European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Carla Stamegna (1st edition),

© bankrx / Fotolia

Due to the recessions brought about by the financial crisis from the end of the past decade, more and more EU companies and citizens have faced economic difficulties in recent years and have been unable to repay their loans. As a consequence, many EU banks have accumulated high volumes of non-performing loans (NPLs) in their balance-sheets. Although almost halved in comparison to December 2014, the ratio between NPLs and the total loans extended by EU banks (NPL ratio) remains historically high when measured against the ratios of other advanced economies. High levels of NPLs require banks to hold higher amounts of regulatory capital and pay a risk premium on liquidity markets, as a result of which their profitability and growth prospects diminish. To tackle this issue, a number of different initiatives have been adopted both at national and EU level. Within this context, in March 2018 the Commission adopted a comprehensive package of measures including a proposal for a directive aimed at fostering NPL secondary markets and easing collateral recovery from secured loans.

Versions

• February 2019: ‘Credit servicers, credit purchasers and the recovery of collateral: Fostering secondary markets for non-performing loans (NPLs) and easing collateral recovery‘ (1st edition)

Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on credit servicers, credit purchasers and the recovery of collateral Committee responsible: Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) COM(2018) 135 of 14.3.2018 Co-rapporteurs: Esther de Lange (EPP, Netherlands)
Roberto Gualtieri (S&D, Italy) 2018/0063(COD) Shadow rapporteurs: Bernd Lucke (ECR, Germany)
Ramon Tremosa i Balcells (ALDE, Spain)
Dimitrios Papadimoulis (GUE/NGL, Greece)
Ernest Urtasun (Greens/EFA, Spain)
Marco Zanni (ENF, Italy) Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Carla Stamegna and Cemal Karakas,

Summary © arrow / Fotolia

The financial technology (fintech) sector encompasses firms that use technology-based systems either to provide financial services and products directly, or to make the financial system more efficient. Fintech is a rapidly growing sector: in the first half of 2018, investment in fintech companies in Europe alone reached US$26 billion.

The fintech sector brings rewards including innovation and job creation, but also challenges, such as data and consumer protection issues, and the risk of exacerbating financial volatility or cybercrime. To tackle these multi-disciplinary challenges, policy- and lawmakers in the European Union (EU) have adopted and announced several initiatives, for instance on intra-EU payment services, data protection, crowdfunding and regulatory sandboxes.

This briefing outlines current and upcoming fintech-related laws at EU level. It follows on from a March 2017 EPRS briefing that focused, inter alia, on the evolution, scope and economic prospects of fintech.

Introduction

Fintech, short for financial technology, is a broad term used mainly to refer to firms that use technology-based systems either to provide innovative and cheaper financial services directly (i.e. without the involvement of banks or other intermediaries) or to make traditional financial business more efficient. Fintech covers a range of services and products, such as cashless payments, peer-to-peer (P2P) lending platforms, robotic trading, robo-advice, crowdfunding, and virtual currencies.

With investment in fintech companies hitting US$26 billion in Europe in the first half of 2018, this dynamic and rapidly growing sector is attracting increasing interest at political level. In the EU, attention is being paid to the contribution that fintech could make to increasing efficiency, strengthening financial integration and enhancing the EU’s role in financial services. Meanwhile, there is a pressing need for safe and effective common rules supporting innovation and protecting consumers.

Indeed, in the EU, areas remain where Member States can choose to apply individualised or less strict rules at national level (e.g. peer-to-peer lending and virtual currencies). This can result in a fragmented environment, preventing businesses from expanding across borders, or an uneven playing field and arbitrage opportunities, incentivising companies to obtain permits in less restrictive jurisdictions so as to minimise red tape while operating internationally.

Fintech-related laws at EU level

No one piece of EU legislation covers all aspects of fintech. Fintech companies providing financial services (e.g. lending, financial advice, insurance, payments), must comply with the same laws as any other firms offering those services. Therefore, different laws apply depending on the activity (e.g. payment services, crowdfunding), such as Directive 2000/31/EC (e-commerce), Directive 2002/65/EC (distance marketing of consumer financial services), Directive 2009/110/EC (electronic money), Directive (EU) 2015/2366 (payment services), etc.

Payment services

The Payment Services Directive (PSD I) (Directive 2007/64/EC) established the single European payments area (SEPA) in 2007. While SEPA has been successful in harmonising card and bank-to-bank payments, online payments remain fragmented.

In July 2013, the European Commission announced a new financial regulation package including PSD II, the updated Payment Services Directive (Directive (EU) 2015/2366), which repealed PSD I, and a proposal for a regulation on interchange fees for card-based payment transactions (Regulation (EU) 2015/751). PSD II came into force on 12 January 2016; the deadline for implementation in national law was 13 January 2018.

PSD II is designed to respond to technological changes in the payments industry. In this context, the definition of payment services has been expanded, and the diversity of traditional payment service providers (PSPs), such as banks and financial institutions, has increased. PSD II classifies both types of provider, i.e. account information service providers (AISPs) and payment initiation service providers (PISPs), as third-party service providers (TPPs). Under the new directive, payment service providers are subject to the same rules as other payment institutions. In return, banks are obliged to provide third parties with API (application programming interface) access. Non-banks would then have the right to access customers’ data (provided they have the customers’ permission).

One particular set of regulatory technical standards (RTS), concerning the processes and data structures of communication between parties, is key to achieving the objectives of PSD II. Mandated by PSD II, the European Banking Authority (EBA) drafted these standards in cooperation with the European Central Bank (ECB). The European Commission adopted the final RTS proposal in November 2017, the RTS are due to apply from September 2019. According to the new rules, banks will have to set up a communication channel that would allow third-party service providers to access the data they need. This would also allow banks and TPPs to identify one another when accessing customer data, and to communicate through secure messaging. Banks may establish this communication channel either by adapting their customer online banking interface or by creating a new dedicated interface. Should they opt for the latter, banks will have to provide the same level of availability and performance as the interface offered to, and used by, their own customers, and provide the same level of contingency safeguards.

While some experts argue that PSD II would level the field and might be a ‘key change’ towards the creation of an open banking system, there is, however, criticism of PSD II. Some experts note that access to bank account information raises the question as to who should pay for the infrastructure needed for such interconnectivity. In addition, the sharing and use of client identification details would heighten the threat of cyber-attacks. To this end, banks are calling for tighter security regulations for newcomers, and have raised concerns about the authentication systems they use.

Data and consumer protection

The legal cornerstone for data protection (in terms of ‘personal data protection’) is Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data. This directive was repealed by the General Data Protection Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (GDPR). This regulation entered into force in 2016 and became applicable from 25 May 2018. Some experts say that current EU legislation on data protection, competition and consumer protection is noticeably lacking in its definition of ‘big data’, creating a regulatory blind spot that needs addressing. Here, the European supervisory authorities (ESAs) – i.e. the European Banking Authority (EBA), the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) and the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) – on financial issues have evaluated the fintech-specific additions to the GDPR and/or other general consumer protection regulations.

In their March 2018 report on big data, the ESAs state that the existing legislative requirements constitute an ‘already quite solid framework to mitigate the risks identified’. They also note that this framework will be further strengthened with the entry into application of several key pieces of legislation in the financial sector as well as in the data protection sector. The ESAs consequently consider that a legislative intervention at this point would be ‘premature’.

Virtual currencies

In the field of virtual currencies, the EU has not yet adopted any specific regulation. However, following up on a June 2017 Commission report, in December 2017, European legislators agreed to extend the scope of the Anti-money-laundering Directive to virtual currency exchanges and wallet providers. Member States must bring the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this directive into force by 10 January 2020.

Fintech action plan and crowdfunding

Having been invited by Parliament in a May 2017 own-initiative resolution to take more action in fintech sectors such as big data, cybersecurity, blockchain, interoperability, financial stability, financial and IT skills, the European Commission presented a fintech action plan in March 2018. The plan sets out 19 steps to promote innovative business models, the uptake of new technologies (e.g. artificial intelligence and cloud services), to increase cybersecurity and the integrity of the financial system, and to enhance further investor, consumer and data protection. It promotes innovation and regulatory certainty. It also envisages the introduction of regulatory sandboxes, which can be considered ‘safe spaces’ where (national) supervisors apply rules to fintech firms in a more flexible way so that businesses can test their models, products and services for a limited time and without being exposed to red tape. The EU FinTech Lab was set up to build capacity and knowledge among regulators and supervisors. It held its first meeting in June 2018.

In this context, the Commission has put forward new rules to help EU crowdfunding platforms scale up. In March 2018, it tabled a proposal for a regulation aimed at introducing an optional EU regime to enable crowdfunding platforms to operate easily across the EU. Instead of facing differing regimes, platforms would have to comply with one set of rules only, both in their home market and in other Member States. The accompanying proposal for a directive amends the scope of Directive 2014/65/EU (MiFID II), adding crowdfunding service providers authorised under the proposed regulation to the list of exempted entities to which the scope of the directive does not apply.

Outlook

In its action plan, the European Commission mandated the ESAs to report on best practices and issue guidelines. The Commission also encouraged competent authorities to take initiatives to enable innovation on the basis of these best practices and invited the ESAs to facilitate supervisory cooperation and the consistency of supervisory practices. Following up on the Commission’s recommendations, in March 2018 the EBA published a fintech roadmap setting out its priorities for 2018 and 2019. The roadmap addresses the challenge of appropriately regulating innovation in finance. It also envisages the establishment of a fintech knowledge hub to improve expertise sharing and promote technological neutrality in regulatory and supervisory approaches.

In its 2019 work programme, one of ESMA’s key objectives for fintech is to achieve a coordinated approach to the regulation and supervisory treatment of new or innovative financial activities and provide the EU institutions, market participants and consumers with advice. It is also committed to implementing the framework for the use of the product intervention powers provided by the Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation (MiFIR).

To tackle issues stemming from insurtech, EIOPA set up the InsurTech Task Force (ITF) to analyse the use of big data by (re-)insurance undertakings and intermediaries. It maps the initiatives taken at national level in this area, with a view to establishing efficient and effective supervisory practices. At a later stage, the ITF will also focus on the convergence of algorithm supervision and investigate the benefits and risks arising from the use of blockchain and smart contracts in insurance activity.

In their January 2019 report, the ESAs set out a comparative analysis of innovation facilitators, and describe best practices for their design and operation. According to the report, a lack of cooperation between financial regulators across the EU could be hindering businesses from expanding their innovative new fintech services beyond national borders. Twenty-one EU Member States and three European Economic Area (EEA) countries currently have innovation hubs, while only five Member States (Denmark, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, and the UK) have fully operational regulatory sandboxes. Based on the ESAs’ report, the European Commission is expected to present a report with best practices for regulatory sandboxes in the first quarter of 2019.

The European Commission is also monitoring the development of crypto-assets and initial coin offerings (ICOs) with the ESAs. Based on an assessment of risks, opportunities and the suitability of the applicable regulatory framework, the Commission will assess whether regulatory action at EU level is required.

Regarding payment services, the Commission (together with market players) is aiming to develop, by mid-2019, standardised application programming interfaces that are compliant with the PSD II and the GDPR as a basis for a European open banking eco-system, covering payment and other accounts.

Further reading

• Karakas C. and Stamegna C., ‘Defining an EU-framework for financial technology (fintech): Economic Perspectives and Regulatory Challenges‘, Law and Economics Yearly Review, Vol. 7 (1), 2018, pp. 106-129.
• Karakas C. and Stamegna C., Financial technology (fintech): Prospects and challenges for the EU, European Parliamentary Research Service, European Parliament, March 2017.

Read this briefing on ‘Fintech (financial technology) and the European Union: State of play and outlook‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marketa Pape (1st edition),

© Oleg Totskyi / Fotolia

With the trans-European transport network (TEN-T) policy, the European Commission seeks to develop a modern, efficient and climate-friendly network covering all transport modes.

Despite the TEN-T’s importance for the economy and society, and despite the binding timelines and targeted financial support, it risks not being completed as planned. This is partly due to complex administrative procedures linked to permit-granting for cross-border projects as well as broader regulatory uncertainty, often resulting in delays and increased cost. To speed up the network’s completion, the Commission has proposed measures to integrate and shorten permit-granting for projects, and facilitate public consultations and the involvement of private investors.

On 3 December 2018, the Transport Council stated that much remains to be resolved before an agreement on the proposal becomes possible. The European Parliament’s Committee on Transport and Tourism adopted a report on the file on 10 January 2019. As interinstitutional negotiations cannot yet start, the file is expected to be closed at first reading during the February plenary session.

Versions

• February 2019: ‘Measures to advance the realisation of the trans-European transport network‘ (1st edition)

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a European Maritime Single Window environment and repealing Directive 2010/65/EU Committee responsible: Transport and Tourism (TRAN) COM(2018) 277 of 17.5.2018 Rapporteur: Dominique Riquet (ALDE, France) 2018/0138(COD) Shadow rapporteurs: Wim van de Camp (EPP, Netherlands)
Inés Ayala Sender (S&D, Spain)
Kosma Złotowski (ECR, Poland)
Merja Kyllönen (GUE/NGL, Finland)
Michael Cramer (Greens/EFA, Germany) Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Vote in plenary

Written by Martin Svášek (1st edition),

© iQoncept / Fotolia

On 30 May 2018, the European Commission published a proposal for a regulation establishing an EU anti-fraud programme under the new 2021 to 2027 multiannual financial framework (MFF). The regulation would replace the Hercule III programme currently in force. The European Court of Auditors (ECA) published a special opinion concerning the proposal on 15 November 2018. The BUDG committee adopted its opinion for CONT on 23 November 2018 and the CONT committee issued its draft report on 26 November 2018. More than 30 amendments were tabled ahead of the vote on the report in the CONT committee on 29 January 2019. The vote in plenary is expected to take place in February 2019.

The Commission is proposing to streamline budgetary management in the area of protection of the EU’s financial interests by grouping the Hercule III programme together with Anti-Fraud Information System (AFIS) and Irregularity Management System (IMS) operational activities. However, the proposed EU anti-fraud programme does not specify possible maximum co-financing rates for eligible actions. The proposal has also been criticised for its lack of specific and measurable objectives and its vague performance indicators, as well as for not having indicated the frequency of performance reporting. The amendments proposed by the ECA, and also by the BUDG and CONT committees attempt to tackle these issues. Moreover, both Parliament committees are in favour of increasing the budget for this programme.

Versions

• February 2019: ‘EU anti-fraud programme 2021-2027‘ (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the EU anti-fraud programme Committee responsible: Budgetary Control (CONT) COM(2018) 386 of 30.5.2018 Rapporteur: José Ignacio Salafranca Sánchez-Neyra (EPP, Spain) 2018/0211(COD) Shadow rapporteurs: Arndt Kohn (S&D, Germany)
Ryszard Czarnecki (ECR, Poland)
Nedzhmi Ali (ALDE, Bulgaria)
Marco valli (EFDD, Italy) Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: First-reading vote in plenary

Written by Marketa Pape (1st edition),

© MrPreecha / Fotolia

Marine litter and pollution put the marine environment at risk. While a great proportion of marine litter originates from land-based sources, limiting waste discharges from ships also plays an essential role in efforts to preserve marine and coastal ecosystems. Based on international law, EU legislation requires vessels to bring the waste they generate on voyages to waste-reception facilities in port, and obliges EU ports to provide such facilities to ships using the port.

Despite these developments, discharges at sea continue. In January 2018, the European Commission put forward a new legislative proposal seeking to improve the collection of ship waste while ensuring efficient maritime transport operations in ports. Interinstitutional negotiations concluded on 13 December 2018. The Parliament’s Committe on Transport and Tourism has endorsed the agreed text, which now awaits formal approval in plenary and by the Council.

Versions

• February 2019: ‘Port reception facilities for ship waste: Collecting waste from ships in ports‘ (1st edition)

Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on port reception facilities for the delivery of waste from ships, repealing Directive 2000/59/EC and amending Directive 2009/16/EC and Directive 2010/65/EU Committee responsible: Transport and Tourism (TRAN) COM(2018) 033 of 16.1.2018 Associated committee: Committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) 2018/0139(COD) Rapporteur: Gesine Meissner (ALDE, Germany) Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Shadow rapporteurs: Deirdre Clune (EPP, Ireland)
Maria Grapini (ALDE, Romania)
Peter van Dalen (ECR, Netherlands)
Tania González Peñas (GUE/NGL, Spain)
Keith Taylor (Greens/EFA, United Kingdom)
Rosa D’Amato (EFDD, Italy)
Rolandas Paksas (EFDD, Lithuania) Next steps expected: First-reading vote in plenary

Written by Marketa Pape (1st edition),

© Igor Kardasov / Fotolia

Every time a ship calls at a port, its maritime transport operator has to submit a set of pre-arrival information to a range of entities and agencies. Currently, the reporting process is not harmonised across EU ports. In addition, the information provided by ships is not efficiently shared among the actors concerned. The resulting multiple reporting places an excessive administrative burden on shipping operators, with negative impacts rippling down the logistics chain.

Within broader efforts to modernise EU transport, the European Commission is proposing to bring all the reporting linked to a port call together into one digital space – the ‘European Maritime Single Window’, to harmonise reporting procedures for shipping operators and to ensure data can be shared and reused efficiently.

The Council agreed a common position on the proposal in December 2018. The European Parliament’s Committee on Transport and Tourism adopted its report on the proposal in January 2019. Interinstitutional negotiations are under way, with the aim of concluding an agreement in time for adoption before the European elections.

Versions

• February 2019: ‘European maritime single window: Harmonised digital reporting for ships‘ (1st edition)

Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a European Maritime Single Window environment and repealing Directive 2010/65/EU Committee responsible: Transport and Tourism (TRAN) COM(2018) 278 17.5.2018 Rapporteur: Deirdre Clune (EPP, Ireland) 2018/0139(COD) Shadow rapporteurs: Knut Fleckenstein (S&D, Germany)
Jacqueline Foster (ECR, United Kingdom)
Gesine Meissner (ALDE, Germany)
Marie-Pierre Vieu (GUE/NGL, France)
Karima Delli (Greens/EFA, France) Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Trilogue negotiations

With European elections coming up in May 2019, you probably want to know how the European Union impacts your daily life, before you think about voting. In the latest in a series of posts on what Europe does for you, your family, your business and your wellbeing, we look at what Europe does for election observers.

Twitter Hashtag #EUandME

© bizoo_n / Fotolia

Do you believe that democracy is key to world security and universal respect of human rights? Do you want to get involved in democratisation in the world? The EU is on your side.

Election observation is one of the main ways the EU promotes democracy, seeking to help stabilise states and increase EU citizens’ security worldwide. Providing election observers shows that Europe cares, and that it is watching, making it easier for voters to accept the outcome of an electoral process and avoid the post-electoral unrest that tends to affect young democracies. Since 2000, the EU has been invited to take part in over 100 election observation missions to third countries. Each mission observes and assesses the electoral process, neither intervening nor validating its result. Indeed, EU missions remain independent, without preference for who wins or loses, but rather make specific recommendations to deepen countries’ democratic processes. To complement this action, the EU can provide capacity-building, technical, and material support for the electoral process: in the last five years, €400 million in EU electoral assistance has been spread between 40 different countries.

Since 2000, about 11 000 experienced observers have taken part in long and short-term election observation missions. Do you fancy taking part in this important task? Advertisements for positions are published on the Commission website regularly, enabling a large spectrum of EU citizens to gain unique experience, while contributing to the noble aim of promoting democracy.

Further information

• EPRS publication on Democracy support in EU external policy, 2018, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI(2018)614717
• European Commission’s Directorate General for Development Cooperation website on Support to elections, https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sectors/human-rights-and-governance/democracy-and-human-rights/election-observation-missions-0_en

With European elections coming up in May 2019, you probably want to know how the European Union impacts your daily life, before you think about voting. In the latest in a series of posts on what Europe does for you, your family, your business and your wellbeing, we look at what Europe does for citizens using e-government.

Twitter Hashtag #EUandME

© iceteastock / Fotolia

We live in a time of electronic communication, and enjoy easy and immediate access to friends and information. The internet and social media seem to reign as kings.  We also want this ease and freedom to extent to other parts of our life, such as our interaction with administrations. The European Union is actively helping with that. Since 2006, as part of EU policies, countries benchmark each other and exchange good practices. The most advanced country so far is Estonia, and others are advancing though still big differences exist.

The aim is to fully modernise the public administrations with the digital access for citizens being at the centre of the process. The EU wants to go all digital, thus facilitating the contact between the citizens and public administration as much as possible. The EU intends to help modernise the national public administrations, and will also give the good example by making its own European administrations, such as the European Commission, much more user-friendly and digitally accessible.

Once the administrations are modernised we will enjoy a totally new user experience. For example, supporting documents will only have to be submitted to the public administrations once. Tax declarations can already be done online. The same would apply when we are dealing with administrations in other EU countries. The exchange of information between national administration and across borders will be done with a high level of data security. Legislation has been put forward that make these services also available for people with disabilities.

Further information

• Communication of the Commission on an eGovernment Action Plan, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52016DC0179
• European eGovernment Action Plan 2016-2020, https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/european-egovernment-action-plan-2016-2020

With European elections coming up in May 2019, you probably want to know how the European Union impacts your daily life, before you think about voting. In the latest in a series of posts on what Europe does for you, your family, your business and your wellbeing, we look at what Europe does for students who want to learn coding.

Twitter Hashtag #EUandME

© nullplus/ Fotolia

We increasingly use digital products, services and connected devices. The digitalisation of society changes the way we communicate, work, shop and requires people to acquire new digital skills.

Currently, there are more than 350,000 vacancies in Europe for highly skilled technical experts in areas such as artificial intelligence or cybersecurity. Are you a student interested in technology and computers? If yes, you should learn coding because knowing how to write computer language is necessary for creating new applications, websites or software and will be a key competence in tomorrow’s digital world.  

The European Coding Initiative brings together a wide range of companies, schools and organisations to promote coding in the education system in Europe. Already several countries have introduced coding classes in primary or in secondary schools. Moreover, every year a Europe Code Week is organised to give all participants the opportunity to take part to coding classes in a fun way. The next EU Code Week 2018 will take place in October 2018 and the EU wants to involve at least half of schools in EU. Check for your country!

In addition, thanks to the Digital Education Action and the Digital Skills and Jobs Coalition promoted by the EU, many high tech companies are financing coding classes for students. Furthermore, the new Digital Opportunity traineeship initiative will provide cross-border traineeships for up to 6,000 students and recent graduates between 2018 and 2020.  Check if you can participate!

Further information

• EPRS briefing, Digital skills in the EU labour market, 2017
• European Commission: the European Coding Initiative
• European Commission: https://www.facebook.com/DigitalSkillsEU/

With European elections coming up in May 2019, you probably want to know how the European Union impacts your daily life, before you think about voting. In the latest in a series of posts on what Europe does for you, your family, your business and your wellbeing, we look at what Europe does for pre-school children.

Twitter Hashtag #EUandME

© inarik / Fotolia

Our children’s early years matter a great deal for their well-being and personal development and later for their success in education and employment. Research shows how ‘skills beget skills’; how stunting by the age of two is difficult to reverse; how good-quality early childhood education and care services can help children, even in the long term, to overcome difficulties caused by a lack of help at home.

In 2002, EU countries agreed to provide early-childhood education and care services for 30 % of children under the age of 3, and for 90 % of those between 3 years of age and school age. The EU helps countries to improve their services in meeting the diverse needs of young children and their families, emphasising families’ rights to access good-quality early childhood resources and services, such as crèches, kindergartens, benefits, education, jobs, health and housing.

EU funding for improving early childhood services includes projects supported under the European Social Fund. A further €1.22 billion for improving early childhood facilities is available from the European Regional Development Fund. The EU’s Erasmus+ education and training programme assists early childhood teachers’ and carers’ development. A platform called eTwinning helps pre-schools to work together on projects across borders. The Horizon 2020 programme supports research helping to get a better understanding of how to create services that best meet the needs of early-age children and their families.

Further information

• EPRS publication on ‘Early childhood education and care in family friendly policies’, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI(2016)582008
• European Commission Directorate for Education and Culture Early Childhood Education and Care policy website,  https://ec.europa.eu/info/education/policy-educational-issues/shared-challenges-education-and-training/early-childhood-education_en
• European Structural and Investment Funds data website, https://cohesiondata.ec.europa.eu/

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

© Rawf8 / Fotolia

China’s increasingly autocratic domestic stance and its assertive foreign policy pose a dilemma for European Union policy-makers as to whether to treat the Asian powerhouse as a partner or a rival, or to take a position somewhere in between. Formally, the EU and China are strategic partners since 2003 – a partnership that was broadened five years ago by the EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation. No EU country wants to be openly confrontational towards China, contrary to the approach of the current United States administration. However, several European governments are wary of Beijing’s economic expansionism and its efforts to take the global lead in digital technologies. Controversy over China’s telecoms giant Huawei has exacerbated those concerns.
This note offers links to recent commentaries, studies and reports from major international think tanks on China, its ties with the EU and related issues. More studies on the topics can be found in a previous edition of ‘What Think Tanks are thinking’ published in September 2018.

EU-China

China’s new policy on the European Union: A toughening line on political issues
Finnish Institute of International Affairs, January 2019

Assessing China’s influence in Europe through investments
Leiden Asia Centre, Clingendael, January 2019

Is Europe tough enough on China?
Carnegie Europe, January 2019

Political values in Europe-China relations
European Think-Tank Network on China, December 2018

The EU and China: Modest signs of convergence?
Egmont, December 2018

A United Nations with Chinese characteristics?
Cligendael, December 2018

How Europe will try to dodge the US–China standoff in 2019
Chatham House, December 2018

China’s ambitions in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus
Institut français des relations internationales, December 2018

Chinese views of European defensce integration
Mercator Institute for China Studies, December 2018

The 21st century maritime silk road: Security implications and ways forward for the European Union
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, November 2018

Guns, engines and turbines: The EU’s hard power in Asia
European Union Institute for Security Studies, November 2018

China and Europe: Buying hearts and minds?
Centre for European Reform, November 2018

The China-EU relationship: Trade but verify
Barcelona Institute for International Affairs, October 2018

Europe and changing Asian geopolitics
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, October 2018

How could Europe benefit from the US-China trade war?
Bruegel, October 2018

The ‘16+1’ platform. China’s opportunities for Central and Eastern Europe
Institut de relations internationales et stratégiques, October 2018

Europe’s emerging approach to China’s Belt and Road Initiative
Carnegie Europe, October 2018

China and the EU: The contradictions of exercising joint trade leadership
Centre for European Policy Studies, September 2018

Security and foreign policy

How US monetary policy tamed Chinese foreign policy
Chatham House, January 2019

Lose-lose scenario for Europe from ongoing China-US negotiations
Bruegel, January 2019

Rare earths and China: A review of changing criticality in the new economy
Institut français des relations internationales, January 2019

China: Between key role and marginalisation
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, December 2018

The Sino-Russian and US-Russian relationships: Current developments and future trends
Finnish Institute of International Affairs, December 2018

Along the road: China in the Arctic
European Union Institute for Security Studies, December 2018

Experiences with Chinese investment in the Western Balkans and the post-Soviet space: Lessons for Central Europe?
Centre for European Neighbourhood Studies, December 2018

Russia-China: Security ties them together?
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, December 2018

China’s ambitions to become a global security actor
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, December 2018

Les multiples atouts de la stratégie sécuritaire de la Chine en Afrique
Groupe de Recherche et d’Information sur la Paix et la Sécurité, December 2018

China expands its peace and security footprint in Africa
International Crisis Group, October 2018

China expands its global governance ambitions in the Arctic
Chatham House, October 2018

Huawei

5G, Huawei und die Sicherheit unserer Kommunikationsnetze
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, February 2019

China testing Trump in Canada
Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 2019

Huawei, the U.S., and its anxious allies
Council on Foreign Relations, January 2019

Huawei and Europe’s 5G conundrum
Carnegie Europe, December 2018

Huawei and the new Thirty Years War
Center for Security Studies, December 2018

Economy and trade

Chinese growth: A balancing act
Bruegel, January 2019

The Belt and Road turns five
Bruegel, January 2019

China’s vision of an ecological civilisation: A struggle for environmental leadership in the era of climate change
Istituto Affari Internazionali, January 20198

From Paris to Beijing: Implementing the Paris Agreement in the People’s Republic of China
Atlantic Council, January 2019

Xi Jinping’s turn away from the market puts Chinese growth at risk
Peterson Institute for International Economics, January 2019

Will China’s currency hit a wall?
Council on Foreign Relations, January 2019

Are China’s trade practices really unfair?
Centre for European Policy Studies, December 2018

Emerging technology dominance: What China’s pursuit of advanced dual-use technologies means for the future of Europe’s economy and defence innovation
International Institute for Strategic Studies, Mercator Institute for China Studies, December 2018

China’s view of the trade war has changed, and so has its strategy
Bruegel, December 2018

Does China force foreign firms to surrender their sensitive technology?
Peterson Institute for International Economics, December 2018

Trump’s trade war with China makes Russia great again
Council on Foreign Relations, December 2018

China’s big push for solar energy
Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, December 2018

The myth of China’s forced technology transfer
Centre for European Policy Studies, November 2018

L’intelligence artificielle en Chine: un état des lieux
Fondation pour l’innovation politique, November 2018

Disciplining China’s trade practices at the WTO: How WTO complaints can help make China more market-oriented
Cato Institute, November 2018

China’s risky drive into new-energy vehicles
Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 2018

The China dream goes digital: Technology in the age of Xi
European Council on Foreign Relations, October 2018

Ten years after the crisis: The West’s failure pushing China towards state capitalism
Bruegel, October 2018

The Belt and Road Initiative: China’s new geopolitical strategy?
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, October 2018

With growth sagging, China shifts back to socialism
Council on Foreign Relations, October 2018

The belt and road initiative looks East
The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, October 2018

China and the United States: Trade conflict and systemic competition Peterson Institute for International Economics, October 2019

Read this briefing on ‘China‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson,

European Union, EP

With the European elections fast approaching, and the Brexit situation still fluid, the Future of Europe is naturally high on Parliament’s agenda in February. On Tuesday afternoon, Italian Prime Minister, Giuseppe Conte, will speak in the latest of the series of debates on the subject.

Parliament will begin the session however with a joint debate on three reports on implementation of the Treaty provisions on EU citizenship, enhanced cooperation, and political control over the Commission on Monday night. Regarding EU citizenship, Members are likely to highlight issues regarding free movement of people and increasing citizens’ participation through voting in European elections. By agreeing specific measures under ‘enhanced cooperation’, groups of countries can act together in the absence of agreement between all Member States, demonstrated by the recent agreement simplifying the rules regarding property regimes for international couples in Europe. Parliament’s Constitutional Affairs committee has proposed improvements to the procedures for such agreements, warns against creating parallel institutions, and looks at how disputes might be settled. Political control over the Commission, a Parliament prerogative, will be the last point of Monday’s debates. The Constitutional Affairs Committee has prepared a report that supports the use of the Spitzenkandidaten process to bring the Parliament and Commission closer. The report also underlines other political procedures, such as approval of the budget, which allow the Parliament to act effectively. However, criticism is nevertheless aimed at the lack of transparency in the Council, particularly regarding the EU budget.

A joint debate will take place on Wednesday evening with a view to the Parliament giving its consent to three agreements between the EU and Singapore, which seek to take political, trade, and investment relations to a new level. Signed in 2018, the three agreements, on free trade, investment protection, and partnership and cooperation, will significantly increase the EU’s trading presence in the region, and serve as a model for developing deeper relations with other countries in ASEAN.

Fisheries also figure largely on this month’s agenda. On Monday evening, Members return to proposals on a multiannual plan for the Western Waters, an area of the north-eastern Atlantic. The proposed plan covers fisheries exploiting stocks of fish and crustaceans living close to the sea bottom (known as demersal species), including deep-sea stocks. Parliament is keen to minimise the socio-economic impact of the measures proposed, by ensuring recreational fisheries do not have significant impact on fish stocks, and by expanding the management area for seabass. Parliament now needs to approve the provisional agreement reached with Council formally. Members will also decide whether Parliament consents to a new protocol to the EU-Côte d’Ivoire fisheries agreement, which determines the EU financial contribution in return for fishing rights in the area. The protocol should promote genuine sustainable development in local fisheries, and increase the added value to Côte d’Ivoire, in exchange for this use of its natural resources. Parliament is also expected to vote on giving consent to the EU-Morocco Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement on Wednesday (but only after a vote on whether to refer the agreement to the Court of Justice), despite concerns regarding disputed waters around the Western Sahara. This agreement will provide fishing rights for128 EU vessels, in return for an average annual EU contribution of €40.15 million.

On Wednesday evening, Members will consider whether to approve the final text of a proposal to create a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the EU. Such inward investments, in sensitive areas such as water, health, media, aerospace, or election infrastructure, by foreign investors who may be directly or indirectly controlled by foreign governments, is an area where scrutiny is necessary on the grounds of security or public order. Member States will retain the power to decide on FDI in their countries, but the Commission will be able to screen and if necessary publish an opinion on FDI, particularly should the investment have a negative effect on another EU Member State.

Electronic road toll systems are on the agenda once more on Wednesday evening. Parliament may formally adopt the text agreed between the Commission and Council during this session. The revised text now ensures vehicles require lower amounts of on-board equipment, and has improved information exchange on vehicle data, allowing for the pursuit of vehicle owners registered in another EU Member State for unpaid tolls, which makes it easier, and fairer, for providers of road tolls and drivers alike.

The principle of mutual recognition of goods crossing EU borders allows for frictionless trade in goods lawfully marketed in one Member State in any other EU country. On Wednesday night, Parliament will debate an agreement between Parliament and Council on a revision of the current rules to address some shortcomings in its application. The new rules would mean that Member States would have to justify any market access restrictions imposed, speed up the assessment of goods, and improve procedures to solve any problems. This could mean introducing SOLVIT-based procedures to resolve disputes between companies and authorities more quickly, as well as improved training, cooperation and legal procedures. Parliament is also likely to be supportive of an agreement on a Commission proposal to review cross-border payments and currency conversion charges, up for debate on Wednesday night. The proposals would reduce charges for cross-border euro payments and improve transparency regarding conversion fees. This would allow greater certainty for people making payments by card or withdrawing cash in non-euro area countries about how much they are likely to be charged.

Finally, the Commission’s 2018 country report on Bosnia and Herzegovina is also on the agenda for the February plenary session. The country has made little progress in its EU accession ambitions, with inter-ethnic tensions still making headlines in the country. Political, judicial and public administration reforms are still lacking, and little has been achieved in the fight against corruption. Parliament’s Foreign Affairs committee is concerned by this lack of progress.

Visit the European Parliament homepage on Future of Europe

Written by Nicole Scholz and Monika Kiss,

© 9dreamstudio / Fotolia

While the main responsibility for health and social security lies primarily with the governments of the individual European Union (EU) Member States, the EU complements national policies, especially those having a cross-border dimension. In a recent poll conducted for the European Parliament, more than two thirds of EU citizens expressed support for increased EU action on health and social security.

EU health policy aims to foster good health, protect citizens from health threats and support dynamic health systems. It is mainly implemented through EU action programmes, the current one being the third health programme (2014-2020). Challenges include tackling the health needs of an ageing population and reducing the incidence of preventable chronic diseases. Since 2014, steps forward have been made in a number of areas, including antimicrobial resistance; childhood obesity, health systems, medical devices and vaccination.

EU action on social security issues in the EU is closely related to the implementation of what is known as the European Pillar of Social Rights as well as labour market developments. The EU helps to promote social cohesion, seeking to foster equality as well as solidarity through adequate, accessible and financially sustainable social protection systems and social inclusion policies. EU spending on social security is tied to labour market measures. Progress can be observed on issues such as work-life balance and equal opportunities, but there is more to do. In the future, social protection schemes will need to be further adapted to the new labour market realities (fewer manufacturing jobs, atypical contracts, ‘platform work’, etc.).

In its proposal for the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework, the European Commission plans to boost funding to improve workers’ employment opportunities, and strengthen social cohesion through an enlarged ‘European Social Fund Plus’. The fund would also incorporate finance for the stand-alone health programme, with the aim of creating synergies with the other building blocks of the European Pillar of Social Rights: equal opportunities and access to the labour market; fair working conditions; and social protection and inclusion.

Read this complete briefing on ‘EU policies – Delivering for citizens: Protection of EU external borders‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

• Future EU health budget in the 2021-2027 MFF
• Percentage of respondents who would like the EU to intervene more than at present
• Expectations for more EU action than at present: percentage points difference between 2016 and 2018
• Perception of EU action as adequate at present: percentage points difference between 2016 and 2018

Written by Anja Radjenovic,

© kamasigns / Fotolia

The unprecedented arrival of refugees and irregular migrants in the EU, which peaked in 2015, exposed a series of deficiencies and gaps in EU policies on external borders. It affected the functioning of the Schengen rules, leading to the re-introduction of border checks by several Member States. In response to these challenges, as well as the surge in terrorist and serious cross-border crime activities, the EU has embarked on a broader process of reform aimed at strengthening its external borders by reinforcing the links between border controls and security.

On the one hand, measures for protecting the EU’s external borders have focused on reinforcing EU border management rules, such as the Schengen Borders Code, and strengthening and upgrading the mandates of relevant EU agencies, such as Frontex, eu-Lisa, Europol and EASO. On the other hand, in connection with a number of key shortcomings in the EU’s information systems, efforts were made to improve use of the opportunities offered by information systems and technologies for security, criminal records, and border and migration management. This included strengthening existing IT systems (SIS II, VIS, Eurodac, ECRIS-TCN), establishing new ones (ETIAS, Entry/Exit System) and improving their interoperability.

The broader mandate and the increase of activities in the area of EU border management is also reflected in the growing amounts, flexibility and diversity of EU funds, inside as well as outside the current and future EU budget.

Read this complete briefing on ‘EU policies – Delivering for citizens: Protection of EU external borders‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

• Frontex budget (€ million)
• Perception of EU action as adequate at present: percentage points difference between 2016 and 2018
• Expectations for more EU action than at present: percentage points difference between 2016 and 2018
• Percentage of respondents who would like the EU to intervene more than at present
• Main migratory routes into Europe

Written by Nikolina Šajn,

© Davizro Photography / Fotolia

Consumer protection rules have been improving the rights of consumers in the European Union since the 1970s. While the level of protection is today considered to be among the highest in the world, consumers in the EU are still faced with a number of issues. One in five consumers say that they have had a reason to complain in the last 12 months, a level which has remained largely unchanged since 2008.

Since 2014, efforts have been made in a number of areas, including stronger cross-border cooperation between national authorities in charge of consumer protection and market surveillance. Notably, the Commission proposed a ‘new deal for consumers’ in April 2018, to enable representative legal actions for the protection of the collective interests of consumers and to modernise EU consumer protection rules. Sector-specific efforts included: eliminating roaming charges across the EU in 2017; legislation aimed at facilitating consumer participation in the digital single market; reforms on the rules on privacy and data protection; enhancing the rights of energy consumers and passengers; and efforts to address the ‘dual quality’ of branded food products.

The EU budget for consumer protection is relatively small, because although rules in this field are made at the EU level, their implementation and enforcement are carried out by the Member States. The consumer programme has a budget of €188 million for the 2013-2020 period, or roughly €0.05 per citizen per year. This may change in the new multiannual financial framework, as consumer protection becomes part of a wider single market programme, which is expected to create synergies between its various components. Future policies could focus on longer product lifetime, labelling and quality requirements for non-agricultural and industrial products, fairer food labelling and retail financial services.

Read this complete briefing on ‘EU policies – Delivering for citizens: Protecting European consumers‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Estimated breakdown of the single market programme elements

Written by Angelos Delivorias,

© Stockfotos-MG / Fotolia

In the European Union (EU), although economic policy is the remit of each Member State, there is, nevertheless, multilateral coordination of economic policies between individual countries. This framework was put severely to the test during the global financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis. Partly as a result, recovery in the EU was slower than recovery in the United States, and was not achieved equally by all Member States. Furthermore, it has to a large extent been based on accommodative fiscal and monetary policies that only partly hide underlying signs of fiscal or financial fragility in some countries.

To remedy this, the European institutions began a twofold process in 2011: initiatives were taken to strengthen the current framework for economic governance, and for banking supervision in the euro area while, in parallel, discussion began on possible ways to reduce the economic divergences between Member States, provide incentives for risk reduction and risk-sharing, render the governance process more transparent and ensure democratic accountability. In this latter area, several initiatives – which did not require changes in the EU Treaties – were taken between 2015 and 2017.

In summer 2017, discussions on deepening the policy framework for economic and monetary union (EMU) intensified. This process, which was advocated in the five presidents’ report (by the heads of the relevant EU institutions) and should be completed by 2025, is now being considered at Member State level. The current state of play points towards two main orientations, dividing Member States into two groups: those that prioritise risk-sharing measures (such as France), and those that argue instead for further risk-reduction initiatives (for example, Germany). This lack of consensus has so far meant that the European Council has not been able to reach a breakthrough.

Read this complete briefing on ‘EU policies – Delivering for citizens: Economic policy‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

• Percentage of respondents who would like the EU to intervene more than at present
• Expectations for more EU action than at present: percentage points difference between 2016 and 2018
• Perception of EU action as adequate at present: percentage points difference between 2016 and 2018

Written by Philip Boucher,

© Dmitry / Fotolia

While we often worry about the acceptance of technology in the face of real and potential public opposition, there are frequently gaps between how regulators, developers and experts conceptualise acceptance and opposition. Here, we examine some prominent conceptualisations and suggest that, rather than responding to public opposition with information campaigns designed to transform citizens into acceptors, strategies for managing public acceptability should include meaningful dialogues that aim to create better technologies, which are not only acceptable to citizens, but can even be actively supported by them.

Taking a simple market perspective, the acceptance of technologies can be measured in sales. Products that are not accepted will simply not survive, while others will have to be modified to react to changing market conditions. This process can be observed live in the mobile phone market, with brands and products entering and leaving the market, sometimes in surprising and dramatic ways.

Frequently, however, technology acceptance goes beyond individual consumer choices. Energy infrastructures, such as power stations or windfarms, can face opposition from citizens that object to the impact of a specific installation on the local environment, economy, sense of place and a wide range of other factors. Opposition may also be more global, on the basis of climate change impacts or even fundamental ethical objections to the use of a given technology by anyone, as observed in the case of stem cell research and genetic modification. In each of these cases, the issue of acceptance cannot be measured with reference to individual consumer choices, and markets do not offer explanations for or responses to opposition.

Potential impacts and developments

People that oppose new and emerging technologies are sometimes characterised as ‘luddites’, dogmatically opposed to any kind of technology development. Others are sometimes characterised as ‘NIMBYs’ (derived from ‘not in my back yard’), who appreciate the benefits of technologies but selfishly object to developments in their local area. These characterisations are often found in popular discourse and, while they do provide a model for understanding opposition, they do not open many avenues for resolving disagreements. A third characterisation suggests that opponents have misunderstood the technology or hold irrational fears of its potential impacts. This is known as the ‘knowledge deficit model’ and it is frequently found in strategies for managing the introduction of new technologies into society. Unlike luddite or NIMBY conceptualisations, the deficit model does indicate a practical means of responding to opposition and fostering public acceptance by informing citizens about the technology, particularly how it works and what benefits it can bring.

For regulators and other stakeholders that are eager to reap the promised social, environmental or economic benefits of technology development, it can be tempting and intuitive to adopt one of these three characterisations. The deficit model is particularly attractive when opposition is expected but there is little appetite to change the development path. This is well illustrated in strategies for responding to potential public opposition to civil drones, which aimed to achieve acceptance through ‘coordinated actions’ to inform citizens about drones and their benefits while downplaying the well-known military applications of the technology, which formed part of the strategic motivation for promoting civil drones in the first place. Later research found that citizens’ informed perspectives on drones were more complex than these strategies assumed.

Indeed, studies of public opposition to technology from energy infrastructure to genetically modified crops have repeatedly highlighted the inaccuracy and ineffectiveness of the luddite, NIMBY and knowledge deficit conceptualisations. They tend to misrepresent the often nuanced and sensitive concerns of citizens with simplistic or even pejorative caricatures of opposition. As a result, instead of opening paths to mutual understanding, dialogue and resolution, they are more likely to escalate tensions and lead to entrenched positions. Concepts such as ‘beyond NIMBYism‘, ‘responsible research and innovation‘ and Science with and for Society have provided practical measures for understanding and responding to opposition. These tend to focus on establishing meaningful dialogues among the full range of actors involved, particularly developers and citizens, from the earliest stages of development.

Genuine public acceptance is contingent upon a sound understanding of the technology, including the full range of expected impacts of its development, whether positive or negative, direct or indirect. Information campaigns can backfire when they are imbalanced or incomplete, or the source is insufficiently trusted. Successful strategies for responding to opposition can only be devised once their real reasons are understood. As such, meaningful dialogues should involve listening to and seriously considering the views of citizens, while avoiding assumptions and caricatures about their motives and concerns. These dialogues – which most Europeans believe should take place – should be established early so that their insights can improve the design and implementation of technologies during the crucial formative stages of development, and should continue as developers and citizens develop the mutual understanding and trust that is required to respond to opposition and generate support.

Meaningful dialogues can transform citizens’ role from that of passive opponent or passive acceptor, who has to accommodate new perspectives or technologies, into that of an informed, active agent, who is (co‑)responsible, along with developers, regulators and other actors, for the development of better technologies that are more acceptable to all actors. Indeed, in this light, meaningful early-stage dialogues should not only be seen as a response to real or potential public opposition, but as a proactive tool that is routinely deployed to generate active public support for better technologies.

Anticipatory policy-making

The European Commission’s Eurobarometer programme provides detailed quantitative and qualitative studies of pan-European public perspectives on a wide range of topics – including science, technology and other issues that are relevant in the context of new developments – and can provide useful background information for new initiatives. The Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making calls for open and transparent stakeholder consultations, which allow for the widest possible participation, particularly of SMEs and end-users. Indeed, public consultation should play a key role in the ex-ante impact assessments undertaken by the Commission before new legislation is proposed, including all relevant actors at all stages of the assessment.

A recent STOA study outlined four policy options for strengthening public engagement at all stages of the policy process. While these options were proposed with reference to low-carbon energy technologies, they remain relevant for a wider range of controversial technologies, from drones to artificial intelligence:

1. Engage people in ways that support meaningful dialogue at all levels and scales of development;
2. Understand and accept that outcomes of public engagement can and should have a tangible impact on development plans;
3. Recognise the important role of public trust in developers and regulators;
4. Go beyond engagement as a tool for overcoming opposition, and use it to gather active public support and to develop better technologies.

Read this complete ‘at a glance’ note on ‘What if we could design better technologies through dialogue?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Rosamund Shreeves,

© frikota / Fotolia

The European Union is committed to working collectively to eradicate female genital mutilation (FGM) as part of broader efforts to combat all forms of violence against women and girls, and to support the efforts of its Member States in this field. The European Commission has undertaken to assess EU efforts to combat FGM every year, on or around the International Day of Zero Tolerance for Female Genital Mutilation on 6 February.

Facts and figures

Female genital mutilation (FGM) includes all procedures that intentionally alter or cause injury to the female genital organs for non-medical reasons. FGM is carried out for cultural, religious and/or social reasons, mostly on young girls between infancy and the age of 15. It has no health benefits and can have serious immediate and long-term effects on health and wellbeing.

In 2016, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) estimated that, worldwide, at least 200 million women and girls are currently living with the consequences of FGM and around 3 million girls are at risk of undergoing FGM every year. The practice, which is most common in 28 African countries, is also prevalent in the Middle East (Yemen, northern Iraq), and Asia (Indonesia), and has been reported to a lesser extent elsewhere. An assessment, issued by the UN Secretary General in December 2018, finds that prevalence has been reduced in some regions, but progress could be cancelled out by population growth, girls undergoing FGM (increasingly performed by medical professionals) at a younger age, and the fact that, as a result of population movement, it is becoming a global issue.

Official EU statistics on the prevalence of FGM in Europe are lacking. However, three studies to map FGM, conducted by the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE) between 2012 and 2018, found that there are victims (or potential victims), in at least 16 EU countries: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Malta, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK. Around 20 000 women and girls from FGM-practising countries seek asylum in EU Member States every year, with an estimated 1 000 asylum claims directly related to FGM. This number has increased steadily since 2008.

Commitments and action to combat FGM

FGM constitutes a form of child abuse and gender-based violence; recognised internationally as a violation of the human rights of girls and women. The practice also violates a person’s rights to health, security and physical integrity; the right to be free from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; and the right to life in cases where the procedure results in death. A range of measures have been adopted at international, EU and national level to prevent FGM and to protect FGM victims.

International instruments

At international level, United Nations and Council of Europe standards are benchmarks in work to combat FGM. Key treaties, including the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women(CEDAW), the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the Geneva Convention, all cover FGM indirectly, with specific guidance on protection and asylum for victims. The Council of Europe’s Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (‘Istanbul Convention’), is the first treaty to recognise that FGM exists in Europe (Article 38), and sets out a number of specific obligations on preventing and combating the practice, and providing support to victims and those at risk.

International action

The UN’s longstanding efforts to end the practice culminated in its first specific resolution on female genital mutilation in December 2012, calling for the adoption of national action plans and comprehensive, multi-disciplinary strategies to eliminate FGM. The UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development identifies FGM as a harmful practice which is to be eliminated by 2030 (Goal 5), a priority reaffirmed by the UN in 2018.

The UN named 6 February the International Day of Zero Tolerance for Female Genital Mutilation and the European Commission takes stock annually, around that day, of EU efforts to combat FGM. 

Legislative and policy framework at European level

Although the EU itself currently has no binding instrument designed to protect women from violence, relevant instruments exist in a number of areas. The principles of gender equality and non-discrimination are affirmed in the Treaty on European Union and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which also guarantees the right to dignity and includes specific provisions on the right to physical and mental integrity. The Directive on Victims’ Rights requires provision of support services to victims of violence, including FGM. In relation to asylum, the Asylum Reception Conditions Directive specifically mentions victims of FGM amongst vulnerable persons who should receive appropriate healthcare during their asylum procedure, while the recast Qualification Directive includes FGM as grounds to consider when granting asylum. The EU also signed the Istanbul Convention on 13 June 2017 and is currently in the accession process. Parliament has urged those Member States that have not yet done so to ratify and implement this Convention.

Combating gender-based violence is a priority in the European Commission’s strategic engagement for gender equality 2016-2019. On FGM, this includes pursuing the measures set out in the action plan adopted in the 2013 communication, ‘Towards the elimination of female genital mutilation’, aiming to ensure that action to combat FGM is mainstreamed across the fields of justice, police, health, social services, child protection, education, immigration and asylum and external action. Areas where the Commission has promised to act include:

• Providing the reliable, comparable EU-level data necessary to establish the prevalence of FGM and provide a solid basis for policy;
• Improving victim support by helping Member States to develop support services for victims, and training and awareness-raising for relevant professionals, focusing on empowering communities;
• Supporting Member States in prosecuting FGM more effectively;
• Ensuring that women at risk are protected more effectively under EU asylum rules through proper transposition and implementation of the EU legislative framework on asylum and victim protection;
• Promoting worldwide elimination of FGM, by ensuring that EU external policy addresses FGM, and that awareness is included in gender and child rights training for EU staff in relevant external delegations.

The Commission has reported on action undertaken to 2018, including the launch of a knowledge platform for professionals who come into contact with (potential) victims, and funding made available under the Rights, Equality and Citizenship Programme 2014‐2020 and the joint EU-United Nations Spotlight initiative.

Instruments against FGM at national level

Many of the actions needed to end FGM lie within the competences of the Member States. FGM is now a prosecutable offence under national laws in all Member States, either as a specific criminal act or as an act of bodily harm or injury. However, very few cases are brought to court. A number of Member States have also developed national action plans on FGM. Continuing issues of concern include barriers to reporting and successful prosecution, support for victims and ensuring long-term, sustainable cultural change.

European Parliament position

The European Parliament has played a particularly important role in raising awareness and pushing for firm action on FGM, including through the work of its Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM). Parliament has adopted resolutions on FGM in 2001, 2009, 2012, 2014, and 2018, calling on the Commission and Member States to provide the legal and other means required to raise awareness, protect and support victims and ensure that offenders are prosecuted. In 2016, it urged Member States to recognise FGM as a form of persecution and the Commission to draw up interpretive guidelines on FGM, according appropriate protection to women and girls seeking asylum.

This publication is a further update of an ‘at a glance’ note published in January 2015.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Zero tolerance for female genital mutilation‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Beatrix Immenkamp, graphic: Samy Chahri,

© elen31 / Fotolia

The US administration announced on 1 February 2019 that it was suspending its obligations under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, with effect from 2 February 2019, and that it was giving Russia six months’ notice of complete withdrawal. Russia reacted by announcing that it was also suspending its obligations under the Treaty. Both parties said they would begin developing new nuclear-capable missiles banned by the treaty. The 1987 INF Treaty is a landmark nuclear-arms-control treaty between the United States (US) and the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) that eliminated and prohibited ground-launched intermediate ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5 500 km. The US announcement follows years of allegations that the Russian Federation has acted in breach of the agreement. Russia, for its part, has also accused the US of violating the treaty. Both deny the allegations. Moreover, both parties consider that the agreement puts their countries at a strategic disadvantage vis-à-vis other nuclear powers, especially China. The parties’ announcements undermine a cornerstone of the European security order. The signing of the INF Treaty in 1987 led to the removal and destruction of nearly 3 000 US and Soviet short-, medium- and intermediate-range nuclear-capable missiles stationed in or aimed at Europe. The EU has called on the US to consider the consequences of its possible withdrawal from the INF for its own security, the security of its allies and that of the whole world. The EU has also called on both the US and Russia to remain engaged in constructive dialogue to preserve the INF Treaty, and on Russia to address the serious concerns regarding its compliance with the treaty. NATO considers Russia to be in violation of the INF Treaty, and the alliance has called on Russia to return urgently to full and verifiable compliance with the agreement. Any redeployment of intermediate-range missiles will put Europe once more in the line of fire of strategic nuclear weapons. If the INF Treaty is abrogated, Europeans will be faced with stark choices all carrying inherent security risks, including engaging in a deployment race with Russia, or refusing re-deployment of US missiles on European soil, potentially leaving European countries exposed to Russian intimidation. Efforts over the next six months will focus on preserving the INF Treaty against all odds.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The end of the INF Treaty? A pillar of European security architecture at risk‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

INF timeline

Written by Zsolt G. Pataki with Riccardo Molinari,

©Photo Landa 2010

A packed Science Week at the European Parliament from 5 to 7 February 2019, organised by the European Parliament’s 2019 Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA), includes:

• the STOA MEP-Scientist Pairing Scheme ‘Brussels Week’;
• the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre ‘Science meets Parliaments’ event, (JRC; 6-7 February, in cooperation with STOA);
• a European Science-Media Hub (ESMH) workshopon ‘Tackling misinformation and disinformation in science’ (6 February); and
• a STOA/ESMH and European Research Council (ERC) Conference entitled ‘Investing in researchers – Shaping Europe’s future’ (7 February).

These events aim to support a structured dialogue between scientists and policy-makers, to raise awareness about politically relevant, cutting-edge scientific issues (such as artificial intelligence, gene technology, or autonomous cars), and the importance of science for evidence-informed policy-making. Here is what will happen at each of the events:

MEP-Scientists Pairing Scheme

During the ‘Brussels Week’ of the seventh edition of the scheme (organised for the first time in 2007 and annually since 2015), paired scientists will have an opportunity to follow their MEP counterparts in their daily political activities, and gain an understanding of the EU science, technology and research policy framework, particularly European Parliament work in this area. In addition, they will attend various meetings with MEPs, Parliament staff and science journalists, presenting their research work and outcomes, and participating in ‘pitching sessions’ between science journalists and scientists, organised by the ESMH.

Science meets Parliaments, 6-7 February 2019

This initiative seeks to build closer links between scientists and policy-makers at EU, national and regional levels and enhance the role of science in policy through regular dialogue. During this year’s edition of the event (held for the first time in 2015), scientists will gain a greater understanding of how the European Parliament works, and the role and working methods of Members and their needs in terms of scientific advice.

ESMH workshop ‘Tackling misinformation and disinformation in science’, 6 February 2019

This workshop aims to exchange good practices in tackling misinformation and disinformation in science, via the presentation of ‘case studies’, illustrating relevant initiatives touching upon different science disciplines. The workshop is participatory, as the audience will be actively involved in debate on the case studies.

STOA/ESMH-ERC conference, Thursday 7 February 2019

The STOA/ESMH-ERC conference ‘Investing in researchers, shaping Europe’s future’ will bring policy-makers and ERC-funded grantees together with the aim of supporting evidence-informed policy-making and underlining how Europe’s future can be shaped by fundamental research on topics ranging from smart agriculture and food, via CRISPR, to migration and demography.

Interested? To keep up to date with the activities of STOA, follow our website, the EPRS blog, Twitter and Think Tank pages.