csoportjuk) nem kívánták elfogadni Hillary győzelmét.
   
   http://www.vox.com/2016/7/27/12279928/bernie-sanders-dnc-protests 
   
   http://www.politico.com/story/2016/07/dnc-2016-protesters-walkout-226247?cmpid=sf#ixzz4FYs1RnTx
   
   http://www.politico.com/story/2016/07/bernie-sanders-booed-convention-226136?cmpid=sf

2. A belső feszültségek kirobbanásában, illetve a Sanders-támogatók makacsságában szerepet játszott az is, hogy a konvenció előestéjén – amerikai források szerint az orosz titkosszolgálat aknamunkája, valamint a WikiLeaks révén – olyan e-mailek kerültek nyilvánosságra, amelyek szerint a Demokrata Nemzeti Bizottság (DNC – gyakorlatilag a Demokrata Párt elnöksége) az előválasztási procedúra során végig etikátlanul próbálta gáncsolni Sanders kampányát és előnyhöz juttatni Clintont.
   
   https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/jul/24/debbie-wasserman-schultz-resigns-dnc-chair-emails-sanders
   
   http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2016/07/dnc-emails-nothing-there-but-bad-timing.html?mid=facebook_nymag
   

3. A botrányok és saját tábora egy részének kitartása ellenére Sanders azonban – korábbi ígéretéhez híven – elismerte vereségét, sőt ő maga tette a formális javaslatot Clinton elnökjelöltté választására. A konvenció végére a Demokrata Párt egysége helyreállt.
   
   http://talkingpointsmemo.com/livewire/sanders-joins-vermont-democrat
   
   https://newrepublic.com/article/135652/hillary-survived-gauntlet-saboteurs-scoundrels

4. Példátlan beavatkozás az amerikai belügyekbe orosz részről a DNC e-mailek kiszivárogtatása, amely Amerikában és a világon széles körű felháborodást váltott ki. Donald Trump republikánus elnökjelölt minderre még rá is tett egy lapáttal, amikor arra kérte az oroszokat, hekkeljék meg a Clinton korábbi szerverbotrányában szerepet játszó, mindeddig nyilvánosságra nem került 30 ezer e-mailt és tegyék azokat is közkinccsé.
   
   http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/25/us/politics/donald-trump-russia-emails.html
   
   http://www.wsj.com/articles/obama-says-experts-tie-russia-to-dnc-hacking-1469619650
   
   http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/07/trump-russia/493298/?utm_source=atlfb
   
   http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/29/world/europe/russia-trump-clinton-email-hacking.html?_r=0
   
   Mindennek jelentős hatása van a két párt külpolitikai profiljára is:
   https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/josh-rogin/wp/2016/07/27/clinton-has-now-made-democrats-the-anti-russia-party/
   
   
5. A konvención a Clinton mellett felsorakozott „tanúságtevők” között kiemelendő Barack Obama jelenlegi elnök és Bill Clinton korábbi elnök, Hillary férje beszédei, de közülük is igazi nagy sztárként emelkedik ki a mostani First Lady, Michelle Obama, akinek beszéde rendkívüli pozitív visszhangot váltott ki.
   
   http://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/obamas-powerful-message-donald-trump-is-un-american?mbid=social_facebook
   
   
   
   
   
6. Ki kell emelni, hogy a Republikánus Párt prominenseinek Trump sorozatos botrányai miatti elbizonytalanodását Clintonék a konvención nagyon ügyesen használták ki: a Demokrata Pártot az összes jóérzésű amerikai platformjának beállítva csalogatták a kiábrándult republikánusokat soraikba.
   
   https://newrepublic.com/article/135609/welcome-new-party-lincoln
   
   
7. Hillary Clinton jelölése történelmi tett: ez az első alkalom, hogy a két nagy párt egyikének elnökjelöltje női politikus.
   
   http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/hillary-clinton-nominated-for-president_us_5796781be4b02d5d5ed28832
   
   http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/07/hillary-clinton-presidential-nomination-dnc/493556/?utm_source=atlfb
   
   http://www.politico.com/story/2016/07/full-text-hillary-clintons-dnc-speech-226410?cmpid=sf
   
   
8. Végül pedig fontos hangsúlyozni, hogy bejött az általam is jósolt, papírformaszerű hatás: míg a Republikánus Konvenció Trump megerősödését hozta a közvéleménykutatásokban, a demokrata elnökjelölt-választását követően először néhány ponttal, immáron 15 százalékkal vezet Hillary Clinton, akit én az idei választás esélyesének tartok.
   
   http://edition.cnn.com/2016/08/01/politics/trump-vs-clinton-presidential-polls-election-2016/
   
   https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/poll-after-conventions-clinton-leads-trump-by-8-points/2016/08/06/517999c0-5b33-11e6-9aee-8075993d73a2_story.html
   
   http://www.businessinsider.com/hillary-clinton-biggest-lead-donald-trump-2016-8

Tartozom olvasóimnak az amerikai Demokrata Párt konvenciójának elemzésével, amelyre balatoni nyaralásom miatt kis csúszással kerítek sort. 

A legfontosabb megállapítások, amelyeket a konvencióval kapcsolatban tennék, a következők:

1. A Demokrata Párt konvenciója éppúgy, mint a Republikánus Párté, felszínre hozta a párt komoly belső feszültségeit, megosztottságát. Hillary Clinton előválasztási ellenfele, Bernie Sanders vermonti szenátor támogatói (legalábbis egy hangos csoportjuk) nem kívánták elfogadni Hillary győzelmét.
   
   http://www.vox.com/2016/7/27/12279928/bernie-sanders-dnc-protests 
   
   http://www.politico.com/story/2016/07/dnc-2016-protesters-walkout-226247?cmpid=sf#ixzz4FYs1RnTx
   
   http://www.politico.com/story/2016/07/bernie-sanders-booed-convention-226136?cmpid=sf

2. A belső feszültségek kirobbanásában, illetve a Sanders-támogatók makacsságában szerepet játszott az is, hogy a konvenció előestéjén – amerikai források szerint az orosz titkosszolgálat aknamunkája, valamint a WikiLeaks révén – olyan e-mailek kerültek nyilvánosságra, amelyek szerint a Demokrata Nemzeti Bizottság (DNC – gyakorlatilag a Demokrata Párt elnöksége) az előválasztási procedúra során végig etikátlanul próbálta gáncsolni Sanders kampányát és előnyhöz juttatni Clintont.
   
   https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/jul/24/debbie-wasserman-schultz-resigns-dnc-chair-emails-sanders
   
   http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2016/07/dnc-emails-nothing-there-but-bad-timing.html?mid=facebook_nymag
   

3. A botrányok és saját tábora egy részének kitartása ellenére Sanders azonban – korábbi ígéretéhez híven – elismerte vereségét, sőt ő maga tette a formális javaslatot Clinton elnökjelöltté választására. A konvenció végére a Demokrata Párt egysége helyreállt.
   
   http://talkingpointsmemo.com/livewire/sanders-joins-vermont-democrat
   
   https://newrepublic.com/article/135652/hillary-survived-gauntlet-saboteurs-scoundrels

4. Példátlan beavatkozás az amerikai belügyekbe orosz részről a DNC e-mailek kiszivárogtatása, amely Amerikában és a világon széles körű felháborodást váltott ki. Donald Trump republikánus elnökjelölt minderre még rá is tett egy lapáttal, amikor arra kérte az oroszokat, hekkeljék meg a Clinton korábbi szerverbotrányában szerepet játszó, mindeddig nyilvánosságra nem került 30 ezer e-mailt és tegyék azokat is közkinccsé.
   
   http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/25/us/politics/donald-trump-russia-emails.html
   
   http://www.wsj.com/articles/obama-says-experts-tie-russia-to-dnc-hacking-1469619650
   
   http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/07/trump-russia/493298/?utm_source=atlfb
   
   http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/29/world/europe/russia-trump-clinton-email-hacking.html?_r=0
   
   Mindennek jelentős hatása van a két párt külpolitikai profiljára is:
   https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/josh-rogin/wp/2016/07/27/clinton-has-now-made-democrats-the-anti-russia-party/
   
   
5. A konvención a Clinton mellett felsorakozott „tanúságtevők” között kiemelendő Barack Obama jelenlegi elnök és Bill Clinton korábbi elnök, Hillary férje beszédei, de közülük is igazi nagy sztárként emelkedik ki a mostani First Lady, Michelle Obama, akinek beszéde rendkívüli pozitív visszhangot váltott ki.
   
   http://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/obamas-powerful-message-donald-trump-is-un-american?mbid=social_facebook
   
   
   
   
   
6. Ki kell emelni, hogy a Republikánus Párt prominenseinek Trump sorozatos botrányai miatti elbizonytalanodását Clintonék a konvención nagyon ügyesen használták ki: a Demokrata Pártot az összes jóérzésű amerikai platformjának beállítva csalogatták a kiábrándult republikánusokat soraikba.
   
   https://newrepublic.com/article/135609/welcome-new-party-lincoln
   
   
7. Hillary Clinton jelölése történelmi tett: ez az első alkalom, hogy a két nagy párt egyikének elnökjelöltje női politikus.
   
   http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/hillary-clinton-nominated-for-president_us_5796781be4b02d5d5ed28832
   
   http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/07/hillary-clinton-presidential-nomination-dnc/493556/?utm_source=atlfb
   
   http://www.politico.com/story/2016/07/full-text-hillary-clintons-dnc-speech-226410?cmpid=sf
   
   
8. Végül pedig fontos hangsúlyozni, hogy bejött az általam is jósolt, papírformaszerű hatás: míg a Republikánus Konvenció Trump megerősödését hozta a közvéleménykutatásokban, a demokrata elnökjelölt-választását követően először néhány ponttal, immáron 15 százalékkal vezet Hillary Clinton, akit én az idei választás esélyesének tartok.
   
   http://edition.cnn.com/2016/08/01/politics/trump-vs-clinton-presidential-polls-election-2016/
   
   https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/poll-after-conventions-clinton-leads-trump-by-8-points/2016/08/06/517999c0-5b33-11e6-9aee-8075993d73a2_story.html
   
   http://www.businessinsider.com/hillary-clinton-biggest-lead-donald-trump-2016-8

This report is for media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared to the previous day. The Mission recorded a significant level of fighting during the night of 5-6 August in Donetsk region. The SMM analysed craters in Krasnohorivka, Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove) and Sakhanka. It observed weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas. The Mission noted the absence of 12 towed howitzers from permanent storage sites in “LPR”-controlled areas. It faced four freedom-of-movement restrictions, all in areas not controlled by the Government. The SMM received concrete responses to recent incidents by the Ukrainian Armed Forces representative at the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination, but no such information regarding incidents that took place in areas not controlled by the Government.

The SMM noted fewer ceasefire violations[1] in Donetsk region compared to the previous reporting period.

On the evening of 4 August, while in Donetsk city centre the SMM heard in two minutes 14 undetermined explosions 6-8km north-north-west of its position. On the night of 5-6 August, the SMM heard 42 undetermined explosions, including 30 assessed as anti-aircraft cannon rounds, 7-10km north of its position.

On night of 4-5 August, whilst in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 8-10km north-west of its location. Earlier that evening, the SMM had heard in one minute 20 explosions assessed as outgoing mortar rounds, explosions assessed as automatic-grenade-launcher and recoilless-gun rounds as well as heavy-machine-gun bursts 700-1000m north of its position 7km north of Horlivka. While in Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard two explosions assessed as impacts of 82mm mortar rounds 4-5km south-east of its location.

The SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) between 21:39 and 21:48 on 4 August recorded 11 rocket-assisted projectiles fired from west to east and one undetermined explosion at unknown distance north-west of its position. During the night of 5-6 August, in about three hours, the camera recorded 118 undetermined explosions as well as bursts of tracer fire (in sequence) from south-west to north-east, west to east and east to west.

Positioned in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard within 50 minutes in the afternoon 94 undetermined explosions assessed as rounds of different weapons (82mm and 120mm mortar, automatic grenade launcher), as well as heavy-machine-gun fire 4-6km south-east of its position. In the course of the day, whilst positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard 20 undetermined explosions at locations ranging from 2 to 6km west, west-north-west and north-north-west of its position.

In one hour in the morning, whilst in Svitlodarsk, the SMM heard 26 undetermined explosions 10-12km north-west, and four undetermined explosions 10-12km north-north-east of its position. In the night hours of 5-6 August, within just over two hours around midnight from the same location, the SMM heard 42 explosions, including 30, which it assessed as impacts of 120mm mortar rounds 4-5km south-east of its position. In Horlivka, on the same night, the SMM heard 43 explosions, including 27 it assessed as outgoing mortar rounds 7-9km north-west of its position.

In Luhansk region the SMM noted fewer ceasefire violations compared to the previous day, with no ceasefire violations recorded during the night of 4 August. Positioned 2km north of “LPR”-controlled Hannivka (58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard one undetermined explosion 5-15km west of its position. Positioned in “LPR”-controlled Veselohorivka (65km west of Luhansk), within about 20 minutes, the SMM heard over a dozen bursts of small arms 2km east of its position.

The SMM followed up on civilian casualties and conducted crater analysis. At the Kalinina hospital morgue in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city, the SMM accompanied by Russian Federation Armed Forces officers at the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC), observed the body of a woman with extensive shrapnel injuries to her head, neck, limbs and torso. According to the autopsy report, she had succumbed to shrapnel injuries she had received due to triggering a booby trap while working in her garden in Donetsk city’s Petrovskyi district on 4 August.

On 4 August, in “DPR”-controlled Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, 23km north-east of Mariupol) the SMM saw four fresh craters, all of which it assessed as caused by 120mm mortar rounds. The SMM assessed the first crater near an abandoned house as caused by a round fired from a westerly direction. The second crater was in the backyard of a house inhabited by an elderly woman and the SMM assessed that the round had been fired from a south-westerly direction. The last two craters were located near a road in the same area and the SMM assessed that one round had been fired from a north-north-westerly direction and the other – from a north-westerly direction. According to residents, the shelling had taken place between 06:00-06:35 on 3 August. No casualties were reported.

In Sakhanka (“DPR”-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw three fresh craters. The first crater was 20m away from an electricity sub-station and the SMM assessed it as caused by a projectile fired from a westerly direction. The SMM saw shrapnel damage to the sub-station. The SMM assessed the second crater, which was located in a field at the outskirts of the village, as caused by a 120mm mortar round fired from a north-westerly direction. The third crater was located in the backyard of a house inhabited by a middle-aged woman and the SMM saw two broken windows. The SMM assessed it as caused by a projectile fired from a north-north-westerly direction. Residents told the SMM that the shelling had occurred on 3 August at 22:30. No casualties were reported.

In Molodizhne (“DPR”-controlled, 20km south of Donetsk) the SMM saw nine fresh impact sites in a “detention” facility guarded by armed “DPR” members. One impact had caused the south-east part of the flat roof of an administrative building to partially collapse. The remainder of the impacts had struck the hard surface of the yard. The SMM assessed four of the craters as caused by 122mm or 152mm artillery rounds fired from a south or south-westerly direction, while a fifth had been caused by a projectile of unknown calibre fired from a northerly direction. The SMM was unable to analyse the remainder of the craters as they had been tampered with. According to the “head” of the facility, the shelling had occurred around midnight on 4 August. He also told the SMM that two “detainees” had sustained minor injuries. Medical personnel at the Dokuchaievsk hospital who treated them told the SMM that one had a shrapnel injury to his ankle and the other - to his chest and jaw. Both had been released back to the facility less than two hours after their arrival to the hospital. Near the facility, the SMM saw a two-storey house with a shattered window and spoke to a resident living in the house who stated that the window had been shattered by shrapnel around midnight on 4 August.

In government-controlled Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk) the SMM visited two residential properties reportedly shelled on the night of 4-5 August. At the first, the SMM saw a crater in the asphalt surface on the yard of the house, and minor shrapnel damage to the nearby east-facing wall. The SMM saw the tail fin of an 82mm mortar round stuck in the asphalt and assessed that the round had been fired from an east-south-easterly direction. At the second location, a five-storey apartment building, the SMM saw a direct impact on the east-facing wall and assessed it as caused by an 82mm mortar round fired from an east-north-easterly direction. No casualties were reported at either location.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Minsk Memorandum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal line, the SMM observed in government-controlled areas: one surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa, 120mm) westbound on the M04 (E50) road near government-controlled Selidove (41km north-west of Donetsk), and two tanks of unknown type in “LPR”-controlled areas of Zolote (60km north-west of Luhansk). 

Beyond the respective withdrawal line but outside assigned areas, the SMM observed 13 stationary tanks (T-64) at the training area near “LPR”-controlled Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification. In a government-controlled area beyond the respective withdrawal lines the SMM saw 11 multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS; BM21 Grad 122mm). The SMM also observed that one area continued to be abandoned, as it had been since 26 February, with 12 MLRS (BM21 Grad 122mm) and two surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10, 120mm) missing. In “DPR”-controlled areas, the SMM noted the presence of eight anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) and six self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm).*

The SMM revisited permanent storage sites, whose locations corresponded with the withdrawal lines. At “LPR”-controlled sites the SMM noted that 12 towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) were missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles in the security zone. In “LPR”-controlled Kalynove (60km west of Luhansk), the SMM observed one armoured personnel carrier (BTR-80) with 12 armed “LPR” members on board travelling west and one stationary combat engineering vehicle (IMR-2) on a tank (T-72) chassis.

The SMM continued to insist on accountability and responsibility for violations related to impediments to SMM monitoring and verification. The SMM continued to follow up on the incident of 2 August when SMM monitors were threatened at gunpoint at a known Ukrainian Armed Forces position near Lobacheve (17km north-west of Luhansk) (see: SMM Spot Report, 3 August 2016). At the JCCC in government-controlled Soledar (79km north of Donetsk), the Ukrainian Armed Forces representative presented the SMM with details of the investigations and disciplinary measures taken against the perpetrators. With regard to the shots fired at the SMM mini unmanned aerial vehicle near Lobacheve on 30 July (see SMM Daily Report 1 August 2016), the representative informed the SMM that the person responsible had been identified and he had disobeyed direct orders.

In relation to the violation near Lukove (72km south of Donetsk) (see: SMM Spot Report, 29 July 2016) in which armed individuals had threatened the SMM at gunpoint, Mr. Zakharchenko continued to refuse to meet the SMM in order to indicate effective steps taken in response.*

The SMM reminded the JCCC of continued restrictions and impediments to monitoring and verification, including in the areas near Zolote and Petrivske, and reminded the JCCC of its obligations under the Addendum to help ensure these and other violations were remedied as a matter of urgency. The SMM likewise reminded the JCCC that many of these restrictions were caused by mines, which the signatories of the Memorandum of September 2014 had insisted should be removed, and the Trilateral Contact Group's decision of 3 March, stipulating that the JCCC should be responsible for overall co-ordination of mine action, with the support of the SMM.

The SMM observed the presence of unexploded ordnance (UXO). The SMM revisited an area in Debaltseve (“DPR”-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk) where it had seen UXO assessed as an MLRS round (BM27 Uragan, 220mm; see SMM Daily Report 5 August 2016). A local farmer stated that “emergency services” had visited the site on 4 August and declared the rocket safe. He also showed the SMM another UXO on a footpath in the area, which the SMM assessed to be a 122mm artillery shell. The SMM informed the JCCC of the location of both pieces of UXO.

The SMM observed a new mine hazard sign 2km west of government-controlled Lobacheve (18km north-west of Luhansk) on the side of the road, which connects Lobacheve to government-controlled Lopaskyne (24km north-west of Luhansk). The sign read “Mines” in Russian and was hand-written on white cloth, which was hung on a movable wooden barrier.

The SMM continued to observe queues of pedestrians at the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge. In the morning between 09:09 and 10:09 the SMM saw 203 people (mixed gender and age) leaving government-controlled areas through the government checkpoint. In the same time period, the SMM saw 265 people (mixed gender and age) entering government-controlled areas through the same checkpoint. At 10:22, the SMM saw some 450 people still queuing to leave government-controlled areas. The SMM saw no traffic in the opposite direction. Between 15:45 and 16:15 the SMM observed 115 people (mixed gender and age) enter government-controlled areas through the government checkpoint. Within the same time frame, the SMM saw 132 people (mixed gender and age) proceed in the opposite direction.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

 

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• An armed “DPR” member stopped the SMM east of Oleksandrivske (formerly Rozy Lyuksemburg, “DPR”-controlled, 82km south of Donetsk), and prevented the SMM from proceeding further east. The SMM took an alternative route to Novoazovsk (“DPR”-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol). The SMM informed the JCCC.
• Four armed “LPR” members in two vehicles stopped the SMM in “LPR”-controlled areas of Zolote (60km north-west of Luhansk). An armed “LPR” member threatened one of SMM’s monitors with “arrest”, unless the SMM complied with their instruction not to stop at a pedestrian path leading to the railway tracks. The SMM informed the JCCC.

Conditional access:

• Armed men limited the SMM’s access to a weapons holding area. The gate was locked and the SMM was informed that the guard with the key was unavailable. The armed “DPR” members present only allowed two monitors and a language assistant to climb the wall (1.2m) in order to record the serial numbers of the designated weapons. The JCCC was informed.
• An armed “LPR” member stopped the SMM at the “LPR” checkpoint south of the bridge at government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk). He informed his superior and only allowed the SMM to proceed after noting down monitors’ names and IDs.

 

[1]  Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

 

Related Stories

• Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 4 August 2016
• Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 3 August 2016
• Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 2 August 2016

This report is for media and the general public.

On 6 August at 07:51hrs the SMM heard an explosion approximately 3.9km east of its location in Luhansk city.

The SMM went to the site from where it had heard the explosion located at the intersection of Karpynsky and Vatutyn Street in Luhansk city, 500m north-east of SMM’s accommodation. The site was cordoned off, by so-called “LPR” “police” and the SMM could assess from a distance of approximately 15-30 meters, that an explosion had likely been caused by an improvised explosive device (assessed as approximately 1kg of high explosives) placed next to or in, a lamp post about two meters away from the vehicle, which was damaged and downed, at the side of the road. The SMM saw a black sport utility vehicle “Toyota Landcruiser Prado” severely damaged with windows shattered and front and side airbags deployed.

“LPR” “police” members at the site told the SMM that there were two casualties, without giving further details. Mr Vladislav Deynego, “LPR” member, told the SMM that Mr Plotnitsky was “in a bad condition and not able to receive visitors.”  At the time of writing, the SMM could not reach personnel at either of the two hospitals in Luhansk city for confirmation.

The SMM will continue following up to confirm the information, and observe further developments.

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WARSAW, 6 August 2016 – Michael Georg Link, Director of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), today criticized the call by the Prosecutor General of Tajikistan for the reintroduction of the death penalty, and expressed concern over recent discussions related to removing the bans on capital punishment in some other OSCE participating States.

“Countries in the OSCE have committed themselves to consider the complete abolition of capital punishment, not to reconsider that abolition,” the ODIHR Director said. “Yesterday’s call by the Prosecutor General in Tajikistan for the reintroduction of capital punishment in that country is completely out of place in a region where most of the countries recognize the inherently cruel, inhuman and degrading nature of a punishment that fails to act as a deterrent and makes any miscarriage of justice irreversible.”

Tajikistan’s Prosecutor-General, Yusuf Rahmon, told a press conference yesterday that perpetrators of premeditated murder, terrorists and traitors must be punished by death. His words followed similar statements by other leaders, among them President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey and President Viktor Orban of Hungary, suggesting that the reinstitution of the death penalty should be opened for discussion.

Tajikistan suspended the application of the death penalty in 2004, while Turkey and Hungary completely abolished capital punishment, in 2004 and 1990, respectively.

“Rather than reversing its course, it is my hope that Tajikistan will take further steps toward the complete abolition of the death penalty,” he said. “It is also my hope that Turkey, remains with the vast majority of the OSCE participating States and will continue to  act as a strong advocate for the global abolition, as it has in recent years.”

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KYIV, 5 AUGUST 2016 –OSCE Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings, Madina Jarbussynova, on Friday concluded an official visit to Ukraine aimed at raising awareness of human trafficking and the risks encountered by the most vulnerable groups as a consequence of the current crisis.

During her five-day visit, she met with representatives of the Donetsk Oblast state administration and female Internally Displaced People (IDPs) in Kramatorsk. Ambassador Jarbussynova also travelled to Kharkiv to talk to relevant civil society representatives about the situation on the ground, how to prevent the expansion of the conflict-driven human trafficking phenomenon, and to evaluate existing mechanisms of identifying, referring and assisting victims of trafficking in human beings.

“More than one-and-a-half million citizens have been displaced – a vast number that demands a comprehensive response,” Jarbussynova said. “This vulnerable group can easily find itself in situations where human trafficking may occur.”

In Kyiv, the OSCE Special Representative met with Ukrainian authorities to discuss progress in anti-trafficking measures and review future plans.

“The Government of Ukraine has recently demonstrated a high level of commitment to addressing human trafficking, particularly in enhancing its victim identification efforts and in filing cases to relevant courts”, said Jarbussynova.

At the same time, she noted that there are still considerable gaps in the National Referral Mechanism for victims, and that long-term, sustainable measures should be sought.

The Special Representative travels regularly to Ukraine, engaging with high-level authorities and holding training sessions together with the Special Monitoring Mission and the OSCE Project Co-ordinator to strengthen the capacity of the Ukrainian institutions and OSCE monitors to spot human trafficking trends and to report on alleged cases.

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This report is for media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region compared to the day before including more than 520 explosions. In Luhansk region the SMM noted a decrease in recorded ceasefire violations compared to the previous day. On the night of 4 August, the SMM heard single shots of small-arms fire in close proximity to  its base in Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov). The SMM analysed craters in Zaitseve, Luhanske and Novozvanivka. It observed weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line, and noted the absence of numerous weapons from permanent storage sites in government-controlled areas. The SMM followed up on reports of water and power supply cuts in areas of Avdiivka and Yasynuvata due to shelling. It faced four freedom-of-movement restrictions – two in government-controlled areas and two in areas not controlled by the Government.

The SMM noted a higher number of ceasefire violations[1] recorded in Donetsk region compared to the previous reporting period, including more than 520 explosions.

On the evening of 3 August, while in Donetsk city centre, the SMM heard 48 undetermined explosions 8-15km north-west of its position.

On the same night, whilst in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 104 undetermined explosions 7-10km north, and 12 explosions assessed as outgoing armoured personnel carrier (BMP-1, 73mm) cannon fire 5-8km north of its position.

The SMM camera in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) between 21:35 and 22:31 of 3 August, facing north-east, recorded 63 undetermined explosions and 30 bursts in the following sequence: five bursts of undetermined tracer fire and 25 bursts of direct tracer fire from east to west, north to south, south to north, north-west to northeast, north-east to north-west, east to north-west, north-east to west, south-east to north-west.

The following day, positioned at the “DPR”-controlled Donetsk central railway station (6km north-west of the city centre), the SMM heard 236 undetermined explosions all at locations 3-10km ranging from north-west to north-east of its position. The most intense violence was noted between 08:14 and 08:42, when the SMM recorded 100 undetermined explosions 4-6km north-north-east of its position. 

Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 25 undetermined explosions and 13 outgoing explosions assessed as caused by automatic-grenade-launcher fire 1-7km west-south-west, west, west-north-west, north, north-north-east and north-east of its position. Positioned in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard 14 undetermined explosions 3-5km east and south-east of its position.

In Luhansk region the SMM noted a decrease in recorded ceasefire violations compared to the previous day, with no ceasefire violations recorded during the night of 3 August. Whilst in government-controlled Trokhizbenka (33km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 32 undetermined explosions 5-6km south of its position. While positioned 1.5km north-west of “LPR”-controlled Hannivka (58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard, within a half-hour period, more than 100 bursts of small-arms fire 1.5km east-south-east of its position – the location of a known shooting range – and assessed them as live-fire exercise – within the security zone – in violation of the ceasefire and of the Trilateral Contact Group decision on the prohibition of live-fire exercises within the security zone. Subsequently, while in the vicinity of a shooting range, the SMM saw five armed “LPR” members wearing ski masks with sniper rifles.

At 21:45 on 4 August, the SMM while at its base in “LPR”-controlled Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk), heard 16 single shots of small-arms (pistol) fire at an undetermined location 100-150m away from the base. The SMM informed the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) and armed “LPR” members controlling area.

The SMM conducted crater analysis. In “DPR”-controlled parts of Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw a fresh crater in a field 60m away from a house and assessed it as caused by a mortar (82 or 120mm) round fired from a north-westerly direction. Residents told the SMM that shelling had occurred during the night of 2-3 August. Across the street, the SMM also saw a completely burnt and destroyed house and two neighbouring houses with minor damage. No casualties were reported.

In government-controlled Luhanske (59km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw four relatively fresh craters  with fragments of 120mm mortar rounds and 122mm artillery rounds in a garden of an inhabited house. The SMM was unable to determine the direction of fire due to contaminated craters after the recent heavy storms.

In government-controlled Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw four craters near an inhabited house and assessed two of them as caused by 82mm mortar and the other two as caused by 122m artillery rounds, all fired from an easterly direction. Two residents told the SMM that shelling had taken place during the night time two days prior.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, in implementation of the Package of Measures and its Addendum, as well as the Minsk Memorandum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal line, the SMM observed in government-controlled areas: five self-propelled howitzers (2S1Gvozdika, 122mm) in Tarasivka (43km north-west of Donetsk); four self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152 mm) in a military compound in Donske (57km south of Donetsk); one radio-guided anti-tank system (9K114 Shturm, 134mm) mounted on a stationary armoured tracked vehicle (MT- LB) in Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk). Aerial surveillance imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence on 3 August of 12 tanks together with other hardware including 19 armoured vehicles and 44 military-type trucks in an industrial complex in “DPR”-controlled Budonivskyi district of Donetsk city.

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage does not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification. In a government-controlled area beyond the respective withdrawal lines the SMM saw six towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm), while it noted as missing six towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) as first observed on 8 July. The SMM also observed that two areas continued to be abandoned, as they have been since 3 July, with 12 towed howitzers (D-30, 12mm) and six Addendum-regulated mortars (2B11, 120mm) missing.

The SMM revisited permanent storage sites, whose locations corresponded with the withdrawal lines. At Ukrainian Armed Forces sites, the SMM noted that 22 tanks (T-64) and seven mortars (five 2B9M, 82mm; and two BM-38, 82mm) remained missing. In addition, the SMM also observed missing for the first time 36 tanks (T-64) and seven mortars (BM-37, 82mm). The SMM noted that one of those sites continues to be abandoned and another site has been newly abandoned.

The SMM observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles (ACV) and anti-aircraft weapons in the security zone. In government-controlled areas the SMM saw: one anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) near Lomakyne (15km north-east of Mariupol); one light-armoured vehicle (Kraz Cougar) mounted with a heavy machine-gun heading north near Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk). In “LPR”-controlled areas, the SMM saw: one anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) at an “LPR” checkpoint south-east of Shchastia across the contact line; one infantry fighting vehicle (BTR) heading north near Kalynove (60km west of Luhansk). Aerial surveillance imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence on 3 August of 33 armoured vehicles and 169 military-type trucks in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city, in addition to aforementioned present in the same compound as the tanks (see above).

The SMM followed up on reports about cuts to water and power supply in areas of Avdiivka and Yasynuvata due to shelling. In Avdiivka, the Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) told the SMM that at around 23:00 on 3 August, water and power supply to the town had been interrupted as shelling had caused damage to power transmission lines and to the Donetsk water filtration station located between Avdiivka and Yasynuvata. At Yasynuvata railway station, an employee (a woman in her thirties), stated that at approximately 04:00 of the day the water supply had been interrupted affecting large parts of the town. She added that most residents currently used water from private wells and bottled water.

The SMM continued to follow up on the incident of 2 August when SMM monitors were threatened at gunpoint at a known Ukrainian Armed Forces position on the road from government-controlled Lopaskyne to Lobacheve (24 and 17km north-west of Luhansk, respectively) (see: SMM Spot Report, 3 August 2016). At the JCCC in government-controlled Soledar (79km north of Donetsk), the Ukrainian Armed Forces chief-of-staff told the SMM that the perpetrators had been identified. The SMM also requested the meeting with a senior “DPR” member to follow up on the incident of 29 July when SMM monitors were threatened at gunpoint by aggressive armed “DPR” members near Lukove (72km south of Donetsk) (see: SMM Spot Report, 30 July 2016). He subsequently  refused  the request.*

The SMM observed the presence of explosive remnants of war (ERW) in “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk). The SMM for the first time saw a tailfin of a multiple-launch rocket system (BM-27 Uragan, 220mm) stuck in soil 30m away from an inhabited house and some 50 rusty shells of 82mm mortars (without fuses) scattered in a nearby field.

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential infrastructure. Positioned on both sides of the contact line, the SMM monitored the cleaning and widening of canals that provide water to the Shchastia power plant, repair works to the Mykhailivka-Lysychansk high power line near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km north-west of Luhansk), repair works to gas pipelines in areas between “LPR”-controlled Slovianoserbsk and Pryshyb (28 and 34km north-west of Luhansk, respectively).

The SMM continued to observe queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. In the morning, at a checkpoint in “DPR”-controlled Olenivka (23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM observed 132 cars waiting in a queue to cross into government-controlled areas and six cars in the opposite direction. A man in his forties told the SMM that he had been waiting for four hours since 06:00. A man in his early thirties with his wife and 8-year-old son stated that they were travelling to receive medical treatment for his son in government-controlled areas, expressing his concern as his son should not stay in the sun for a long time.  

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.

Denial of access:

• In government-controlled Hranitne (25km north of Mariupol), armed Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel did not allow the SMM to enter a military compound. The JCCC was informed.
• Armed Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel denied the SMM access to a military compound in government-controlled Myrne (40km north-east of Mariupol), citing orders from their superior. The JCCC was informed. 
• A senior “DPR” member refused to meet with SMM, when it attempted to follow up on the incident 29 July near Lukove.

Conditional access:

• Armed “LPR” members at a checkpoint immediately south of the bridge at Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north of Luhansk) allowed the SMM to proceed only after taking the names and ID card numbers of SMM monitors.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

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MOSCOW, 5 August 2016 – On the occasion of the formal opening of the election observation mission (EOM) deployed by the OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) to observe the 18 September State Duma elections in the Russian Federation, the mission will hold a press conference in Moscow on Monday, 8 August 2016.

Jan Petersen, the head of the OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission, will introduce the role of the EOM and its upcoming activities.

Journalists are invited to attend the press conference at 15:00, Monday, 8 August, at Interfax, 1-ya Tverskaya-Yamskaya ul., 2 Moscow, 127006.

For further information, please contact Inta Lase OSCE/ODIHR EOM Media Analyst, at +79166214710 (mobile) or Inta.Lase@odihr.ru

or

Thomas Rymer, OSCE/ODIHR Spokesperson, at +48 609 522 266 (Warsaw mobile) or at thomas.rymer@odihr.pl.

 

 

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257951 Communication and Media Relations Section

Representatives of relevant ministries and other state agencies of Belarus, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan responsible for implementing provisions of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 on preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction met at an OSCE-supported peer review meeting in Minsk from 2 and 5 August 2016, to discuss progress in their work.

Experts from the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre, the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs and the UN Security Council’s 1540 Committee also attended the meeting, which was hosted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Belarus, and is the second event of its kind to be held in the OSCE region and in the world, and the first to be held in trilateral format.

Opening the event, Deputy Foreign Minister of Belarus Valentin Rybakov said that the issues of non-proliferation are among his country’s priorities in the area of international security.

He noted that Belarus was the first state of the former Soviet Union to voluntarily refuse the opportunity to possess weapons of mass destruction, and that the withdrawal of such weapons from the country’s territory was completed in 1996. Rybakov added that his country also initiated the adoption of the UN General Assembly resolution on prohibiting the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons.

Adriana Volenikova of the  OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre said regional co-operation on UNSCR 1540-related issues has become one of the most efficient means in bolstering national implementation and enhancing an open dialogue between countries that face similar challenges and benefit from close interaction in related areas.

The three States will work on a joint report on implementation and later submit it to the UNSC 1540 Committee and the UN Security Council.

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DUSHANBE, 5 August 2016 – Twenty officers  of the Tajik Border Troops, ranked between warrant officer and major, mainly coming from border detachments  on the Afghan and Tajik border, successfully completed a four-week course today on patrolling and leadership at the Gissar Training Centre in Dushanbe.

The course, organized by the OSCE Office in Tajikistan, focused on enhancing participants’ knowledge of conducting observation missions using topographical maps, satellite imagery and other tools. They also learned about reporting and analysis, repelling methods, communications and tactical movement.

Uniforms and common tactical equipment were given to each participant. Separate medical lessons were delivered by trainers from the United States Embassy in Tajikistan. The sessions on gender mainstreaming and demining awareness were delivered by experts of the OSCE Office. Two officers of the Tajik Border Troops, who previously passed the course, also supported the OSCE in delivering the lessons.

OSCE Office in Tajikistan Counter-terrorism and Police issues Adviser Wolfgang Nikolaus, congratulated the officers on completing the course and said: “The OSCE continues supporting efforts to enhance the capacity of Tajik Border Troops Staff by providing such high-quality training courses."

The course is the eighth to be held under the third phase of the Patrol Programming and Leadership Project. The Project aims to increase the capacities of Tajik border staff in detection and interdiction of illegal cross-border movements.

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