European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Maria Díaz Crego and Györgyi Mácsai.

The number of migrant children has been rising globally since the turn of the century. According to estimates by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, in 2020, 35.5million children were living outside their country of birth, 11.5 million more than in 2000. Child migration takes many forms, from regular family reunification to forced and traumatic migration. This infographic focuses exclusively on forced and irregular movements of migrant children to the EU.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Child migrants: Irregular entry and asylum‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Gianluca Quaglio with Virginia Mahieu.

While killing all microorganisms in our bodies may seem tempting to some germaphobes, scientific evidence indicates that beneficial microorganisms (that live in nearly ubiquitous communities called microbiota) are an essential component of human health, and could form a new frontier for personalised medicine to fight non-communicable diseases and improve human health.

It is possible to raise animals completely free of microorganisms (i.e. bacteria, viruses, fungi and parasites). These ‘germ-free’ animals can survive (with supplementation of vitamins), but show marked differences in health and development, such as abnormal digestion, metabolism, respiration and circulation, as well as behavioural and neurological dysfunction.

These models make it possible to study the interplay between human microbiome (all microbiota in the body) and host, revealing some interesting and perhaps unexpected links.

The microbiome is essential to human life in many ways, including not only digestion, but also hormone regulation and the immune system, and even mental health. Humans and our microbiomes are an example of a symbiotic relationship: we provide them with shelter and food, and they provide us with many ‘services’ in return.

The microbiota in our gut feed on prebiotics (a group of nutrients that are degraded by gut microbiota) such as dietary fibre – a substance commonly found in cereals, vegetables and nuts – that we cannot digest. In return, they break down essential nutrients and they help keep infections at bay. In addition, the microbiota have been shown to be a key regulator of the gut-brain axis, and thus the microbiota-gut-brain axis has been proposed.

Probiotics (foods and supplements containing specific microorganisms that can contribute to health such as yogurt, miso and kefir) are gaining increasing popularity, not only for increasing general wellbeing, but also for treating a number of medical conditions.

Potential impacts and developments

Diet, physical activity, medical treatments and environmental factors can all affect our microbiome. There is indication that the human microbiome could be detrimentally impacted by societal changes of the past few decades, especially in terms of nutrition, lifestyle and the use of antibiotics. It is increasingly plausible that a substantial rise in a large host of non-communicable diseases (NCDs) could be at least partially attributed to changes in our gut microbiome. As NCDs currently represent over 70 % of global deaths, these place an enormous burden on healthcare systems and economies.

At least partly responsible for this rise in NCDs may be a shift in the consumption of fresh versus processed food, and an increased use of food additives such as emulsifiers and artificial sweeteners. In the USA, a country with one of the highest rates of obesity in the world, healthier food is markedly more expensive and often less readily available.

Some doctors are now prescribing probiotics as medical treatment for gastrointestinal conditions and allergies, but their full health potential is not yet widely demonstrated or recognised by the medical community. In fact, pending a deeper biological understanding and wide-scale clinical trials, probiotics could have the potential to treat other conditions such as obesity, hypertension, diabetes mellitus, rheumatoid arthritis, respiratory tract infections, and several other pathologic conditions. Perhaps most intriguingly, gut microbiota can influence brain physiology and pathology via the ‘gut-brain axis‘ and treating dysbiosis could in some cases influence anxiety and depression, as well as multiple sclerosis, Alzheimer’s and Parkinson’s diseases. Probiotics are even being suggested as an alternative to chemical disinfectants in hospitals.

Antibiotics, though effective at killing pathogens, can also kill some of the ‘good bacteria’ in our gut. The balance of the microbiome is delicate, and shifts in that balance can leave space for flare-ups of certain types of bacteria that, while helpful in small quantities, may not be good in larger quantities. Misuse and abuse of antibiotics can therefore have several potential side-effects.

Furthermore, persistent and excessive prescription of antibiotics can lead to antimicrobial resistance (AMR), meaning that we increasingly have to resort to more potent broad-spectrum antibiotics. Deaths from multi-drug resistant (MDR) bacteria accounted for more than 33 000 deaths in Europe in 2015. Recent research suggests that the future combat against AMR may involve probiotic-based approaches.

In short, killing infectious bacteria is important, but it can damage the balance of the human microbiome. If this is not prevented or managed it can ultimately lead to health problems in itself. There is evidence that taking probiotics can mitigate some of the side effects of antibiotics. Furthermore, probiotics could become part of a more personalised form of medicine in which treatments for a range of conditions are adapted based on the composition of the patient’s microbiome. They could open a path for preventing certain NCDs, and they could reduce the need for antibiotics in healthcare (both as medical treatment and as disinfectant).

Anticipatory policy-making

To safeguard the future of public health, we need to respect the ‘invisible’ microorganisms that live with us and are currently largely ignored or even unknowingly harmed. Though their role is becoming increasingly evident, there is currently no EU guidance, legislation or regulation on microbiomes in the context of human health.

Furthermore, EU food law does not yet contain any provisions for evaluating the safety or composition of probiotics in food, or how our food processing or intake can affect the human microbiome. The European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) is currently investigating the scientific evidence on microbiomes and working to integrate it into regulatory assessments.

There are major limiting factors for research into the potential applications of probiotics in healthcare and general wellbeing, so many health claims are currently associated with a lack of a clear causal pathway. Probiotic products can be subject to fad marketing and hype, so without proper governance they can lack credibility and quality control.

In addition, there is a need for new microbiome-oriented diagnostic tools in medical care. For the potential benefits of targeting the microbiome to reach society, the EU should consider standardisation, protocols, and a regulatory framework to support research and innovation. This research is essential to further understanding the processes that underlie the human microbiome and how to treat it.

The health of the microorganisms in our bodies and our food goes hand in hand with the health of the planet. A better understanding of the role of microorganisms in soil and in the ocean could also contribute to sustainable agriculture and plant protection by improving crop yields and reducing the need for pesticides. They could also contribute to a circular economy through improved waste degradation, helping to mitigate pollution and closing gaps in the production chain. As such, they could contribute to the successful achievement of several of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as well as the EU circular economy action plan, and the European Green Deal.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘What if we killed all microorganisms in our bodies?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘What if we killed all microorganisms in our bodies?’ on YouTube.

Written by Nikolina Šajn.

The European Commission has announced the establishment of a ‘right to repair’, with a view of saving costs for consumers and facilitating the development of a circular economy. The right to repair may refer to different issues and situations: repair during the legal guarantee, the right to repair after the legal guarantee has expired, and the right for consumers to repair products themselves.

Rates of repair depend on the type of a product, with the cost of repair being the most important reason consumers avoid repair. Research shows that consumers favour products that are easily repaired, but their willingness to pay for such products depends on the type of product and the way information on the reparability is presented to them.

Currently, EU contract laws give consumers a right to have faulty products repaired during the legal guarantee, while the new generation of ecodesign rules require the availability of spare parts for a certain time, at least for some products. Repair-related requirements are also present in the rules on the EU Ecolabel. The Commission is now planning a number of initiatives to improve reparability of products, including legislation on the right to repair, on empowering consumers for the green transition, a sustainable products initiative, design requirements for electronics, and measures making the broader economic context more favourable to repair.

The European Parliament has been in favour of improving consumers’ right to repair for over a decade, and has in this parliamentary term adopted two resolutions that contain a number of concrete proposals to make repairs systematic, cost-efficient and attractive. Consumer organisations and associations advocating for easier repair have called for rules to facilitate repair for non-professionals, and to guarantee consumers access to spare parts and repair manuals. Business organisations favour professional repairs, and have warned that any information requirements should not infringe on companies’ intellectual property.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Right to repair‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘Right to repair‘ on YouTube.

Written by Luisa Antunes with Laia Delgado Callico

Enforced collective social isolation during the coronavirus crisis has led to unprecedented societal changes. Each of us has dealt with stress factors resulting from social distancing, reduced interpersonal connections, and work and study challenges. At the same time, we have retained a sense of connectivity and belonging through the use of technology. This new unique set of circumstances has yielded unprecedented impacts on our psychological makeup and our interaction with the collective. What psychosocial and mental health factors affected us during the pandemic? Which stressors contributed to the development of mental health issues? Which protective factors can strengthen resilience and mental health?

To answer these questions and to discuss policy options for strengthening the EU’s common response to the coronavirus outbreak, the European Parliament’s Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA) organised an online ‘STOA Meets Experts’ event ‘Coping with the pandemic: Psychosocial consequences of the corona crisis‘, which took place on 25 January 2022.

European Parliament Vice-President and STOA Chair Eva Kaili (S&D, Greece) opened the event stressing STOA’s commitment to science as a fundamental means for ensuring European citizens’ wellbeing. She mentioned that the European Parliament approved a resolution in July 2020, recognising mental health as a fundamental human right and calling for a 2021‑2027 EU action plan on mental health.

Presentation of the STOA study ‘How are we coping with the pandemic? Mental health and resilience amid the COVID-19 pandemic in the EU’

Dr Angela Kunzler, research associate at the Leibniz Institute for Resilience Research (Germany), presented the first EU-exclusive review study addressing the mental health impact of the pandemic and the impact of containment measures and policies centred on health, work and financial support. The study, commissioned by STOA, compared data before and during the pandemic from observational studies performed across population groups and Member States.

A consistent increase was observed in anxiety, depression and general distress during the first wave of the pandemic, followed by adaptation in a further early phase. This adaptation can be interpreted as resilience, i.e. the maintenance or fast recovery of mental health during or after exposure to a stressful event. The individuals most affected were women, people of lower socioeconomic background and those affected with feelings of loneliness and fear of Covid‑19. Protective factors identified included the existence of social support systems, financial stability and the exercise of physical/recreational activities. No conclusions could be drawn regarding the impact of containment measures or of specific support policies in different Member States.

Four possible policy options were identified:

(i) to monitor mental health in the general EU population over a period of at least five years;

(ii) to raise public and policy-maker awareness;

(iii) to conduct an EU-wide study of the impact of Covid‑19 on mental health services, and

(iv) to initiate a mental health preparedness and response strategy focused on psychosocial and mental support.

Expert reflexions

Dr Eleni Andreouli, director of research at the School of Psychology & Counselling at The Open University (United Kingdom), focused on what helps us as a society to better cope with the pandemic, highlighting social solidarity and opportunities for collective resilience.

A recent study showed how the polarisation of opinions increased during the pandemic, leading to a decline in trust in national governments and in the EU. The pandemic exacerbated already-existing tensions in the social contract. It increased social and health inequalities, altered social interactions and work-life balance, and brought new norms in our identities as citizens in the public space.

However, the shared traumatic experience can also be a positive opportunity for the design of a new social contract built around solidarity and care. This will depend on the ability for authority figures, such as political and scientific, to show leadership in addressing social and health inequalities and in harnessing concrete policies and practices centred on inclusion and common identity.

Discussion

Member of the European Parliament, Peter Liese (EPP, Germany) focused on the impact of the pandemic – school closures – on the mental health of children. ‘Long-Covid’ poses challenges to our mental health and the neurological effects of the virus should not be understated. In this regard, daylight and physical activity were fundamental tools to improve our mental health during Covid‑19. In addition, targeted support should be provided to people suffering from severe mental health issues.

Vice-President Kaili reminded participants of the importance of stress resilience. More research is needed on mental health protective factors and on the long-term effects of Covid‑19. An EU-wide research study should be developed to compare the response of national healthcare systems to the mental health impact of the pandemic. The results could then be used to develop an EU emergency preparedness plan to counteract the negative mental health consequences of pandemics in general.

The full recording of the event is available here. Your opinion counts for us. To let us know what you think, get in touch via stoa@europarl.europa.eu.

Written by Ann Neville.

Precise figures about the numbers of illegal firearms in the European Union (EU) are lacking, but several indicators point to their widespread availability and accessibility. According to the Small Arms Survey, over half of the estimated total number of firearms held by civilians in the EU in 2017 were unlicensed. While most of these citizens had no criminal intentions, their illicit firearms could be used for self-harm or domestic violence, or end up in the hands of criminals or terrorists.

Most criminals and terrorists have more sophisticated ways to get hold of illicit firearms. They can be trafficked from source countries, diverted from legal supply chains, illegally manufactured or assembled in the EU, converted from legally available weapons, or sourced on the internet. Firearms seizures suggest that the EU illicit firearms market is made up mostly of shotguns, pistols and rifles, with converted or convertible weapons also frequently appearing.

Illicit firearms trafficking is driven by criminal demand, with organised crime groups that engage in firearms trafficking also involved in other forms of criminality. The EU considers illicit firearms a key crime threat precisely because they are used in many crimes and terrorist attacks. Even people who lack extensive criminal connections can access illicit firearms due to increased online trafficking and the availability of easy to convert weapons.

The EU is actively involved in addressing the threat posed by illegal firearms by means of legislative and policy measures, and provides operational assistance to the Member States in the fight against firearms trafficking. The EU is also active in the international fight against firearms trafficking, working closely with the United Nations (UN) in its work to combat the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and engaging in the UN’s global firearms programme. Although the export of arms remains a national competence, the EU has defined common rules governing the control of exports of military technology and equipment and works actively with third countries that are viewed as source or transit countries for illicit firearms.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Understanding EU policy on firearms trafficking‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Bruno Bilquin.

The European Peace Facility (EPF) has been operational since 1 July 2021. This off-EU budget instrument finances operations with military implications (previously financed by the Athena mechanism and the African Peace Facility), and provides support to the EU partner countries’ armies with infrastructure, training and equipment, including with lethal weapons. So far, it has funded operations in places as diverse as the Western Balkans, the Eastern Neighbourhood, in particular Ukraine, and sub-Saharan Africa. As stated in the Strategic Compass process, the EU aims to strengthen its crisis management role, with the EPF playing a crucial role in this process.

EPF: A budget of nearly €6 billion and a key role in EU security

The EPF was set up by Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/509 (the EPF Decision) of 22 March 2021, and entered into force on the same day. The EPF has a financial ceiling of €5.692 billion (in current prices) for 2021-2027, with an annual ceiling that will gradually increase from €420 million in 2021 to €1.132 billion in 2027. Member States make yearly contributions to the facility in proportion to their GNI. Denmark opted out of the common security and defence policy (CSDP) on military matters (by a formal declaration made under Article 31(1) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). The EPF has two financing pillars, brought together in an effort to simplify decision-making and make EU actions more coherent. The operations pillar finances the common costs of CSDP missions and operations that have military or defence implications. The assistance measures pillar finances EU actions for third states and regional or international organisations, aimed at strengthening military and defence capacities and supporting military aspects of peace support operations (PSOs). The facility has two secretariats: one for CSDP operations, hosted by the Council, and another for assistance measures, hosted by the European Commission’s Foreign Policy Instruments Service.

Emerging external actors pose challenges to the EU’s CSDP missions and operations. It is hoped that the EPF, which for the first time allows the EU to train and equip, including with lethal weapons, the armies of its partner countries, will help counter these challenges. In a rapidly evolving security context, the Strategic Compass, expected to be formally adopted at the European Council meeting on 24-25 March 2022, will seek to strengthen the EU’s role in crisis management, with the help of both civilian experts and military forces. It will also aim to make full use of the EPF, without any geographical limitations, to make the EU partners more resilient against hybrid threats. The compass suggests forging closer links between CSDP missions and operations, on the one hand, and European-led ad-hoc coalitions, on the other, notably in the Sahel, the Horn of Africa and the Strait of Hormuz; it also suggests that EPF-funded activities might help these ad-hoc coalitions.

A farewell to the African Peace Facility, but not to funding for military activities

The African Peace Facility (APF), which was created in 2003, is still de facto in force, but will no longer receive new funding. Through the APF, EU Member States have funded military activities in Africa, namely African Union (AU)-led or AU-supported PSOs, in places like South Sudan, the Central African Republic, Somalia, the Sahel, Gambia, and the Lake Chad Basin. The EPF has now taken the place of the APF to finance the military components of AU-led or AU-supported PSOs, while the Neighbourhood, Development and International Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI-GE) is used to finance the civilian components of those PSOs.

On 22 July 2021, the Council adopted an assistance measure under the EPF in the form of a general programme for support to the AU. With a budget of €130 million, the assistance measure will provide support to the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the Somali national army. It will also help to finance: the military component of the G5 Sahel Force (covering Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger); the PSO in Gambia (ECOMIG); and the Multi-national Joint Task Force (MNJTF) of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (which supports the fight against Boko Haram in Chad, Cameroon, Nigeria and Niger).

Common costs of CSDP military missions and operations: Not a farewell to Athena

Observing the ban imposed by Article 41(2) TEU on paying operating expenditure arising from CSDP operations having military or defence implications from the EU budget, but using the possibility offered by this article to charge Member States for such expenditure, the Council established the Athena mechanism in 2004. This mechanism has financed the ‘common costs’ of CSDP operations, covering 5-10 % of the total cost of an operation. The EPF has maintained the Athena cost-sharing mechanism and its governance system, and currently contributes to the common costs of the seven active CSDP operations and missions.

EPF-funded assistance measures

In December 2021, the Council adopted a €24 million EPF-funded assistance measure for Mali, for a period of 30 months. Jointly with the EU Training Mission in Mali, this measure will help strengthen the capacities of the Malian armed forces to conduct military operations aimed at restoring Malian territorial integrity and reducing the threat posed by terrorist groups. The Malian minister for foreign affairs has requested that the EU training mission evolve, possibly with the EPF, into both a more efficient training component (with ‘train the trainers’ programmes) and more combative components (with directly deployable equipment, lethal weapons, vehicles, aircraft and means of communications). On 2 February 2022, the HR/VP deeply regretted the expulsion of the French Ambassador to Mali by the country’s transitional government.

On 12 July 2021, the Council set up a military training mission to Mozambique (EUTM Mozambique). Officially launched on 15 October, the mission seeks to help address the crisis in Cabo Delgado province, by providing the Mozambican army – more specifically the military units that will be part of a future quick reaction force – with training and capacity-building. The common costs of the mission are funded by the EPF, which also supports assistance measures to the mission. On 30 July 2021, the Council approved a concept note for a €4 million assistance measure under the EPF for the most urgently required equipment; on 19 November 2021, the Council decided to complement the former measure with a €40 million assistance measure, to enable the units trained by EUTM Mozambique to conduct security operations in Cabo Delgado province. EUTM Mozambique, which mainly consists of Portuguese special forces, will train a total of 11 companies of the Mozambican army and navy. The EU is providing these units with individual and collective equipment, ground mobility assets, technical tools and a field hospital. Moreover, a Southern African Development Community (SADC) mission, the SAMIM, was deployed on 15 July 2021 to join forces with the Mozambican national army and other (South African but also Zimbabwean and Rwandan) foreign troops in combating the Islamic terrorists; the SADC decided on 12 January 2022 to extend the SAMIM mandate for three months. For comparison, the extension will cost almost €26 million for the SADC.
The EU is likely to respond favourably to possible requests from Rwanda (although it is not a SADC member state), Mozambique or the AU, to fund, through the EPF, the deployment of African troops in Mozambique.

On 4 November 2021, the Council adopted an assistance measure of €10 million to support the capacity building of the armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), and to finance the delivery of 68 medical and transport vehicles and 150 metal detectors to the BiH humanitarian demining battalion, with the aim of helping the country become mine-free by 2027. EPF funds also support EUFOR Althea, which has, with around 600 troops, an executive mandate to maintain a stable and secure environment in BiH.

On 2 December 2021, the Council adopted assistance measures to Georgia (€12.75 million) Moldova (€7 million) and Ukraine (€31 million), all for a period of three years and aimed at strengthening the capacities of the beneficiary countries in military and defence matters, as well as promoting domestic resilience and peace. The measure for Ukraine finances military medical units (including field hospitals), engineering units (including demining), mobility and logistics units, and support for cyber-defence. It is worth noting that, against the backdrop of renewed Russian threats on the Ukrainian border, a cyber-attack was launched against the Ukrainian government’s websites on 14 January 2022. The HR/VP intends to propose establishing an EU Military Advisory and Training Mission in Ukraine; the costs of such a mission, its possible participants, the Ukrainian needs and the modalities of EU help have already been evaluated; pending Member States’ agreement, the preparatory work to deploy the mission is ongoing at an accelerated speed. On 24 January, the Council stressed that the EU is defining arrangements for support to Ukraine in the area of professional military education. So far, none of the EPF-funded active assistance measures that the Council has approved at the request of the countries concerned allows for the controversial supply of equipment designed to deliver lethal force.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘The European Peace Facility: A new tool in action‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Jakub Przetacznik with Linda Tothova.

Since the beginning of 2021, Ukraine has struggled with Russia’s attempts to further destabilise the country and intensify tensions in Europe’s east, including through repetitive military build-ups along Ukraine’s borders. Russia’s most recent threatening troop manoeuvres, together with its unsupportable security demands, met with a united response from Western countries, making it clear that a very high price will be paid if Russia attacks Ukraine. The EU and its institutions, including the European Parliament, have been clear in their response to Russia’s aggression on Ukrainian territory. The EU does not recognise the illegal annexation of Crimea and regularly calls on Russia to de-escalate and withdraw its forces, and urges Moscow and Russian-backed separatists in eastern Ukraine to adhere to the ceasefire agreement. Currently the situation remains very volatile.

Relations between the European Union and Ukraine continue to be shaped by the 2014 Association Agreement, which includes the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area. The long-term relationship between the EU and Ukraine covers a broad range of areas including trade, providing assistance to the country’s health sector, support for the country’s reform agenda, and support for the fight against hybrid attacks against Ukraine that have been perpetrated by Russia ever since Ukraine made its firm pro-European choice in 2014.

Russia decided to respond aggressively to the Revolution of Dignity – a revolution whose main aim was the signature of the Association Agreement – and immediately after the change of power in Ukraine in 2014 it annexed Crimea and moved to actively support Donbas separatists. Intensive fighting in Donbas in 2014 and early 2015 led to the Minsk agreements, but limited progress in implementing the agreements on the Russian side have led to the prolongation of Western sanctions against Russia. Russia continues its bullying policy towards Ukraine with a wide range of instruments, including disinformation, blackmail and cyber-attacks.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU-Ukraine relations and the security situation in the country‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Rosamund Shreeves.

The European Union (EU) is committed to working collectively to eradicate female genital mutilation (FGM), as part of broader efforts to combat all forms of violence against women and girls, and to supporting the efforts of its Member States in this field. The European Commission has undertaken to assess EU efforts to combat FGM every year, on or around 6 February – the International Day of Zero Tolerance for Female Genital Mutilation.

Facts and figures

Female genital mutilation (FGM) includes all procedures that intentionally alter or cause injury to the female genital organs for non-medical purposes. FGM is carried out for cultural, religious and/or social reasons, mostly on young girls between infancy and the age of 15. It has no health benefits and can have serious immediate and long-term effects on health and wellbeing.

The exact number of girls and women affected by FGM is not known, but the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) estimates that, worldwide, at least 200 million women and girls have been cut, while around 4 million girls are at risk of undergoing FGM every year. The practice, which is most common in 28 African countries, is also prevalent in parts of the Middle East and Asia, and has been reported to a lesser extent elsewhere. Assessments issued by the United Nations Secretary-General and UNICEF-UNFPA, find that prevalence has been reduced in some regions, but progress could be cancelled out as a result of population growth, girls undergoing FGM at a younger age and further spread of the practice as a result of population movement. The coronavirus pandemic has been a further obstacle to progress, putting more girls at risk of FGM and disrupting prevention efforts and support services. Medicalisation of FGM is a growing problem.

Although official EU data on the prevalence of FGM in Europe are lacking, four studies to map FGM, conducted by the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE) between 2012 and 2020, found that there are victims (or potential victims) in at least 16 EU countries: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. Around 20 000 women and girls from FGM-practising countries seek asylum in the EU every year, with an estimated 1 000 asylum claims relating directly to FGM. This number has grown steadily since 2008.

Commitments and action to combat FGM

FGM constitutes a form of child abuse and gender-based violence, and is recognised internationally as a violation of the human rights of girls and women. The practice also violates a person’s rights to health, security and physical integrity; the right to be free from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; and the right to life in cases where the procedure results in death. Measures have been adopted at international, EU and national level to prevent FGM and to protect FGM victims.

Instruments and action at international level

At international level, United Nations (UN) and Council of Europe standards are benchmarks for work to combat FGM. Key treaties, including the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the Geneva Convention, all cover FGM indirectly, with specific guidance on protection and asylum for victims. The Council of Europe’s Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (‘Istanbul Convention’), is the first treaty to recognise that FGM exists in Europe (Article 38), and sets out specific obligations on preventing and combating the practice, and providing support for victims and those at risk.

The UN’s longstanding efforts to end the practice culminated in its first specific resolution on FGM in 2012, calling for the adoption of national action plans and comprehensive strategies to eliminate it. The UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development identifies FGM as a harmful practice, to be eliminated by 2030 (Goal 5), a priority reaffirmed by the UN – in a resolution in 2018 and at the International Conference on Population and Development in 2019. Concrete targets were set at the Generation Equality Forum in 2021. The UN also recommended action to tackle FGM in the context of the coronavirus pandemic. The UN has named 6 February the International Day of Zero Tolerance for Female Genital Mutilation, and the European Commission takes stock annually, around that day, of EU efforts to combat FGM.

Legislative and policy framework at EU level

The EU itself currently has no binding instrument designed to protect women from violence, but relevant instruments exist in a number of areas. The principles of gender equality and non-discrimination are affirmed in the Treaties and in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which also guarantees the right to dignity and includes provisions on the right to physical and mental integrity. The Directive on Victims’ Rights requires provision of support services for victims of violence, including FGM. The Asylum Reception Conditions Directive specifically mentions victims of FGM as being among vulnerable persons who should receive appropriate healthcare during their asylum procedure, while the recast Qualification Directive includes FGM as grounds to consider when granting asylum. Both directives are under review. The EU signed the Istanbul Convention in 2017 and is currently in the accession process. Parliament has urged those Member States that have not yet done so to ratify and implement this convention.

Combating gender-based violence, including FGM, is one of the priorities of the EU’s external action and its internal strategies on children’s rights and gender equality Proposals for new EU legislation on gender-based violence and a recommendation on measures to prevent harmful practices are planned for 2022. In addition, the approach to eliminating FGM adopted in 2013 will continue, with the aim of ensuring that action to combat FGM is mainstreamed across the fields of justice, police, health, social services, child protection, education, immigration and asylum and external action. Areas where the Commission has promised to act include:

• providing the reliable, comparable EU-level data necessary to establish the prevalence of FGM and provide a solid basis for policy;
• improving victim support by helping Member States to develop support services for victims, and training and awareness-raising for relevant professionals, focusing on empowering communities;
• supporting Member States in prosecuting FGM more effectively;
• ensuring that women at risk are protected more effectively under EU asylum rules through proper transposition and implementation of the EU legislative framework on asylum and victim protection;
• promoting worldwide elimination of FGM, by ensuring that EU external policy addresses FGM.

Funding for tackling FGM is made available through the joint EU-UN Spotlight Initiative and EU funding programmes, notably the longstanding Daphne strand, which is continuing under the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values programme for 2021-2027.

National-level instruments against FGM

Many of the actions needed to end FGM lie within the competences of the Member States. FGM is now a prosecutable offence under national law in all Member States, either as a specific criminal act or as an act of bodily harm or injury. However, very few cases are brought to court. A number of Member States have also developed national action plans on FGM. Continuing issues of concern include barriers to reporting and successful prosecution, victim support, and ways to ensure long-term, sustainable cultural change.

European Parliament position

The European Parliament has played an important role in raising awareness and pushing for firm action on FGM, including through the work of its Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM). Parliament adopted resolutions on FGM in 2001, 2009, 2012, 2014, and 2018, calling on the Commission and Member States to provide the legal and other means required to raise awareness, protect and support victims and ensure that offenders are prosecuted. In 2016, it called for appropriate protection for women and girls seeking asylum on grounds of FGM. In 2020, Parliament set out its own recommendations for an EU strategy to put an end to FGM around the world. It has called for coordination of external and internal programmes and for action to address the increased risks of FGM resulting from the pandemic. Parliament has also welcomed the Commission’s plan for an EU recommendation.

This publication is a further update of an ‘at a glance’ note originally published in January 2015.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Zero tolerance for female genital mutilation‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Alex Wilson (1st edition).

On 15 December 2021, the European Commission adopted a major revision (recast) of the Energy Performance of Buildings Directive (EPBD), as part of the ‘Fit for 55’ package. The latter consists of several legislative proposals to meet the new EU objective of a minimum 55 % reduction in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2030 compared to 1990. It is a core part of the European Green Deal, which aims to set the EU firmly on the path towards net zero GHG emissions (climate neutrality) by 2050.

The recast EPBD aims to accelerate building renovation rates, reduce GHG emissions and energy consumption, and promote the uptake of renewable energy in buildings. It would introduce a new EU definition of a ‘zero emissions building’, applicable to all new buildings from 2027 and to all renovated buildings from 2030. Zero-emissions buildings would need to factor in their life-cycle global warming potential. The recast EPBD would accelerate energy-efficient renovations in the worst performing 15 % of EU buildings, and would set minimum energy performance standards. In due course, every building would need to achieve at least a Class E on a revised A-G scale of energy performance certificates (EPCs). EPCs would be included in linked national databases. Other provisions introduce building renovation passports and a smart readiness indicator, end subsidies for fossil fuel boilers, and make building automation and control systems more widespread.

The file has been referred to the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE), which will in due course appoint a rapporteur, who will produce a draft report.

Versions

• February 2022: Revision of the Energy Performance of Buildings Directive: Fit for 55 package (1st edition)

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the energy performance of buildings (recast) Committee responsible:Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE)COM(2021) 802 final
15.12.2021Rapporteur:To be appointed2021/0426(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Appointment of rapporteur

Written by Gregor Erbach with Nela Foukalova (1st edition).

As part of the ‘Fit for 55’ package, the Commission presented a legislative proposal to review the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS). The aim of the review is to align the EU ETS Directive with the EU target set out in the European Climate Law to reduce net greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 55 % by 2030, compared to 1990 levels.

To this end, the amount of emission allowances would be reduced, fewer allowances would be allocated for free, and the ETS would be extended to maritime transport. This would reduce emissions in the ETS sectors by 61 % by 2030, compared to 2005. A separate new emissions trading system would be established for fuel distribution for road transport and buildings. The Innovation Fund and the Modernisation Fund would be enlarged, and Member States would be obliged to spend all of their ETS revenues on climate action.

In the European Parliament, the proposal has been referred to the Committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI), which has appointed Peter Liese (EPP, Germany) as rapporteur.

Versions

• January 2022: Review of the EU ETS: ‘Fit for 55’ package (1st edition)

Proposal for a directive amending Directive 2003/87/EC establishing a system for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Union, Decision (EU) 2015/1814 concerning the establishment and operation of a market stability reserve for the Union greenhouse gas emission trading scheme and Regulation (EU) 2015/757 Committee responsible:Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI)COM(2021) 551
14.7.2021Rapporteur:Peter Liese (EPP, Germany)2021/0211(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Jytte Guteland (S&D, Sweden)
Emma Wiesner (Renew, Sweden)
Michael Bloss (Greens/EFA, Germany)
Danilo Oscar Lancini (ID, Italy)
Alexandr Vondra (ECR, Czechia)
Silvia Modig (The Left, Finland)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council
on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Vote on draft report in committee

Written by Laurence Amand-Eeckhout.

Held every 4 February since 2000, World Cancer Day aims at raising worldwide awareness of the action needed to fight cancer. With over 100 million Europeans expected to be diagnosed with cancer in the next 25 years, Parliament is expected to debate the final report of its Special Committee on Beating Cancer during the February plenary session, and vote on a series of recommendations calling for specific policy measures in this crucial area of public health.

Background

In June 2020, the European Parliament approved the establishment of the Special Committee on Beating Cancer (BECA). BECA held a series of public hearings with high-level experts, set up an exchange of views with national parliaments and international organisations, and conducted a public consultation, running from February to March 2021, on the impact of the pandemic on cancer care and research. In November 2021, a BECA delegation travelled to the World Health Organization (WHO) headquarters in Geneva (Switzerland), and then to Lyon (France) to meet experts, researchers and healthcare professionals at the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) and at CLARA, an oncology and cancer research cluster with a European dimension looking to accelerate research and innovation in the specific area of childhood, adolescent and rare cancers. BECA used its mandate to focus on ways to strengthen cancer prevention and control in health systems, examine the impact of the coronavirus crisis on the continuity of cancer care delivery, assess the need to address inequalities in cancer prevention and care across the EU and highlight the importance of the availability of quality data and evidence to underpin health policies.

EU action against cancer

As far back as 1985, the EU has been fighting cancer and investing in cancer research, even though responsibility for health policies lies primarily with the Member States (Article 168 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union). Cancer is the second most common cause of death in the EU, after heart disease. In February 2021, the European Commission adopted the ‘Europe’s Beating Cancer Plan‘ to address cancer-related inequalities and help improve prevention and care. This plan forms part of the Commission’s proposals for a strong European health union.

European Parliament position

On 9 December 2021, BECA adopted its final report on ‘strengthening Europe in the fight against cancer – towards a comprehensive and coordinated strategy’. The report’s main recommendations include taking stronger EU action to address the key risk factors of cancer (including alcohol and tobacco consumption), extending screening schemes and launching an EU platform for national screening centres, facilitating cancer patients’ access to cross-border health care and clinical trials, and developing European multi-centre clinical trials. The report also advocates extending the use of joint procurement procedures to manage cancer medicine shortages, and guaranteeing cancer survivors the ‘right to be forgotten’, so as to prevent discrimination and improve access to financial services. Calling for transparency throughout the pharmaceutical system (fair pricing and affordability) and equal access to innovative cancer treatments, the report notes that a holistic approach and multidisciplinary cancer research are fundamental to securing improvements in cancer prevention, diagnosis, treatment and follow-up care for survivors. Finally, the report advocates increased funding for research into the causes of cancer, action to boost the efficiency of preventive measures, more research into paediatric and rare cancers, and additional funding for the European Reference Networks, and their integration into national health systems, while also building up the Knowledge Centre on Cancer.

Own-initiative report: 2020/2267(INI); Committee responsible: BECA; Rapporteur: Véronique Trillet-Lenoir (Renew Europe, France).

Written by Alessandro D’Alfonso.

A major innovation in EU finances to counter the socio-economic impact of the pandemic, the Next Generation EU (NGEU) recovery instrument enters its full deployment phase in 2022. On this occasion, the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) has launched a new series of briefings – ‘Next Generation EU (NGEU) delivery: How are the Member States doing?’.

The EU is currently projected to use €504 billion out of the maximum allocation available (€723.8 billion) under the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), the centrepiece of NGEU. But how is this significant amount of resources going to be used to meet the key objectives of the green transition, the digital transformation, resilience and inclusion?

The publications in the series look at the national recovery and resilience plans (NRRPs) put forward by the Member States to benefit from investment under the RRF. Each briefing sets out the funding each Member State can access, the country-specific challenges that the plan is designed to address, the investment and reform measures put forward by national authorities, and the Commission’s assessment of their plans. Other sections present the milestones and targets to be met and the latest state of play in the implementation, as well as a flavour of the debate individual plans have triggered. Various graphics recapitulate key data in a snapshot. In a nutshell, the briefings aim to provide the essentials of each national plan in an easily accessible format.

The series will cover all Member States and the briefings will be updated regularly, at key stages throughout the lifecycle of the plans. The first briefings in the series are devoted to: Cyprus; Estonia; Germany; Ireland; Italy; Latvia; and Spain.

Don’t hesitate to return to this page to discover new briefings and the latest updates as we add them .

Written by Henrique Morgado Simões (1st edition).

The proposal to revise the market stability reserve (MSR) for the EU emissions trading system (ETS) consists of prolonging its current parameters. Under the current rules, the intake rate of allowances to the MSR and the minimum allowances placed in the reserve have been doubled until the end of 2023, to allow for a quick removal of surplus EU ETS allowances. The proposal is aimed at maintaining the current doubled intake rate (24 %) and minimum number of allowances placed in the reserve (200 million) until 31 December 2030, the end of Phase IV of the EU ETS.

In Parliament, the rapporteur has produced a draft report to be voted in the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI). The Council is currently debating the proposal. Its December 2021 progress report notes delegations’ differing views on the proposal.

Versions

• February 2022: Revision of the market stability reserve for the EU emissions trading system: Fit for 55 package (1st edition)

Proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Decision (EU) 2015/1814 as regards the amount of allowances to be placed in the market stability reserve for the Union greenhouse gas emission trading scheme until 2030. Committee responsible:Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI)COM(2021) 571
14.7.2021Rapporteur:Cyrus Engerer (S&D, Malta)2021/0202(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Emma Wiesner (Renew, Sweden)
Michael Bloss (Greens/EFA, Germany)
Alexandr Vondra (ECR, Czechia)
Silvia Modig (The Left, Finland)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on
equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Vote in committee on draft report

Written by Jaan Soone (1st edition).

On 14 July 2021, the European Commission presented a package of proposals to make the EU’s climate, energy, land use, transport and taxation policies fit for reducing net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55 % by 2030, compared with 1990 levels – the fit for 55 package. The package includes a proposal to ensure a level playing field for sustainable air transport, also known as the ReFuelEU Aviation initiative.

In the draft regulation, the Commission proposes obligations on fuel suppliers to distribute sustainable aviation fuels (SAF), with an increasing share of SAF (including synthetic aviation fuels, commonly known as e-fuels) over time, in order to increase the uptake of SAF by airlines and thereby reduce emissions from aviation. The proposal also includes obligations on airlines to limit the uptake of jet fuel before departing from EU airports to what is needed for safe operation of flights, with the aim of ensuring a level playing field for airlines and airports, and avoiding additional emissions related to extra weight of aircraft carrying excessive amounts of fuel.

In the European Parliament, the file has been referred to the Committee on Transport and Tourism as lead committee. The Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety and the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy are associated under Rule 57.

Versions

• January 2022: ReFuelEU Aviation initiative: Sustainable aviation fuels and the fit for 55 package (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on ensuring a level playing field for sustainable air transport Committee responsible:Transport and Tourism (TRAN)COM(2021) 561
14.7.2021Rapporteur:Søren Gade (Renew, Denmark)2021/0205(COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Cláudia Monteiro de Aguiar (EPP, Portugal)
Erik Bergkvist (S&D, Sweden)
Ciarán Cuffe (Greens/EFA, Ireland)
Julie Lechanteux (ID, France)
Kosma Złotowski (ECR, Poland)
Clare Daly (The Left, Ireland)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council on
equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of the draft report

Written by Liselotte Jensen (1st edition).

As part of the ‘Fit for 55’ package, the Commission is proposing a revision to the EU’s emissions trading system (ETS) as regards carbon dioxide emissions from aviation. The proposal seeks to ensure that the sector contributes to the EU’s climate targets through increased auctioning of allowances, with an end to free allowances from 2027, and by applying the linear reduction of aviation allowances. The proposal will also integrate, into the revised ETS, the International Civil Aviation Organization’s agreed global market-based Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA) and apply it to international flights departing from or arriving at an airport inside the European Economic Area (EEA). For domestic flights in the Member States or flights within the EEA, the ETS would continue to apply. In the European Parliament, the file has been referred to the Committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI), where the rapporteur, Sunčana Glavak (EPP, Croatia), has published her draft report.

Versions

• January 2022: Aviation’s contribution to European Union climate action: Revision of EU ETS as regards aviation (1st edition).

Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2003/87/EC as regards aviation’s contribution to the Union’s economy-wide emission reduction target and appropriately implementing a global market-based measure Committee responsible:Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI)COM(2021) 552
14.7.2021Rapporteur:Sunčana Glavak (EPP, Croatia)2021/0207 (COD)Shadow rapporteurs:Milan Brglez (S&D, Slovenia)
Claudia Gamon (Renew, Austria)
Bas Eickhout (Greens/EFA, the Netherlands)
Anna Zalewska (ECR, Poland)
Silvia Modig (The Left, Finland)Ordinary legislative procedure (COD)
(Parliament and Council
on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Vote on draft report in committee

Written by Alessandro D’Alfonso, Angelos Delivorias, Martin Höflmayer, Karoline Kowald, Marianna Pari and Magdalena Sapała, with Nele Foukalova.

According to preliminary figures for 2021, gross domestic product (GDP) rebounded significantly in all EU Member States (by 5 per cent), and even exceeded last year’s more modest expectations. The European Commission expects euro-area and EU GDP growth to continue in 2022, but becoming more muted. This forecast depends on several variables, however, including whether the pandemic finally subsides, supply bottlenecks and/or material shortages, and inflation, which – against expectations – could remain high or increase further. Other risks identified could stem from the international environment (in particular China and Russia) or climate change (with extreme weather events likely to occur more frequently).

When it comes to employment, the national and EU measures, such as the temporary ‘Support to Mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency’ (SURE) instrument, put in place early in the Covid‑19 crisis helped to dampen its effects to a greater degree than expected in 2021. Moreover, unemployment is projected to decline further in the coming months. As was the case last year, this rebound in GDP and the diminishing unemployment figures are common to most major economies, although the rates vary slightly. In the course of 2022, the unemployment rate will depend on the timing and pace of the withdrawal of policy support schemes and on whether the economic recovery continues. Taking these factors into consideration, unemployment is expected to fall in the coming years.

As a result of the various measures put in place, general government deficits grew significantly in 2021. While these deficits are thought to have peaked, the debt-to-GDP ratio is expected to remain high, with levels in 14 Member States still higher than the Maastricht Treaty limit of 60 % in 2023. Therefore, it is expected that deficit and debt will be at the centre of discussions in the immediate future, as application of the general escape clause comes to an end, and also in the context of the review of the EU economic governance framework.

Similarly, in 2021, the European Central Bank (ECB) significantly expanded its holdings under the Asset Purchase Programmes and the Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme. Following its Governing Council meeting in December 2021, the ECB is expected to ease off on these purchases, but the future pathway is not yet clear, as it depends on elements such as complete recovery from the crisis and the course of inflation. Indeed, following several years of low inflation, the strong resumption of economic activity in the EU has been accompanied by a swift pick-up in prices, with average inflation for the euro area in October 2021 at 4.1 % and strong variations between Member States. Inflation – as estimated in November 2021 – was expected to reach 2.4 % in 2021 in the euro area and 2.6 % in the EU as a whole, with similar trends in other major economies. This has led to a discussion regarding the nature of the current inflationary pressures and whether these transitory price pressures will become more persistent.

The pandemic has had a major impact on the design of the medium-term structure for EU finances, resulting in the adoption of an unprecedented budgetary package that combines the €1 210.9 billion multiannual financial framework (MFF) for the years 2021 to 2027 with the €806.9 billion Next Generation EU (NGEU) instrument. This new financial architecture has brought new momentum to the EU budget, assigning it a major role in the Union’s strategy to relaunch the economy. In addition, on the revenue side, the European Commission has proposed a package of new own resources that could generate an average total of up to €17 billion annually (in 2018 prices) for the EU budget over the years 2026 to 2030. This sum would help to repay the funds raised by the EU to finance the grant component of Next Generation EU.

The 2022 budget is designed to support the EU’s recovery through investments, in addition to its other objectives. Although it is limited to €169.5 billion in commitments (1.14 % of EU-27 gross national income – GNI), it represents an important stimulus for public investment in several Member States, all the more so when considered in conjunction with NGEU, which is expected to provide an additional €143.5 billion. The EU budget includes a €1.6 billion reinforcement of flagship EU priorities, as negotiated and secured by the European Parliament. In this second year of both the 2021-2027 MFF and NGEU, the implementation of the new generation of EU actions and programmes is expected to gain momentum, while the programmes from the previous financing period, 2014 to 2020, approach closure. The green transition is an integral part of the recovery. It is estimated that, in 2022, the EU budget and NGEU will jointly contribute €165.3 billion to this objective. Other priorities supported by EU resources include cohesion and agriculture, the digital transformation, security and defence, migration and border management, and the EU’s role in the world.

The focus of this year’s edition of the Economic and Budgetary Outlook is recovery. Given the importance of the subject, two chapters are devoted to it (Chapters 6 and 7). The first deals with economic aspects of the recovery, while the second focuses on the Next Generation EU instrument and the Recovery and Resilience Facility.

The response provided by Member States and the EU to the pandemic, as well as the economic support provided to cushion the effects of lay-offs, preserve incomes and protect businesses, are the subject of this year’s ‘economic focus’. The fiscal and monetary reaction has been unprecedented, in terms of both approaches and volumes. It is described in detail, from the EU’s recovery package (MFF and NGEU) of €2 018 billion, to the ECB’s new Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme of €1 850 billion. This leads on to a topical debate on the fiscal rules, on whether (and to what extent) debt-financed government spending should be kept in check, and on some of the proposals available. Furthermore, as governments shift from the ‘rescue’ to the ‘recovery’ phase, some possible ways to harness this phase, to support the transition towards sustainable economies, are explored.

The Covid-19 pandemic has caused significant labour market dislocation, with effects varying between countries, sectors and social groups, exacerbating the pre-existing inequalities and accelerating the transition towards automation and digitalisation. The EU’s immediate ‘rescue’ policy response included job retention schemes, while – as economies have begun to recover – Member States have started to move towards long-term recovery measures. The recovery is expected to be unequal across sectors, and reallocation and other active labour market policies will play an important role. The Commission’s recommendation on ‘effective, active support to employment’ (EASE) offers a strategy for a gradual transition towards a job-rich recovery, supporting job creation and job-to-job transition, for instance to the green and digital sectors.

Lastly, the EU’s recovery response steers the transition towards climate neutrality, in line with the European Green Deal. To this end, an unprecedented volume of resources has been earmarked: 30 % of the EU’s long-term budget and NGEU taken together has been allocated to addressing climate change and biodiversity protection. Moreover, all investments must uphold the ‘do no significant harm’ principle. The EU’s green recovery areas are labelled ‘Power up’ (clean technologies and renewables), ‘Renovate’ (improvement of energy efficiency of public and private buildings) and ‘Recharge and refuel’ (sustainable, accessible and smart transport, charging and refuelling stations, and extension of public transport).

Overall, Next Generation EU – the recovery instrument financed through resources borrowed on the markets by the European Commission on behalf of the Union – represents a major innovation in EU finances. Complementing ECB action and national stimulus packages, with a coordinated common fiscal response, NGEU significantly reinforces the resources channelled through EU budgetary instruments up until 2026. Its main expenditure tool, the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), is implemented through national plans that comprise a coherent package of reforms and investments aimed at making the EU economy more sustainable, innovative and inclusive. To this end, the RRF focuses its action on six policy areas of European relevance identified as vital for strengthening the EU’s resilience, including the green transition (at least 37 % of each national plan) and the digital transformation (at least 20 %). The grant component of NGEU (up to €338 billion) is projected to be used entirely, whereas Member States have so far requested less than half of the available loan component (€166 billion out of €385.8 billion). While the RRF is already contributing to the EU recovery, 2022 is the first year of its full deployment, putting the focus on the importance of RRF implementation and monitoring, as underlined by the European Parliament. Lessons learnt from the RRF are likely to feed into the ongoing debate on the review of the EU’s economic governance framework.

Read the complete study on ‘Economic and Budgetary Outlook for the European Union 2022‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Hendrik Mildebrath.

The datafication of everyday life and data scandals have made the protection of personal information an increasingly important social, legal and political matter for the EU. In recent years, awareness of data rights and expectations for EU action in this area have both grown considerably.

The right to privacy and the right to protection of personal data are both enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and in the EU Treaties. The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 gave the Charter the same legal value as the Treaties and abolished the pillar structure, providing a stronger basis for a more effective and comprehensive EU data protection regime.

In 2012, the European Commission launched an ambitious reform to modernise the EU data protection framework. In 2016, the co-legislators adopted the EU’s most prominent data protection legislation – the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) – and the Law Enforcement Directive. The framework overhaul also included adopting an updated Regulation on Data Protection in the EU institutions and reforming the e-Privacy Directive, which is currently the subject of negotiation between the co-legislators.

The European Parliament has played a key role in these reforms, both as co-legislator and author of own-initiative reports and resolutions seeking to guarantee a high level of data protection for EU citizens. The European Court of Justice plays a crucial role in developing the EU data protection framework through case law.

In the coming years, challenges in the area of data protection will include balancing compliance and data needs of emerging technologies, equipping data protection authorities with sufficient resources to fulfil their tasks, mitigating compliance burdens for small and medium-sized enterprises, taming digital surveillance and further clarifying requirements of valid consent.

This is an updated edition of a briefing written by Sofija Voronova in May 2020.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The Conference on the Future of Europe‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Niombo Lomba, Lenka Jančová and Meenakshi Fernandes.

Europe is in the midst of a digital revolution that is transforming our approach to work and communication and building significant potential to improve living standards and economic output. With a potential to drastically change the economy and society, digital transformation can bring both promising developments and challenges. Digital transformation touches on all aspects of our lives, from public health, societal and democracy issues, and the environment, to the economy. The internet of things (IoT), cloud computing, artificial intelligence, advanced robotics and block-chain technologies are examples of technologies driving the revolution. Their influence on society is driven by the increasing affordability and computer power of consumer devices.

The European Union (EU) has implemented a set of digital principles and long-term digital targets with the European Commission communication on the digital decade. Nevertheless, there is a wide variation in advances in digital transformation both within the EU and between Member States. To this end, the EU and Member States are developing and adopting policies targeted at boosting digital transformation. This paper draws from the annexed study of the cost of non-Europe in digital transformation prepared by Ecorys, focusing on the competences of Parliament’s Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE). 

Figure 1 – Key gaps and barriers affecting aspects related to digital transformation

This Cost of Non-Europe study analyses the status quo of digital transformation in the EU in order to identify key gaps and barriers (see Figure 1) that negatively impact or hamper innovation; the EU’s digital leadership; its ability to achieve an effective twin transition entailing a green sustainable transformation; as well as social and fundamental rights aspects, such as gender equality and social inclusion. These gaps and barriers could be driven to some extent by the fragmentation of the internal market. Their impact is estimated in both economic and non-economic terms.

While not explicitly assessed, environmental pressures are also considered in this paper. These pressures are relevant in light of the EU ambition to achieve the digital as well as the green transition. 

If no additional EU-level action is taken to support the digital transformation, the cost is estimated at €315 billion in 2021, and would be expected to grow over time to reach €1.3 trillion by 2033. This cost stems from the identified gaps and barriers. The estimate is based on an assumed baseline scenario from mid-2020, reflecting the expected economic developments in the absence of further EU action. The manufacturing, construction and transportation sectors would see the greatest gains (14 %, 6 % and 4 % respectively). It should be noted that not all aspects of the cost of non-Europe (namely geopolitical and social impacts and impacts on fundamental rights), could be assessed in quantitative terms. Thus, the estimated figures could be understood as representing the lower bounds of the true cost of non-Europe in the area of the digital transformation.

Figure 2 – Policy options explored in the study

The research and analysis conducted throughout this study led to the development of the three main policy options (see Figure 2). The development of these policy options takes account of the initiatives announced up to May 2021. The selected policy options therefore go beyond those announced initiatives and point to potential initiatives that could further eliminate the existing gaps and further accelerate the ongoing digital transformation.

The policy options put forward and explored are unique and differ from each other in their impacts and benefits. Each policy option could be implemented independently of the others. However, they are complementary and one policy option could be strengthened by adding an individual element(s) from another policy option(s). As shown in Table 1, the assessments of policy options 1 and 3 are similar although policy option 1 scores lower in terms of the gaps and barriers addressed. The assessment for policy option 2 was weaker on some criteria in particular economic impacts and feasibility. Policy option 3 would generate the greatest economic benefits in terms of gross domestic profit (GDP) and employment. Moreover, it would address all the identified gaps and barriers for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) – a group that faces greater challenges in the digital transformation. When assessing the policy options in a quantitative manner, this paper makes assumptions as to what extent the proposed policy options could address the selected gaps and barriers. The estimated figures can be understood as representing the lower bounds of the potential benefits.

Table 1 – Summary of policy options assessments

Policy Option 1 – Enhance cybersecurity and trustPolicy Option 2 – Strengthen R&DPolicy Option 3 – Digital policy for SMEsExtent to which gaps and barriers addressed++++++Economic impacts+++++++Other impacts+++
(on innovation, geopolitics, competitiveness, acceptance of technology)++
(on innovation, competitiveness, changing mind-sets, spill-over innovation to other technologies)+++
(on innovation, geopolitics, competitiveness, benefits across the value chain, digital skills)Feasibility of implementing a policy option+++++++Proportionality and subsidiarity+++++++++Notes: feasibility, proportionality and subsidiarity are ranked from low (+), medium (++), to high (+++).
Source: Annex to this study – Ecorys.

Read the complete study on ‘Digital transformation – Cost of Non-Europe‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Rafał Mańko.

The annual rule of law reports, launched by the Commission in September 2020, are a new addition to the European institutions’ rule of law toolbox. The exercise can be described as a monitoring tool, as it collects data on the state of the rule of law in each of the 27 EU Member States but without drawing legal conclusions or giving specific recommendations. The second rule of law report was published in July 2021 and the third is expected in 2022, with the annual exercise becoming a permanent mechanism.

The methodology adopted by the Commission provides for reporting on four subject areas in all 27 Member States: (i) justice systems; (ii) the anti-corruption framework; (iii) media pluralism; and (iv) other institutional issues related to checks and balances. This methodology underlines the close involvement of Member States in the preparation of the annual reports and their follow-up.

The Member States are involved throughout the process by way of: (i) a network of contact persons on the rule of law that meets regularly with the Commission; (ii) contact persons providing written contributions to the report; (iii) dialogue between the Commission and Member States through the network of contact persons, the group of contact persons on national justice systems, the national contact points on corruption, and bilaterally at political and technical level; (iv) country visits; and (v) the opportunity for each Member State to comment on the part of the report concerning them.

The reports have met with some criticism from academics, who draw attention to the purely descriptive, rather than prescriptive nature of the reports and the lack of concrete follow-up.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The European Commission’s annual rule of law reports: A new monitoring tool‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Meenakshi Fernandes and Aleksandra Heflich.

Why this study?

Recent years have witnessed a number of disruptive events and developments that have generated significant and sometimes transformational impacts on society. Examples include the global financial crisis in 2008, the Brexit referendum results in 2016 and the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic in 2020. Current policy design and assessment tools seem to be ill-equipped to deal with the risks such events may entail. Moreover, Better Regulation tools such as ex-ante impact assessment and stakeholder consultation have often been sidelined due to the urgency to act.

Policy-makers are increasingly seeking to ‘future proof’ policies. In October 2021, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) called on governments to enable the development of agile and future-proof regulation. In November 2021, the European Commission issued a revised Better Regulation Guidelines and Toolbox that promotes the integration of strategic foresight into EU policy-making. Stress-testing is a strategic foresight method that appears particularly suitable for reinforcing the resilience and robustness of policies and legislation in view of unexpected shocks that could plausibly occur in the future. In a nutshell, stress-testing involves a critical assessment of a piece of legislation’s preparedness for the advent of disruptive events and developments. For example, would EU legislation concerning legal migration continue to function as intended if the internet failed? What elements in the legislation would support its resilience in the face of such an event? What additional elements could promote the legislation’s resilience to the event?

This study presents a practical methodology to stress-test EU legislation. This methodology can be applied to different policy areas and for different types of EU legislation (e.g. directives, regulations and recommendations). It draws on the lessons learnt and recommendations made following independent research led by Dr Tine Andersen of the Danish Technological Institute (see Annex – DTI Study). The research encompassed a comprehensive literature review, in-depth research in four countries with advanced foresight practices (Finland, the Netherlands, New Zealand and the United Kingdom), and a pilot-test for three policy areas (robotics and artificial intelligence (AI), information and consultation of workers, and competition policy – State aid).

Key findings

Stress-testing policies against a small number of disruptive events is achievable in a limited timeframe and can generate added value for the EU law-making process. Stress-testing can help to identify weak points or gaps for closer scrutiny in EU legislation, which could be addressed via proposed amendments or new legislation. 

In combination with strategic foresight, stress-testing can be applied most notably in the agenda-setting phase, but also in other phases of thelegislative cycle. It requires dedicated effort to carry out exercises and to maintain ties and communication with relevant institutions and networks. Stress-testing exercises should engage policy-makers and stakeholders at key points in the process. Following these guidelines could promote the relevance of the stress-testing exercise and its outcomes for EU law-making.

This study presents a step-by-step approach to carrying out stress-testing on EU policies. This approach draws on a range of expertise, tools and methods, including legal analysis, strategic foresight, regulatory policy analysis, narrative storytelling, online stakeholder engagement and SWOT (strength/weakness/opportunity/threat) analysis.

Recommendations

The European Parliament should consider the use of stress-testing to support its law-making and scrutiny activities and bolster its role as co-legislator. The organisational arrangements to facilitate the uptake of stress-testing could be inspired by examples from national parliaments. This study highlights the example of Finland, where the national Parliament includes a Committee for the Future.

Stress-testing in the European Parliament should ensure a participatory and transparent approach with other EU institutions and stakeholders. The stress-testing methodology, presented and discussed in this study, will be extended to other policy areas and legislation at different stages of its policy life-cycle. For this reason and to assist the European Parliament in using the methodology, the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS), will continue the stress-testing project in the second half of the ninth parliamentary term.

Read the complete study on ‘How to stress-test EU policies: Building a more resilient Europe for tomorrow‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

How to stress-test EU legislation