European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

With European elections coming up in May 2019, you probably want to know how the European Union impacts your daily life, before you think about voting. In the latest in a series of posts on what Europe does for you, your family, your business and your wellbeing, we look at what Europe does for antibiotic users.

Antibiotics are a very useful drug when you are sick and the doctor tells you that you need to take them. However, antimicrobial resistance (AMR) is a growing global threat to public health. It occurs when bacteria and other microbes, like viruses and fungi, develop resistance to drugs, especially antibiotics, used to treat the infections they cause. Although resistance appears naturally over time, it is accelerated by factors like overuse of antimicrobial medicines on humans and animals. In the EU alone it is estimated that infections caused by resistant microbes are responsible for 25 000 deaths a year. Some forecasts say that by 2050, drug-resistant infections could cause more deaths than cancer.

© Kenishirotie / Fotolia

For almost two decades, the European Union has been working on a solution to AMR. It strives to strengthen existing good practices and to support countries fighting AMR in both humans and animals. For instance, the EU promotes prudent use of antimicrobials and improved infection prevention. Every November, European Antibiotic Awareness Day promotes the responsible use of antibiotics, as many people are not aware of the risks of misusing antibiotics. The EU also aims to improve cooperation related to activities on AMR across the EU, targeting all actors who play a role in antimicrobial drug usage, such as the pharmaceutical industry. EU funds have been invested in, for example, common research efforts to develop new effective antibiotics. Moreover, the EU has reinforced cooperation with international organisations and third countries on surveillance and research.

Further information

• European Commission’s Directorate General for Health and Food Safety website, https://ec.europa.eu/health/amr/antimicrobial-resistance_en
• European Commission’s Directorate General for Research and Innovation website, https://ec.europa.eu/research/health/index.cfm?pg=area&areaname=amdr
• European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control’s website, https://ecdc.europa.eu/en/antimicrobial-resistance

With European elections coming up in May 2019, you probably want to know how the European Union impacts your daily life, before you think about voting. In the latest in a series of posts on what Europe does for you, your family, your business and your wellbeing, we look at what Europe does for beekeepers.

If you are one of the EU’s 600 000 professional or amateur beekeepers, offering consumers the much loved product that is honey, you are also undoubtedly well aware of the vital contribution that your activity makes to environmental conservation and food production. Indeed, your bees help to produce more than 200 000 tonnes of honey a year and, in doing so, ensure natural pollination for over 80 % of Europe’s cultivated crops and wild plants. Nevertheless, you may find it hard to keep your activity economically profitable in the face of threats to bee health and strong competition on the honey market. EU policies can play an important role in helping you cope with these challenges.

© Jaroslav Moravcik / Fotolia

For example, EU funds can cover up to half the cost of measures to address major issues such as bee health, hive management and product quality. Also, beekeeping products can benefit from promotional campaigns co-financed by the EU and from EU quality labels that can increase their economic potential on the market. More than 30 types of honey have already received an EU label of protected designation of origin (PDO) or protected geographical indication (PGI).

Furthermore, the EU policy-makers’ dialogue with stakeholders helps to define policies to support beekeeping indirectly, for example by promoting agricultural and environmental policies that prevent the deterioration of bees’ habitats, by fighting cases of food fraud, such as honey adulteration, and by funding research projects to study bee health problems and the high mortality rate registered in recent decades.

Further information

• EPRS publication ‘The EU’s beekeeping sector’, www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2017/608786/EPRS_ATA(2017)608786_EN.pdf
• EPRS publication ‘Les abeilles dans l’UE: un bilan de santé inquiétant’, www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/bibliotheque/briefing/2014/140792/LDM_BRI(2014)140792_REV1_FR.pdf
• European Commission’s website on honey bees, www.ec.europa.eu/food/animals/live_animals/bees_en

Written by Katarzyna Sochacka and Clare Ferguson,

Xavier BETTEL, Prime Minister of Luxembourg

The May II plenary session highlights were the debate on the 2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework and own resources in the context of the publication of individual proposals for spending programmes, and the debate on the future of Europe with the Prime Minister of Luxembourg, Xavier Bettel. Alpha Condé, President of Guinea and the President of Colombia, Juan Manuel Santos Calderón, also addressed Parliament. VP/HR Federica Mogherini’s statements on the situation in the Gaza Strip, the status of Jerusalem, and the situation in Nicaragua were also discussed. Debates followed on US tariffs in the steel and aluminium sector, the use of pre-accession funds in Turkey and the impact of delocalisation on workers and regions. Parliament approved the revision of the Posting of Workers Directive, and the modernisation of the Trade Defence Instruments Regulation (at second reading), and a multiannual plan for demersal stocks in the North Sea. Parliament voted, inter alia, on a number of own-initiative reports on implementation of the interinstitutional agreement on better law-making, odometer manipulation in motor vehicles, gender equality and women’s empowerment, and minimum standards on rights, support and protection for victims of crime.

MFF and own resources

Many Members expressed disappointment following statements from the Council and Commission on the Multiannual Financial Framework for 2021‑2027 and own resources, for which the Commission adopted overarching proposals on 2 May, and a first set of individual proposals for spending programmes this week. Parliament opposed any budget cuts over the 2021-2027 period that would change EU agricultural and cohesion policy objectives, in a resolution deploring the lack of an ambitious scale of appropriations, and opposing 15 % and 10 % reductions in the appropriations for agriculture and cohesion respectively. Parliament stresses the overall total in percentage of GNI terms is lower than the current MFF in real terms and underlines the need for the Parliament and Council to agree a clear methodology.

Multiannual plan for demersal stocks in the North Sea

Over 70 % of fish caught by EU fishermen in the North Sea, worth more than €850 million, are species that live close to the seabed, such as cod and haddock. Parliament is particularly concerned that fisheries measures should be taken based on the best available scientific advice, with a view to managing fishing stocks to secure the long-term sustainability of the North Sea fisheries, including joint management with third countries in the region. Members approved at first reading a text agreed with Council on a multi-annual plan for demersal stocks in the North Sea and the fisheries exploiting those stocks.

Posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services

Parliament debated the agreement reached with the Council on the revision of the Posting of Workers Directive, which was adopted with a majority that exceeded expectations (456 votes for, 147 votes against and 49 abstentions). Posting of workers is increasingly common in the internal market, particularly in the services sector, but such workers often find themselves at a disadvantage compared to their peers in their host country, through receiving lower wages and in a lack of legal protection. The Commission’s proposed revisions to the 1996 directive that currently governs the treatment of posted workers, aim at adapting them to today’s labour market and the needs of firms, while ensuring fair social protection for workers.

Modernisation of Trade Defence Instruments

Parliament approved the International Trade Committee’s recommendation for a second reading of the new regulation on the protection against dumped and subsidised imports from countries not members of the EU. Modernising trade defence instruments, which allow countries to counter unfair trade practices under World Trade Organization rules, is needed to ensure Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Regulations are fit for the fast evolving global trade environment. Key issues are the proposal for partial waiver of the ‘lesser duty rule’ (LDR) for vulnerable countries, and the introduction of interested party status for trade unions.

South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation

Members voted at first reading on a text on the transposition of management, conservation and control measures applicable in the Convention Area of the South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation, making the measures applicable to EU fishing vessels that fish in the area, to, among other things, control the types of nets used, reduce seabird capture, and manage fishing affecting the sea bottom.

Proliferation of corruption and crime through golden visas

Members discussed EU values and the proliferation of corruption and crime through ‘golden visas’, a practice whereby some EU countries offer citizenship or residence to persons who bring funding into their country. As the former also automatically confers EU citizenship, the equity of such schemes, and their possible links to corruption and crime, as well as the effect on other Member States, cause concern.

Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making

Parliament adopted its report on the interpretation and implementation of the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making, in force since 2016. Through their commitment to greater simplicity, clarity and consistency in Union legislation, and better coordination and transparency in the legislative process, the EU institutions have issued annual joint declarations on legislative priorities and improved access to information in the preparation of delegated acts. However, the report deems progress on other issues, such as information flow from the Council, and lack of transparency in Member States regarding their ‘gold-plating’ of EU law to be unsatisfactory.

Minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime

Members debated and adopted a report assessing the implementation of the Victims’ Rights Directive – legislation ensuring EU-wide protection and support for victims of crime. Parliament has long supported ensuring minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime throughout the EU, aiming at better protection against domestic violence and crimes such as stalking. However, some Member States have delayed introduction of the legislation, leading to differences in the treatment of victims.

EU solidarity fund amendment to the EU budget

Parliament amended the EU budget in order to provide €97.6 million in EU Solidarity Fund assistance for Greece, Spain, France and Portugal to help with the recovery from natural disasters, earthquakes, hurricanes, and catastrophic fires suffered in the course of 2017.

Odometer manipulation in motor vehicles

Parliament adopted a report on revising the EU legal framework on odometer manipulation in motor vehicles – or tampering with the mileage gauge in cars – on Thursday. The practice is particularly prevalent in the very large EU second-hand car market and poses risks to consumers, who are often unaware of the fraud, and to road safety. The report proposes that hardware solutions are introduced to protect new vehicles, that mileage recordings are made mandatory, and that long-term solutions are explored, as well as making odometer fraud an offence.

Gender equality and women’s empowerment

Members adopted a resolution concerning the implementation of the Gender Action Plan, and particularly transforming the lives of girls and women through EU external relations in the development sphere, by ensuring gender equality and women’s empowerment, including within the EU institutions themselves.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

Parliamentary committees’ decisions to enter into interinstitutional (trilogue) negotiations were confirmed on a common procedure for international protection in the Union (Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs Committee); on EMIR and ESMA regulations (Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee); and on common rules for the operation of air services in the Community (Transport and Tourism Committee).

This ‘at a glance’ note is intended to review some of the highlights of the plenary part-session, and notably to follow up on key dossiers identified by EPRS. It does not aim to be exhaustive. For more detailed information on specific files, please see other EPRS products, notably our ‘EU legislation in progress’ briefings, and the plenary minutes.

Read this ‘At a glance’ note on ‘Plenary round-up – Strasbourg, May II 2018‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Angelos Delivorias (1st edition),

© Björn Wylezich / Fotolia

Covered bonds are debt securities issued by credit institutions and secured by a pool of mortgage loans or credit towards the public sector. They are characterised further by the double protection offered to bondholders, the segregation of assets in their cover pool, over-collateralisation, and their strict supervisory frameworks. Currently, their issuance is concentrated in five Member States. National regulatory regimes vary widely in terms of supervision and composition of the cover pool. Lastly, despite benefiting from preferential treatment under the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR), they share no common definition, which can lead to different securities benefiting from this treatment. To remedy this, the Commission has adopted proposals for, on the one hand, a directive, which would lay down investor protection rules and provide common definitions, and on the other, a regulation, which would amend the CRR with regard to covered bond exposures.

Versions

• May 2018: ‘Covered bonds – Issue and supervision, exposures‘ (1st edition)

Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the issue of covered bonds and covered bond public supervision and amending Directive 2009/65/EC and Directive 2014/59/EU
Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 as regards exposures in the form of covered bonds Committee responsible: Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) COM(2018) 94
COM(2018) 93
12.3.2018

2018/0042 (COD)
2018/0043 (COD)

Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Rapporteur:

To be appointed.

Shadow rapporteurs:

To be appointed.

Next steps expected: Initial discussion in committee

Written by Cécile Remeur (1st edition),

© Art_Photo / Fotolia

Value added tax (VAT) is a consumption tax borne by the final consumers and collected by businesses as taxable persons. Businesses have VAT administrative obligations and act as VAT collectors. This generates compliance costs that are higher for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) than for bigger businesses, in spite of the small business exemption, especially in the case of cross-border activities.

The proposal for a revision of the VAT Directive relating to the common system of value added tax as regards the special scheme for small enterprises simplifies the rules, so as to reduce VAT compliance costs for SMEs by introducing simpler measures regarding invoicing, VAT registration, accounting and returns for SMEs, whether they operate in wholly domestic markets only or also across borders in the EU.

The legislative proposal falls under the consultation procedure.

Interactive PDF

• VAT for small enterprises

Proposal for a Council directive amending directive 2006/112/EC on the common system of value added tax as regards the special scheme for small enterprises Committee responsible: Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) COM(2018) 21 of 18.1.2018

procedure ref.: 2018/0006(CNS)

Consultation Procedure Rapporteur: Tom Vandenkendelaere (EPP, Belgium) Shadow rapporteurs:

  Alfred Sant (S&D, Malta)
Stanisław Ożóg (ECR, Poland)
Caroline Nagtegaal (ALDE, the Netherlands)
Paloma López Bermejo (GUE/NGL, Spain)
Molly Scott Cato (Greens/EFA, United Kingdom) Next steps expected: Discussion of the draft report

With European elections coming up in May 2019, you probably want to know how the European Union impacts your daily life, before you think about voting. In the latest in a series of posts on what Europe does for you, your family, your business and your wellbeing, we look at what Europe does for non-smokers.

Do you suffer from having to breathe second-hand smoke from someone else’s cigarette? Even if protection for passive smokers has improved considerably in the EU, one in five citizens is still exposed to second-hand smoke.

Smoking is the largest preventable cause of death in Europe, responsible for about 90 % of lung cancers, and causes other forms of cancer, including of the mouth and throat. It raises the risk of cardiovascular diseases and can lead to lung conditions, such as chronic obstructive pulmonary disease.

Inhaling second-hand smoke raises non-smokers’ risk of developing the same health issues as smokers. Babies and children are particularly vulnerable.

© vchalup / Fotolia

In the EU one in every four citizens aged 15 or over is a smoker. True to the saying ‘the best way to quit is never to start’, the EU aims to deter people, especially the young, from taking it up. Measures to protect Europeans against the harmful effects of smoking range from laws on packaging, labelling and the ingredients in tobacco products; restrictions on tobacco advertising; tax measures and combating illicit trade; to anti-tobacco campaigns (‘Ex-Smokers are Unstoppable’ targeted EU smokers aged 25-34, with over 480 000 benefitting from the iCoach tool).

Laws on smoke-free environments, such as indoor workplaces, public transport, and restaurants and bars, are the responsibility of national governments; the EU’s simply coordinates. All EU countries have national rules in place, even though they vary in scope. Overall results show the positive, and immediate, health effects of indoor smoking bans.

Further information

• European Commission’s Directorate General for Health and Food Safety website, https://ec.europa.eu/health/tobacco/policy_en
• European Commission’s Eurostat website, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Tobacco_consumption_statistics
• EPRS publication on ‘Technological innovation strategies in substance use disorders’, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_STU(2017)581942

Written by Enrico D’Ambrogio,

© beebright / Fotolia

Following fears in 2017 of an escalation of the North Korean crisis, an unexpected detente has come in early 2018. North Korean athletes took part in the Winter Olympics in South Korea, and Pyongyang undertook a charm offensive followed by a successful historic inter-Korean summit in late April, which may prompt long-awaited peace talks. A summit between US President Trump and North Korean Leader Kim Jong‑un had been scheduled for 12 June in Singapore, but Trump called it off on 24 May. The main issue is the extent to which Pyongyang’s leadership is ready to agree on denuclearisation on the Korean Peninsula.

An unexpected detente

The events of 2017 triggered fears around the world that the North Korean crisis could develop into a larger-scale conflict. Instead, in his New Year speech, Kim, though not renouncing his bellicose language towards the USA, held out an olive branch to Seoul, calling for peace on the Korean peninsula and offering talks on sending a delegation to the February 2018 Winter Olympics in Pyeongchang (South Korea). The USA and South Korea announced the postponement of their annual Foal Eagle military exercises. On 17 January 2018, the two Koreas reached an agreement: North Korea would participate in the Olympics, the athletes of both sides would march together under the blue Korean Reunification Flag and form a joint women’s ice hockey team. Kim’s younger sister Kim Yo-jong was a member of the North Korean delegation and her handshake with South Korea’s President Moon Jae-in during the opening ceremony, together with an all-female North Korean squad of cheerleaders, upstaged the Olympic athletes. Kim Yo‑jong delivered her brother’s invitation to President Moon to visit Pyongyang. On 5 March in Pyongyang, Kim met a delegation of South Korean officials for the first time. On 6 March, Seoul announced that the two Koreas had agreed to hold a summit at the end of April at the truce village of Panmunjeom. This was followed by the 9 March announcement that US President Trump had accepted Kim’s proposal for a bilateral summit. Kim then made a secret trip to China to meet Xi Jinping, his first trip abroad since becoming leader. On 21 April, North Korea reaffirmed that it would suspend nuclear and missile tests immediately and dismantle its nuclear site in Punggye-ri, where Pyongyang’s six nuclear tests had taken place. On 28 April, Seoul officials said that the dismantlement would be done in the presence of experts and media representatives.

The inter-Korean summit

On 27 April, Kim Jong-un and Moon Jae-in met at the Peace House in the truce village of Panmunjeom, in the Korean demilitarised zone. This was the first inter-Korean summit to take place outside North Korea (the previous two in 2000 and 2007 were held in Pyongyang) and the first visit by a Northern leader to Southern territory. Many elements of this highly mediatised summit were expressly designed to be symbolic.

The two leaders issued the Panmunjeom Declaration. They agreed to pursue trilateral or quadrilateral meetings in the course of 2018 ─ involving the two Koreas and the USA, and/or China too ─ to declare the end of the Korean War and to sign a peace treaty. They ‘confirmed the common goal of realising, through complete denuclearisation, a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula’. They agreed to carry out disarmament in a phased manner and to transform the demilitarised zone into a ‘peace zone’ and to cease all hostile acts against each other, such as for instance broadcasting through loudspeakers and distributing leaflets. The Northern Limit Line in the West Sea (also known as the Yellow Sea) would be turned into a maritime peace zone. The two countries have already re-established a hotline and will hold dialogues, negotiations and establish a joint liaison office with representatives of both sides. Cross-border railways and roads are to be built, as agreed in 2007. Reunion programmes for separated families are to be planned for 15 August, National Liberation Day, the two countries’ only common public holiday, and there will be joint participation in the 2018 Asian Games. Later Pyongyang reset its time zone to match Seoul’s time, moving back from its 2015 decision. Whereas only one year ago, South Korea appeared side-lined in the context of the North Korean crisis, Moon Jae-in, elected on a programme to engage with North Korea, is now reaping the benefits of his work on diplomatic rapprochement between Pyongyang, Seoul and Washington. Not only is he enjoying record support, but he has also convinced a previously reluctant South Korean public of the merits of engaging with Pyongyang. Moon has also underlined that the issue of the US armed forces presence in South Korea (28 500 personnel) is unrelated to the peace agreement ─ although some allege that Washington may consider downsizing or even removing them.

A US-North Korea summit would be on denuclearisation, not on human rights

A US-North Korea summit had been announced as taking place in Singapore on 12 June 2018. It would have been the first ever meeting between a sitting US president and a North Korean leader. Washington has claimed that its intransigent policy ─ which led it to walk away from the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, despite EU and UN opposition ─ is paying off. Internationally backed UN sanctions may have convinced Pyongyang’s regime to come to terms, especially after Beijing, frustrated by its lack of leverage to prevent North Korea from escalating regional tensions, began adopting a tougher line. This is a critical issue for Pyongyang as trade with China is crucial to its survival. This also explains why Kim has met Xi Jinping twice in two months ─ a second surprise summit took place on 7 and 8 May. In turn, China is concerned about being outflanked by Washington in peace talks (as is Japan, owing to the security implications) and is successfully reasserting its influence. Kim Jong‑un, meanwhile, has gained confidence since completing the development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles able to strike the US mainland: he may feel able to negotiate from a position of strength. His focus now has shifted towards economic development: on 21 April, Kim proclaimed that the ruling Workers’ Party’s ‘new strategic line’ should be socialist economic construction.

On 17 April, it was revealed that, while he still was CIA director – shortly after being nominated (but before being confirmed) as secretary of state – Mike Pompeo had travelled to North Korea to meet with Kim Jong-un. Pompeo said that Kim is ‘serious’ about denuclearisation. The parties may look at the issue in different ways however. Washington’s position can be summed up in the acronym CVID: complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement of the North Korean facilities, carried out under the inspection of independent observers. Only once these conditions have been met, would US policy towards Pyongyang be ready to change. Pyongyang may however advocate denuclearisation of the whole Korean Peninsula in a wider sense, that would include the US military presence ─ despite Moon’s recent reassurances ─ and in an incremental approach under which concessions would be synchronised. North Korea threatened to pull out of the Singapore summit following US National Security Adviser, John Bolton‘s, and Vice-President, Mike Pence‘s, references to the Libyan model, and insulted the latter. This prompted Trump to cancel the summit on 24 May, citing ‘tremendous anger and open hostility in North Korea’s most recent statement.

UN Secretary-General António Guterres is optimistic that the negotiations on denuclearisation would be meaningful. A compromise between the two positions will however need to be found if a deal is to be achieved. Should a summit take place, its agenda ─ as was the case for the inter-Korean summit ─ may not include North Korean human rights abuses, despite the ‘egregious human rights violations’ ascertained in the 2017 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices published on 20 April by the US Department of State. However, following a second surprise visit by Pompeo to Pyongyang on 9 May, three US citizens imprisoned in North Korea since 2015 and 2017, were released ─ a goodwill gesture from Kim.

EU and European Parliament on recent North Korean crisis developments

On 9 March, High Representative/Vice-President (HR/VP) Federica Mogherini welcomed the announce­ment of the two summits. She reaffirmed that the EU supports ‘the objective of the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula’. On 13 March, during a debate at the European Parliament in Strasbourg, she praised President Moon’s efforts and underlined the power of multilateral diplomacy and the unity of the international community. A delegation from Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs visited South Korea, including the demilitarised zone near the North Korean border, on 5 and 6 April. The delegation advocated a new boost to peace talks and the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula, urging that pressure on North Korea should be maintained, until it delivers in a concrete manner. On 6 April, the EU Council aligned its restrictive measures with the latest UN sanctions against North Korea, and on 19 April it added four people involved in financing the nuclear programme to the sanctions list. On 21 April, the HR/VP welcomed Kim’s announcement that nuclear tests and missiles launches were being halted and the nuclear test site closed. She offered to share the EU’s experience of negotiations on denuclearisation, while maintaining its policy of critical engagement.

Read this ‘At a glance’ note on ‘North Korea: No summit for the moment‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Wouter van Ballegooij and Piotr Bakowski,

fotolia

In the wake of recent attacks, surveys show that combatting terrorism while respecting individual freedom, remains one of the key concerns of EU citizens. The EU fights terrorism through supporting various national measures and exchanges, including those preventing radicalisation and recruitment, measures addressing terrorist financing and regulating the possession and acquisition of weapons and explosives, as well as instruments aimed at strengthening security at the Union’s external borders. Moreover, the EU supports operational cooperation between national law enforcement authorities, as well as harmonising terrorism-related provisions in criminal law and procedure. This includes active cooperation with third countries and international organisations.

Gaps and barriers

Nevertheless, this Cost of Non-Europe report identifies a number of gaps and barriers in EU counterterrorism action, notably regarding:

• The accountability and oversight of – and the evidence-base for – policy and law making;
• The evidence base for – and fundamental rights compliance of – counter-radicalisation programmes;
• The scope of action related to the disruption of terrorist financing;
• Information sharing between Member States through various EU and national databases, in part due to the complex architecture of these databases and the lack of their interconnection due to legal and technical limitations and a degree of unwillingness among national authorities to share information;
• The awareness and use made of judicial cooperation tools; and
• The use made of the (analytical) support and coordination possibilities by EU agencies.

Impact of terrorism and counterterrorism measures

Further EU action in the area is imperative since, besides the impact on victims and their families, terrorism has a negative effect on the wellbeing of the population as a whole, affecting people’s life satisfaction, happiness, health and trust within communities and in national political institutions. Since 2004, terrorism has cost the EU about €185 billion in lost Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and around €5.6 billion in lost lives, injuries and damages to infrastructure. It is argued that terrorism also harms trade, foreign direct investment, tourism (where the consequences are immediate, but often short-lived) and transport. Inversely, the defence sector has benefited from increased investments. Moreover, in recent years, the EU counterterrorism budget has risen significantly, as illustrated by the €4 billion in commitments and €3 billion in payments towards the Commission’s Security and Citizenship programme in 2016. Finally, certain measures and practices under the guise of the fight against terrorism have had a disproportionate impact on suspects and wider groups within the society: not only have they violated fundamental rights, but they were also counterproductive. Examples include the rendition, unlawful detention and torture of terrorism suspects in secret locations, anti-radicalisation programmes conflating the Muslim faith with violent extremism (and thus further ostracising a community which already faces severe discrimination), as well as blanket mass surveillance by intelligence services.

Policy options

Significant benefits could be achieved by the EU and its Member States by addressing the gaps and barriers described above, notably by:

• Making sure we know what works and what does not and ensuring people’s fundamental rights are respected in the fight against terrorism. This can be achieved through the development of an evidence-based EU criminal policy cycle involving the European Parliament and national parliaments. In this context EU institutions should conduct proper ex-ante assessments and ex-post evaluations of counterterrorism measures in line with better law making principles;
• In the same vein, monitoring the effectiveness and fundamental rights compliance of counter-radicalisation programmes;
• Depriving terrorists from their funding by further refining the framework for countering terrorism financing; and
• Fostering a European law enforcement culture with full respect for fundamental rights, in which relevant information is shared and analysed, judicial cooperation tools are properly used and seeking the support of EU agencies becomes a natural thing to do. This also requires the allocation of significant resources aimed at training and exchanges.

Beyond resulting in a more relevant, coherent, effective and efficient action in the fight against terrorism, such measures could increase the wellbeing of the population, reduce the material and immaterial impacts of terrorism, and ensure protection of fundamental rights when impacted by counterterrorism measures.

Read this study on ‘The fight against terrorism‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

With European elections coming up in May 2019, you probably want to know how the European Union impacts your daily life, before you think about voting. In the latest in a series of posts on what Europe does for you, your family, your business and your wellbeing, we look at what Europe does for surfers.

The EU makes it easier for you to enjoy riding the waves in several ways.

Most importantly, you can enjoy improved water quality at many EU surfing spots, thanks to EU rules that protect the environment, including against sewage and industrial waste. This reduces your chances of getting sick. The EU also publishes information on bathing water quality online, so that you can easily check the water quality at your favourite surfing spots.

© oneinchpunch / Fotolia

As a surfer, you know how hard it can be to find the best surfing spots. If you love surfing but live inland, there’s nothing to stop you trying out the surf in another EU country, as there are no borders within the EU Schengen Area. The EU has provided financial support to several projects that can help you explore new destinations. One example is ‘SURFINGEUROPE‘, which enables you to discover an entire surfing route, from Bundoran in Ireland to Viana do Castelo in Portugal. Another example of EU funding is ‘Green Room‘, which helps you plan a sustainable surfing experience in six Surf Camps, including in Bornholm in Denmark and Gran Canaria in Spain. Such projects promote local tourism and increase employment, from which you might also benefit.

Finally, a special free app called ‘MeteoSurf‘ uses data from the EU-managed Copernicus earth observation programme to provide surfers with information on sea conditions in the Mediterranean Sea. Once you select a surfing spot, MeteoSurf produces a table with the forecast for wave height, wave direction, wind speed and wind direction. All you need to do is catch the perfect wave!

Further information

• European Commission’s Directorate General for Environment website on ‘Bathing water quality’, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/water/water-bathing/index_en.html
• Official website of Surfing Europe, http://europesurfing.eu/
• Official website of the Green Room Surf Alliance, http://www.greenroom-surfalliance.org/philosophy.php
• European Commission’s Copernicus Marine Environment Monitoring Service website on ‘Meteosurf’, http://marine.copernicus.eu/usecases/met-ocean-conditions-surfers/

With European elections coming up in May 2019, you probably want to know how the European Union impacts your daily life, before you think about voting. In the latest in a series of posts on what Europe does for you, your family, your business and your wellbeing, we look at what Europe does for rail passengers.

Considerable growth in passenger transport in the EU and a wider choice of transport operators has led the EU to consider that passengers should benefit from the same standards of treatment, regardless of how and where they travel. It has therefore adopted a common set of 10 basic rights for rail, air, road and waterborne passengers, to provide them with information and assistance and forbid discrimination.

If you are a train passenger, you may know that additional specific rights and obligations have been in force since December 2009. As a passenger, you must be kept informed before and during your journey, for instance on the lowest fares, delays, access conditions and facilities for people with disabilities.

© kasto / Fotolia

In the event of a foreseeable delay of more than one hour you can choose between a refund (full or partial) of your ticket, continuation, or rerouting to your final destination. You can also get assistance: meals, refreshments and, under certain conditions, accommodation. If you continue your journey, you can get 25 % to 50 % delay compensation.

Involvement in a train accident, entitles you to compensation and to advance payment for immediate needs. You are also entitled to compensation if a registered piece of luggage is lost or damaged. Disabled people have the right to assistance in stations and on board trains; and passengers can bring easy-to-handle bicycles onto the train. If you are dissatisfied with the service you receive, you can complain to the railway company. The Commission published a fresh proposal on rail passenger rights in September 2017.

Further information

• EPRS publication on ‘Rail passenger rights in the European Union’, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2016/593566/EPRS_ATA%282016%29593566_EN.pdf
• EPRS publication on ‘Rail passenger rights and obligations’, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/it/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI%282016%29587352

With European elections coming up in May 2019, you probably want to know how the European Union impacts your daily life, before you think about voting. In the latest in a series of posts on what Europe does for you, your family, your business and your wellbeing, we look at what Europe does for teachers.

Most people have heard of Erasmus, the EU’s successful student exchange programme, which has enabled millions to study abroad. Less well known is that teachers – from universities, schools, vocational colleges and adult education – can also take part. In 2015, over 100,000 teachers travelled abroad with the help of EU grants.

Erasmus offers teachers opportunities to travel to 33 countries for up to two months. During their trips, some teachers take part in training courses, others join the staff of schools and universities to experience working in a different educational system. Another option is job shadowing to learn how teachers from other countries deal with day-to-day challenges. All of these activities are a great way for teachers to develop professionally, get new ideas and make new contacts.

© johoo / Fotolia

As well as Erasmus, the EU brings together teachers from different countries through networks and online communities. For example, on eTwinning, there are nearly half a million teachers from 180 000 schools all over Europe exchanging ideas on subjects as varied as awareness-raising of smoking health risks to craft activities for school libraries. School Education Gateway offers access to free online training courses and teaching materials.

For teachers who would like to spend more than a few months abroad, the EU has removed some of the barriers to working abroad through mutual recognition of teaching qualifications; this means that, for example, a teacher who qualified in one EU country can teach in another without having to take additional exams.

Further information

• The EU and the teaching professions: http://ec.europa.eu/education/policy/school/teaching-professions_en
• eTwinning home page: https://www.etwinning.net/en/pub/index.htm
• School Education Gateway: https://www.schooleducationgateway.eu/en/pub/index.htm

With European elections coming up in May 2019, you probably want to know how the European Union impacts your daily life, before you think about voting. In the latest in a series of posts on what Europe does for you, your family, your business and your wellbeing, we look at what Europe does for early school leavers.

Did you leave school early? Or do you know someone who might? Leaving school without qualifications may seem a personal choice, yet around 6.4 million young people in Europe are in the same situation. School can seem too difficult or irrelevant and other problems may make walking out seem like the thing to do. Yet young people who leave school early are less likely to find a job, will probably earn less, might miss out on some benefits of technology, and can have more health problems later on.

© Monkey Business / Fotolia

This is not always the case, but as the risks are high, the EU has made it its business to work on the situation. It brought education ministers together to agree to bring down the share of early school leavers in the EU to less than 10 % by 2020. Member States will need to try different solutions to achieve this result, so the EU offers support by helping them exchange experiences. In this way they can learn from each other which changes are more likely to produce good results. It is also monitoring results so Member States can understand how well they are doing.

You may feel all this is too late for you now, but if you regret not having much to show for your skills, and if you wish to improve them further, it’s never too late to go to your local job office or education authority. The EU developed the Youth Guarantee to help Member States give people a second chance, not necessarily in a classroom, but possibly even in a workplace setting. Tools are also being developed to recognise the skills you might have developed outside school in a way future employers are likely to appreciate.

Further information

• Early School Leaving Commission webpage http://ec.europa.eu/education/policy/school/early-school-leavers_en
• Youth Guarantee http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=1079
• Basic skills http://ec.europa.eu/education/policy/school/math_en

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

© pixs:sell / Fotolia

European Union officials have warned the United Kingdom that time is running out if definitive agreement on the country’s withdrawal from the Union is to be reached by this autumn. Meanwhile, British Prime Minister Theresa May is struggling to keep her Cabinet and Conservative Party united as the focus of negotiations has shifted to the future customs regime and the accompanying, highly sensitive, issue of the border between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland.

This note offers links to reports and commentaries from some major international think-tanks and research institutes on Brexit negotiations and related issues. More reports on the topic can be found in a previous edition of ‘What Think Tanks are thinking’, published in January 2018.

Brexit: Next steps in UK’s withdrawal from the EU
House of Commons Library, May 2018

Brexit and EU agencies
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, May 2018

Brexit: What Theresa May’s White Paper must do
European Policy Centre, May 2018

How “special” will the UK-EU security partnership really be?
Open Europe, May 2018

Brexit endgame: Uncertainty mounts in face of deep Tory divides
Scottish Centre for International Relations, May 2018

UK must swallow the unpalatable Irish backstop
Centre for European Reform, May 2018

Theresa May’s Cabinet customs row is irrelevant, it’s the Brexit backstop that really matters
Centre for European Reform, May 2018

Getting over the line: Solutions to the Irish border
Policy Exchange, May 2018

Brexit Brief
Institute of International and European Affairs, May 2018

While May must decide what to do about Northern Ireland and Brexit, here’s what the people themselves think
UK in a Changing Europe, May 2018

Brexit: Implications for cross-border lives
UK in a Changing Europe, May 2018

India and the UK adjust to the realities of Brexit
UK in a Changing World, May 2018

Voting on Brexit: Parliament’s consideration of the withdrawal deal and future framework
Institute for Government, April 2018

Devolution after Brexit: Managing the environment, agriculture and fisheries
Institute for Government, April 2018

The reopening of the Irish question
Carnegie Europe, April 2018

Brexit: What impact on British global power?
Institut Thomas More, April 2018

Plugging in the British: EU defence policy
Centre for European Reform, April 2018

What third-country role is open to the UK in defence?
Centre for European Policy Studies, April 2018

The EU budget after Brexit: Reform not revolution
Centre for European Reform, April 2018

‘Zero-sum’ approach to defence and security during Brexit negotiations risks a less secure UK and EU
Rand Corporation, April 2018

Deepening political divisions and exacerbating peripherality: Scotland, Northern Ireland and Brexit
Scottish Centre for International Relations, April 2018

Brexit roundup series
Scottish Centre for International Relations, April 2018

The bigger EU problems hidden by Brexit
Friends of Europe, April 2018

Who will cope with the post-Brexit resentment?
Notre Europe, April 2018

Wishful Brexiting: Or the complicated transformation of what Britain wants into reality
Fondation Robert Schuman, March 2018

Brexit: Half in, half out or right out?
European Policy Centre, March 2018

Believe it or not, EU doesn’t share Britain’s obsession with Brexit
Friends of Europe, March 2018

Brexit and the financial services industry: The story so far
European Policy Centre, March 2018

Negotiating Brexit: The views of the EU27
Institute for Government, March 2018

Keeping Europe safe after Brexit
European Council on Foreign Relations, March 2018

Rethinking the European Union’s post-Brexit budget priorities
Bruegel, March 2018

The Brexit transition deal
Bruegel, March 2018

Costing Brexit: What is Whitehall spending on exiting the EU?
Institute for Government, March 2018

A Brexit gentlemen’s agreement
Centre for European Policy Studies, March 2018

The impact of the UK-EU agreement on residence rights for EU families
UK in a Changing Europe, March 2018

There is life for the EU after Brexit
Carnegie Europe, March 2018

Getting accustomed to Brexit: UK and the customs union scenario
Bruegel, March 2018

Will the unity of the 27 crack?
Centre for European Reform, March 2018

Plugging in the British: EU foreign policy
Centre for European Reform, March 2018

Theresa May’s deep and comprehensive free trade agreement
Centre for European Policy Studies, March 2018

Brexit: Promising the impossible
Carnegie Europe, March 2018

Implications of Brexit for food and agriculture in developing countries
Trinity College Dublin, March 2018

Why a good Brexit outcome matters (and it’s not just the economy, stupid!)
Bruegel, February 2018

Ireland-UK relations and Northern Ireland after Brexit
LSE Ideas, February 2018

Global champion: The case for unilateral free trade
Policy Exchange, February 2018

Brexit and beyond: The future of Europe
Dahrendorf Forum, February 2018

Over-the-counter interest rate derivatives: The clock is ticking for the UK and the EU
Centre for European Policy Studies, February 2018

Brexit: The transition period
Fondation Robert Schuman, February 2018

Brexit and human rights
Centre for International Governance Innovation, February 2018

Cross-border insolvencies after Brexit: Views from the United Kingdom and Continental Europe
Centre for International Governance Innovation, February 2018

Failing financial institutions: How will Brexit impact cross-border cooperation in recovery, reconstruction and insolvency processes?
Centre for International Governance Innovation, February 2018

Brexit and environmental law: The rocky road ahead
Centre for International Governance Innovation, February 2018

Leaving the EU, not the European model? New findings on public attitudes to Brexit
Institute for Public Policy Research, February 2018

Have your cake or eat it
Institute for Public Policy Research, February 2018

Theresa May et le bateau ivre du Brexit
Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques, February 2018

Brexit and European security
Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, February 2018

UK foreign and security policy post-Brexit: The search for a European Strategy
Swedish Institute of International Affairs, February 2018

Brexit, strategy, and the EU: Britain takes leave
Egmont, January 2018

Read this briefing on ‘Brexit negotiations‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Martin Russell,

© cone88 / Fotolia

Sanctions have become an increasingly central element of the EU’s common and foreign security policy. At present, the EU has 42 sanctions programmes in place, making it the world’s second-most active user of restrictive measures, after the US.

Unlike the comprehensive trade embargoes used in the past, the EU has moved towards asset freezes and visa bans targeted at individual persons and companies, aiming to influence foreign governments while avoiding humanitarian costs for the general population. Other measures in the sanctions toolkit include arms embargoes, sectoral trade and investment restrictions, as well as suspensions of development aid and trade preferences.

Listen to podcast ‘EU sanctions, A key foreign and security policy instrument‘

The declared purpose of EU sanctions is to uphold the international security order as well as defending human rights and democracy standards, by encouraging targeted countries to change their behaviour. Measuring their effectiveness is difficult, as sanctions rarely achieve all their aims, and usually there are other causes to which changes can be attributed. However, even when this primary purpose is not achieved, sanctions may have useful secondary effects, for example by deterring other actors from similar behaviour.

The broader the international support for EU sanctions and the closer the relationship between the EU and the targeted country are, the stronger the prospects for success will be. On the other hand, effectiveness can be undermined by inconsistent application of sanctions standards and by the difficulty of coordinating implementation between multiple stakeholders.

Read this briefing on ‘EU sanctions, A key foreign and security policy instrument‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Szczepański,

© spql / Fotolia

Ten years have passed since the app economy was launched. Since then apps have evolved to play an increasingly important role in the life of citizens and became crucial to the success of many industries. Growing connectivity and availability of portable devices ensure that this trend will continue.

The European app economy is rather successful and accounts for just under a third of revenues in the global market. Clusters of app developers exist in a few western European and Nordic Member States creating well-paid jobs, value and innovation in the digital economy. However, some bottlenecks still exist and hamper the growth of the sector. These include limited availability of finance, shortage of digital skills, the need to constantly upgrade infrastructure, and improving access to data.

Listen to podcast ‘European app economy, State of play, challenges and EU policy‘

The EU strives to address these issues by creating an environment conducive to growth of the app economy. The main policy actions include strengthening the digital single market, funding research and innovation, creating fair taxation rules, developing standards and interoperability, fostering consumer protection and confidence, reforming training and education systems and supporting the development of a data economy and the internet of things.

Read this briefing on ‘European app economy, State of play, challenges and EU policy‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Estimated global app economy and number of Apple apps

Written by Philip Boucher,

© NaMaKuKi / Shutterstock.com

Social media platforms are often thought of as open and connected spaces, since they allow users to communicate with a wide range of people and organisations. It seems obvious that to have access to a social network it should be necessary to open an account with the platform, and that on closing the account that access would be lost. However, telephone and email networks do not restrict access to their networks depending on which provider or platform is being used, and there are ways in which social media too could be more open and connected, providing greater connectivity and allowing users to change platform without losing access to the network. This could help foster a more competitive market that is more responsive to challenges such as privacy and disinformation.

The implications of changing provider for telephone, email and social media, three transformative communication services, vary. First, telephones. With both landlines and mobile phones, regardless of the service provider used, it is possible to call friends and family on other networks competing in the market. Any phone, using any service provider, can call any other phone. This means that customers can change provider if they become unhappy with their current provider or want to test the services of a new market entrant. They can even keep the same phone number, so they do not have to tell their contacts to update their phone books. Indeed, their contacts will probably not even notice.

Just like with phone calls, emails pass freely between accounts managed by different providers. Many people have several accounts, perhaps including a personal account from a commercial provider and a professional account maintained by an employer. Here, a customer who wants to change provider can open a new account elsewhere without losing the ability to email friends and colleagues who still use the original provider. Advanced users who are dissatisfied with what the market has to offer, for whatever reason, can even set up their own domain names and servers and control the whole account themselves. They can still send and receive emails to and from anyone else, with any email address. A change of provider, however, means a change of address, requiring contacts to update their directories.

Listen to podcast ‘What if social media were open and connected?‘

When it comes to social media profiles, there are many options available, and some people manage several profiles for different aspects of their personal and professional lives. However, social media platforms do not usually offer interconnectivity, so users cannot interact with accounts on a particular social media platform without having an account on it. This also means that the price is high for any customer who decides to leave a platform. They lose access to the network and their contacts and so might no longer receive invitations to events, and might not even realise what they have missed because they cannot see the pictures posted by their erstwhile contacts.

On the markets for telephone, email, internet or electricity services, customers can choose between several companies that provide access to the same open and connected network. There might be a small fee or minor inconvenience involved in changing provider, but the customer is not penalised by losing access to the whole network. Social media platforms, on the other hand, not only provide access to a network but, rather, they are the network. So the only way to participate in a particular social media network is through an account with the platform itself. Leaving the platform means losing access to that space.

In this sense, social media platforms are less open and less connected than old-fashioned telephone and email networks. As a result, their market is also less competitive. While new entrants to the telephone and email markets can immediately connect their new customers with all other telephone and email users, a new entrant to the social media market does not have the same luxury. Only platforms that are already large can offer a large network and, since they have full control over access to their network, they continue to attract more users. As large networks grow even larger, the cost of leaving them grows accordingly, and so do the barriers to new market entrants.

With high penalties for leaving platforms and little competition in the market, life is difficult for the discerning customer. Yet, there is a long and growing list of reasons to be judicious when it comes to social media providers. Citizens are increasingly concerned about immediate personal risks related to privacy, cyberbullying, depression and addiction, as well as wider social issues such as taxation, fake news and political interference. Perhaps a more competitive market would foster more robust responses to these problems. One way of fostering a healthier ecosystem of social media platforms might be to encourage the emergence of an open model for social media.

Potential impacts and developments

An open model for social media would have two separate features, open accounts and open platforms. Open accounts are just like standalone social media profiles, so they would include basic personal details as well as contacts with other accounts – using their email, phone number or other identifiers – and familiar content such as status updates, events, photos and videos. They would also specify the user’s preferences for how content could be shared with other accounts and how information from the network should be presented and communicated to them. These open accounts could be used with any open platform.

Open platforms would host and maintain these accounts. They would be responsible for managing communications with other platforms and accounts, protecting the user’s privacy, and presenting the user with information from the whole network – including contacts from all of the open accounts on all of the other open platforms – according to the user’s preferences. Open platforms could be funded by advertising revenue, subscriptions, donations, endowments, the state or some mixture of sources. They could offer specialist features and services catering for different users’ needs and preferences. Advanced users could set up their own servers and manage their own accounts and their relationships with the network. They could pay for this themselves, and offset the cost by charging advertisers to use their data. With such an open model, there would be no contradiction in a social media platform that has only one user, because it could still connect with any other open account on any other open platform.

The key to this is developing open standards that describe how open accounts and open platforms should communicate with each other, such as W3C‘s social web. The open standard should have full connectivity and portability so that any account on any platform that complies with the standard can connect with any other account on any other open platform. This means that users could change platforms without losing access to the network. In this way, if they felt that their current social media platform was untrustworthy or unethical, they could leave it and join another without missing invitations to events. En masse, such behaviour could help foster a competitive market that could respond to the immediate personal risks and wider social problems posed by social media. Users who already had accounts on closed social media platforms that did not comply with the open model could download a readable copy of all their data and convert it into an open account format, which they could then use with any open platform.

Anticipatory policy making

Several EU policies are already encouraging the portability of social media accounts, as well as the development of open standards. For example, Article 20 of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) gives citizens the right to obtain readable, portable copies of data about them that is held by their social media platforms. This could help discerning users to change platform if they are dissatisfied. EU procurement strategy also supports open source and open standards. Further initiatives supporting user control and open standards, combined with consumer demand for a new approach, could lead to the emergence of a genuinely open and connected model for social media.

Read this At a glance on ‘What if social media were open and connected?’ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Elena Lazarou,

The event was part of the series on the future of EU.

Speakers including David McAllister (EPP, Germany), Chair of the AFET Committee, Julia de Clerck-Sachsse (Adviser, Strategic Planning Division, EEAS), Tomáš Valášek (Director, Carnegie Europe) and Elena Lazarou (Policy Analyst, EPRS), as well as moderator Alexandre Stutzmann, Director of Committees, DG EXPO, joined the EPRS on 15 May 2018 for a roundtable event entitled ‘Roadmap for the Future of Europe: shaping EU Security and Defence Policy’. The event was held in the European Parliament’s Library and was the occasion for the launch of a new EPRS publication on ‘Peace and Security in 2018 – Overview of EU action and outlook for the future‘, which will be updated annually and which complements the existing annual publications on the Economic Outlook for the EU and the Demographic Outlook for the EU.

In his introductory keynote, David McAllister referred to the topic as a very timely one. In the past two years, the EU’s Member States have begun for the first time to put words into action in the area of security and defence. Looking back to the Bratislava Summit of 2016, which followed the Brexit vote and aimed at breathing new life into the EU integration process; one area of priority EU action was Security and Defence. This meant moving to the implementation of the Global Strategy and of the EU-NATO Joint Declaration. David Mc Allister identified three decisive factors in the EU’s decision to move ahead in the area of defence: the EU’s defence efficiency problem; improving EU-NATO relations to an unprecedented degree; and external factors such as the growing pressure on the international rules-based system and the shifting of economic and political power globally. He discussed ongoing challenges, such as Russian aggression, cyber threats and interference with elections, as well as the changes in United States’ foreign policy, and perceived those challenges as ‘push’ factors for European integration in defence. Permanent Structured Cooperation in defence (PESCO), implemented through projects such as Military Mobility, is perhaps the most illustrative example of this move towards integration. He also highlighted that the next challenges for PESCO will be arrangements on financing and governance, which will be discussed in the European Council in June 2018. The developments we have witnessed, such as PESCO and the European Defence Fund, led David McAllister to express optimism about the future, based on the fact that, contrary to the situation in the past, political will has emerged that could give rise to a new momentum. He ended his speech by reiterating the European Parliament’s call for an EU Security and Defence White Book, with more details and specifications on the implementation of the Global Strategy.

In the subsequent roundtable, experts discussed the challenges ahead for the EU’s security and defence policy, such as relations with NATO, implementing decisions and managing to keep up with the pace of events. The discussion also focused on the Global Strategy and how it translates into action, including in terms of the objectives set in Bratislava, but also with regard to the identity of the EU as a global peace and security actor. It was highlighted that security and defence is one of five priorities in the Global Strategy that include resilience, an integrated approach, a focus on prevention, regional orders and strengthening the multilateral order and global governance making it more inclusive and sustainable. That the multilateral rules-based order is being challenged today was a recurrent theme of discussion, and the EU’s need to work with partners on this was highlighted. The role of media and public perceptions of peace, security and the global environment was also emphasised as a source of anxiety about the future of the international system.

On the particular issue of PESCO, experts agreed that the combination of political will and the specific process that it represents, coupled with external factors (fragility, crises, a confrontational global environment), are encouraging. PESCO is also putting pressure on governments to spend more on defence and defence innovation, something which is needed in the EU. However, finding a compromise in the ambitions, interests, threat perceptions and capacities of Member States, is bound to be the major challenge ahead. Nevertheless, within an environment which is becoming increasingly unstable, this is a challenge – experts agreed – to be dynamically tackled.

Click to view slideshow.

In preparation for the European Youth Event (EYE 2018), taking place in the European Parliament’s seat in Strasbourg on 1 and 2 June 2018, the European Parliamentary Research Service has prepared 18 short and punchy ‘At a glance’ notes on a range of themes from EYE 2018.

The papers cover topics ranging from health apps to protecting our water and oceans, and from the urban-rural divide to dealing with cyber-attacks. The topics chosen are close to young people’s hearts and lives: they touch on key themes including youth unemployment, sport and equal opportunities.

The European Youth Event is for young people aged 16-30. They will exchange ideas and perspectives on youth-related issues, develop innovative solutions to crucial questions for the future and meet with European decision-makers and speakers with a wide range of professional experience.

As a follow-up to EYE, in July 2018 a report with the main ideas discussed will be made available to all 751 Members of the European Parliament. Furthermore, some of those participating at EYE will have the chance to present the most concrete ideas to a number of European parliamentary committees and receive feedback from MEPs.

The topics covered in this compendium are divided into the five main themes of the programme of EYE 2018, namely:

• Keeping up with the digital revolution
• Calling for a fair share
• Working out for a stronger Europe
• Staying alive in turbulent times
• Protecting our planet

Download all the EPRS publications prepared for the EYE 2018 or access them below.

Young and old

Youth unemployment: The race to zero

Quantum leaps: This time it’s the EU!

I am Doctor Robot. What can I do for you?

Schools of tomorrow: Learning for ever-changing times

Rich and poor

Equal opportunities: Forever poor or born to be free?

Urban-rural divide: Blame it all on my roots…

Globalisation: In the twilight zone

Trade for all: Please fasten your seat belt

Apart and together

Free speech in the digital era

Safe and Dangerous

Sport without corruption

Sakharov Prize: Voices of humanity

Europe’s fight against terror

Cyber-attacks: Not just a phantom menace

The DNA revolution: We better talk this over

Local and global

Ocean protection: Hooked on heavenly habitat

Sustainable city: Global picture, local colour

Water for all: Born to run…

Biodiversity and wildlife crime

Written by Clare Ferguson,

© European Union, European Parliament

If the succession of Heads of State, leaders and other well-known personalities that continue to visit Parliament is anything to go by, the Parliament is definitely ‘the place to be’ on the diplomatic map. The second Parliamentary session in May will feature the attendance of the Prime Minister of Luxembourg, Xavier Bettel, who will contribute to the series of debates on the Future of Europe on Wednesday lunchtime. Alpha Condé, President of the Republic of Guinea, will also address Parliament on Tuesday lunchtime, and the President of the Republic of Colombia, Juan Manuel Santos Calderón, will address the plenary in a formal sitting on Wednesday lunchtime.

Over 70 % of EU fish caught in the North Sea, worth more than €850 million, are species that live close to the seabed, such as cod and haddock. Parliament is particularly concerned that fisheries measures should be taken based on the best available scientific advice, with a view to managing fishing stocks to secure the long-term sustainability of the North Sea fisheries, including joint management with third countries in the region. On Monday evening, Members will debate a provisional agreement with Council on a multi-annual plan for demersal stocks in the North Sea and the fisheries exploiting those stocks. Members will then also discuss a provisional agreement on the transposition of management, conservation and control measures applicable in the Convention Area of the South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation, making the measures applicable to EU fishing vessels that fish for jack mackerel and other species in the area, with the aim of, among other things, controlling the types of nets used, reducing seabird capture, and managing fishing that affects the sea bottom.

Also on Monday evening, Parliament will consider a report on the interpretation and implementation of the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making, in force since 2016. Through their commitment to greater simplicity, clarity and consistency in Union legislation, and better coordination and transparency in the legislative process, the EU institutions have issued joint declarations on legislative priorities and improved access to information in the preparation of delegated acts. However, the report deems progress on other issues, such as information flow from the Council, and lack of transparency in Member States regarding their ‘gold-plating’ of EU legislation, as unsatisfactory.

On Tuesday morning, there will be statements from the Council and Commission on the Multiannual Financial Framework for 2021 to 2027 and Own Resources, for which the Commission adopted overarching proposals on 2 May, and is planning to adopt individual proposals for spending programmes during the week of the plenary session. Following that debate, Parliament will debate the agreement reached with the Council on the revision of the Posting of Workers Directive. Posting of workers is increasingly common in the internal market, particularly in the services sector, but such workers often find themselves at a disadvantage to counterparts in their host country, through being paid less and lacking legal protection. The Commission proposed revisions to the 1996 directive which currently governs the treatment of posted workers, with a view to adapting them to today’s labour market and the needs of firms while ensuring fair social protection for workers.

On Tuesday evening, Parliament will debate a recommendation for second reading of an important agreement on a Commission proposal on the protection against dumped and subsidised imports from countries not members of the EU. Modernising trade defence instruments, which allow countries to counter unfair trade practices under World Trade Organization rules, is needed to ensure Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Regulations are fit for the fast evolving global trade environment. A key issue is the proposal for partial waiver of the ‘lesser duty rule’ (LDR) for vulnerable countries, as well as the introduction of interested party status for trade unions.

Also on Tuesday evening, Members will debate a report assessing the implementation of the Victims’ Rights Directive – legislation ensuring EU-wide protection and support for victims of crime. Parliament has long supported ensuring minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime throughout the EU, aiming at better protection against domestic violence and crimes such as stalking. However, some Member States have delayed introduction of the legislation, leading to differences in the treatment of victims.

A vote will take place on Wednesday on a proposal to amend the EU budget, aimed at providing €97 646 105 in EU Solidarity Fund assistance for Greece, Spain, France and Portugal to help their recovery from natural disasters, earthquakes, hurricanes, and catastrophic fires suffered in the course of 2017.

On Wednesday afternoon, Members will discuss EU values and the proliferation of corruption and crime through ‘golden visas’, a practice whereby some EU Member States offer citizenship and residence to persons who commit to bringing funding into their country. As these persons also automatically acquire EU citizenship in the process, concern has been expressed regarding the equity of such schemes, and their possible links to corruption and crime, as well as the effect on other Member States.

Parliament will debate a report on revising the EU legal framework on odometer manipulation in motor vehicles – or tampering with the mileage gauge in cars – on Wednesday afternoon. The practice is particularly prevalent in the very large EU second-hand car market and poses risks to consumers, who are often unaware of the fraud, and to road safety. The report proposes that hardware solutions are introduced to protect new vehicles, that mileage recordings are made mandatory, and that long-term solutions are explored, as well as making odometer fraud an offence.

A motion for a resolution is tabled for debate on Wednesday evening concerning the implementation of the Gender Action Plan, and particularly transforming the lives of girls and women through EU external relations in the development sphere, by ensuring gender equality and women’s empowerment, including within the EU institutions themselves.

 

A list of all material prepared for this Plenary Session: Protection and support for victims of crime (available in DE – EN- ES – FR – IT – PL) Modernising trade defence instruments (available in DE – EN- ES – FR – IT – PL) South Pacific fisheries management measures (available in DE – EN- ES – FR – IT – PL) Multiannual plan for North Sea fisheries (available in DE – EN- ES – FR – IT – PL) Odometer manipulation in motor vehicles (available in DE – EN- ES – FR – IT – PL) Golden visas, EU values, corruption and crime (available in DE – EN- ES – FR – IT – PL) Amending Budget No 1 to the 2018 EU budget: Mobilisation of the European Union Solidarity Fund (available in DE – EN- ES – FR – IT – PL) Transforming the lives of girls and women through EU external relations, 2016-2020 (available in DE – EN- ES – FR – IT – PL) Implementation of the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making (available in DE – EN- ES – FR – IT – PL) Revising the Posting of Workers Directive (available in EN)

Written by Martin Russell,

DG EPRS Policy round table – ‘ EU sanctions against Russia : What’s next? ‘

Four years after Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea, the issue of sanctions against Moscow is more topical than ever. Relations between Russia and the West have continued to deteriorate to a level not seen since the end of the Cold War, with revelations of the Kremlin’s interference in the United States elections and elsewhere – for example, in the United Kingdom’s EU referendum. Then in March 2018 came the attempted assassination on UK territory of former Russian spy Sergey Skripal, with the likely involvement of Russian security services. Against this tense backdrop, the European Union is expected during the next few weeks to reach a decision on whether or not to extend its economic sanctions against Russia, due to expire in July 2018, for another six months. On the other side of the Atlantic, the US adopted its Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act in August 2017, and on the basis of this new legislation, has adopted a range of new sanctions. Among other things, these strengthen existing restrictions on cooperation with Russian defence and energy companies, and penalise individuals and businesses not previously targeted, such as oligarch Oleg Deripaska and aluminium producer Rusal. Further US sanctions are expected over the coming months.

KALNIETE, Sandra (EPP, LV)

With sanctions very much in the news, there was particularly strong attendance at the EPRS roundtable discussion on the topic of ‘EU sanctions against Russia: What next’, held in the European Parliament library on 16 May 2016. EPRS Director General Anthony Teasdale delivered a welcoming speech, while the event was moderated by Monika Nogaj, acting head of the EPRS External Policies unit. First to speak was Sandra Kalniete (European People’s Party, Latvia), a prominent Member of the European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee with a long-standing interest in Russia that goes back to her time as Latvian Foreign Affairs Minister. Sandra Kalniete pointed out that Moscow’s aggression in Ukraine, as well as its support for the Syrian regime, highlighted the need for the EU to have a policy of credible deterrence vis-à-vis Russia. She felt that sanctions targeted at Russia’s political leaders and allied oligarchs were particularly important, as they raised the personal cost of Russia’s unacceptable foreign policy actions for members of Vladimir Putin’s inner circle. She also called for the EU to follow the example of the United States and some EU Member States in adopting Magnitsky-type sanctions against individuals involved in human rights violations in Russia.

The next two panellists outlined the economic impacts of EU sanctions against Russia. EPRS policy analyst Martin Russell began with an overview of the various sanctions regimes currently in place against Russia, before going on to describe the effects of EU and US measures targeted at the Russian defence, energy and financial sectors. In the longer term, restrictions on cooperation between EU and Russian companies on projects to develop new oil reserves were expected to seriously undermine Russia’s capacity to maintain production of oil, its number one export; however, in the short term the most immediate impact had come from financial sector sanctions cutting off Russian banks and businesses from access to western finance. Sanctions were not the only cause of Russia’s 2015-2016 economic recession, but they had significantly aggravated it, and were continuing to dampen growth. A muted economic recovery meant that Russia was increasingly falling behind the rest of the world as its share of the global economy continued to decline.

PETERS, Eric

By contrast, Eric Peters, Fulbright Scholar at the Hungarian think tank Antall József Knowledge Centre, focused on the economic effects of sanctions on the EU, above all on the four Visegrád countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia). Agrifood exports to Russia had been particularly hard hit, with Poland and Slovakia the worst affected. Nevertheless, the agrifood sector had successfully adapted, thanks to EU payments compensating farmers for lost exports, and to efforts to diversify into new markets. With three of the four countries relying on Russia for over half of their gas supplies, energy sanctions also had a potential impact; at the same time, several initiatives had been taken at both EU and Visegrád country level to reduce dependence on Russian gas. In the defence sector, even before sanctions, Russia had only had a very small share in weapons supplies to Visegrád countries, which were increasingly turning to fellow NATO countries for their armament needs. Peters therefore concluded that the economic costs for EU countries had been limited, and recommended that sanctions be continued.

Professor Irina Busygina from the Higher School of Economics discussed the political effects of sanctions in Russia. According to her, Russia’s leadership had initially miscalculated that EU countries would not be able to reach consensus on restrictive measures. After the adoption of sanctions, expectations that they would soon be lifted again had given way to acceptance of the situation as the ‘new normal’. Russia’s leaders had attempted to present sanctions to the public in a positive light, arguing that they reflected western fears of a strong Russia, and that they could stimulate economic reforms. In reality though, far from encouraging beneficial reforms, sanctions were widening inequalities between Russia’s regions, leading to more state intervention in the economy, and isolating Russia from global markets. Meanwhile there had been a ‘rally round the flag’ effect, illustrated by Vladimir Putin’s overwhelming victory in the March 2018 presidential election.

Fernando Andresen Guimarães, Head of Division for Russia in the European External Action Service emphasised that the sanctions had been adopted in response to Russian actions in violation of international law and the European security order: its illegal annexation of the Crimean peninsula, and its destabilisation of eastern Ukraine. Regarding the latter, the duration of the EU’s restrictive measures had been linked by the European Council to the complete implementation of the Minsk agreements, and although this had not yet happened, it could be argued that sanctions had helped to avoid further escalation of the conflict in eastern Ukraine. Furthermore, EU sanctions were carefully targeted not to cause damage to the broader economy and the Russian people. Due to the way in which sanctions worked and in light of the pressure that they evidently created, it was important to show patience and keep them in place until the desired outcome was achieved. Sanctions were a tool in support of a broader EU policy towards Russia, based on the five principles expressed unanimously by EU foreign ministers in March 2016, and recently reaffirmed in the April 2018 Foreign Affairs Council, which stressed firmness on Ukraine and principles of international law, such as sovereignty and territorial integrity, while keeping communication channels open, engaging on foreign and security policy and global issues, and continuing to strengthen bridges between Russian and EU citizens. An example of the latter was the EU’s Erasmus Plus programme of educational exchanges, with Russian students and teachers the largest non-EU group of participants.

The roundtable discussion was followed by a lively Q&A session.

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